Appendix 2 APPENDIX 2. PRECISION AREA NAVIGATION (P-RNAV)
1. OPERATOR/RNAV SYSTEM APPROVAL FOR P-RNAV IN DESIGNATED P-RNAV AIRSPACE.
NOTE: EUROCONTROL has published approval guidance information.
These materials can be retrieved from http://www.ecacnav.com/p-rnav.
a. Assumptions. This guidance material is based on the assumptions contained in Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) temporary guidance leaflet (TGL) 10 for Precision Area Navigation (P-RNAV) operations in the European region. The following is a subset of the assumptions contained in JAA TGL-10 for P-RNAV operations in the European region. (Refer to JAA TGL-10 for the complete set.)
(1) All terminal P-RNAV procedures:
(a) Take account of the lack of a mandate for Vertical Navigation (VNAV) by ensuring that traditional means of VNAV can continue to be used.
(b) Support integrity checking performed by the flightcrew, by including on the charts fix data (e.g., range and bearing to Navigational Aids (NAVAID)) from selected waypoints.
(c) Take account of the functional and performance capabilities of Area Navigation (RNAV) systems and their safety levels as detailed in JAA TGL-10.
(2) P-RNAV procedures are based upon World Geodetic System (WGS) 84 coordinates.
(3) The design of a P-RNAV procedure and the supporting navigation infrastructure have been assessed and validated. This includes flight checking where appropriate.
(4) If a choice of navigation infrastructure is provided, e.g., distance measuring equipment (DME)/DME, very high frequency (VHF) omni-directional range station (VOR)/DME or Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), the obstacle clearance assessment has been based upon the infrastructure providing the poorest precision.
(5) If any critical NAVAIDs exist, they are identified in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) and on the relevant charts.
(6) NAVAIDs that must be excluded from the operation of a specific procedure are identified in the AIP and on the relevant charts.
(7) Temperature compensation is not addressed as a special P-RNAV consideration.
(8) A requirement for the carriage of dual P-RNAV systems is identified in the AIP for specific terminal P-RNAV procedures (e.g., procedures below the applicable minimum safe altitude/minimum obstacle clearance altitude) or where radar performance is inadequate.
Appendix 2
(9) Where radar is used for contingency procedures, radar performance has been shown to be adequate and the requirement for a radar service is identified.
(10) Exclude NAVAIDs that are not compliant with ICAO Annex 10 (e.g., Tactical Air Navigation Aids (TACAN)).
b. Aircraft Equipage. An aircraft may be considered eligible for P-RNAV approval when equipped with one or more aircraft systems approved and installed in accordance with the guidance contained in this document. The minimum level of availability and integrity required for P-RNAV systems for use in designated airspace can be met by a single installed system comprised of one or more sensors, an RNAV computer, a control display unit (CDU), and a navigation display(s) (e.g., horizontal situation indicator (HSI), or course deviation indicator (CDI)), provided the system is monitored by the flightcrew and in the event of a system failure, the aircraft retains the capability to navigate relative to ground-based NAVAID. Aircraft not suitably equipped for P-RNAV operations will not be permitted to operate in the designated P-RNAV airspace or on P-RNAV procedures.
c. Eligibility Based on the AFM (Supplement) or POH.
(1) Aircraft P-RNAV System Eligibility. Consider the aircraft eligible for P-RNAV operations, if the AFM or POH shows the appropriate instrument flight rules (IFR) navigation system installation has received airworthiness approval in accordance with this advisory circular (AC) or has a statement of compliance to the performance and functional requirements of JAA TGL-10.
(2) Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 91 Aircraft/Operator Approval. U.S. part 91 operators present the following documentation to their Flight Standards District Office (FSDO): sections of the AFM or POH as appropriate to establish P-RNAV system eligibility; and, evidence of meeting the requirements contained in appendix 2, sections 3, 4 and 5 of this AC. The FSDO issues a letter of authorization (LOA) or similar operational approval documentation authorizing P-RNAV operations to part 91 operators. Appendix 2, paragraph 1d provides guidance for operators not able to determine from the AFM or POH that the aircraft system has been approved and installed in accordance with an appropriate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) AC.
(3) U.S. Air Carrier Aircraft/Commercial Operator Approval. Title 14 CFR part 121, 125, or 135 operators should present the following documentation to their certificateholding district office (CHDO): sections of the AFM or POH that establish P-RNAV eligibility.
