Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 21
6.2.5.2 MPL is the greatest dollar amount of loss for bodily injury or property damage that is reasonably expected to result from a licensed or permitted activity. Third parties are people, including government personnel, other than those involved in a licensed or permitted launch or reentry activity.
6.2.5.3 Property damage is the partial or total destruction, impairment, or loss of tangible property, real or personal. Radiological contamination can cause partial or total destruction of tangible property. Property damage includes the cost of radiological clean-up and remediation activities performed to limits required by the U.S. government, which can be substantial.
6.2.5.4 The FAA conducts a maximum probable loss analysis based on information provided by an applicant in accordance with § 450.31(a)(6), which refers to information requirements in part 440.
6.3 Other Agency Regulations.
6.3.1 Launch or reentry of SNS may be subject to regulation by other Federal agencies. The NRC is the terrestrial nuclear regulator, and the FAA expects that most commercial SNS missions will use commercial SNS devices that are under the regulatory authority of the NRC while on the ground. In some cases, the DOE or DOD may be the nuclear safety regulator. In these situations, the DOE or DOD will perform terrestrial nuclear safety regulation, while the FAA will remain responsible for protecting public safety during the launch and reentry. When ground transportation of the SNS occurs, the DOT PHMSA (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration) is involved as the nuclear material transportation safety regulator. Applicants should be aware of the appropriate terrestrial nuclear safety regulator for their SNS and operate in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Table 3 provides government agencies with roles in SNS licensing.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 22 Table 3 – Government Agencies with Roles in SNS Licensing Agency Responsibilities Department of Defense Responsible for national security and critical asset protection, including federal launch ranges, launch sites, and national security missions (Department of the Air Force & FAA 2021).
Department of Energy Produces certain nuclear materials and space nuclear systems, will be involved if the DOE is the source of the nuclear fuel (DOE 2021). DOE provides indemnification for nuclear mishaps.
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Works globally to prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring weapons-usable nuclear or radiological materials and technology (National Nuclear Security Administration 2021).
NNSA Nuclear Emergency Response Teams (NEST) are the lead response teams when responding to accidents involving nuclear material.”
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency Planning for severe (worst-case credible) accident with release of radioactive material in populated areas (FEMA REP Program Manual 2019).
Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Prevents the spread of weapons of mass destruction, tracks, develops, and implements effective responses to proliferation threats (Department of State 2021) Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Regulates transportation using large trucks or busses, as described in Title 49 CFR parts 300-399 (Title 49 CFR Chapter I 2021).
Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Transportation of hazardous (including radioactive) materials (Title 49 CFR Chapter I 2021).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licenses the commercial possession and use of nuclear material (Title 10 CFR Chapter I 2021). Authorizes Type B and fissile material packages for its licensees, as well as for NRC agreement state licensees use.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 23 7 TIER LEVELS AND SAFETY GUIDELINES.
7.1 NSPM-20 Tier Level Definitions.
7.1.1 NSPM-20 categorizes launches and reentries involving SNS into three Tiers of radiological risk based upon the PER, the level of total activity, and national security considerations of the SNS. NSPM-20 assigns SNS to the highest Tier for which they satisfy any criteria and, for commercial launches and reentries, directs the FAA to coordinate with other Federal agencies, based on the Tier. Because these tiers impact the FAA’s level of government coordination, and so may impact the timing and depth of any review, the FAA provides the following descriptions from NSPM-20.
a. Ti er I. Applies to launches of spacecraft containing radioactive sources of total quantities up to and including 100,000 times the A21 value listed in Table 2 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Specific Safety Requirements (SSR) No. SSR–6 (Rev. 1), Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition.2
b. Ti er II. Applies to:
(i) Launches of spacecraft containing radioactive sources in excess of 100,000 times the A2 value referenced above;
(ii) Any Tier I launches where the associated safety analyses determine that the probability of an accident during launch or subsequent operation resulting in an exposure in the range of 5 rem to 25 rem TED to any member of the public is equal to or greater than 1 in 1,000,000; and
(iii) Any launches of spacecraft containing nuclear fission systems and other devices with a potential for criticality3 when such systems utilize low-enriched uranium.4
c. Ti er III. Applies to launches of any spacecraft containing a space nuclear system for which the associated safety analyses determine that the probability of an accident during launch or subsequent operation resulting in an exposure in excess of 25 rem TED to any member of the public is equal to or greater than 1 in 1,000,000. Due to potential national security considerations associated with nuclear nonproliferation, Tier III also applies to launches of spacecraft containing nuclear fission systems and other devices with a potential for criticality when such systems utilize any nuclear fuel other than low-enriched uranium.
