AC 120-28D Appendix 1 07/13/99 PRM Precision Radar Monitor PTS Practical Test Standard QFE Altimeter Setting referenced to airport field elevation QNE Altimeter Setting referenced to standard pressure (1013.2HPa or 29.92") QNH Altimeter Setting referenced to airport ambient local pressure QRH Quick Reference Handbook RA Radio Altitude or Radar Altimeter RAIL Runway Alignment Indicator Light System RCLM Runway Center Line Markings RDMI Radio Direction Magnetic Indicator RDP Runway Datum Point REIL Runway End Identification Lights RII Required Inspection Item RMI Radio Magnetic Indicator RMS Root-mean-square RNAV Area Navigation RNP Required Navigation Performance RNPx2 RNP Containment Limit (2 times RNP value) RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics RTS Return to Service RTO Rejected Takeoff RVR Runway Visual Range RVV Runway Visibility Value RWS Runway Segment RWY Runway SA Selective Availability SARPS ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices SBAS Space Based Augmentation System SDF Simplified Directional Facility SFL Sequence Flasher Lights SIAP Standard Instrument Approach Procedure SID Standard Instrument Departure SLA Standard Landing Aid SLF Supervised Line Flying SMGC Surface Movement Guidance and Control SMGCP Surface Movement Guidance and Control Plan
AC 120-28D 07/13/99 Appendix 1 SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control System STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route STC Supplemental Type Certificate STOL Short Takeoff and Landing SRE [Type of Landing system used in certain foreign States] SV Space Vehicle TACAN Tactical Air Navigation system [NAVAID] TAF Terminal Aviation Forecast TC Type Certificate TDZ Touchdown Zone TERPS [U.S.] Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures TLS Target Level of Safety TOGA Takeoff or Go-Around [FGS Mode] TSE Total system error ua micro amps VASI Visual Approach Slope Indicator VDP Visual Descent Point VFR Visual Flight Rules VHF Very High Frequency VIS Visibility VOR VHF Omni-directional Radio Range VORTAC Co-located VOR and TACAN VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions VNAV Vertical Navigation V1 Takeoff Decision Speed Vef Engine Failure Speed Vfailure Speed at which a failure occurs Vlof Liftoff Speed Vmcg Ground Minimum Control Speed WAAS Wide area augmentation system WAD Wide Area Differential WAT Weight, Altitude and Temperature WGS World Geological Survey WGS-84 World Geological Survey - 1984 WP Waypoint xLS [Generic term used to denote any one or more of the following NAVAID’s: ILS, MLS, or GLS]
AC 120-28D 07/13/99 Appendix 2 APPENDIX 2
AIRWORTHINESS APPROVAL OF AIRBORNE SYSTEMS USED DURING A
TAKEOFF IN LOW VISIBILITY WEATHER CONDITIONS Mandatory terms used in this AC such as “shall” or “must” are used only in the sense of ensuring applicability of these particular methods of compliance when the acceptable means of compliance described herein is used. This AC does not change, add or delete regulatory requirements or authorize deviations from regulatory requirements.
1. PURPOSE. This appendix contains criteria for the approval of aircraft equipment and installations used during Takeoff in low visibility conditions (see section 4.2 Takeoff).
2. GENERAL. The type certification approval for the equipment, system installations and test methods should be based upon a consideration of factors such as the intended function of the installed system, its accuracy, reliability, and fail-safe features, as well as the operational concepts contained in the body of this AC. The guidelines and procedures contained herein are considered to be acceptable methods of determining airworthiness for a transport category airplane intended to conduct a takeoff in low visibility weather conditions.
The overall performance and safety of an operation should be assessed considering principle elements of the system, including aircraft, crew and facilities.
3. INTRODUCTION. This appendix provides airworthiness criteria for airplane systems that are required by section 4.2 Takeoff of this AC. These systems are required when visibility conditions, alone, may be inadequate for safe takeoff operation. This Appendix does not address all possible combinations of systems that might be proposed. This appendix provides criteria which represents an acceptable means of compliance with performance, integrity and availability requirements for takeoff in low visibility conditions. Alternative criteria may be proposed by an applicant.
Operations using non-ground based facilities, or evolving ground facilities (e.g., local or wide area augmented GNSS), and the use of some new aircraft equipment require Proof of Concept testing to establish appropriate Criteria for operational approval and system certification. The need for a Proof of Concept program is identified with this AC by a [PoC] designator.