Once the operator has satisfied the requirements described in appendix 2, sections 3, 4, and 5 of this AC; the CHDO: issues operations specifications (OpSpecs) to reflect Basic Area Navigation (B-RNAV)/RNAV 5 and P-RNAV approval; and, approves changes to the minimum equipment list (MEL) to account for B-RNAV/RNAV 5 and P-RNAV operations. Appendix 2, paragraph 1d provides guidance if the operator is unable to determine from the AFM or POH whether the aircraft system is approved in accordance with an appropriate FAA AC.
d. Eligibility Not Based on the AFM (Supplement) or POH.
Appendix 2
(1) State of Compliance. The operator should submit either a statement of compliance from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or their own statement of compliance to the CHDO/FSDO. The operator should develop this statement with supporting documentation, e.g., Boeing Commercial Aviation Services Service Letter: 717-SL-02-101, 737-SL02-020, 747-SL-02-016, 757-SL-02-020, 767-SL-02-013, 777-SL-02-005, MD10-SL-02-101, MD11-SL-02-101, MD80-SL-02-101, MD90-SL-02-101, ATA: 0200-00 dated June 4, 2003. If the FSDO/CHDO is unable to make a determination of system eligibility, a request for assessment should be made to the Aircraft Certification Office (ACO).
(a) Existing Installations (FSDO/ACO). The applicant will need to submit a compliance statement showing how the criteria listed in paragraph 2 have been satisfied for existing installations. Compliance may be established by inspection of the installed system to confirm the availability of required features and functionality. The performance and integrity criteria of JAA temporary guidance leaflet (TGL) 10 section 6 may be confirmed by reference to statements in the AFM, POH or to other applicable approvals and supporting certification data.
In the absence of such evidence, supplementary analyses and/or tests may be required. JAA TGL-10, paragraph 9.3 addresses AFM/POH changes that might be necessary.
(b) New Installations or Systems that are Being Modified (ACO Only). The applicant will submit a compliance statement showing how the criteria listed in paragraph 2 have been satisfied. The statement will be based on a plan that identifies the certification data to be submitted and includes, as appropriate, a system description together with evidence resulting from the following activities:
1. Demonstrate compliance with the airworthiness requirements for the intended function and safety by equipment qualification, system safety analysis, confirmation of appropriate software design assurance level, performance analyses, and a combination of ground and flight tests. To support the approval application, submit design data showing the objectives and criteria of JAA TGL-10, sections 6 and 7 have been satisfied.
2. Evaluate use of the RNAV systems and the manner of presentation of lateral and vertical guidance information on the flight deck to show the risk of flightcrew error has been minimized. In particular, during the transition to the final approach, the display of instrument landing system (ILS) information simultaneously with RNAV information to the flight crewmember will need careful consideration.
NOTE: In particular, the evaluation should consider presentation to the pilot during transition from RNAV to final approach guidance (e.g., ILS.)
This evaluation is not meant to imply a requirement for simultaneous RNAV and ILS information.
3. Evaluate equipment failure scenarios involving conventional navigation sensors and the RNAV system(s) to demonstrate adequate alternative means of navigation are available following failure of the RNAV system, and reversion to other navigation sources
(e.g., VOR#2 on HSI#1) do not lead to misleading or unsafe display configurations. The evaluation must also consider the probability of failures within the switching arrangements.
Appendix 2
4. Evaluate the coupling arrangements for the aircraft system to flight director/automatic pilot to show clear, unambiguous indications of the operating modes, including annunciation of system failures modes and impacts on these modes of operation.
5. Demonstrate compliance with appendix 2, section 2, the execution of all leg types (in particular when intercepting a CF leg) possible without the need for manual intervention. Specifically, there should not be a need to disengage the selected navigation mode and manually make course selection. This does not preclude means for manual intervention when needed.
(2) Part 91 Aircraft/Operator Approval. U.S. part 91 operators present the documentation received from the ACO to their FSDO and evidence of meeting the requirements contained in appendix 2, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this AC. The FSDO issues LOA or similar operational approval documentation authorizing P-RNAV operations to part 91 operators.
(3) U.S. Air Carrier Aircraft/Commercial Operator Approval. Part 121, 125, or 135 operators should present the documentation from the ACO to their CHDO and evidence of meeting the requirements described in appendix 2, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this AC. The CHDO issues OpSpecs to reflect B-RNAV/RNAV 5 and P-RNAV approval; and, if applicable, changes to the MEL to account for B-RNAV/RNAV 5 and P-RNAV operations.
2. REQUIREMENTS.
a. Performance. P-RNAV operations are based upon the use of RNAV equipment that automatically determines aircraft position in the horizontal plane using inputs from the following types of positioning sensor (no specific priority):
NOTE: Operators should consider currency and/or accuracy of their magnetic variation tables. Errors introduced from outdated values may impact certain RNAV procedures. Further guidance on magnetic variation may be found in Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-236A/ European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) ED-75A, paragraph 3.2.5.2.
(1) Distance Measuring Equipment. Giving measurements from two or more distance measuring equipment (DME) ground stations (DME/DME).
(2) Very High Frequency (VHF) Omni-Directional Radio (VOR) Range. With a co-located DME (VOR/DME) where it is identified as meeting the requirements of the procedure.
(3) GNSS.
(a) The use of GPS or WAAS equipment to perform P-RNAV operations is limited to equipment approved under FAA TSO-C145A and TSO-C146A, and TSO-C129A.
TSO-C129A equipment classes A1, B1, C1, B3 and C3 meet P-RNAV performance requirements.
Appendix 2
(b) For TSO-C129 equipment, GPS equipment approved in accordance with TSO-C129 and satisfying the step-detection and health word checking contained in TSO-C129A meet P-RNAV performance requirements.
(4) Inertial Navigation System (INS) or Inertial Reference System (IRS). With automatic updating from suitable radio based navigation equipment.
NOTE: Loran-C is not an acceptable navigation sensor for terminal airspace operations.
NOTE: TACAN beacons may be included in the onboard Navigation Database and used to supplement DME, provided they meet ICAO Annex 10 Standards and are listed in the AIP.
(5) Use of Inertial Data. In the event of unavailability or loss of radio sensor derived automatic position updating, it is permissible to use, for a short period of time, data from an inertial system as the only means of positioning. For such operations, in the absence of a position integrity indication, the applicant must establish how long the aircraft can maintain the required accuracy using only inertial data. Consider both takeoff and terminal area operations when addressing the contingency procedures. Base the limits on an acceptable drift rate model agreed to by the FAA.
b. Functional. This section only covers the required functionality of JAA TGL-10. JAA TGL-10 also includes recommended functions, contained in section 7.2, table 2.
Item Functional Description
(1) Display elements (e.g., CDI, (E) HSI) each with a lateral deviation display, to/from flag, and failure indicator, for use as primary flight instruments for navigation of the aircraft, for maneuver anticipation, and for failure/status/integrity indication, visible to the pilot and located in the primary FOV when looking forward along the flight path. The course selector of the deviation display shall be automatically slaved to the RNAV computed path. The deviation display shall have a full-scale deflection suitable for the phase of flight and based on the required track keeping accuracy. Scaling may be set automatically by default logic or to a value obtained from a NDB. The full-scale deflection value must be known or made available for display to the flightcrew. For P-RNAV operations, a value of ±1 nautical mile (NM) is acceptable. An acceptable alternative for P-RNAV is a navigation map display, readily visible to the flightcrew, with appropriate map scales and giving equivalent functionality to the lateral deviation display, except that scaling may be set manually by the pilot.
(2) Capability to continuously display to the pilot flying, on the primary flight instruments for navigation of the aircraft, the RNAV computed direct track (DTK) and aircraft position relative to the path.
(3) Where the minimum flightcrew is two pilots, means for the pilot not flying to verify the desired path and the aircraft position relative to the path.
Appendix 2
(4) A NDB, containing current navigation data officially promulgated for civil aviation, which can be updated in accordance with the Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control (AIRAC) cycle and from which terminal airspace procedures can be retrieved and loaded into the RNAV system. The resolution to which the data is stored must be sufficient to achieve the required track keeping accuracy. The database must be protected against flightcrew modification of the stored data.
NOTE: When a procedure is loaded from the database, the aircraft system is required to fly it as published. This does not preclude the flightcrew from having the means to modify a procedure or route already loaded into the aircraft system as permitted by Appendix 2, paragraph 3 (Operating Procedures) or JAA TGL-10, section 10. However, the procedure stored in the database must not be modified and must remain intact within the database for future use and reference.
(5) Means to display the validity period of the NDB to the flightcrew.
(6) Means to retrieve and display data stored in the NDB relating to individual waypoints and NAVAIDs, to enable the flightcrew to verify the procedure to be flown.
(7) Capacity to load the whole terminal procedure(s) to be flown from database into the RNAV system.
(8) Display of the active navigation sensor type, either in the pilot’s primary FOV, or on a readily accessible page on a multifunction control and display unit (MCDU) together with a means of determining navigation system performance.