1 A2 is an activity value, i.e., a level of radioactivity, in System International (SI) units of Tera-Becquerel (TBq) listed in the IAEA SSR-6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition, Table 2. Note:
1 TBq is approximately = 27 Ci.
2 Small amounts of nuclear materials such as those present in instrumentation may not necessarily result in an extensive review.
3 The condition in which a nuclear fission chain reaction becomes self-sustaining.
4 Less than 20 percent uranium-235 enrichment.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 24
7.1.2 Tier II and Tier III can include low enriched Uranium (LEU) systems capable of criticality, as determined by the results of a probabilistic risk assessment. Only the Tier III definition includes SNS capable of criticality that employ other than LEU fuels, including highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and other fissile radionuclides.
7.1.3 Per NSPM-20, the FAA will consult with the heads of appropriate Federal agencies for commercial activities in Tier II or Tier III.
7.1.4 A flowchart to aid applicants in determining the Tier level of an SNS is provided in Figure 1 of this AC.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 Candidate SNS Device and Safety Analysis Results Nuclear Fission System or Has Potential for \ Yes Criticality Using Other Than LEU Fuel ·No Tier III PER ≥ 1x10-° of > 25 Yes rem TED · No Nuclear Fission System or Potential for Has Yes Criticality Using LEU Fuel · No PER ≥ 1x10- of Yes Tier Il 5 to 25 rem TED ·No Total Legend Activity Applicant Produced Product >100,000 Yes Data Driven Conclusion A2 Tier 1 ·No Tier II Tier III Tier I Figure 1- NSPM-20 Tier Level Determination Aid 25
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 26
7.2 SNS Safety Guidelines.
7.2.1 As noted earlier, in accordance with § 450.45(e)(6), the FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of any SNS on a case-by-case basis and issue an approval if the FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. Use of the following criteria (in terms of Probability of Exposure to Radiation (PER)), in conjunction with the analyses set forth in paragraph 8.3 and Appendix A of this AC, is one way to demonstrate that the launch or reentry of the SNS is consistent with public health and safety:5
a. An accident resulting in exposure in excess of 25 millirem but less than 5 rem Total Effective Dose (TED), as defined in 10 CFR § 835.2, to any member of the public is unlikely, such that the probability of such an event does not exceed 1 in 100;
b. An accident resulting in exposure in the range of 5 rem to 25 rem TED to any member of the public is extremely unlikely, such that the probability of such an event does not exceed 1 in 10,000; and
c. The probability of an accident resulting in exposure in excess of 25 rem TED to any member of the public does not exceed 1 in 100,000.
7.2.2 Figure 2 of this AC was created to help applicants visualize potential PERs, the NSPM-20 Tier level based on PER, and the Safety Guidelines, and to identify any unique considerations based on the PER. Because Figure 2 of this AC considers only the PER, it does not capture the full scope of the Tier levels specified above, which can also be impacted by the quantity or type of nuclear material. The Tier levels are the grey, yellow, and gold boxes, while the black line capping the Tier boxes illustrates the SNS Safety Guidelines.
