RISK REPORT NO.: 3.2 Company: Company ABC, Inc.
Hazard Title: Main Propellant Feed Valve Failure Analysis Phase: Subsystem Hazard Analysis (FMECA)
Initial Closeout Date 3/ 5/ 02 6/15/02 Originator John Doe, XYZ
Hazard Status:
Frequency* Severity* HRI* Initial C II 6 Closeout D II 10 *See FAA Advisory Circular 431.35-2A Prelaunch to Launch Descent X Ascent Landing/Recovery Mission Phase:
On-Orbit to Reenty
Post-launch Risk Level: (See FAA Advisory Circular 431.35-2A for explanation of risk level.)
Severity
Frequency
Catastrophic I
Critical II
Marginal III
Negligible IV Frequent (A) 1 3 7 13 Probable (B) 2 5 9 16 Occasional (C) 4 6 11 18 Remote (D) 8 10 14 19 Improbable (E) 12 15 17 20
Level Index Hazard Risk Index Acceptability Criteria High (Red) 1 - 6 Corrective/controlling actions must be taken to reduce the hazard severity below “II” or reduce the likelihood of occurrence below “C”.
Medium (Yellow) 7 - 10 If not controlled, must be presented to Program Management and FAA as accepted risk.
Low (Green) 11 - 20 Project Management decides on actions, if any.
38 RISK REPORT NO.: 3.2 System:
Vehicle propulsion system
Subsystem:
Main propellant valve Controlling Doc.
(Name, #, etc.):
Vehicle Operations Handbook Function:
The main propellant valve is a manually controlled valve used to shut off the propulsion system during nominal and off-nominal operations
Hazard Description:
See Effect below.
Failure Mode(s)/Cause(s):
Manufacturing process error or contamination causes the main propulsion valve to remain open or partially open when commanded to shut down.
Effect:
Failure to shut down the propulsion system could result in the potential to provide thrust after shutdown command, leading to possible crash in a populated area.
Mitigation of Hazard/Controls:
(1) Use high-reliability valve designed to XYZ Standard 126-P. (2) Use redundant valve in series that uses an automated programmable logic controller to shut down propulsion system in the event of failure of the manual valve.
Verification Method(s) & Documentation:
(1) Inspect and operate the valve before flight per Mission Procedure Checklist 26. (2) Acceptance tests of valve per XYZ Standard 126-P – test results provided at 2/15/02 TIM. (3) System tests of valve operation during envelope expansion tests per Vehicle Flight Plan item 35.
Additional Remarks:
See risk report 2.1 for description of hazard of this failure mode.
Closure Signatures Originator: _____________________ System Safety Manager: _____________________ Program Manager: _____________________
RISK REPORT NO.: ______ Company:
Hazard Title:
Analysis Phase:
Initial Closeout Date Originator
Hazard Status:
Frequency* Severity* HRI* Initial Closeout *See FAA Advisory Circular 431.35-2A Prelaunch to Launch Descent Ascent Landing/Recovery Mission Phase:
On-Orbit to Reenty
Post-launch Risk Level: (See FAA Advisory Circular 431.35-2A for explanation of risk level.)
Severity
Frequency
Catastrophic I
Critical II
Marginal III
Negligible IV Frequent (A) 1 3 7 13 Probable (B) 2 5 9 16 Occasional (C) 4 6 11 18 Remote (D) 8 10 14 19 Improbable (E) 12 15 17 20
Level Index Hazard Risk Index Acceptability Criteria High (Red) 1 - 6 Corrective/controlling actions must be taken to reduce the hazard severity below “II” or reduce the likelihood of occurrence below “C”.
Medium (Yellow) 7 - 10 If not controlled, must be presented to Program Management and FAA as accepted risk.
Low (Green) 11 - 20 Project Management decides on actions, if any.
40 RISK REPORT NO.: ______ System:
Subsystem:
Controlling Doc.
(Name, #, etc.):
Function:
Hazard Description:
Failure Mode(s)/Cause(s):
Effect:
Mitigation of Hazard/Controls:
Verification Method(s) & Documentation:
Additional Remarks:
Closure Signatures Originator: _____________________ System Safety Manager: _____________________ Program Manager: _____________________
Patricia Grace Smith July 20, 2005 Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation