(3) Influential Factors in System Updating. The duration of the flight before the oceanic boundary and the accuracy of the external navigation system are factors that influence any decision to update the system. If the system received an update, follow the proper procedures with the aid of a prepared checklist.
(4) Auto-Coupling. Select the navigation system that performs the most accurately for auto-coupling. In view of the importance of following the correct track in oceanic airspace, some operators advise that the third pilot or equivalent crewmember should check the inserted waypoints using appropriate source information.
l. Oceanic Entry. Crews must ensure they have given an accurate estimated time of arrival (ETA) to ATC for their oceanic entry point. They must also ensure they entered the ocean at the cleared FL.
m. Oceanic Boundary Position Report. Just prior to the oceanic boundary and prior to any waypoint, the crew should monitor, record, and verify the present position coordinates.
Check and verify the coordinates for the next waypoint. When the CDU alert light comes on, the crew should note and record the present position on the master document. Verify this information against the current clearance on the master document. Annotate the waypoint number on the master document with the appropriate symbol to indicate its verification. If you make the oceanic boundary position report over a VOR facility, select the appropriate radial to the first oceanic waypoint as a further check shows that the navigation system is tracking according to the current clearance. If DME is available, you can also perform a distance check.
n. Approaching an Oceanic Waypoint. Two minutes before reaching each oceanic waypoint, crews should verify the accuracy of the subsequent waypoint. This verification should include the expected outbound course and distance of the currently effective ATC clearance.
o. At Each Oceanic Waypoint. Crews must ensure that when overhead each oceanic waypoint, the aircraft turns to the anticipated heading and that the distance to the next waypoint is accurate. Verify the coordinates of the next waypoint against the master document. After the ATC position report is sent, plot the present position to ensure that the tracking is correct. The crew should be particularly alert in maintaining SELCAL watch in the event of possible ATC followup to the position watch.
NOTE: Crews must not assume the aircraft has automatically transitioned to the next waypoint.
p. Ten-Minute Position Plotting. Approximately 10 minutes after transitioning each oceanic waypoint, crews will plot their LRNS position and note the coordinates and time on the plotting chart. When sending the ATC position report, copy the coordinates from the master document or the present position and you can read the next two forward positions from the CDU.
As soon as the waypoint alert light goes on, check the present position coordinates of each navigation system against the current clearance to ensure that the position report coincides with the actual position of the aircraft and the ATC clearance.
q. Routine Monitoring. Operators must ensure they have procedures in their International Operations Manual concerning which page(s) the PIC will routinely monitor versus the pages the Page 32 Par 3-6
SIC routinely monitors. For example, the PIC may monitor the cross-track error (XTK) page and the second in command (SIC) may monitor distance/time.
(1) Position Coordinates. There are a number of ways in which you may accidentally disconnect the autopilot (AP) from the command mode. Crews should make regular checks of correct engagement. Although it is a common practice to display “dist/track,” the FAA recommends that the navigation system coupled to the AP display the present position coordinates throughout the flight. If plotting the coordinates at roughly 20-minute intervals, they will confirm that the flight is on track according to the ATC clearance. Distance-to-go information should be available on the instrument panel, and the waypoint alert light provides a reminder of the proximity of the waypoint.
(2) XTK and Track Angle Error (TKE). If a crew makes a position check and verification at each waypoint and 10 minutes after each waypoint, additional plotting every 20 minutes may be counterproductive during routine flight. The navigation equipment not used to steer the aircraft should display XTK and TKE. Monitor these indicators with XTK displayed on the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) when feasible.
r. Use of Radar. Aircraft equipped with airborne weather radar capable of ground mapping should use the radar to observe any land masses as an aid to determining the accuracy of their navigation. The flightcrews must use the radar on a constant basis during flight to monitor navigation system accuracy.
s. Approaching Landfall. When the aircraft is approaching the first landfall NAVAID, it should acquire the appropriate inbound radial as soon as the flightcrew is confident that the NAVAID information is accurate.
t. Navigation System Accuracy Check. At the end of each flight, determine the accuracy of the navigational system to facilitate correction of performance. You may perform a check to determine the radial error at the ramp position as soon as the aircraft parks. Radial errors for INSs in excess of 2 NM per hour are generally considered excessive (part 121, appendix G).
Keep records on each individual navigation system performance.
u. Monitoring During Distractions. Training and drills ensure that minor emergencies or interruptions of normal routine do not distract the crew to the extent of mishandling the navigation system. If the AP disconnects during flight, re-engage it carefully to ensure that you follow the correct procedure.
v. Avoiding Confusion Between Magnetic and True. To cover all navigation requirements, some air carriers produce flight plans that include both magnetic and true tracks. If crews are changing to a new system, there is a risk of confusion in selecting the correct values.
Operators should devise drills to reduce this risk and ensure that training covers this subject.
Crews that check or update their LRNS by reference to VORs located in the Canadian Northern Control Area (NCA) should remember to not align them with reference to magnetic north.
w. Navigation in Areas of Magnetic Unreliability (AMU). The FAA designates Canada’s NCA and Arctic Control Area (ACA) as AMUs. Although Canadian publications sometimes refer to it as the area of compass unreliability, they are the same. The magnetic North Par 3-6 Page 33
Pole is at approximately 75°N 100°W and is slowly moving as it circles the true pole every 960 years. This is why we see current navigation charts occasionally changing an instrument landing system (ILS) course by 1º.
(1) Magnetic North Pole. When you approach the magnetic North Pole, horizontal magnetic influences decrease and vertical magnetic influences increase to a point where the compass is no longer reliable (the magnetic pole is below the aircraft). It is common to see the compass drifting aimlessly or tilting in its case due to the vertical component even when hundreds of miles from the magnetic North Pole. The better the magnetic compass, the closer to the magnetic pole it will operate. Within about 250 miles of the magnetic pole, all aircraft magnetic compasses will be useless. As a result, some VORs, runways, and radar vectors in Canada’s NCA and ACA are oriented to true north.
(2) AMU. When operating in the AMU, move the HDG REF switch to TRUE when the Canada HI 4 chart defines the course with a °T. Add two additional items to the master flight plan checklist: TRUE HDG adjacent to the first true heading leg and MAG HDG at the end of the AMU. This will serve as a reminder to return to a normal heading reference. The primary reason for selecting TRUE HDG in the NCA and ACA is to provide a more realistic navigation display (ND) heading presentation, thus avoiding rapidly changing heading indications. This will help with radar vectors in TRUE and comply with Canadian Air Regulations.
x. Navigation in Areas of Convergence. Because of the rapid changes in variation and due to meridian convergence, you may note a considerable difference between the flight plan course and the flight management computer (FMC) course when conducting the Class II navigation checks. The flight plan entry consists of the average for the leg while the FMC displays the course at the start of the leg. If a significant difference exists between the two, then you can confirm the course by checking it in TRUE, which will eliminate the large changes in variation. In the far north, convergence is so great that even in TRUE there may be a considerable difference between the flight plan and the FMC. If this is the case, check the FMC against the Canada HI 4 chart. The course at the start of the leg on the chart should agree with the FMC. If averaging the outbound and inbound courses of the leg on the Canada HI 4, the result should closely agree with the flight plan.
NOTE: The direct route from Thule to Cambridge Bay in a southwesterly direction begins on a course of 254°T and ends on 219°T. This is a 35° change because of convergence. The variation at Thule is 66°W and the variation at Cambridge Bay is 25°E. This results in a magnetic course of 320°M departing Thule and a 194°M course arriving over Cambridge Bay. This change of 126°M is due to the effects of convergence and variation while flying a great circle route. It is evident that even though the flight in this example is south of 82°N, select a true heading reference, thus allowing a more realistic heading presentation. If this were flown as a single leg, it would be necessary to do the Class II course check using the Canada HI 4 chart as described above in order to get a valid check. The FMC in TRUE should closely agree with the charted outbound course of 254°T and the flight plan should closely agree with the average of 254°T outbound and 219°T inbound, which is 236°T.
Page 34 Par 3-6
y. Weather Deviations. Temporary diversions from track are sometimes necessary, but obtain prior ATC clearance. Such diversions can cause GNEs if you do not re-engage the navigation mode of the AP. Selection of the AP turbulence mode (if applicable) can disengage the AP from the navigation system. After using turbulence mode, fly the aircraft back to the desired track before re-engaging the AP. For inertial platform aircraft, the following steps are useful in preventing GNEs as a result of diversions around severe weather:
• Use the AP turn control knob to turn the aircraft in the desired direction.
• The AP engage switch will automatically move from “command” to “manual.”
• The altitude mode switch will either remain on “altitude hold,” or if in the “altitude select” mode, will trip to “off.”
• Set the steering CDU selector to XTK/TKE to provide a continuous display of cross-track data.
• If encountering turbulence, you may use the “turb” setting on the speed mode selector. In this case, the altitude mode switch automatically positions to “off.”
• Both radio INS switches remain in the INS position. This provides a visual display of the navigation situation on the HSI. Even if more than 8 NM off the track, the pegged needle on the HSI is a reminder of that fact and confirms whether the aircraft is tracking towards, away from, or parallel to the desired track.
• Use the turn control knob to maneuver the aircraft as necessary.
• When clear of the severe weather, steer the aircraft back to the desired track, guided by the steering CDU to zero the XTK indication.
• When the aircraft returns to the desired track, set the AP engage switch to “command” and the altitude mode switch to “altitude hold.” The navigation mode selector should still be in the INS position.
• The captain and first officer, or the entire crew if possible, should monitor the diversion maneuver to ensure that the aircraft has returned to the desired track and if you properly re-engaged the AP for command INS operation.
• After completing return to route, check the assigned Mach number and advise ATC.
z. ATC Re-Clearance. Scrutiny groups determined that a re-clearance scenario is the greatest contributor to an oceanic error (e.g., GNE, Large Height Deviation (LHD)). Experience suggests that when ATC issues a clearance involving rerouting and new waypoints, the risk of error increases. The procedures used to copy the ATC clearance, load and check the waypoints, verify the flight plan information, and prepare a new plotting chart should be the same as the procedures for beginning a flight. Designate one pilot to fly the aircraft while the other pilot reprograms the navigation systems and amends the cockpit documents. In the event that a Par 3-6 Page 35
re-clearance involves a direct routing, retain the data relevant to the original route in case ATC requires the aircraft to return to its original course.
aa. Detecting Failures. Inertial and global positioning system (GPS) installations typically include comparator and/or warning devices, but the crew must still make frequent comparison checks. With three systems onboard, identification of a defective system should be straightforward. Identifying system failures with two systems is more difficult. If a significant deviation occurs in oceanic airspace, contact nearby aircraft on 123.45 MHz and obtain information to aid in identifying a system failure. Maintain and keep a record of GPS or inertial performance available for crews. The following are suggestions for recordkeeping:
• Before takeoff and while stationary, note the inertial groundspeed and position indicators. These may give an indication of system accuracy.
• Note the accuracy of each unit before reaching oceanic airspace, preferably while passing a convenient short-range facility. Make a further record at the destination regarding terminal error after first canceling any in-flight updates made.
• You can make compass deviation checks (inertial only) to determine deviation values for the magnetic compass systems so that you can check the accuracy of the inertial heading outputs in-flight.
bb. Identifying Faulty Systems.
• Check malfunction codes for indications unserviceability.
• Refer to records for indications of prior problems.
• Obtain a fix, possibly using the weather radar, in order to determine position relative to information from other systems.
• Communicate with nearby aircraft on air-to-air VHF to compare information on spot wind, groundspeed, and drift. Compare information from the prognostic chart to the system readout if there is no contact with any aircraft. Use this method as a last resort and preferably should use it with another method of verification.
• Use the heading method (inertial only). Simultaneously read both the inertial and magnetic compass indicators. Obtain the mean to the nearest degree to get an acceptably accurate true heading value to compare to the inertial readings and determine what reading is inaccurate.
• Situations may arise when distance or cross-track differences develop between two LRNSs, but the crew cannot identify the faulty system. If three systems are onboard, accept the two agreeing systems as reliable signals. If, however, only two systems are onboard and they disagree, most operators believe that the best procedure in this instance is to fly the aircraft halfway between the cross-track Page 36 Par 3-6
differences as long as uncertainty exists. Inform ATC that the flight is experiencing navigation difficulties so that you may obtain the appropriate clearance.
