AC 27-1B, Chg 1 2/12/03
a. Explanation. This rule lists the flight and navigation instruments that are required for VFR operation. Additional rules to be used when determining compliance for the flight and navigation instrument installation for rotorcraft are § 27.1321, Arrangement and Visibility, and Part 27, Appendix B, paragraphs VIlI(a) and (b), for IFR operation considerations. Additional information regarding the different instruments can be found by referring to the Technical Standard Order (TSO) for each one. Compliance with the TSO requirements does not ensure compliance with the appropriate Part 27 installation requirements. Other considerations may also be found by reviewing the requirements of §§ 27.1323, 27.1327, 27.1335, 27.1381, 27.1543, 27.1545, and
27.1547.
b. Procedures.
(1) The following instruments are the required minimum flight and navigation instruments for VER:
(i) Airspeed indicator.
(I!) Altimeter.
(iii) Magnetic Direction Indicator.
If additional instruments are required per other considerations, then evaluation will take place to determine appropriateness.
(2) Refer to Part 27, Appendix B, paragraphs VIlI (a) and (b), for IFR operation considerations.
(3) If a speed warning device is required to be included as part of the rotorcraft design, it must meet the performance requirements given in the rule. In addition, the evaluation of the acceptability of the aural warning (i.e., this warning differs distinctively from aural warnings used for other purposes) should be accomplished by flight test personnel as part of their overall evaluation.
(4) Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS).
(i) Explanation. The increased use of microprocessor technology in avionic systems has resulted in the use of computer-generated graphics to replace conventional electromechanical instruments, which are used for the display of flight information required by § 27.1303. For IFR certified aircraft, the EFIS usually is used for the display of the magnetic gyro-stabilized direction indicator (slaved compass system). These computer-generated graphics are usually displayed on small multicolor-shadow-mask cathode ray tubes (CRT) or liquid crystal displays (LCD), and replace the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) and the attitude direction indicator (ADI).
This section presumes that the EFIS for which approval is sought meet the general requirements of an EFIS for a technical standard order or a small category airplane with Page F - 2
regard to color, symbology, operation, and so forth. This paragraph along with some others in this document principally highlights the areas that are peculiar to the installation in a normal category rotorcraft. A discussion of the flight director function performed by the EFIS is given in paragraph AC 27.1335. A discussion of the location of the displays is contained in paragraph AC 27.1321. A discussion of the recommendations for an EFIS is contained in the latest versions of both AC 25-11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems and AMJ 25-11, Electronic Display Systems, and refer to AC-23.1311-1A, Installation of Electronic Displays in Part 23 Small Airplanes, dated March 12, 1999.
(її) Procedures.
(A) System Components. The system components require qualification testing to determine that their design is acceptable, free from hazards, and suitable to their airborne environment. The components of the EFIS should meet the requirements of TSO C-113, C2d, C3d, C4c, C5e, C6d, and C10b (other TSOs for EFIS may apply).
(1) Environmental Qualification. The EFIS hardware must be shown to be suitable to its airborne environment. A desirable way to qualify the system component is to obtain approval to the appropriate TSO. If the equipment is not TSO approved, it should be shown via testing that it complies with the requirements of SAE Document AS-8034, the latest revision of RTCA Document DO-160, and other appropriate standards. This may include testing in accordance with the appropriate categories of the latest revision of RTCA Document DO-160, JEDEC Publication No. 64D (Protection from lonizing Radiation), and UL Document No. 1418 (Impact Implosion Test).
(2) Software. The embedded software should be qualified in accordance with the latest revision of RTCA Document DO-178B. The software level is contingent on the worst case criticality of the function it performs. The software should be designed to provide adequate consideration for this factor (reference paragraph AC 27.1309). A similar consideration is required for altitude and airspeed.
(B) System Installation Considerations.
(1) Human Factors. Humans are very adaptable, but they adapt at varying rates with varying degrees of effectiveness and mental processing compensation. Thus, what some pilots might find acceptable and approvable, others would reject as being unusable and unsafe. Rotorcraft EFIS displays must be effective when used by pilots who cover the entire spectrum of variability. Relying on a requirement of "train to proficiency" may be unforeseeable, economically impracticable, or unachievable by some pilots without excessive mental workload as compensation.
(i) In order to minimize the potential for changes to first time EFIS installation approvals, the test program for EFIS displays should include sufficient flight and simulation time, using a representative population of pilots, to substantiate:
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AC 27-1B, Chg 1 2/12/03
(a) Reasonable training times and learning curves; (however, realistic assumptions should be made concerning the actual time for an average pilot to learn/adapt to a system. Also, these assumptions should reflect the fact that Part 91 pilots might not be trained, since training is not typically required.);
(b) Usability in an operational environment;
(c) Acceptable interpretation error rates equivalent to or less than conventional displays;
(d) Proper integration with other equipment that uses electronic display functions;
(e) Acceptability of all failure modes including those failures or combinations of failures not shown to be extremely improbable; and
(1) Compatibility with other displays and controls.
The manufacturers should provide human factors support/rationale for their decisions regarding new or unique features in their EFIS display. Evaluation pilots should verify that the data supports a conclusion that any new or unique features have no human factors traps or pitfalls, such as display perceptual or interpretive problems, for a representative pilot population.
(i) It is desirable to have display evaluations conducted by more than one pilot, even for certification of EFIS displays that do not incorporate significant new features. For display designs that incorporate unproven features, evaluation by a greater number of pilots should be considered. To help the FAA/AUTHORITY certification team gain assurance of a sufficiently broad exposure base, the electronic display manufacturer or installer should develop a test program with the certificating office that gathers data from FAA/AUTHORITY test pilots, company test pilots, and customer pilots who will use the display. A reasonable amount of time for the pilot to adapt to a display feature can be allowed, but long adaptation times must receive careful consideration. Any attitude display format presented for FAA/AUTHORITY approval should be sufficiently intuitive in its design so that no training is required for basic manual rotorcraft control.
(iii) For those electronic display systems that have been previously approved (including display formats) and are to be installed in rotorcraft in which these systems have not been previously approved, a routine FAA/AUTHORITY certification review should be conducted. This program should emphasize the systems' integration in the rotorcraft, taking into account the operational aspects, which may require further detailed systems failure analysis (where "system" means display, driving electronics, sensors, and sources of information).
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(iv) Simulation is an invaluable tool for display evaluation. Acceptable simulation ranges from a rudimentary bench test set up, where the display elements are viewed statically, to full flight training simulation with motion, external visual scene, and entire rotorcraft systems representation. For minor or simple changes to previously approved displays, one of these levels of simulation may be deemed adequate for display evaluation. For evaluation of display elements that relate directly to rotorcraft control (i.e., air data, attitude, power parameters, etc.), simulation should not be relied upon entirely. The dynamics of rotorcraft motion, coupled with the many added distractions and sensory demands made upon the pilot that are attendant to actual helicopter flight, have a profound effect on the pilot's perception and usability of displays. Display designers, as well as FAA/AUTHORITY test pilots, should be aware that display formats evaluated and found acceptable in simulation may well (and frequently do) turn out to be unacceptable in actual flight.
(v) Prior to defining the characteristics (color, symbology, etc.) or standards to be used on a specific display, a flight deck design philosophy should be established. Additionally, displays should be consistent across all systems in the flight deck. Documentation of the usage for display philosophy would help establish the working basis for determining compliance.
(2) Symbology and Function.
(i) When assessing the acceptability of the EFIS, consideration should be given to the effect of the loss of one of the CRT color guns. This type of failure is especially a factor in determining the acceptability of the installation for single-pilot operation.
(i) Symbols should be distinctive to minimize misinterpretation or confusion with other symbols utilized in the displays. The type and function of symbology should be clearly defined and appropriately classified for pilot understanding.
Symbols representing the same functions on more than one display should utilize the same shape and/or color-coding.
(3) Display Chromaticity and Luminance. The chromaticity and luminance of the displays should be determined to be acceptable for all cockpit lighting conditions which are expected in service. An expanded discussion of these characteristics may be found in AC 25-11 and AC 23.1311.