The airworthiness criteria contained in this appendix for the takeoff system provides the requirements to track and maintain the runway centerline during a takeoff from brake release on the runway to liftoff and climb to 35 ft. AGL, and from brake release through deceleration to a stop for a rejected takeoff.
It is important to emphasize that the entire takeoff operation, through completion of the en route climb configuration, (see section 25.111), is considered to be an intensive phase of flight from an airworthiness perspective. The use of the takeoff system must not require exceptional skill, workload or pilot compensation.
The takeoff system must provide an appropriate transition from lateral takeoff guidance (i.e., at about 35 ft.
AGL) through transition to en route climb for a takeoff, and from brake release through deceleration to a stop for a rejected takeoff. Requirements for the airborne portion of the takeoff (i.e., above 35 ft. AGL) are provided in Appendix 9.
The takeoff system shall be shown to be satisfactory with and without the use of any outside visual references, except that outside visual references will not be considered when assessing lateral tracking performance. The airworthiness evaluation will also determine whether the combination of takeoff guidance and outside visual
AC 120-28D Appendix 2 07/13/99 references would unacceptably degrade task performance, or require exceptional workload and pilot compensation, during normal operations and non-normal operations with system and airplane failure conditions.
For the purpose of the airworthiness demonstration, the operational concept for coping with the loss of takeoff guidance is based upon availability of some other method for the flightcrew to safely continue or reject the takeoff, if necessary.
Additional proof of concept demonstration may be appropriate for any operational concept that is not based on the presence of adequate outside visual references to safely continue or reject the takeoff, following loss of takeoff guidance. [PoC] The minimum visibility required for safe operations will be specified by FAA Flight Standards in the operational authorization.
The intended takeoff path is along the axis of the runway centerline. This path must be established as a reference for takeoff in restricted visibility conditions. A means must be provided to track the reference path for the length of the runway in order to accommodate both a normal takeoff and a rejected takeoff.
The intended lateral path may be established in a number of ways. For systems addressed by this appendix, the required lateral path may be established by a navigation aid (e.g., ILS, MLS). Other methods may be acceptable if shown to be feasible by a PoC. Methods requiring PoC include, but are not limited to:
• the use of ground surveyed waypoints, either stored in an on-board data base or provided by data link to the airplane, with path definition by the airborne system,
• the use of inertial information following initial alignment,
• sensing of the runway surface, lighting and/or markings with a vision enhancement system (Indications of the airplane position with respect to the intended lateral path can be provided to the pilot in a number of ways.),
• deviation displays with reference to navigation source (e.g., ILS receiver, MLS receiver),
• on-board navigation system computations with corresponding displays of position and reference path, or
• by a vision enhancement system.
In addition to indications of the airplane position, the takeoff system should also compute and display command information (i.e., flight director), as lateral guidance, to the pilot, accounting for a number of parameters including airplane position, deviation from the reference path, and deviation rate. Takeoff system designs which provide only situational information, in lieu of command information, might be found acceptable, but would require a Proof of Concept demonstration. [PoC]
On-board navigation systems used for takeoff may have a number of possible navigation aid sensor elements by which to determine the position of an airplane including ILS, MLS, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), Local Area Differential GNSS, Pseudolites, or inertial information, etc. Each of these elements has limitations with regard to accuracy, integrity and availability and should be used within their appropriate capability.
New Takeoff System designs may be developed which employ various combinations of aircraft systems, sensors and system architecture, and use ground and space based navigation sources. Such new systems may be approved if suitably demonstrated. [PoC]
AC 120-28D 07/13/99 Appendix 2
4. TYPES OF TAKEOFF OPERATIONS. The operational concept and intended function of a takeoff system are important factors for its airworthiness approval. Section 4.2 Takeoff of the AC describes a variety of low visibility concepts and intended functions for takeoff systems which vary according to the degree of reliance on the system to accomplish the takeoff, climb, and as necessary, the aborted takeoff.
Takeoff under low visibility conditions may be conducted as follows:
1) Based on authorizations in standard OpSpecs to visibility values not requiring takeoff guidance, or
2) Based on authorizations requiring takeoff guidance.
The airworthiness criteria for takeoff systems are based on item 2) above. These systems should provide the required performance of the intended function, with acceptable levels of workload and pilot compensation to achieve the required level of safety.