• Compare the number of satellites received (GPS or GPS-augmented systems) by each receiver.
cc. Attributes of a Failed System. Crews must be able to determine when an inertial or GPS system fails. Crews must notify ATC. The red warning light, self-diagnostic indications, or an error over a known position exceeding the value agreed upon by the operator and the certifying authority may indicate inertial failure. Generally, if there is a difference of greater than 15 NM between the two aircrafts’ navigation systems, it is advisable to split the difference to determine the aircraft’s position. If the disparity exceeds 25 NM, assume one or more of the systems have failed.
dd. Loss of Navigation Capability. There are various navigational requirements for oceanic operations. One example refers to the navigation performance (or accuracy) that you should achieve; a second example is the need to carry standby equipment with comparable performance characteristics. Some aircraft carry three or more LRNSs so that if one system fails they still meet the requirements. The following guidance is for aircraft with two systems:
• If one system fails before takeoff, the pilot must delay departure until repairs are made.
• If a system fails before the aircraft reaches an oceanic boundary, the pilot must land at a suitable airport before the boundary, return to the departure airport or request an ATC clearance on a route that does not require dual LRNS.
• If a system fails after the aircraft crosses the oceanic boundary, the pilot should continue the flight according to the ATC clearance already obtained while keeping in mind that the reliability of the navigational information is significantly reduced.
The pilot should assess the reliability of the remaining system and contact ATC with a proposed course of action. Before making any deviation to the existing clearance, obtain ATC clearance.
• While continuing flight in oceanic airspace with a failed system, the pilot should monitor the following:
• The operation of the remaining system(s);
• Check the main and standby compass reading against available information; and
• Check the performance record for the remaining system.
• If there is doubt about the reliability of the remaining system, the pilot should attempt visual sighting of other aircraft contrails for a track indication, call the appropriate ATC facility to get information on the location of adjacent aircraft, and establish air-to-air communication with nearby aircraft on 123.45 MHz.
Par 3-6 Page 37
Page 38 Par 3-6
• If the remaining system fails or indicates degradation of performance, the pilot must notify ATC, obtain all possible information from other aircraft, keep visual watch and monitor TCAS for other aircraft, use all possible outside lights, and use any necessary, applicable contingency procedures.
3-7. OCEANIC OPERATIONS.
a. Overview. The chapters in this AC discuss operational factors required for various geographic regions. This AC also discusses various types of navigation equipment. It is the pilot’s responsibility to read the sections that pertain to his/her flights and in addition the general discussion in this chapter. The most stringent conditions exist in the Northern Atlantic due to the high density of traffic between North America and Europe. The most critical area for light aircraft is the long route between the U.S. West Coast and the Hawaiian Islands. Oceanic operating procedures are different depending upon many factors:
• The size of the aircraft.
• Type and number of power plants.
• Range with or without long-range tanks installed.
• Operation type (general or commercial).
• Navigation equipment installed.
• State (country) of the operator.
• Body of water traversed.
• Qualifications of the flightcrew.
• Airspace-specific requirements.
b. U.S.-Registered Aircraft. Offshore operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans may require FAA authorization issued through OpSpecs, MSpecs or LOAs. The improper application of contingency procedures can result in the loss of separation with other aircraft. It is also a requirement to contact ATC whenever the aircraft is unable to continue flight according to its current ATC clearance. This includes situations when the aircraft is off course and/or unable to maintain its assigned altitude. A failure to comply with this requirement prevents ATC from taking measures to provide separation between adjacent aircraft and the aircraft deviates from its clearance. Failure to contact ATC is also contrary to ICAO Annex 2 and § 91.703, the latter of which requires compliance with Annex 2 by all aircraft of U.S. registry.
3-8. EXTENDED OPERATIONS (ETOPS). Part 121 and 135 operators desiring to obtain approval to operate over a route that contains a point further than 1 hour flying time from an adequate airport should refer to AC 120-42, Extended Range Operations (ETOPS and Polar Operations), current edition. This AC defines the tasks that an operator must accomplish in preparation for the monitoring process that the FAA principal maintenance inspector (PMI) will undertake. This monitoring process is necessary to obtain an ETOPS authorization as stated in the current edition of AC 120-42, which requires an approval from the AFS Director for a
deviation to the operating rule of § 121.161. To meet the requirements of this deviation, the operator must be able to substantiate that the type design reliability and the performance of the proposed airplane/engine combination have been evaluated per the guidance in AC 120-42. In addition, the operator must be suitable for Extended-Range Operations (ER-OPS) and submit an application package that includes supplemental maintenance requirements and programs that allow for safe operations under an ETOPS authorization.
