Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 13
4.19 Space Nuclear System A nuclear system intended to operate in space, including any radioactive fuel and associated structures, systems, and components that are required to operate the nuclear power system. Space nuclear systems would include radioisotope power systems (RPSs), such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and radioisotope heater units (RHUs), and fission reactors used for power and propulsion.
4.20 Supercritical or Supercriticality A state of a nuclear reactor core during which fission neutron production exceeds all neutron losses, causing an increase in the number of fissions occurring and resulting in rising power.
4.21 Uncontrolled Release A release of any radioactive material that cannot be terminated on command by the operator. An example of uncontrolled release is a material fracture resulting in a direct pathway for nuclear fuel or fission products to reach the environment with no way for the operator to stop the release.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 14 5 ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS.
AC – Advisory Circular ALARA – As Low as Reasonably Achievable ANS – American Nuclear Society ANSI – American National Standards Institute APNSA – Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ASME – American Society of Mechanical Engineers AST – FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation CEc – Conditional Expected Casualty CFR – Code of Federal Regulations d/dt – Differential Operator DBTT – Ductile-to-Brittle Transition Temperature DOD – Department of Defense DOE – Department of Energy DOT – Department of Transportation EA – Environmental Assessment Ec – Expected Casualty EIS – Environmental Impact Statement EOM – End of Mission EPA – Environmental Protection Agency EPZ – Emergency Planning Zone ERP – Emergency Response Plan FAA – Federal Aviation Administration FCC – Federal Communications Commission FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency FGR – Federal Guidance Report FHA – Functional Hazard Assessment HALEU – High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium HEU – Highly Enriched Uranium HFRSA – High-Fidelity Radiological Safety Analysis IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ICRP – International Commission on Radiological Protection INSRB – Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 15 ISO – International Organization for Standardization LEO – Low Earth Orbit LEU – Low Enriched Uranium MM – Mission Multiple MPL – Maximum Probable Loss NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration NEPA – National Environmental Policy Act NRC – U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSPM-20 – Presidential Memorandum on the Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems, dated August 20, 2019 NUREG – U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission technical report designation P – Linear Momentum PER – Probability of Exposure to Radiation PoC – Probability of Collision REM – Roentgen Equivalent in Man (rem) REP – Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP – Radiological Emergency Response Plan RHA – Radiological Hazard Analysis RHUs – Radioisotope Heater Units RMR – Radioactive Materials On-Board Report RPSs – Radioisotope Power Systems RTGs – Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators SAR – Safety Analysis Report SI – System International, i.e., meter, kilogram, second units SNS – Space Nuclear System SSG – Specific Safety Guide SSR – Safety Series Requirement TBq – Tera-Becquerel TED – Total Effective Dose U.S.C. – United States Code U.S. – United States USD – United States Dollars
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 16 6 PERTINENT REGULATIONS FOR SPACE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.
6.1 Safety Challenges.
Commercial space activities involving SNS introduce unique public safety challenges.
For example, various radionuclides carried on SNS emit radiation which can be harmful to human health. Some radionuclides are long-lived, emit high-energy radiation, or are difficult to decontaminate if released into the environment. Some radionuclides present all these characteristics simultaneously. Additionally, radioactive decay and nuclear fission inevitably change the isotopic composition of the nuclear fuel, producing isotopes which were not present at the start of the licensed activity, thereby changing the risk characteristics of the device. Appendix C provides an example of a past mishap involving an SNS. Due to the unique public health and safety hazards posed by the use of SNS in commercial space activities, the FAA will carefully review proposals to launch or reenter SNS for compliance with the following regulations.
6.2 FAA Launch and Reentry License Regulations.
This AC provides a means of compliance for assessing radionuclide safety within the context of 14 CFR part 450. Part 450 calls for a case-by-case approach to address hazards from SNS, as discussed in this section.
Note: The FAA has the authority to license the launch and reentry of commercial SNS, but it does not license possession of nuclear material in the U.S. Obtaining the appropriate licenses to legally possess nuclear material on the ground is an applicant responsibility and must be completed before the SNS launch or reentry can be licensed.
Issuance of a part 450 license does not relieve a licensee of its obligation to comply with all applicable requirements of law or regulation (14 CFR § 450.13).
6.2.1 S afety Review and Approval.
6.2.1.1 In accordance with § 450.45, the FAA issues a safety approval to an applicant if it determines that an applicant can conduct a launch or reentry without jeopardizing public health and safety or the safety of property.
The focus of the safety review is to ensure that an applicant can meet the safety requirements in subpart C, including the safety criteria in § 450.101.
The safety criteria and other safety requirements in subpart C are primarily focused on three hazards: impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure. The FAA included certain provisions in part 450 to cover other hazards such as radionuclides, as discussed below.
6.2.1.2 For nuclear hazards specifically, § 450.45(e)(6) states that the FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of any radionuclide on a case-by-case basis and issue an approval if the FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. For any radionuclide on a launch or reentry vehicle, an applicant must:
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 17
• Identify the type and quantity of any radionuclide,
• Include a reference list of all documentation addressing the safety of its intended use, and
• Describe all approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for pre-flight ground operations.
6.2.1.3 Paragraphs 7.2 and 8.3 and Appendix A of this AC provide an acceptable means of compliance for § 450.45(e)(6) and will allow an applicant proposing to use SNS to demonstrate to the FAA that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety. Use of the safety guidelines in paragraph 7.2, in addition to the analyses described in paragraph 8.3 and Appendix A, is one way to demonstrate that the launch or reentry of the SNS is consistent with public health and safety.
6.2.1.4 The means of compliance that the FAA sets forth in this AC generally follows the guidelines outlined in Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems (NSPM-20). NSPM-20 addresses the authorization process for government and commercial launches of spacecraft containing SNS, and categorizes launches of spacecraft containing SNS in three Tiers based upon the characteristics of the system, the level of potential hazards, and national security considerations.
6.2.1.5 During the safety review, the FAA will review the applicant’s submitted information looking for ways that:
• The SNS might jeopardize the function or safety of the launch or reentry vehicle;
• The launch or reentry vehicle might jeopardize the function or safety of the SNS; and
• Interactions between the SNS and the launch or reentry vehicle that might have public safety implications.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 18
6.2.2 Payload Review and Determination.
6.2.2.1 In accordance with § 450.43, the FAA issues a favorable payload determination for a launch or reentry to a license applicant or payload owner or operator if it has obtained all required licenses, authorizations, and permits (§ 450.43(a)(1)), and its launch or reentry would not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States (§ 450.43(a)(2)).
6.2.2.2 Under its payload review and determination authority, the FAA may prevent the launch or reentry of a payload that will conduct novel space activities if it determines that its launch or reentry would jeopardize the public health and safety, safety of property, or national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition to a launch or reentry operator, a payload owner or payload operator may request a payload review and determination.
6.2.2.3 Similar to the safety review, paragraphs 7.2 and 8.3 and Appendix A of this AC provide an acceptable means of compliance for the safety aspects of § 450.43(a)(2) and will allow an applicant to demonstrate to the FAA that launch or reentry of a SNS will not jeopardize public health and safety. Use of the safety guidelines in paragraph 7.2, coupled with the analyses in paragraph 8.3 and Appendix A, will allow an applicant to show that the launch or reentry of the SNS is consistent with public health and safety.
6.2.2.4 Section 450.43(i) outlines specific application requirements, including paragraph (i)(1)(ii), which requires an applicant to describe the physical dimensions, weight, and composition of the payload for launch, paragraph
(i)(1)(v), which requires an applicant to identify radioactive materials and their amount for launch, and paragraph (1)(2)(iv), which requires an applicant to identify the type, amount, and container of radioactive materials in the payload. Section 450.43(i)(1)(xi) requires an applicant to identify any other information necessary to make a determination based on public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States.
For applicants using this AC as a means of compliance, Appendix A identifies other information unique to SNS.
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6.2.3 Policy Review and Approval.