5. TYPES OF TAKEOFF SERVICES. There are a number of navigation aids which may support aircraft systems in providing guidance to the flightcrew during takeoff in low visibility conditions. The required flight path is inherent in the design of some systems (e.g., ILS and MLS) but some systems require the flight path to be defined either in the airplane or provided to the airplane by datalink.
The accuracy, integrity and continuity of service of these external facilities, when used to support the takeoff system, will affect the overall safety of the operation (see Section 4.3.10). Criteria for ILS and MLS navigation aids for takeoff systems are the same as for landing systems.
5.1. ILS. The ILS is supported by established international standards for ground station operation (ICAO Annex 10, or State equivalent). Ground facility provisions are stated in Section 8.1 of this AC. These standards should be considered when demonstrating aircraft system operation.
5.2. MLS. The MLS is supported by established international standards for ground station operation (ICAO Annex 10, or State equivalent). Ground facility provisions are stated in Section 8.2 of this AC. These standards should be considered when demonstrating aircraft system operation.
5.3. GLS/GNSS [PoC]. This appendix section is not intended to provide a comprehensive acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness approval of GLS or GNSS based systems, but it does address key issues pertinent to any applicant who may seek early approval of a GLS (or GNSS based) system. Currently approved systems are ILS or MLS based. The application of new technologies and systems such as GLS requires an overall assessment of the integration of the airplane components with other navigation and related elements
(e.g., new ground based elements, satellite elements) to ensure that the overall safety of the use of the system is acceptable. This GNSS section is also included to show the inherent differences between conventional ILS/MLS based systems and GLS (or GNSS) based systems that affect criteria development.
The performance, integrity and availability of any ground station elements, any data links to the airplane, any satellite elements and any data base considerations, when combined with the performance, integrity and availability of the airplane system, should be at least equivalent to the overall performance, integrity and availability provided by ILS to support low visibility operations.
5.3.1. GLS/GNSS Flight Path Definition. The required lateral path for the takeoff is key to the safety of the operation. The required path has to be established to ensure that the airplane stays within the confines of the runway.
In a GLS/GNSS based Takeoff System, the required lateral path is established by data, rather than the physical location of an RF signal in space. Earth referenced waypoints define the required path, which is coincident
AC 120-28D Appendix 2 07/13/99 with the runway centerline. The airplane navigation and flight guidance system will require that the appropriate waypoints be provided either from an onboard database or via a datalink.
Certain "special waypoint" definitions, and other criteria are necessary to effectively implement takeoff operations using satellite systems and other integrated multi-sensor navigation systems. See Section 4.6 of this AC, Flight Path Definition, which shows the minimum set of "special waypoints" considered necessary to conduct takeoff operations in air carrier operations.
The required path may be stored in an airplane database for recall and use by the takeoff guidance and/or control system when required to conduct the operation.
The definition, resolution and maintenance of the waypoints which define the required path and flight segments is key to the integrity of this type of takeoff operation.
A mechanism should be established to ensure the continued integrity of the waypoints.
The integrity of any data base used to define flight critical path waypoints for a Takeoff System should be addressed as part of the certification process. The flightcrew should not be able to modify information in the data base which relates to the definition of the required flight path.
5.3.2. GLS/GNSS Airplane Position Determination. The safety of a low visibility takeoff operation is, in part, predicated on knowing where the airplane is positioned relative to the required path. Navigation satellite systems exist which can provide position information to specified levels of accuracy, integrity and availability.
The accuracy, integrity and availability can be enhanced by additional space and ground based elements. These systems provide certain levels of capability to support present low visibility operations and are planned to have additional future capability.
Satellite systems have the potential to provide positioning information necessary to guide the airplane during the takeoff operations. If operational credit is sought for these operations, the performance, integrity and availability must be established to support that operation. Ground based aids such as differential position receivers, pseudolites etc., and a data link to the airplane may be required to achieve the accuracy, integrity or availability for certain types of operation.
An equivalent level of safety to current ILS based low visibility takeoff operations should be established.
The role of the satellite based elements in the takeoff system should be addressed as part of the airplane system certification process until such time as an acceptable national, or international standards, for satellite based systems are established.
Basic GNSS (Un-augmented).
This is the basic navigation service provided by a satellite system. No additional elements are used to enhance accuracy or integrity of the operation.
Differential Augmentation.
If a ground based GNSS receiver is used to provide differential pseudo-range corrections, or other data to an airplane to support low visibility operations, the overall integrity of that operation will have to be established.