3-9. STRATEGIC LATERAL OFFSETS IN OCEANIC AIRSPACE TO MITIGATE COLLISION RISK AND WAKE TURBULENCE. Pilots should use the Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure (SLOP) as standard operating practice in the course of normal operations to mitigate collision risk and wake turbulence. The SLOP is in force throughout the New York, Oakland and Anchorage Oceanic FIRs and in oceanic airspace in the San Juan FIR.
Internationally, operators implement the SLOP in the NAT, the Pacific (including the NOPAC, Central East Pacific (CEP) and Pacific Organized Track System (PACOTS)) and South Pacific airspaces. Use this procedure for both the heightened risk of collision when non-normal events such as operational altitude deviation errors and turbulence-induced altitude deviations occur due to highly-accurate navigational systems and to mitigate wake vortex encounters.
a. Guidelines. Apply SLOPs using the following guidelines:
• Make strategic lateral offsets and those executed to mitigate the effects of wake turbulence to the right of a route or track only.
• In relation to a route or track, there are three positions that an aircraft may fly:
centerline (CL) and 1 or 2 NM right.
• Offsets are not to exceed 2 NM right of CL.
b. Reducing Risk. The intent of this procedure is to reduce risk (increase the safety margin) by distributing aircraft laterally and equally across the three available positions. In this connection, pilots must take into account the following:
• Aircraft without automatic offset programming capability must fly the CL.
• Aircraft programmed with automatic offsets may fly the CL or offset 1 or 2 NM right of CL to obtain lateral spacing from nearby aircraft.
• Pilots should use whatever means are available (e.g., TCAS, communications, visual acquisition, ground proximity warning system (GPWS)) to determine the best flightpath to fly.
• Any aircraft overtaking another aircraft is to offset within the confines of this procedure, if capable, so as to create the least amount of wake turbulence for the overtaken aircraft.
Par 3-8 Page 39
• For wake turbulence purposes, pilots are also to fly one of the three positions in the second bullet above and never offset to the left of the CL nor offset more than 2 NM right of CL, appropriate to any given situation and have the final authority and responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft. You may use air-to-air frequency 123.45 to coordinate the best wake turbulence offset option.
NOTE: The FAA recognizes that the pilot will use his/her judgment to determine the action most appropriate to any given situation and has the final authority and responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft. You may use air-to-air frequency 123.45 to coordinate the best wake turbulence offset option.
• Pilots may apply an offset outbound at the oceanic entry point, but must return to CL at the oceanic exit point.
• Aircraft transiting radar-controlled airspace (e.g., Bermuda) may remain on their established offset positions.
• This procedure does not require ATC clearance and it is not necessary to advise ATC.
• Base voice position reports on the current ATC clearance and not the offset positions.
3-10. OCEANIC EMERGENCY PROCEDURES.
a. Introduction. When conducting flights, especially extended flights outside the United States and its territories, crews should give full consideration to the quality and availability of air navigation services in the airspace used. Operators should obtain as much information as possible concerning the location and range of NAVAIDs and availability of SAR services.
Annex 12 to the Convention contains SAR International Standards and Recommended Practices (ISARP). Each ICAO region has published air navigation plans that include the facilities, services, and procedures required for international air navigation within that particular region.
b. Pilot Procedures. Any pilot who experiences an emergency (alert, distress, or uncertainty) during flight should take these steps to obtain assistance:
• If equipped with a radar beacon transponder and unable to establish voice communication with ATC, switch to Mode A/3 and Code 7700. If a crash is imminent and the aircraft has an ELT equipped, activate the emergency signal if possible.
• Transmit as much of the following message as possible on the appropriate air-ground frequency, preferably in the order shown below:
• “Mayday, mayday, mayday” for distress, “pan, pan, pan” for other types of emergency.