6.2.3.1 In accordance with § 450.41, the FAA issues a policy approval to an applicant unless the FAA determines that a proposed launch or reentry would jeopardize U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. The launch or reentry of SNS may very well implicate U.S. national security, foreign policy interests or international obligations due to the unique hazards posed by SNS and the potential for release of nuclear material outside the United States.
6.2.3.2 The interagency review is an important component of the policy and payload review process that provides other Federal agencies with the opportunity to examine the proposed activity from their unique perspectives. Table 1 of this AC indicates the FAA’s primary partner agencies and their primary areas of responsibility. For applicants proposing to launch or reenter SNS, the FAA may also consult with other agencies as shown in Table 2 of this AC, as appropriate.
Table 1– Partner Agencies Agency Primary Area of Responsibility Department of Defense Issues related to US national security Department of State Issues related to US foreign policy Federal Communications Commission US commercially owned communications satellites and frequency issues involving FCC licensing of transmitters, including those on launch/reentry vehicles for telemetry National Aeronautics and Space Administration The effect of commercial space activities on NASA programs and Center operations National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration US commercially owned remote sensing satellites United States Coast Guard Overflight of navigable waterways Office of the Director of National Intelligence Issues related to US national security
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 20 Table 2 – Additional Government Agencies Consulted for SNS Policy or Payload Review Additional Government Agencies Reason for Participation in the Policy Review Department of Energy Nuclear material sourced from the DOE Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Material in the SNS poses a nuclear proliferation concern Department of State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Material in the SNS poses a nuclear proliferation concern;
NNSA provides critical capabilities to USG response in the case of a nuclear or radiological incident.
Federal Emergency Management Agency National Response Framework, Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commercial use or possession of nuclear material Office of the Director of National Intelligence Radiation emissions from the space nuclear system have potential to interfere with national assets
6.2.4 Environmental Review.
The FAA is responsible for complying with the procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act and other applicable environmental laws prior to issuing a launch or reentry license, and an applicant must provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such requirements. As specified in § 450.47, when directed by the FAA, an applicant must prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
assume financial responsibility for preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and managed consultant or contractor; or submit information to support a written re-evaluation of a previously submitted Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement.
6.2.5 M aximum Probable Loss (MPL) Determination.
6.2.5.1 In 14 CFR part 440, the FAA prescribes the amount of liability insurance required by the launch or reentry license applicant to compensate for the total of covered third-party claims for bodily injury or property damage, including Government personnel and property. This amount cannot exceed $500 million US dollars (USD), or the maximum liability insurance available on the world market at reasonable cost. Subject to Congressional appropriation, the Federal government indemnifies the launch or reentry operator for claims above the insured amount up to $1.5 billion USD, adjusted for inflation from January 1989.
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6.2.5.2 MPL is the greatest dollar amount of loss for bodily injury or property damage that is reasonably expected to result from a licensed or permitted activity. Third parties are people, including government personnel, other than those involved in a licensed or permitted launch or reentry activity.
6.2.5.3 Property damage is the partial or total destruction, impairment, or loss of tangible property, real or personal. Radiological contamination can cause partial or total destruction of tangible property. Property damage includes the cost of radiological clean-up and remediation activities performed to limits required by the U.S. government, which can be substantial.
6.2.5.4 The FAA conducts a maximum probable loss analysis based on information provided by an applicant in accordance with § 450.31(a)(6), which refers to information requirements in part 440.
6.3 Other Agency Regulations.
6.3.1 Launch or reentry of SNS may be subject to regulation by other Federal agencies. The NRC is the terrestrial nuclear regulator, and the FAA expects that most commercial SNS missions will use commercial SNS devices that are under the regulatory authority of the NRC while on the ground. In some cases, the DOE or DOD may be the nuclear safety regulator. In these situations, the DOE or DOD will perform terrestrial nuclear safety regulation, while the FAA will remain responsible for protecting public safety during the launch and reentry. When ground transportation of the SNS occurs, the DOT PHMSA (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration) is involved as the nuclear material transportation safety regulator. Applicants should be aware of the appropriate terrestrial nuclear safety regulator for their SNS and operate in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Table 3 provides government agencies with roles in SNS licensing.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 22 Table 3 – Government Agencies with Roles in SNS Licensing Agency Responsibilities Department of Defense Responsible for national security and critical asset protection, including federal launch ranges, launch sites, and national security missions (Department of the Air Force & FAA 2021).