AC 120-28D 07/13/99 Appendix 2 The role of the differential station in the takeoff system will have to be addressed as part of the airplane system certification process until such time as an acceptable national, or international standard, for the ground reference system is established.
Local Area Differential Augmentation.
Local Area Differential (LAD) augmentation consists of a set of ground based GNSS receivers that are used to derive pseudorange corrections and integrity data referenced to a point on or near the airport. This augmentation data is then provided to the airplane via a local, ground based data broadcast signal.
5.4. Other.
5.4.1. Datalink. A data link may be used to provide data to the airplane to provide the accuracy necessary to support certain operations (e.g., navigation way points, differential corrections for GNSS). The integrity, availability and continuity of service of the data link should be commensurate with the operation.
The role of the data link in the takeoff system must be addressed as part of the airplane system certification process until such time as an acceptable national, or international standard, for the ground system is established.
6. AIRWORTHINESS.
6.1. General Takeoff System. The following sections identify the performance and workload requirements for the takeoff roll, through liftoff and for the rejected takeoff. These requirements apply for takeoff systems that are intended for use in low visibility conditions below the floor for visual operations.
The airplane elements of the Takeoff System must be shown to meet the performance, integrity and reliability requirements identified for the type(s) of operation for which approval is sought. The relationship and interaction of the aircraft elements with non-aircraft elements must be established and understood.
The performance of the aircraft elements may be established with reference to an approved flight path
(e.g., localizer) provided the overall performance is not compromised by budgeting between aircraft and non-aircraft elements.
When international standards exist for the performance and integrity aspects of any non-aircraft elements of the Takeoff System, the applicant can assume these standards will be applied by member States of ICAO.
When international standards do not exist for the performance and integrity aspects of any non-aircraft elements of the Takeoff System, the applicant must address these considerations as part of the airworthiness process. A means must be provided to inform the operator of the limitations and assumptions necessary to ensure a safe operation. It will be the responsibility of the operator and associated State regulatory authorities to ensure that appropriate criteria and standards are applied.
6.1.1. Takeoff Performance Prior to 35 Ft. AGL. The takeoff system is intended to provide a means for the pilot to track and maintain the runway centerline during a takeoff from brake release on the runway to liftoff to 35 ft. AGL, and during a rejected takeoff. Systems should ensure that a takeoff, or a rejected takeoff, can be safely completed on the designated runway, runway with clearway or runway with stopway, as applicable.
The system performance must be satisfactory, even in "non-visual conditions," for normal operations, aircraft failure cases (e.g., engine failure) and recovery from displacements from non-normal events. The system
AC 120-28D Appendix 2 07/13/99 should be easy to follow and not increase workload significantly compared to the basic airplane. Consideration should not be given for performance improvements resulting from available visual cues.
The system should not require unusual skill, effort or excessive workload by the pilot to acquire and maintain the desired takeoff path. The display should be easy to interpret in all situations. Cockpit integration issues should be evaluated to ensure consistent operations and pilot response in all situations.
The continued takeoff or rejected takeoff operation should consider the effects of all reasonable events which would lead a flightcrew to make a continued takeoff or a rejected takeoff decision.
The airplane must not deviate significantly from the runway centerline during takeoff while the takeoff system is being used within the limitations established for it. The reference path of the system is usually defined by the ILS localizer, or other approved approach navigation aid, which normally coincides with the runway centerline. The performance of the system must account for differences, if any, between the runway centerline and the intended lateral path. Compliance may be demonstrated by flight test, or by a combination of flight test and simulation. Flight testing must cover those factors affecting the behavior of the airplane (e.g., wind conditions, ILS characteristics, weight, center of gravity). Specific takeoff system demonstration requirements are found in Section 7.1 of this appendix.
In the event that the airplane is displaced from the runway centerline at any point during the takeoff or rejected takeoff, the system must provide sufficient lateral guidance to enable the "pilot flying" to control the airplane smoothly back to the intended path in a controlled and predictable manner without significant overshoot or any sustained nuisance or divergent oscillations. Minor overshoot or oscillations around the centerline are permissible when not leading to unacceptable crew workload.
The performance envelope and conditions for evaluating takeoff systems for the following scenarios are described in Section 5.1.3 of this AC (Figure 5.1.3-1) for at least the following conditions:
a) Takeoff with all engines operating
b) Engine Failure at Vef - continued takeoff*
c) Engine Failure just prior to V1 - rejected takeoff *
d) Engine Failure at a critical speed prior to Vmcg - rejected takeoff *
* Wind and runway conditions consistent with basic aircraft takeoff performance demonstrations.