5 These safety guidelines are stated in terms of probability of occurrence for a member of the public receiving ionizing radiation exposure—specifically, the probability of occurrence of a Total Effective Dose of threshold magnitudes. Radiation exposure within these criteria is not expected to cause death or serious injury. However, consistent with the linear no-threshold model of radiation exposure, any amount of radiation is assumed to increase the risk of stochastic radiation effects (e.g. cancer in the exposed individual). To distinguish that SNS radiation exposure is not normally expected to cause casualties, the FAA uses the term Probability of Exposure to Radiation, PER, to describe the probabilistic risks to the public associated with an SNS. The PER is a two-part term, specifying both the probability and magnitude of the dose to the most exposed member of the public.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 PER'S of Note
1.00E+00
1.00E-01 Guidelines of NSPM-20 Exceeds the Safety Exceeds the Probability
1.00E-02 of Casualty to an Tier I Below Lowest Individual (Logsa 1.00E-03 NSPM-20 Specified Dose Member of the Public Threshold Tier I by PER in Title 14 CFR Part
1.00E-05 Tier Il by 450.101 PER Tier I|l by PER
1.00E-06 Contributes to Maximum Probable Loss Determination
1.00E-07
0.001 0.01 Total Effective Dose in Rem (Log Scale) Figure 2 - Considerations Given to Various PER'S
7.2.3 To ensure the individual risk requirements of 14 CFR § 450.101(a)(2) are met, the applicant should select and justify to the FAA a TED value above which a casualty from their operation may occur. In situations where the PER exceeds 1x10-° of a dose greater than this specified TED value, the FAA considers that the Pc exceeds the individual risk limit of § 450.101(a)(2). Figure 2 symbolizes this by the light blue box.
The FAA considers exposure above that TED level a casualty for the purposes of evaluating the risk limit in § 450.101(a)(2). Therefore, such an exposure would violate the regulatory safety criteria defined in § 450.101(a)(2).
7.3 Notes on the Tier Level Definitions.
7.3.1 Subsequent Operation. Embedded in the definition for the various Tier levels is an important detail: the Tier level for an SNS is defined not only by the risk to the public during launch and reentry, but also by the risk to the public during subsequent operation, such as uncontrolled reentry.° Uncontrolled reentry can be initiated in a variety of ways, including malfunction, collision, hacking, deliberate signal " Note that NSPM-20 uses the term "reentry" in a generic sense and is not limited to the reentry of a reentry vehicle as defined in 14 CFR § 401.7.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 28 interference, operator error, etc. Applicants are encouraged to be mindful of how these initiation scenarios might result in inadvertent reentry, and the changes they might have on the SNS prior to, during, or after the uncontrolled reentry to create a robust assessment of potential consequences to a maximally exposed individual member of the public in accident scenarios.
7.3.2 C riticality . Criticality related to an SNS refers to an achievable state of sustained nuclear fission chain reactions (Paxton 1989). Radiological activity is greatly increased for radioactive materials during and after critical or supercritical chain reactions (American Nuclear Society 2018). Criticality depends upon several isotopic and physical or geometrical considerations related to neutron production, moderation, reflection, capture, and leakage. These factors can be changed by changing environmental conditions outside the SNS (Knief 2013). An applicant should consider the specifics of its SNS and all environments their SNS may encounter during normal and abnormal operating conditions to determine if the device is capable of criticality or unintended criticality. This is addressed further in Appendix A of this AC.
7.3.3 Quantities of Radioactive Material.
7.3.3.1 The amount of radioactive material is referenced to the A2 activity level, a level of activity for a specific radionuclide in SI units of TBq, listed in Table 2 of the IAEA SSR-6. This comparison is analogous to the mission multiple (MM), which was used in historical government launches.
Applicants choosing to use MM to describe the activity of their SNS should use the standard definition as shown in the following equation:
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = � ( 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑨𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝒑𝒑𝑺𝑺 𝑺𝑺 𝑰𝑰 𝑰𝑰𝑺𝑺𝑨𝑨 𝑺𝑺𝒑𝒑𝑺𝑺)𝒏𝒏 (𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑺𝑺𝑨𝑨 𝑺𝑺𝒑𝒑𝑨𝑨𝑺𝑺 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑺𝑺 𝑺𝑺)𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏
Mission Multiple Equation (NASA 2022)
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 29
7.3.3.2 MM is a dimensionless integer coefficient that scales a value of the activity level A2. For example, if total activity equals 100,000 × A2, MM equals 100,000. Additional information on specific A2 values, their combination and derivation can be found in:
• IAEA Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.
SSG-26, Rev 1, (2018 Edition).
• IAEA, Regulations for the Safe transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-6 (Rev.1), 2018.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 8 SPACE NUCLEAR SYSTEM LICENSING PROCESS.
