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4.4.5.3 PIAs used by an aircraft other than the aircraft to which the address is assigned results is a violation of § 91.227 and notification to the FAA. Upon detection of improper PIA use, the aircraft owner/operator will be issued a warning that requires immediate action to remedy the issue before the next operation involving the assigned PIA. Failure to comply may result in the revocation of the PIA assignment. Upon revocation of the PIA assignment, the aircraft would be required to fly with its original ICAO aircraft address as found in the CAR, and failure to do so would result in regulatory enforcement action by the FAA and cessation of additional PIA assignments to that aircraft until the enforcement action is closed.
4.4.5.4 An aircraft operator may use the ICAO aircraft address originally assigned and recorded in the CAR at any time for operations, including any time while having an active PIA assignment. Use of the assigned ICAO aircraft address recorded in the CAR is required for all flights leaving U.S. sovereign airspace, and it may be used for any other flights at any time, as desired by the aircraft operator.
4.4.5.5 The FAA requires that the user submits documented validation that an ICAO code has been correctly installed into the aircraft’s ADS-B avionics after each change. Refer to the FAA PIA website for complete program details.
4.5 Preflight Requirements (U.S. Airspace).
Note: The remainder of paragraph 4.5 describes additional preflight considerations that do not apply to the operation of aircraft equipped with Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS)/Aircraft-Based Augmentation System (ABAS) position sources, as further described in paragraphs 4.5.1.4 and 4.5.1.5.
4.5.1 Flight Planning Requirements for Certain Operators. Under § 91.103, pilots and operators must use all available information in planning their flight, to ensure that the performance requirements will be met for the duration of the flight. Variations in position source performance affect ADS-B Out in two specific broadcast elements required by § 91.227—Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp) and Navigation Integrity Category (NIC). During certain Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation geometries, some position sources may produce values for NACp and NIC that are less than required by the rule.
4.5.1.1 Four different variants of GPS receivers are currently in use as a position source that can meet ADS-B Out rule performance requirements, to varying degrees, when adequate numbers of GPS satellites are in view. Selective availability (SA) is a feature that deliberately degraded the GPS satellite signal, resulting in a less accurate reported position. SA was deactivated in 2000.
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4.5.1.2 SA-On GPS receivers assume SA is still active (on), thereby unnecessarily inflating integrity and accuracy bounds of the positions that are no longer degraded by SA. Most GPS receivers that are only compliant with TSO-C129, Airborne Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using the Global Positioning System (GPS), are SA-On receivers.
4.5.1.3 SA-Aware GPS receivers are designed to recognize that SA is inactive and optimize the performance from GPS. GPS receivers that comply with the performance requirements of TSO-C196, Airborne Supplemental Navigation Sensors for Global Positioning System Equipment using Aircraft-Based Augmentation, are SA-Aware receivers.
4.5.1.4 SBAS receivers also use the additional signals from geostationary satellites specifically designed for aviation use, improving the quality and robustness of positioning performance. This difference in performance is most pronounced for very precise operations, such as localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) approaches, and for all operations when there are inoperative GPS satellites. GPS receivers complying with TSO-C145, Airborne Navigation Sensors Using the Global Positioning System Augmented by the Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS), or TSO-C146, Stand-Alone Airborne Navigation Equipment Using the Global Positioning System Augmented by the Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS), are SBAS receivers.
4.5.1.5 ABAS sensors tightly integrate GPS measurements with inertial reference/navigation sensor data, improving the quality and robustness of positioning performance. This difference in performance is most pronounced for lower lev el Required Navigation Performance (RNP) operations, such as Area Navigation (RNAV) approaches, and for all operations when there are inoperative GPS satellites.
Note 1. Some GPS receivers manufactured with a TSO-C129a appr oval are SA-Aware, and, therefore, have the sam e NACp and NIC availability as TSO-C196() approved equipment. Operators should check with their GPS receiver supplier to ver ify whether their insta lle d TSO-C129() GPS receiver is SA-On or SA-Aware.