(4) Temperature Survey to Determine Proper Cooling of EFIS Components.
Equipment Requiring Cooling Test. As with any avionic equipment, good engineering judgment may deem that all components of the EFIS should have an in-flight temperature survey performed to ascertain that the thermal environmental tolerance of the system components is not exceeded. Usually, the following general Page F - 5
AC 27-1B, Chg 1 2/12/03 guidelines may be used to aid in determining when an in-flight temperature survey is warranted.
(a) Components that contain a CRT, LCD, etc., require the temperature survey outlined in paragraph AC 2 7.1303b(4)(ii)(B)(4)(ii).
(b) Equipment which does not contain a CRT, LCD, etc., but is specified by the manufacturer to require forced air cooling (by an airframe-mounted system), usually requires a temperature survey.
(c) Equipment which does not contain a CRT, LCD, etc., and is not specified as requiring forced air cooling may usually have its critical thermal environment substantiated by laboratory testing.
(ii) Temperature Survey Testing. The temperature tests for the EFIS units should consist of a short-term test of approximately 30 minutes which accounts for an aircraft which has heat-soaked on the ramp. A factor of 25° F should be added to the maximum corrected temperature to account for "greenhouse effect." A long-term test should be accomplished at various altitudes and limiting (low and high) airspeeds.
All avionics equipment should be turned on during this test, and the cockpit panel lights should be operated at full intensity. The environmental control unit (ECU) or air conditioning system should not be operating during these tests; however, any windows or vents which are part of the "basic" TC rotorcraft may be utilized to ventilate the pilot's stations. Both these tests should be corrected to the maximum temperature for which the rotorcraft is certified and a standard lapse rate for altitude as specified in this AC. If an airframe cooling system is necessary to keep the display units within acceptable temperature limits, then the pilots) must be made aware of a failure or malfunction of this cooling system. Some type of cockpit visual annunciation with the capability to perform a preflight test is usually utilized to fulfill this requirement.
(5) System Reliability.
(i) Failure of the EFIS to perform an intended function which results in the reversion to standby instruments or requires the use of abnormal procedures should be shown to be improbable.
(i) For IFR operations, Appendix B of Part 27, paragraph VIII(b)(5) (ii), requires that the equipment, systems, and installations must be designed so that one display of the information essential to the safety of flight which is provided by the instruments will remain available to a pilot, without additional crewmember action, after any single failure or combination of failures that is not shown to be extremely improbable. The display of attitude, altitude, or airspeed is individually "essential to the safety of flight," and, therefore, the loss of all attitude display, all airspeed information, or all altitude information to the pilots) should be extremely improbable. Also, any malfunction or failure of the EFIS which would result in the simultaneous incorrect display of this critical information should be extremely improbable. In view of the Page F - 6
relatively new technology embodied in the EFIS, the conventional technology electromechanical standby attitude indicator, with its independent power supply, should be retained.
c. Standby Instruments. The EFIS which have been approved on normal category rotorcraft at this time have only presented the critical function of attitude display. A specific requirement for a standby attitude instrument is contained in Appendix B of Part 27. This requirement is usually satisfied by an electromechanical panel-mounted gyro with an independent power source. Because of the mature technology of this type of standby attitude indicator, certain aspects of the EFIS installation have not been an area for concern. If, however, a total commitment of critical display functions is made to the "glass" technology, such that the standby attitude instrument requirement is satisfied by a software based CRT system, then several major areas of concern will be raised.
Among these are the electromagnetic vulnerability of the system (protection from the effects of lightning and high energy radio frequency fields) and software. The certifications of EFIS with an electromechanical standby attitude indicator have not considered loss of function critical from a software aspect (reference paragraph AC 27.1309 for a discussion of software qualification).
AC 27.1305. § 27.1305 (Amendment 27-9) POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS.
a. Explanation. This section specifies the instruments which are required for reciprocating and turbine engine installations. These instruments will provide the pilot with essential data to determine operational status of critical components and select desired performance conditions.
b. Procedures.