Figure 5.1.3-1 should not be interpreted to mean that the airplane can begin the takeoff roll up to 7m from the centerline. The pilot is expected to position and align the airplane on, or near, the runway centerline. While the pilot is positioning and aligning the airplane on the runway, the takeoff guidance system should provide an indication such that the flightcrew can confirm its proper operation.
For the rejected takeoff, the actual performance should reflect the effects of a dynamic engine failure, a short term increase in lateral deviation, and then converge toward the centerline during the deceleration to a full stop.
6.1.1.1. ILS. The aircraft system response to permanent loss of the localizer signal shall be established, and the loss of the localizer signal must be appropriately annunciated to the crew.
The aircraft system response during a switchover from an active localizer transmitter to a backup transmitter shall be established (Reference ICAO Annex 10).
AC 120-28D 07/13/99 Appendix 2
6.1.1.2. MLS. The aircraft system response to the loss of the MLS signal shall be established, and appropriately annunciated to the crew.
The aircraft system response during a switchover from an active azimuth transmitter to a backup transmitter shall be established (reference ICAO Annex 10).
6.1.2. Workload Criteria. The workload associated with the use of the takeoff system shall be Satisfactory in accordance with the HQRS criteria of AC 25-7A, as amended, or equivalent. The takeoff system should provide required tracking performance with Satisfactory workload and pilot compensation, under foreseeable normal conditions. It may be assumed that the operational authorizations process will address any visual cues needed for the required task performance with satisfactory workload and pilot compensation.
The system should not require unusual skill, effort or excessive workload by the pilot to acquire and maintain the desired takeoff path. The display should be easy to interpret in all situations. Cockpit integration issues should be evaluated to ensure consistent operations and pilot response in all situations.
6.2. Takeoff System Integrity. The takeoff system shall provide command information, as lateral guidance, which, if followed by the pilot, will maintain the airplane on the runway during the takeoff roll through acceleration to liftoff or, if necessary, during a deceleration to a stop during a rejected takeoff.
The onboard components of the low visibility takeoff system and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, should be designed to meet the requirements of Title 14 of the code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25, section 25.1309, in addition to any specific safety related criteria identified in this appendix. The elements not on the airplane should not reduce the overall safety of the operation to unacceptable levels. The following criteria is provided for the application of section 25.1309 to Takeoff Systems:
The system design should not possess characteristics, in normal operation or when failed, which would degrade takeoff safety, or lead to a hazardous condition. Any single failure of the airplane which could disturb the take-off path (e.g., engine failure, single electrical generator or bus failure, single IRU failure) must not cause loss of guidance information or give incorrect guidance information.
To the maximum extent possible, failures that would result in the airplane violating the lateral confines of the runway while on the ground should be detected by the takeoff system and promptly annunciated to the pilot.
If pitch and/or speed guidance is also provided, failures that would result in rotation at an unsafe speed, pitch rate or pitch angle should be detected by the takeoff system and promptly annunciated to the pilot.
However, there may be failures, which result in misleading guidance, but cannot be annunciated. For these failures, outside visual references or other available information, that the pilot is expected to monitor, would be used by the pilot to detect the failures and mitigate their effects. These failures must be identified, and the ability of the pilot to detect them and mitigate their effects must be verified by analysis, flight test or both.
Whenever the takeoff system does not provide valid guidance appropriate for the takeoff operation, it must be clearly annunciated to the crew, and the guidance must be removed. The removal of guidance, alone, is not adequate annunciation. The annunciation must be located to ensure rapid recognition, and must not distract the pilot making the takeoff or significantly degrade the forward view.
The probability of the takeoff system generating misleading information that could lead to an unsafe condition shall be Improbable when the flightcrew is alerted to the condition by suitable fault annunciation or by
AC 120-28D Appendix 2 07/13/99 information from other independent sources available within the pilot's primary field of view. For airworthiness, the effectiveness of the fault annunciation or information from other independent sources must be demonstrated.
The probability of the takeoff system generating misleading information that would be unsafe to follow, must be Extremely Improbable, if:
1. no means are available for the takeoff system to detect and annunciate the failure, and
2. no information is provided to the pilot to immediately detect the malfunction and take corrective action.