Note 2. The wide area augmentation system (WAAS) is the desig nation of the SBAS system available in North America and is the term often used when making reference to SBAS in the United States.
4.5.2 GPS Performance Prediction. For aircraft equipped with TSO-C129() or TSO-C196() GPS units to support ADS-B Out equipment, an NACp and NIC GPS service availability prediction should be performed for the intended route of flight (route and time) using available GPS satellite information and guidance published in this AC. It is not necessary for operators of aircraft equipped with the WAAS (TSO-C145 or TSO-C146) receivers to conduct a preflight availability prediction. Operators of aircraft equipped with specific
4-13 ABAS receivers that have been reviewed by the FAA, are approved for ADS-B operations (i.e., §§ 91.225 and 91.227), and have demonstrated sufficient performance do not need to conduct a preflight availability prediction. For operations under Exemption 12555, see paragraph 4.5.3 for additional guidance. See Table 4-1, Preflight Availability Prediction, for a summary.
Note: Operators should check with their ABAS receiver supplier and/or airplane manufacturer to verify whether their installed ABAS receiver has been reviewed and approved by the FAA for operation without need to conduct a preflight availability prediction.
4.5.2.1 Prediction Methods. Operators may use any of the following preflight availability prediction methods.
4.5.2.1.1 Operators of large fleets of aircraft or users of flight planning programs may wish to use their own preflight availability verification tool. The operator is responsible for selecting a tool that accurately predicts the ADS-B position source performance for their aircraft. The tool needs to account for the GPS satellites that are in service at the time of the prediction, and may take into account unique characteristics of the GNSS receiver, aircraft integration, or installation; including performance better than required in FAA standards or use of inertial information integrated into the ADS-B Out position source. The FAA does not evaluate or approve a particular tool, but may evaluate the basis of the operator’s determination that the tool is appropriate to their aircraft, particularly if its use results in noncompliant flights in airspace where ADS-B Out is required.
4.5.2.1.2 Operators may use the FAA-provided preflight availability prediction tool, called the Service Availability Prediction Tool (SAPT) (http://sapt.faa.gov).
Refer to the SAPT User Guide for specific instructions on its use.
4.5.2.1.3 Operators may use a third-party interface, incorporating FAA GPS performance prediction data without altering performance values, to predict NACp/NIC performance outages for the aircraft’s predicted flightpath and times.
4.5.2.2 Prediction Model Parameters. The operator should use a model appropriate to their equipment, including the type of GPS receiver and the demonstrated capability to track satellites at a given mask angle. When selecting a mask angle, the operator should consider the equipment qualification, installation in the aircraft, and the effects of normal maneuvering. Aircraft are typically qualified with a five-degree mask angle, and operational experience has indicated that a two-degree mask angle can be achieved by some equipment installations. If using the SAPT, each prediction is valid for the operation within 5 minutes of the plan time and 7.5 nautical miles (NM) of the route.
The operator may wish to submit additional requests for predictions for
4-14 varying times around the proposed departure time to ensure compliance at the actual departure time.
4.5.2.3 Flight Planning Guidance. Predictions should be conducted within 24 hours of departure and as close to departure time as feasible, but with sufficient time to re-plan the flight in the event a segment along the planned route is predicted to have insufficient GPS service availability. The prediction should be re-evaluated prior to flight if new information (i.e., a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM)) provides notice of an unscheduled GPS satellite outage. In the event of a predicted loss of performance for any part along the intended route in the airspace where ADS-B Out is required, the flight should be re-planned so that ADS-B Out performance requirements specified in § 91.227 can be met.
Table 4-1. Preflight Availability Prediction Preflight availability prediction?
Equipment Years 2020-2024 After 2024 Exemption 12555 No Exemption SA-On Yes SAPT will determine backup surveillance and exemption authorizes flight if prediction results in NIC < 7 and/or NACp < 8.