(1) FAR 27.1305(f), (g), and (I) requires a warning device for transmission oil temperature, gearbox oil pressure, and low fuel. An indicator/gage is not acceptable for use as a warning device since the indicator/gage is not a primary instrument and therefore is not actively monitored.
(2) There are advanced display systems that take advantage of microprocessor power by integrating the processing of several parameters. These systems have to date been referred to as Engine Caution Advisory Systems (ECAS) or as Integrated Instrument Display Systems (IIDS) and possibly other variations of these names. These systems typically integrate propulsion instruments, fuel quantity indication, and caution and warning system into a single display system. In traditional designs the powerplant instruments, fuel quantity display, and the caution and warning system are independent from each other. The integration of these systems/indicators eliminates their independence from one another and increases the probability of loss of more than one indicator/system as a result of a single fault or malfunction. Redundant design is generally applied to compensate for the loss of independence.
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This integration and resultant mitigation of independence can result in an increased opportunity for common mode failures. Approval of the compensating features is elevated in importance as it is this aspect that allows the concept to be acceptable and subsequently certifiable. The loss of all displayed information or erroneous information should be considered for determination of worst case criticality.
With this determination of criticality, the design can be evaluated to see that it meets the minimum associated level ot design assurance. Additionally, due to space limitations some systems employ "page over" features that may have some difficulty displaying the required information when needed and human factors aspects must be considered.
(її) The instrument display system must be investigated and found to be acceptable under both normal and emergency conditions, must perform its intended function under foreseeable operating conditions, and must be designed to minimize the hazards in the event of probable malfunction or failure.
(iii) It must be shown that there is appropriate redundancy to provide adequate compensation for the loss of independence in the system. If a multi-page system is employed, it must be shown that needed information is displayed when required. Specific issues that must be addressed to assure compliance with the minimum safety standards are as follows:
• The level of most severe hazard must be determined.
• Equivalent reliability and software design assurance to the determined criticality level must be shown.
(3) Additional sections to be consulted when determining the powerplant instrument installation design are §§ 27.1321, Arrangement and visibility; 27.1337, Powerplant instruments; 27.1381, Instrument lights; 27.1543, Instrument markings:
General; 27.1549, Powerplant instruments; 27.1551, Oil quantity indicator; and 27.1553, Fuel quantity indicator.
AC 27.1305A. § 27.1305 (Amendment 27-23) POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS.
a. Explanation. Amendment 27-23 revises, edits, and adds new powerplant instrument requirements. Section 27.1305(1) was revised to require a low fuel warning device for each tank that can be used to feed an engine. The amendment allows a longer time between warning actuation and fuel exhaustion and requires the low fuel warning device to be independent of the normal fuel quantity indication system.
Section 27.1305(q) was changed to extend its application to all rotorcraft (not just those with turbine engines) and to require an indication to the crew of the degree of filter blockage as it relates to the fuel flow requirements in § 27.955. Section 27.1305(s) was revised to require function indicators only for fuel heaters that can be selected or are controllable.
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b. Procedures. The requirement and purpose for each instrument is self-explanatory in the amendment. Other sections that should be considered when designing powerplant instruments are listed in paragraph AC 27.1305.
AC 27.1305B. $27.1305 (Amendment 27-29) POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS.
a. Explanation. Amendment 27-29 added Sections 27.1305(t) and 27.1305(u) to provide for 30-second/2-minute OE power ratings.
(1) Section 27.1305(t) adds the requirement that a device or means be provided to alert the crew of the use of the 30-second and 2-minute OEI power level.
The crew should be alerted when the 30-second or 2-minute interval begins and when the time interval ends. The amount of time spent at the 30-second or 2-minute OEI power levels is at the crew's discretion, unlike the other limits (i.e., torque, measured gas temperature, and gas generator speed) for 30-second OEI that are set by an automatic control required by § 29.1143. The purpose for providing the time interval alerts and automatically controlling the 30-second OEI limits is to free the crew from monitoring the engine instruments during critical phases of flight caused by the loss of an engine.
