Appendix 3
u. Failure Effect Category (FEC).
(1) Category 5. Functional failures that have evident safety effects.
(2) Category 6. Functional failures that have evident operational effects.
(3) Category 7. Functional failures that have evident economic effects.
(4) Category 8. Functional failures that have hidden function safety effects.
(5) Category 9. Functional failures that have hidden function non-safety effects.
v. Field Approval. A method for obtaining FAA approval of a design change to the airplane. An FAA Flight Standards inspector can approve the design change using FAA Form 337.
w. Flammable Fluid Leakage Zones. Any area where flammable liquids or vapors are not intended to be present, but where they might exist due to leakage from flammable fluid carrying components (e.g., leakage from tanks, lines). Examples of these areas include:
• The wing leading (including any adjacent compartment such as the strut) and trailing edges;
• Fairings located below the fuel tanks;
• Wheel wells;
• Fuel pump enclosures;
• Unpressurized areas of the fuselage surrounding fuel tanks; and
• Areas containing flammable fluid lines or tanks.
x. Flight Standards Service (AFS). Offices located in FAA headquarters (HQ) responsible for developing guidance and policy applicable to transport category airplanes for AEG personnel and AFS field personnel (maintenance, avionics, and Operations ASI in the conduct of their responsibilities.
y. Functional Failures. The failure of a component or subsystem to perform its intended function within specified limits.
z. Hidden Failure. A failure whose presence may not be readily apparent to the flightcrew or maintenance personnel.
aa. Hidden Functional Failure Safety Effect. A combination of a hidden (or latent) functional failure and one additional failure of a system-related or backup function that will have an adverse effect on operational safety.
bb. Hot Short. Electrical energy introduced into equipment or systems as a result of unintended contact with a power source, such as bent pins in a connector or damaged insulation on adjacent wires.
Appendix 3 cc. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). The information developed in accordance with applicable airworthiness requirements that include the applicable inspection tasks, intervals, methods, processes, procedures, and airworthiness limitations to keep the product airworthy throughout its operational life.
dd. Maintenance and Inspection Instructions. Information that provides, for each part of the airplane and its engine auxiliary power units, propellers, accessories, instruments, and equipment, the recommended periods at which they should be cleaned, inspected, adjusted, tested, lubricated, and the degree of inspection, the applicable wear tolerances, and work recommended at these periods needed to provide for the continued airworthiness of the airplane.
The recommended overhaul periods and necessary cross-reference to the airworthiness ALS of the manual are also included.
ee. Maintenance Planning Data (MPD). Data developed by the manufacturer of a particular airplane that contain the information each operator of that airplane needs to develop a customized, scheduled maintenance program.
ff. Maintenance Review Board (MRB). An FAA group that supports industry development of the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) and approves the final MRBR.
gg. Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR). A report which contains the initial minimum scheduled maintenance and inspection requirements for a particular transport category airplane and on-wing engine program. Air carriers may use those provisions, along with other maintenance information contained in the ICA, in the development of their maintenance programs.
hh. Maintenance Significant Item (MSI).
(1) Under MSG – 3rd Task Force (MSG-3), items other than ALI that are identified by the DAH whose failure could cause one of the following effects:
• It could affect safety on the ground or in flight,
• It could be undetectable during operations,
• It could have a significant impact on operations, or
• It could have a significant economic impact.
(2) In terms of development of maintenance and inspection instructions, MSIs include systems, subsystems, modules, components, accessories, units, or parts.
ii. Maintenance Steering Group-3 (MSG-3). A voluntary structured process developed by the industry and maintained by the ATA to make decisions used to develop maintenance and inspection tasks and intervals for an airplane.
jj. Maintenance Working Group (MWG). A working group of maintenance specialists from participating operators, the prime manufacturer, and the regulatory authority whose function is to develop airplane maintenance programs. The MWG should have representatives knowledgeable about the fuel tank system under analysis and about the requirements of SFAR 88.
Appendix 3 Page 5 (and 6) kk. Mandatory Action Advisory Board. A committee composed of representatives from the cognizant FAA Oversight Office and the Transport Airplane Directorate whose function was to review the findings from the SFAR 88 safety review for determination of an unsafe condition using the criteria in FAA policy memorandum 2003-112-15, SFAR 88—Mandatory Action Decision Criteria.
ll. National Aviation Authority (NAA). The aviation authority responsible for the certification and continued airworthiness of those airplanes having a U.S. TC within its state of design as established in accordance with agreements with the United States.
mm. Products. Products are certified aircraft, engines, propellers, and appliances.
nn. Supplemental Type Certificate ICA. The STC holder ICA consists of the inspection tasks, intervals, methods, processes, and procedures to keep an alteration affecting the fuel tank system approved under an STC airworthy throughout its operational life. The STC holder ICA must meet the requirements of SFAR 88, or § 25.981 and part 25 appendix H, and be approved by the FAA Oversight Office.
oo. Type Certificate Holder ICA. The TC holder ICA consists of the inspection tasks, intervals, methods, processes, procedures to keep the product’s fuel tank system airworthy throughout its operational life. It is typically the result of the MRB process. During this process the TC holder develops MSIs and subjects them to maintenance program development logic, such as in MSG-3 or later revisions. The TC holder ICA must comply with the requirements of SFAR 88, or § 25.981 and part 25 appendix H, and be approved by the FAA Oversight Office.
Appendix 4 Page 1 (and 2) 8B8BAPPENDIX 4. FAA OVERSIGHT OFFICES BY AIRPLANE MANUFACTURER Airplane Manufacturer FAA Oversight Office ATR – GIE Avions de Transport Régional Transport Standards Staff, International Branch (ANM-116) Airbus Transport Standards Staff, International Branch (ANM-116) BAE Systems Transport Standards Staff, International Branch (ANM-116) Boeing—Seattle Area Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) (ANM-100S) and/or Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (ANM-100B) Boeing—Long Beach (McDonnell-Douglas) Los Angeles ACO (ANM-100L) and/or Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (ANM-100B) Certification Office Bombardier New York ACO EADS CASA Transport Standards Staff, International Branch (ANM-116) de Havilland New York ACO Dornier Transport Standards Staff, International Branch (ANM-116) Embraer Transport Standards Staff, International Branch (ANM-116) Fokker Transport Standards Staff, International Branch (ANM-116) Lockheed Martin Atlanta ACO SAAB Transport Standards Staff, International Branch (ANM-116)