Department of Energy Produces certain nuclear materials and space nuclear systems, will be involved if the DOE is the source of the nuclear fuel (DOE 2021). DOE provides indemnification for nuclear mishaps.
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Works globally to prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring weapons-usable nuclear or radiological materials and technology (National Nuclear Security Administration 2021).
NNSA Nuclear Emergency Response Teams (NEST) are the lead response teams when responding to accidents involving nuclear material.”
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency Planning for severe (worst-case credible) accident with release of radioactive material in populated areas (FEMA REP Program Manual 2019).
Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Prevents the spread of weapons of mass destruction, tracks, develops, and implements effective responses to proliferation threats (Department of State 2021) Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Regulates transportation using large trucks or busses, as described in Title 49 CFR parts 300-399 (Title 49 CFR Chapter I 2021).
Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Transportation of hazardous (including radioactive) materials (Title 49 CFR Chapter I 2021).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licenses the commercial possession and use of nuclear material (Title 10 CFR Chapter I 2021). Authorizes Type B and fissile material packages for its licensees, as well as for NRC agreement state licensees use.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 23 7 TIER LEVELS AND SAFETY GUIDELINES.
7.1 NSPM-20 Tier Level Definitions.
7.1.1 NSPM-20 categorizes launches and reentries involving SNS into three Tiers of radiological risk based upon the PER, the level of total activity, and national security considerations of the SNS. NSPM-20 assigns SNS to the highest Tier for which they satisfy any criteria and, for commercial launches and reentries, directs the FAA to coordinate with other Federal agencies, based on the Tier. Because these tiers impact the FAA’s level of government coordination, and so may impact the timing and depth of any review, the FAA provides the following descriptions from NSPM-20.
a. Ti er I. Applies to launches of spacecraft containing radioactive sources of total quantities up to and including 100,000 times the A21 value listed in Table 2 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Specific Safety Requirements (SSR) No. SSR–6 (Rev. 1), Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition.2
b. Ti er II. Applies to:
(i) Launches of spacecraft containing radioactive sources in excess of 100,000 times the A2 value referenced above;
(ii) Any Tier I launches where the associated safety analyses determine that the probability of an accident during launch or subsequent operation resulting in an exposure in the range of 5 rem to 25 rem TED to any member of the public is equal to or greater than 1 in 1,000,000; and
(iii) Any launches of spacecraft containing nuclear fission systems and other devices with a potential for criticality3 when such systems utilize low-enriched uranium.4
c. Ti er III. Applies to launches of any spacecraft containing a space nuclear system for which the associated safety analyses determine that the probability of an accident during launch or subsequent operation resulting in an exposure in excess of 25 rem TED to any member of the public is equal to or greater than 1 in 1,000,000. Due to potential national security considerations associated with nuclear nonproliferation, Tier III also applies to launches of spacecraft containing nuclear fission systems and other devices with a potential for criticality when such systems utilize any nuclear fuel other than low-enriched uranium.
1 A2 is an activity value, i.e., a level of radioactivity, in System International (SI) units of Tera-Becquerel (TBq) listed in the IAEA SSR-6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition, Table 2. Note:
1 TBq is approximately = 27 Ci.
2 Small amounts of nuclear materials such as those present in instrumentation may not necessarily result in an extensive review.
3 The condition in which a nuclear fission chain reaction becomes self-sustaining.
4 Less than 20 percent uranium-235 enrichment.
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7.1.2 Tier II and Tier III can include low enriched Uranium (LEU) systems capable of criticality, as determined by the results of a probabilistic risk assessment. Only the Tier III definition includes SNS capable of criticality that employ other than LEU fuels, including highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and other fissile radionuclides.
7.1.3 Per NSPM-20, the FAA will consult with the heads of appropriate Federal agencies for commercial activities in Tier II or Tier III.
7.1.4 A flowchart to aid applicants in determining the Tier level of an SNS is provided in Figure 1 of this AC.