(9) Display of the identification of the active (To) waypoint, either in the pilot’s primary FOV, or on a readily accessible page on an MCDU, readily visible to the flightcrew.
(10) Display of distance and bearing to the active (To) waypoint in the pilot’s primary FOV. Where impracticable, the data may be displayed on a readily accessible page on an MCDU, readily visible to the flightcrew.
(11) Display of ground speed or time to the active (To) waypoint, either in the pilot’s primary FOV, or on a readily accessible page on a MCDU, readily visible to the flightcrew.
(12) Where the MCDU is to be used to support the accuracy checks of Appendix 2, paragraph 3 (Operating Procedures), or JAA TGL-10, section 10, display of lateral deviation with a resolution of 0.1 NM.
(13) When used for RNAV position updates, automatic tuning of VOR and DME NAVAIDs and the capability to inhibit individual NAVAIDs from the automatic selection process.
NOTE: Further guidance may be found in ED-75A/DO-236A, section 3.7.3.1.
Appendix 2
(14) Capability for the P-RNAV system to perform automatic selection (or de-selection) of navigation sources, a reasonableness check, an integrity check, and a manual override or deselect.
(15) Further guidance may be found in ED-75A/DO-236A, section 3.7.3.1.
(16) Capability for the “Direct to” function.
(17) Capability for automatic leg sequencing with display of sequencing to the flightcrew.
(18) Capability to execute database procedures including fly-over and fly-by turns.
(19) Capability to execute leg transitions and maintain tracks consistent with the following ARINC 424 path terminators, or their equivalent:
• Initial Fix (IF),
• Track between Two Fixes (TF),
• Course to a Fix (CF),
• Course from a Fix to an Altitude (FA), and
• Direct to a Fix (DF).
NOTE: Path terminators are defined in ARINC Specification 424, and their application is described in more detail in documents EUROCAE ED-75A/RTCA DO-236A, ED-77/DO-201A, and EUROCONTROL document NAV.ET1.ST10.
(20) Indication of the RNAV system failure, including the associated sensors, in the pilot’s primary FOV.
(21) For multi-sensor systems, automatic reversion to an alternate RNAV sensor if the primary RNAV sensor fails.
NOTE: This does not preclude means for manual navigation source selection.
(22) Alternative means of displaying navigation information, sufficient to perform the checking procedures of Appendix 2, paragraph 3 (Operating Procedures) or JAA TGL-10, section 10 (Operational Criteria).
3. P-RNAV OPERATING PROCEDURES (GENERAL). In addition to B-RNAV/RNAV 5 operating procedures, in Appendix 1, paragraph 2, flightcrews should be familiar with the P-RNAV normal operating and contingency procedures.
a. Normal.
(1) Pre-flight Planning.
Appendix 2
(a) During the pre-flight planning phase, the availability of the navigation infrastructure, required for the intended operation, including any non-RNAV contingencies, shall be confirmed for the period of intended operation. Confirm availability of the onboard navigation equipment necessary for the route to be flown. The onboard NDB must be appropriate for the region of intended operation and must include the NAVAIDs, waypoints, and coded terminal airspace procedures for the departure, arrival and alternate airfields.
(b) If during the flight the AIRAC cycle changes, operators should establish procedures to ensure the accuracy of navigation data, including suitability of navigation facilities used to define the route of flight, and approach. Traditionally, this has been accomplished by verifying electronic data against paper products. An acceptable means is to compare aeronautical charts (new and old) to verify navigation fixes prior to dispatch. If an amended chart is published for the procedure, the data within the database shall not be used to conduct the operation.
(c) Where the responsible airspace authority has specified in the AIP that dual P-RNAV systems are required for a specific terminal P-RNAV procedure, confirm the availability of dual P-RNAV systems. This typically will apply where procedures are effective below the applicable minimum safe altitude/minimum obstacle clearance altitude or where radar coverage is inadequate for the purposes of supporting P-RNAV. This will also take into account the particular hazards of a terminal area and the feasibility of contingency procedures following loss of P-RNAV capability.
(d) If a stand-alone GPS is to be used for P-RNAV, confirm the availability of receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) with the latest information from the U.S.
Coast Guard giving details of satellite non-availability (see http://www.navcen.uscg.gov). The U.S. Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) Office also provides satellite non-availability data. See Appendix 1, paragraph 1d(3)(b) for guidance materials on RAIM prediction.