In the event of a probable failure (e.g., engine failure, electrical source failure) if the pilot follows the takeoff display and disregards external visual reference, the airplane performance must meet the requirements illustrated in figure 5.1.3-1.
In showing compliance with the performance and failure requirements, the probabilities of performance or failure effects may not be factored by the proportion of takeoffs which are made in low visibility.
Loss of any single source of electrical power or transient condition on any single source of electrical power should not cause loss of guidance to the pilot flying (PF), or loss of information that is required to monitor the takeoff to the pilot not flying (PNF).
Takeoff systems that use navigation aids other than ILS and MLS require an overall assessment of the integration of the airplane components with other elements (e.g., ground based aids, satellite systems) to ensure that the overall safety of the use of these takeoff systems is acceptable [PoC].
6.3. Takeoff System Availability. When the Takeoff operation is predicated on the use of the Takeoff system, the probability of a system loss should be Remote (10-5/flight hour).
6.4. Flight Deck Information, Annunciation and Alerting. This section identifies information, annunciations, and alerting requirements for the takeoff system on the flight deck. The controls, indicators, and alerts must be designed to minimize crew errors which could cause a hazard. Mode and system malfunction indications must be presented in a manner compatible with the procedures and assigned tasks of the flightcrew. The indications must be grouped in a logical and consistent manner and be visible under all expected normal lighting conditions.
6.4.1. Flight Deck Information. System design or use should not degrade the flightcrews ability to otherwise adequately monitor takeoff performance or stopping performance.
The system shall be demonstrated to have no display or failure characteristics that lead to degradation of the crews ability to adequately monitor takeoff performance (e.g., acceleration, engine performance, takeoff speed callouts, attitude, and airspeed), conduct the entire takeoff, and make an appropriate transition to en route climb speed and configuration, for all normal, abnormal and emergency situations.
6.4.2. Annunciation. Prior to takeoff initiation and during takeoff, positive, continuous and unambiguous indications of the following information about the takeoff system must be provided and made readily evident to both pilots:
• system status
AC 120-28D 07/13/99 Appendix 2
• modes of engagement and operation, as applicable
• guidance source
6.4.3. Alerting. The takeoff system must alert the flightcrew whenever the system suffers a failure or any condition which prevents the system from meeting the takeoff system performance requirements (see 6.1.1 of this appendix).
Alerts shall be timely, unambiguous, readily evident to each crewmember, and compatible with the alerting philosophy of the airplane. Annunciations must be located to ensure rapid recognition, and must not distract the pilot making the takeoff or significantly degrade the forward view.
6.4.3.1. Warnings. Warnings shall be provided for conditions that require immediate pilot awareness and action. Warnings are required for the following conditions:
a) Loss of takeoff guidance
b) Invalid takeoff guidance
c) Failures of the guidance system that require immediate pilot awareness and compensation
During takeoff, whenever the takeoff system does not provide valid guidance appropriate for the takeoff operation, it must be clearly annunciated to the crew, and the guidance must be removed. The removal of guidance, alone, is not adequate annunciation. The annunciation must be located to ensure rapid recognition, and must not distract the pilot making the takeoff or significantly degrade the forward view.
6.4.3.2. Cautions. Cautions shall be provided for conditions that require immediate pilot awareness and possible subsequent pilot action. These alerts need not generate a Master Caution light, which would be contrary to the takeoff alert inhibit philosophy. Cautions should be carefully generated so as not to cause flightcrew distraction during takeoff roll.
6.4.3.3. Advisories. Advisories shall be provided for conditions that require pilot awareness in a timely manner. Advisories should not be generated after takeoff has commenced.
6.4.3.4. System Status. Status of takeoff guidance system shall be provided (e.g., status of BITE/self-test).
7. Takeoff System Evaluation.
An applicant shall provide a certification plan which provides a description of the airplane systems, the basis for certification, the certification methods and compliance documentation. The certification plan should also describe how any non-airplane elements of the Takeoff System relate to the operation of airplane systems from a performance, integrity and availability perspective.
The certification plan shall identify the assumptions and considerations for the non-airplane elements of the system, and describe how the performance, integrity and availability ‘requirements’ of these elements are met.
For ILS and MLS based system elements, satisfaction of these requirements can be predicated upon compliance with either the ICAO SARP’s, equivalent state standard, or by reference to an acceptable standard for performance of any navigation service.