Yes If prediction results in NIC < 7 and/or NACp < 8, operator should re-plan the flight or request ATC authorization.
Yes If prediction results in NIC < 7 and/or NACp < 8, operator should re-plan the flight or request ATC authorization.
SA-Aware No Exemption authorizes flight without the need for preflight prediction.
Yes If prediction results in NIC < 7 and/or NACp < 8, operator should re-plan the flight or request ATC authorization.
Yes If prediction results in NIC < 7 and/or NACp < 8, operator should re-plan the flight or request ATC authorization.
SBAS/ABAS No No No
4.5.3 Operations Conducted Under Exemption No. 12555. In August 2015, the Administrator issued Exemption No. 12555, a time-limited grant of exemption from § 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii) for the period from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2024 to operators who made timely notification of intent to comply with the conditions and limitations.
Those operators approved to conduct operations under the conditions and limitations of Exemption No. 12555, or a similar exemption as determined by the FAA, should adhere to the additional guidance provided in this section.
4-15 Note: Operators approved to operate under Exemption No. 12555 are encouraged to review the conditions and limitations detailed in the Grant of Exemption No. 12555 at Docket Number FAA-2015-0971, Petition for Exemption, at https://www.regulations.gov/.
4.5.3.1 Under the conditions of Exemption No. 12555, operators with receivers meeting the performance requirements of TSO-C196() may operate in designated airspace for which ADS-B Out is required when the aircraft’s NACp and NIC do not meet the performance specified in § 91.227. For these operations, the operator does not need to conduct any preflight availability prediction.
4.5.3.2 Operators conducting operations under Exemption No. 12555 using TSO-C129-approved GPS receivers that do not meet the performance requirements of TSO-C196, TSO-C145, or TSO-C146 may operate in airspace where ADS-B Out is required when the aircraft’s NACp and NIC do not meet the performance specified in § 91.227, when the FAA determines that backup surveillance is available. SAPT will indicate if the FAA has determined that backup surveillance is predicted to be available during a predicted performance outage. Since the FAA must make the determination that backup surveillance is predicted to be available, the SAPT is the only tool that can provide this capability. The applicable SAPT run should be completed no more than 3 hours before the planned departure time. If ATC in the departure jurisdiction requires FP submission earlier than 3 hours prior, the SAPT for backup surveillance should be run just prior to FP submission.
Under Exemption No. 12555, operators may elect to use their own tool for preflight prediction and use SAPT only to determine the availability of backup surveillance when needed under Exemption No. 12555.
4.5.4 Preflight Prediction Compliance. Operators need to perform an ADS-B Out preflight prediction only for the intended route of flight to the intended destination. For example, when departure and/or arrival alternate airports are required, no preflight prediction is necessary for these routes. However, if you become aware of a change that could result in degraded ADS-B Out performance, such as a satellite outage prior to receiving an ATC clearance for the intended route of flight, then you should conduct a subsequent preflight prediction for the planned flight. This will ensure that ADS-B Out performance is still predicted to comply with the performance requirements of § 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii).
Once the pilot has received an ATC route clearance, there is no requirement to conduct a subsequent preflight prediction. Therefore, upon receiving a satisfactory preflight availability prediction and an ATC clearance for an intended route of flight, the operator will be deemed to have complied with the preflight availability prediction requirement and the performance requirements of § 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii). The FAA accepts that unanticipated changes in route of flight and environmental conditions may adversely affect ADS-B Out performance. ATC will continue to exercise its responsibility for the safe and efficient movement of air traffic, including the routing of traffic to meet those objectives. ADS-B preflight planning should include:
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• Identification of flights or aircraft that require completion of a preflight prediction.
• Identify the preflight prediction system (or systems) to be used.
• Include a means to document completion of a satisfactory prediction for each flight where a prediction is required.
• Retain documentation of prediction completion for a suitable period of time, such as three months.
4.5.5 GPS Interference with ADS-B Compliance. There may be times when the GPS position source cannot meet the required technical performance for compliance with § 91.227 due to planned GPS interference. In the event of a scheduled interference outage of GPS, the FAA will issue a NOTAM that identifies the airspace and time periods that may be affected by the interference. The FAA has determined that it would be impractical and not in the public interest to require operators to avoid the affected area based on the chance that an otherwise compliant flight could experience GPS interference.
Accordingly, operators should proceed with their intended operation if the only impediment to their operation is possible planned GPS interference. An operator who is required to perform a preflight availability prediction for the intended route of flight is still required to obtain a satisfactory preflight availability prediction. When a NOTAM identifies the airspace and time periods that may be affected by GPS interference, an operator will not be required to alter his or her route of flight to avoid the area based solely on that NOTAM. If an operator encounters actual GPS interference during their flight that results in a degradation of ADS-B Out performance, provided the operator has taken the appropriate preflight actions, the FAA will not consider these events to constitute a violation, as such application of the regulation would impose standard of conduct wholly outside the operator’s control.
4.5.6 SAPT Outages. The FAA will issue a NOTAM in the event of a SAPT outage. Operators who use SAPT as their preflight prediction tool will not need to conduct a preflight prediction for the duration of the outage. Additionally, any flight plans submitted to ATC with a proposed departure time within 90 minutes of SAPT return to service do not require a subsequent preflight analysis. When there is a SAPT outage and an operation falls below the performance requirements, provided the operator has taken the appropriate preflight actions with regard to relying upon SAPT, the FAA will not consider these events to constitute a violation, as such application of the regulation would impose standard of conduct wholly outside the operator’s control. For operators who have been notified by the FAA of consistent and repeated ADS-B Out performance issues, the FAA cautions that operating during a SAPT outage without first redressing the identified non-performance issue will be considered a continuation of existing noncompliance of the performance requirements.
4.6 Flightcrew Entry of Required ADS-B Data. The operator should develop operational procedures to address flightcrew entry of the ADS-B message elements required in § 91.227 and as described in paragraphs 4.6.1 through 4.6.4. If the ADS-B avionics system design does not allow for a single point of entry for this information, the AFM, AFMS, RFM, RFMS, POH, or other required flight manual must address the requirement
4-17 to enter the information multiple times through the appropriate system’s interface and to ensure that conflicting ACID information is not transmitted to ATC.
4.6.1 Mode A Code.
4.6.1.1 ATC automation relies on the Mode A code to identify aircraft under radar surveillance and to correlate the displayed target to an FP. The Mode A code is one element of the transmitted ADS-B message set. Since SSR and ADS-B surveillance will overlap in much of the NAS, correlation of the Mode A code between the transponder and the ADS-B message is necessary to ensure that a single target is resolved and correlated to an FP route.
4.6.1.2 It is imperative that the ATC-assigned transponder code is identical to the one in the ADS-B Out message. A preferable design configuration is one that provides the pilot a single point of entry for the Mode A code in both the transponder and the ADS-B Out avionics. If there is no single point of entry provided for the Mode A code into the transponder, then the AFM or operating handbook must address the requirement to enter the Mode A code into both systems separately.
Note: Transmission of conflicting transponder and ADS-B Mode A codes will result in erroneous traffic conflict alerts within the ATC automation system.
4.6.2 Aircraft’s Flight Identification (FLT ID).
4.6.2.1 An aircraft’s FLT ID is transmitted by the ADS-B Out avionics. The FLT ID is composed of a maximum of seven alphanumeric characters and, per § 91.227(d)(8), must be identical to the “Aircraft Identification” as entered in Item 7 of the FP. It is also referred to as a call sign. The FLT ID is typically entered by the flightcrew during preflight through either a flight management system (FMS) interface (control display unit (CDU)) or transponder control panel. The FLT ID for General Aviation (GA) aircraft is typically associated with the aircraft’s registration number. The aircraft owner can preset the FLT ID to the aircraft’s registration number (e.g., N235RA), since it is a fixed value, or the pilot can enter it into the ADS-B Out system prior to flight, provided the ADS-B avionics has this capability. It is important to know that the FLT ID should be input into the ADS-B system exactly as filed in block 2 or Item 7 of the FP. No additional characters should be used to fill all available fields.