NOTE: RAIM prediction may be a function of the equipment when satellite non-availability data can be entered. In the absence of such a function, an airspace service provider may offer an approved RAIM availability service to users. The use of the EUROCONTROL AUGUR tool may be used to satisfy this requirement (see http://www.augur.ecacnav.com).
(2) Departure.
(a) At system initialization, the flightcrew must confirm the NDB is current and verify the aircraft’s present position is entered correctly. The flightcrew shall check the active flight plan by comparing the charts, Standard Instrument Departure (SID) or other applicable documents, with the map display (if applicable) and the MCDU. This includes confirmation of the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, any altitude or speed constraints, and, where possible, which waypoints are fly-by and which are fly-over. If required by a procedure, a check will need to be made to confirm that updating will use a specific NAVAID(s), or to confirm exclusion of a specific NAVAID. A procedure shall not be used if doubt exists as to the validity of the procedure in the NDB.
Appendix 2 NOTE: As a minimum, the departure checks could be a simple inspection of a suitable map display that achieves the objectives of this paragraph.
(b) The creation of new waypoints by manual entry into the aircraft system is not permitted and invalidates any affected P-RNAV procedure, e.g., manual entry or modification by the flightcrew of the loaded procedure, using temporary waypoints or fixes not provided in the database, is not permitted. Route modifications in the terminal area may take the form of radar headings or ‘direct to’ clearances and the flightcrew must be capable of reacting in a timely fashion. This may include the insertion of waypoints into the flight plan loaded from the database.
(c) Prior to commencing take off, the flightcrew must verify the aircraft’s RNAV system is available and operating correctly and, where applicable, the correct airport and runway data is loaded.
(d) The flightcrew must ensure initialization on the runway either by means of a manual runway threshold or intersection update, as applicable, unless automatic updating of the actual departure point is provided. This is to preclude any inappropriate or inadvertent position shift after take-off. Where GNSS is used, the signal must be acquired before the take-off roll commences and GNSS position may be used in place of the runway update.
(e) During the procedure and where feasible, flight progress should be monitored for navigational reasonableness, by crosschecks with conventional NAVAIDs using the primary flight displays and the MCDU. Where applicable and when used, the flightcrew procedures shall include flightcrew monitoring to verify automatic updating of the inertial systems and the ability to ensure the time period without updating does not exceed the permitted limit.
(f) Where the initialization described in subparagraph (d) above is not achieved, the departure should be flown by conventional navigation means. A transition to the P-RNAV structure should be made at a point where the aircraft’s RNAV system has had sufficient time to provide a position update.
NOTE: If a procedure is designed to be started conventionally, then the latest point of transition to the P-RNAV structure will be marked on the charts. If a pilot elects to start a P-RNAV procedure using conventional methods, there will not be any indication on the charts of the transition point to the P-RNAV structure.
(3) Arrival.
(a) Prior to the arrival phase, the flightcrew should verify that the correct terminal procedure has been loaded, and check the active flight plan by comparing the charts with the map display (if applicable) and the MCDU. This includes confirmation of the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, any altitude or speed constraints, and, where possible, which waypoints are fly-by and which are fly-over. If required by a procedure, a check will need to be made to confirm that updating will exclude a particular NAVAID. A procedure shall not be used if doubt exists as to the validity of the procedure in the NDB.
Appendix 2 NOTE: As a minimum, the arrival checks could be a simple inspection of a suitable map display that achieves the objectives of this paragraph.
(b) Manual entry creation of new waypoints into the aircraft’s system invalidates the P-RNAV procedure and is not permitted.
(c) The flightcrew must make the necessary preparation to revert to a conventional arrival procedure where required as a contingency.
(d) During the procedure and where feasible, the flightcrew should monitor flight progress for navigational reasonableness by crosschecks with conventional NAVAIDs using the primary displays in conjunction with the MCDU. In particular, the flightcrew shall display and check the reference VOR/DME used for the construction of a VOR/DME RNAV procedure. A navigation reasonableness check is required during the descent phase before reaching the initial approach fix (IAF) for RNAV systems without GNSS updating. For GNSS based systems, absence of an integrity alarm is considered sufficient. If the check fails or a GNSS integrity alarm is received, a conventional procedure must be flown.
NOTE: For example, display bearing/range to a VOR/DME from the RNAV system and compare the result with the radio magnetic indicator (RMI) read-out (selected to same VOR/DME) where feasible.
NOTE: In some systems the accuracy may be derived from the navigation mode or accuracy mode.
NOTE: Where the MCDU shows only integers and is unable to display errors with sufficient resolution for P-RNAV accuracy checks, an alternative means of checking will need to be followed.