(2) Section 27.1305(u) adds the requirement for a device to record the usage and the amount of time spent at the 30-second OEI power level and the amount of time spent at the 2-minute OEI power level. The information recorded by this device is for the use of the ground crew to determine if maintenance actions/inspections are to be conducted.
b. Procedures. For the purpose of complying with FAR 27.1305(t) and
27.1305(u), the 2-minute OEI power level is considered to be achieved whenever one or more of the operating limitations applicable to the next lower OEI power rating are exceeded. The 30-second OEI power level is considered to be achieved whenever one or more of the operating limitations applicable to the 2-minute OEI power rating are exceeded.
(1) A review of the method to meet the requirements of Section 27.1305(t) should be conducted by the FAA/AUTHORITY Flight Test pilot. A determination should be made as to whether the method used to alert the crew of 30-second or 2-minute OEI power usage can be recognized and understood by the crew.
(2) To meet the requirements of Section 27.1305(u), a device should be installed on the engine or the airframe to record the time and each usage of 30-second and 2-minute OEI power levels. The information on the time and usage of 30-second and 2-minute OEI power should be recoverable from the recording device by ground personnel. The device should not be capable of being reset in flight and should only be capable of being reset by ground personnel. Prior to each flight this device should be capable of being checked for proper operation and to determine if 30-second or 2-minute OEI power levels were used during the previous flight.
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c. Integrated Display Systems. This advisory material is to provide guidance for compliance to Part 27 and Part 29 regulations as they apply to integrated display systems. The integration aspects of these systems require some additional issues to be addressed during certification. The term "must" in this advisory material is used in the sense of ensuring the applicability of these particular methods of compliance when the acceptable means of compliance described herein is used. This advisory material establishes an acceptable means, but not the only means of certifying an integrated display system.
(1) Definitions.
(i) Integrity. The term "integrity" for the purpose of this advisory material includes the hardware quality requirements, including reliability; as well as the software level requirements, as defined in DO178B.
Criticality. The term "criticality" refers to the five levels of criticality addressed in FAA Advisory Circulars AC 27-1B and AC 29-2C.
(2) Related documents.
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) paragraphs 21.21, 27.1301,
27.1309, 27.1305, and 27.1322
(ii) Standards - Latest revision of RTCA/DO178 and RTCA/DO-160;
(iii) SAE documents ARP4754 and ARP4761
(3) Background. A tendency to integrate functions/indications that have previously been independent is a result of technology advancement. Microprocessor driven systems have facilitated the ease of this integration. Integrated Instrument Display System (IIDS) or Engine Instrument and Caution Advisory System (EICAS) are examples of integrated display systems. IIDS, EICAS, or any other similar systems are defined as a combination of engine instruments (previously independent indicators), fuel quantity indication, and caution/warning parameters, as a minimum, presented by a common display driven by a common processor.
(4) Discussion. This design philosophy does not result in the traditional requirement for individual display independence for failure/malfunction considerations.
This loss of independence means that a single failure could result in loss of most, if not all, instrument displays on the integrated display system. Redundancy of the integrated display system is often proposed to compensate for this lack of independence.
However, redundancy alone may not meet the integrity requirements since they are derived from the level of criticality associated with the loss or malfunction of instrument/parameter displays for flight operations that are dependent on these indications.
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(5) Certification Approach. A two step procedure should be used to determine the adequate safety level for this type of system. The first step is to determine the level of criticality associated with the total loss/malfunction of these functions/indications or loss/malfunction of the critical parts of the display. This can be achieved through the use of a functional hazard assessment (FHA). This criticality assessment must be a product of failure/malfunction of the indication system and the flight operation that would represent the worst case for loss of this information. The second step is to determine that the design integrity of the system is at least equal to the assessed criticality level determined in step one.
(6) Functional Hazard Assessment. The operational classifications to be considered when assessing the criticality are Cat A, Cat B, and IFR. The need for critical information varies with each of these different operational categories. An example would be the demand for OEI parameter information in the single engine Cat A operation. Another example is the loss of fuel quantity indication and fuel low level indication simultaneously in IFR flight conditions. The FHA should address not only loss of one type of indication, but combined loss of engine parameter indication, including total loss of display information, caution/warning, fuel quantity indication, and any other included display in combination with a particular flight operation. There are techniques to lessen the consequences of the failure/malfunction requirements for integrity, such as providing back-up displays for the information deemed critical for a particular operational consideration.
(7) Summary. The loss of all integrated display information for certain types of flight operations may have the highest level of criticality associated with it. The same may be true for malfunctions that result in misleading indications. These failures/malfunctions must be addressed by the commensurate design integrity level.
Lesser levels of criticality must also be addressed by the appropriate design integrity levels.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 9 6/23/23 AC 27.1305C. § 27.1305 (AMENDMENT 27-51) POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS.
a. Explanation. Amendment 27-51 revised § 27.1305(e), (k), (n), and (o) to incorporate flexibility for the use of a synthesized power indicator (SPI).
b. Procedures. The purpose of the SPI display is to reduce pilot workload by providing an indicator showing a single parameter that is closest to the applicable engine or transmission limit, versus monitoring individual engine parameters. The SPI display for reciprocating engines presents a normalized indication of the current engine manifold pressure and engine RPM. For turbine engines, the SPI display presents normalized indications of the engine power or torque, gas temperature, and engine compressor speed output. The normalized value is presented to the flight crew on the primary flight displays, along with a caption indicating the nearest engine limiting parameter (engine manifold pressure, RPM, torque, gas temperature indicator, engine compressor speed, as applicable) that is being used for the SPI display calculation. The SPI display function is typically performed by the avionics suite using data provided by the engine FADEC.
Section 27.1305 establishes the required powerplant instruments and warning and caution annunciations that must be displayed within the view of the flying pilot. These have traditionally been independent instruments and are needed not only to measure the performance output of the engines, but they collectively allow the flying pilot to continuously monitor the condition and health of the engines.
The absence of continuously displayed engine manifold pressure and RPM for reciprocating engines or engine torque, gas temperature, and engine compressor speed parameters may affect the pilot's ability to directly monitor the health and condition of each engine. In addition, the absence of individual gauges deprives the pilot of the ability to quickly assess trend or rate of change information and proximity to individual parameter limits, and to accurately compare engine-to-engine data. As a result, in addition to the requirements in §§ 27.1305 and 27.1549, the SPI display must also meet the requirements of § 27.1321.
The applicant's description and justification of the SPI display should address the following:
(1) The accuracy of the engine power and other engine indications to safely conduct Category Band, when applicable, Category A operations (power setting, NR control, piloting a given rating with precision).
(2) The flight crew must be able to assess how close the indicated parameter is relative to the limit, including the transitions from one limiting factor to another (engine manifold pressure to engine RPM or engine torque to gas temperature indicator to engine compressor speed), and the ability to quickly and accurately compare engine-to- Page F - 11.1
engine data when engine limiting factors are different (Engine 1 Torque, Engine 2 Gas Temperature Indicator). See §§ 27.1321 and 27.1549.
(3) Engine design features or characteristics that forewarn the crew prior to the parameter reaching the operating limit (the redline) should be evaluated.
(4) The SPI display must provide a timing countdown when operating with time limited power settings and as required by § 27.1305(t).
(5) The minimum and maximum operating limits must be marked as required by § 27.1549.
(6) The SPI display should allow the pilot to identify indicator failures, engine failures, partial power loss conditions, and adverse trends, to meet the requirements in §§ 27.771(a), 27.1309, 27.1321, and 27.1549. The SPI design should also address all normal and abnormal operations including start/shutdown and OEI conditions per § 27.771(a).
(7) Since the SPI is a system comprised of instruments required by subchapter C of Title 14, its hazards are among those that must be assessed under the requirements of § 27.1309. When conducting this assessment, to meet the requirements in § 27.1301, the applicant must take into account that the crew will operate the Rotorcraft, monitoring the engine status and health, without continuously accessing the powerplant display page. In addition, the assessment should assume the SPI will remain the only engine instrument available in case of loss of one display.
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