8.1 Overview of Licensing Process
8.1.1 The launch and reentry license process is illustrated in Figure 3 of this AC. Any launch or reentry with an SNS will follow this process. As noted earlier, the FAA will address the unique safety aspects of SNS on a case-by-case basis during the licensing process.
8.1.2 Because of the unique public safety issues raised by use of SNS in commercial launch or reentry activity, the FAA encourages applicants to begin pre-application consultation for launches or reentries involving SNS as early as possible. The pre-application engagement with the FAA provides guidance for the applicant on developing an acceptable application, the roadmap to engaging with other government agencies, and the administrative and technical requirements for the application. This enables a timely and effective licensing evaluation and determination when the application package is complete enough for review.
Pre-Application Consultation* *Pre-Application for New License or Compliance Lifecycle Management of Existing License Planning Templates and Guidance:
**License and Applicant May Request: • Application Letter License Orders Lifecycle • Unique Means or Compliance (MOC) Template Will Reference • even Loved of stay • Application Compliance the Compliance Management Checklist Document Set: • Sample Compliance Document List Compliance document set includes the application data Modify License Issue License or Acceptance for New or Modified License Application • Pre-Application • Means of Compliance Consultation Checklist submittals below: Table
• Crosswalk Mapping to
• Application Letter Legacy Regulations
• Application with FAA Evaluates • Advisory Circulars
• Application Compliance Compliance Documents Determination and Compiles • License & License Orders FAA Makes License • Environmental Review • Policy Review • Safety Review Checklist • Compliance Document Set** • Financial Responsibility • Payload Review
- Any Waivers & ELOS Figure 3 - License Evaluation Process
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 31
8.2 Licensing Process for the Launch or Reentry of an SNS.
8.2.1 The FAA issues a vehicle operator license if it determines that the launch or reentry operator can launch or reenter without jeopardizing public health and safety, the safety of property, or the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. All the data requirements and licensing stages for a conventional launch or reentry, as described in 14 CFR part 450, apply for the launch or reentry of an SNS.
8.2.2 To show compliance with § 450.45(e)(6) specifically, an applicant can provide the information and conduct the analyses described in paragraph 8.3 below and Appendix A of this AC.
8.3 Nuclear Safety Analyses to Demonstrate Acceptable Public Health and Safety.
8.3.1 The scope and content of the nuclear safety analyses demonstrating compliance with the public health and safety criteria should be commensurate with the level of mission radiological risk incurred. Figure 4 provides applicants a way to determine which nuclear safety analyses could be used to demonstrate acceptable level of public health and safety for various SNS, and Appendix A provides details on the scope and intent of the various analyses.
Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems AC 450.45-1 SNS Device and Mission Description Prepared Radioactive Materials Onboard Report (RMR) Prepared Legend Applicant Produced Product The sum of Data Driven Conclusion the ratios of 10 CFR 30.72 NSPM-20 Tier I Schedule C ves → Radiological Emergency NSPM-20 Tier I| Quantities × Response Plan Prepared Release NSPM-20 Tier III Factors Applicant Determination exceeds 1 Subject to FAA Concurrence Optional Paths for Applicants → No Fissile, Criticality Hazard Analysis Yes Fertile or Fissionable Prepared Isotopes Present _ NO OPTIONAL:
Device has Comparison made to existing No analyses and quantity limits to potential for determine the maximum potential exposure based on criticality.
RMR information.
Optional Comparison Process LEU Optional Comparison Omitted Fuel Maximum Total exposure Activity shows ≤ 5 potential yes ≤ 100,000 Onboard rem TED to a A2; or, Tier Il or III, Tier III, member of MM ≤ Additional Additional the public. 100,000 Analysis Analysis Needed Needed → No No Tier I, No Analysis Maximum Needed Criticality Safety exposure Analysis Prepared potential Yes Tier II, No Further shows ≤ 25 Analysis rem TED to a Needed member of the public.
NO Radiological Hazard Analysis Prepared High Fidelity Radiological Safety Analysis Prepared Tier Level Determined If Not Already Known Safety Analysis Report Prepared Figure 4 - Nuclear Safety Analysis Flow Chart 32