(e) Route modifications in the terminal area may take the form of radar headings or “direct to” clearances and the flightcrew must be capable of reacting in a timely fashion. This may include the insertion of tactical waypoints loaded from the database. Manual entry or modification by the flightcrew of the loaded procedure, using temporary waypoints or fixes not provided in the database, is not permitted.
(f) All published altitude and speed constraints must be observed even though a particular method is not mandated.
b. Contingency Procedures.
(1) The operator will need to develop contingency procedures to address cautions and warnings for the following conditions:
(a) Failure of the RNAV system components including, those affecting flight technical error (e.g., failures of the flight director or automatic pilot);
(b) Multiple system failures; and Page 10
Appendix 2
(c) Failure of the navigation sensors.
NOTE: The loss of RAIM for GNSS-based system constitutes the loss of P-RNAV capability.
(d) Coasting on inertial sensors beyond a specified time limit.
(2) The flightcrew must notify ATC of any loss of the P-RNAV capability, together with the proposed course of action.
(3) The flightcrew should continue with the P-RNAV procedure in accordance with the published lost communication procedure in the event of communications failure.
(4) The flightcrew should navigate using an alternative means of navigation which may include the use of an inertial system in the event of loss of P-RNAV capability. The alternative doesn’t need to be RNAV.
c. Incident Reporting. Report significant incidents associated with the operation of the aircraft which affect or could affect the safety of P-RNAV operations, in accordance with Joint Aviation Requirement (JAR)-Operations (OPS) 1.420. Specific examples may include:
(1) Aircraft system malfunctions during P-RNAV operations which lead to:
(a) Navigation errors (e.g., map shifts) not associated with transitions from an inertial navigation mode to radio navigation mode;
(b) Significant navigation errors attributed to incorrect data or a NDB coding error;
(c) Unexpected deviations in lateral or vertical flight path not caused by pilot input;
(d) Significant misleading information without a failure warning; and
(e) Total loss or multiple navigation equipment failure.
(2) Problems with ground navigational facilities leading to significant navigation errors not associated with transitions from an inertial navigation mode to radio navigation mode.
d. Database Integrity.
(1) The NDB updating process shall comply with EUROCAE ED-76/RTCA DO-200A, or equivalent approved procedures. The NDB should be obtained from an approved supplier complying with EUROCAE/RTCA document ED-76/DO-200A, Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data. Until such approved suppliers become available, prior to the effective date of the NDB, as a minimum, the operator must implement NDB integrity checks using appropriate software tools or approved manual procedures to verify data relating to waypoints below the applicable minimum obstacle clearance altitude. Such checks are in addition to any previously performed by the Aeronautical Information Services (AIS), unapproved NDB suppliers, or navigation equipment manufacturers. The integrity checks need to identify any discrepancies Page 11
Appendix 2 between the NDB and the published charts/procedures. Integrity checks may be performed by an approved third party. Discrepancies that invalidate a procedure must be reported to the NDB supplier and affected procedures must be prohibited by an operator’s notice to its flightcrew.
Aircraft operators should consider the need to continue their own database checks even for products obtained from approved suppliers.
NOTE: See JAR-OPS 1.035.
(2) Quality Systems. To aid database integrity checking, a suitable tool having the following functionality may be used. A database integrity check tool is a software tool which enables an aircraft operator to conduct independent checks on specific data areas in a NDB to ensure integrity is maintained. These checks can be delegated to a service organization. The software tool does not have to be qualified in accordance with EUROCAE ED-12B/RTCA DO-178B. The tool should include the following functionality:
• Allow a user to specify the data areas to be checked and the critical data items to be monitored
• Detect any changes in monitored data items
• Generate reports listing all identified changes
• Provide a full data history to support configuration control
• Maintain non-editable log-files of all online actions
• Provide analyses of database quality and changes in quality levels by tracking of rates of discovered errors
• Provide a flexible data input interface to enable database integrity checks for a variety of database providers
4. PILOT KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENTS. In addition to the requirements specified in Appendix 1, paragraph 3, pilots should be knowledgeable in the following areas:
a. RNP-1 definition as it relates to P-RNAV requirements in P-RNAV airspace;
b. Airspace where P-RNAV is required;
c. Changes to charting and documents to reflect P-RNAV;
d. Required navigation equipment for flight in designated P-RNAV airspace, and limitations associated with the RNAV equipment;
e. Flight planning requirements;
f. Contingency procedures (e.g., for equipment failure);