4.6.2.2 Some ATC systems use transmitted FLT IDs to uniquely identify each aircraft within a given airspace and correlate them with a filed FP for the provision of surveillance and separation services. If the FLT ID is not entered correctly, ATC automation systems may not associate surveillance tracks for the aircraft to its filed FP. Therefore, air traffic services may be delayed or unavailable until this is corrected. Consequently, it is imperative that flightcrews and GA
4-18 pilots ensure the FLT ID entry correctly matches the ACID annotated in the filed ATC FP prior to departure.
4.6.2.3 In FAA ATC systems, if the FLT ID transmitted by the aircraft’s ADS-B system does not exactly match the FLT ID on the FP, a call sign mismatch (CSMM) occurs. When a CSMM occurs, the controller is alerted and may take action resulting in a flight delay. Furthermore, ATC may elect to advise the Flight Standards Service of the event and the potential violation of § 91.227(d)(8). The specific wording of this regulation has caused misunderstanding from numerous operators and airmen who believe it is acceptable to have a different FLT ID on the FP [ABC1234] from the FLT ID [N12345] transmitted by ADS-B. In an August 3, 2017 legal interpretation, the FAA Office of the Chief Counsel found that the intent of § 91.227(d)(8) is to require that the FLT ID as entered on the FP must exactly match the ADS-B transmitted FLT ID. See Table 4-2, Aircraft Identification Transmission Examples, for examples.
Table 4-2. Aircraft Identification Transmission Examples Flight Plan Aircraft ID Correct ADS-B Transmission Incorrect ADS-B Transmission AAL5688 AAL5688 AAL-5688 SWA2155 SWA2155 2155 UAL21 UAL21 UAL0021 DAL9450 DAL9450 N561DL ASH5861 ASH5861 ASH5872 N350QS N350QS EJA350 FDY1055 FDY1055 VFR N777JK N777JK N-777JK N123DJ N123DJ NGF123
CGABC CGABC C-GABC
VHXYZ VHXYZ VH-XYZ
4.6.2.4 GA pilots occasionally have the opportunity to use a FLT ID provided by a charity or other organization instead of using their N-number. In this situation, the GA pilot may only use the organization’s FLT ID for the flight provided they change the FLT ID transmitted by the ADS-B Out avionics. If the ADS-B equipment does not allow the FLT ID to be changed or the pilot is unsure of how it is accomplished, the pilot should not use the organization’s FLT ID. In this case, in order to ensure compliance with § 91.227(d)(8), the pilot should use the aircraft registration number as the FLT ID.
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4.6.3 Emergency Status.
4.6.3.1 This ADS-B message element and transponder code alerts ATC that the aircraft is experiencing emergency conditions and indicates the type of emergency. The appropriate Mode A code should be entered into the transponder (e.g., 7500, 7600, or 7700). The ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV, Surveillance and Collision Avoidance Systems, emergency codes (general emergency, no communications, and unlawful interference) are required by § 91.227.
4.6.3.2 ADS-B systems integrated within a transponder will automatically set the applicable emergency status when code 7500, 7600, or 7700 is entered into the transponder.
4.6.3.3 ADS-B systems not integrated with the transponder or systems with optional emergency codes may need the appropriate emergency code to be entered through a separate pilot interface. Flightcrews should ensure that both emergency codes (ADS-B and transponder) are identical.
4.6.4 Transponder IDENT Function. The AFM or POH will provide specific instructions on how the IDENT feature will be activated in specific installations, including any installations with multiple IDENT features.
Appendix A A-1 APPENDIX A. ADS-B IN-TRAIL PROCEDURE A.1 Purpose. This appendix provides a description of the ADS-B-enabled In-Trail Procedure (ITP) and guidance to operators seeking FAA authorization to conduct ITP operations.
A.2 Background. The ITP is designed primarily for use in nonradar oceanic airspace to enable appropriately equipped ADS-B In aircraft to perform flight level (FL) changes previously unavailable with procedural separation minima applied. The improved traffic information available to ADS-B In-equipped aircraft allows ITP maneuvers to occur safely with reduced separation minima applied. ITP enables flightcrews to execute FL changes to improve ride comfort, avoid weather, or obtain more favorable winds to improve fuel economy and arrival times.
A.2.1 ITP Scenario. Figure A-1, Reduction of Aircraft Separation Minima with In-Trail Procedure, illustrates a basic ITP scenario. The ITP aircraft (blue) wishes to climb from FL340 to 360 between two reference aircraft (red) where procedural separation minima is applied. Using onboard ADS-B In and ITP equipment, the ITP aircraft can determine if the necessary criteria can be met and, if so, request air traffic control (ATC) approval to execute the desired FL change using reduced separation minima between the two reference aircraft.
A.2.2 ATC Responsibility. ATC maintains separation responsibility throughout the ITP maneuver, and resumes the appropriate separation minima at its completion. ATC will apply the reduced ITP separation only between a qualified ITP aircraft and no more than two reference aircraft for the duration of the maneuver. The ITP maneuver can be performed with reference aircraft that do not have ADS-B In equipment. To enable an ITP maneuver, it is necessary for the reference aircraft to transmit an ADS-B Out signal of sufficient quality.
Figure A-1. Reduction of Aircraft Separation Minima with In-Trail Procedure A.3 I TP Terminology.
A.3.1 Closing Groundspeed (GS) Differential. The difference between the ITP aircraft’s GS and a reference aircraft’s GS that results in a reduction of the ITP distance.
Appendix A A-2 A.3.2 Closing Mach Speed Differential. The difference in Mach speed between the ITP aircraft and the reference aircraft that results in a reduction of the ITP distance.
A.3.3 ITP Aircraft. An aircraft operated by a flightcrew authorized to conduct an ITP.
A.3.4 ITP Criteria. A set of conditions to be satisfied prior to initiating or executing an ITP clearance that ensure the safety of the procedure.
A.3.5 ITP Distance. The distance between the ITP aircraft and reference aircraft as defined by the difference in distance to an aircraft calculated common point along a projection of each aircraft’s track in front of or behind the aircraft, as appropriate. (See Figure A-2, In-Trail Procedure Distances Illustrated.) For the case where aircraft are on parallel tracks, the ITP distance is measured along the track of one of the aircraft using its calculated position and the point abeam the calculated position of the other aircraft. This measurement technique is similar to the method described in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 4444, Procedures for Air Navigation Services—Air Traffic Management, Section 5.4.2.9, Performance-Based Longitudinal Separation Minima.
A.3.6 ITP Equipment. The onboard avionics that support an ITP.
A.3.7 Reference Aircraft. Aircraft (no more than two) transmitting valid ADS-B data that meet specified criteria and are referenced as part of an ITP clearance request to ATC.
Appendix A A-3 Figure A-2. In-Trail Procedure Distances Illustrated A.
4 ITP Concept. The ITP concept is based on the aircraft satisfying specific initial conditions and the flightcrew promptly and correctly executing the requested procedure once approved. The initial conditions are the ITP speed/distance criteria, the relative altitude criteria, the similar track criteria, and the closing Mach differential, as well as the accuracy and integrity of the ADS-B data transmitted from participating aircraft. (See Table A-1, In-Trail Procedure Initiation/Maneuver Criteria (Reference RTCA DO-312 Supplement).) The safety of the procedure depends upon the ITP aircraft maintaining