Page 40 Par 3-9
• Who – name of station addressed, circumstances permitting.
• What – nature of the distress or emergency condition, intentions of the person in command.
• Where – present position, FL, altitude, and any other useful information.
c. Aircraft in Distress. The most important parts of the message are who, what, and where. If you receive no response on the air-ground frequency, repeat the message on 121.5 MHz. Other useful distress frequencies are 2182 or 4125 kHz. An aircraft in distress may use any available means through communications and signaling to alert ATC and other aircraft.
d. Two-Way Communication Failure. The FAA expects pilots of flights that experience two-way communication failure to follow the applicable airspace procedures. Initially, the pilot should squawk 7600 on the transponder for loss of communications. Subsequently, you determine that an emergency condition exists, change to 7700.
e. ICAO Doc. 4444 (PANS-ATM) Procedures for In-flight Contingencies in Oceanic Airspace. Although you cannot cover all possible contingencies, the procedures in the PANS-ATM 15.2.2 and 15.2.3 provide for the more frequent cases such as:
• Inability to maintain assigned FL due to meteorological conditions.
• Aircraft performance or pressurization failure.
• En route diversion across the prevailing traffic flow.
• Loss of, or significant reduction in, the required navigation capability when operating in airspace where the navigation performance accuracy is a prerequisite to the safe conduct of flight operations.
f. Applicable Procedures for Rapid Descent and/or Turn-back or Diversion. With regard to 15.2.1.1a) and b), the procedures listed above in subparagraph 3-10e are applicable primarily when rapid descent and/or turn-back or diversion is required. The pilot’s judgement will determine the sequence of actions to take, having regard to the prevailing circumstances.
ATC will render all possible assistance.
(1) General Procedures. If an aircraft is unable to continue the flight in accordance with its ATC clearance, and/or an aircraft is unable to maintain the navigation performance accuracy specified for the airspace, obtain a revised clearance, whenever possible, prior to initiating any action. Use the radiotelephony distress signal (MAYDAY) or urgency signal (PAN PAN PAN), preferably spoken three times, as appropriate. The intentions of the operator and the overall air traffic situation will determine subsequent ATC action with respect to that aircraft.
(2) Obtaining Prior Clearance. Use the following procedures if you cannot obtain prior clearance. Obtain an ATC clearance at the earliest possible time and, until receiving a revised clearance, the pilot will leave the assigned route or track by initially turning 45° to the Par 3-10 Page 41
right or to the left. When possible, determine the direction of the turn from the position of the aircraft relative to any organized route or track system. Other factors that may affect the direction of the turn are:
• The direction to an alternate airport and en route terrain clearance;
• Any lateral offset flown; and
• The FLs allocated on adjacent routes or tracks.
NOTE: Crews should also consider sensitive airspace, NOTAMs, and low-altitude weather, all of which can affect safety of flight en route to a diversion airport.
(a) Procedures Following a Turn. Following the turn, the pilot should:
• If unable to maintain the assigned flight level, initially minimize the rate of descent to the extent that is operationally feasible;
• Take account of other aircraft that are laterally offset from their track;
• Acquire and maintain, in either direction, a track laterally separated by 28 km (15 NM) from the assigned route; and
• When 10 miles offset, start climb or descent to select a FL which differs from those normally used by 150 m (500 ft).
• Establish communications with and alert nearby aircraft by broadcasting, at suitable intervals: aircraft identification, FL, position (including the ATS route designator or the track code, as appropriate), and intentions on the frequency in use and on 121.5 MHz (or, as a backup, on the inter-pilot air-to-air frequency 123.45 MHz);
• Maintain a watch for conflicting traffic both visually and by reference to ACAS (if equipped);
• Turn on all aircraft exterior lights (commensurate with appropriate operating limitations);
• Keep the Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponder on at all times;
and
• Take action as necessary to ensure the safety of the aircraft.
(b) Leaving an Assigned Track. When leaving the assigned track to acquire and maintain the track laterally separated by 28 km (15 NM), the flightcrew, should, where practicable, avoid over-shooting, particularly in airspace where you apply a 55.5 km (30 NM) lateral separation minimum.
Page 42 Par 3-10
g. ETOPS. If an aircraft employs the contingency procedures as a result of an engine shutdown or failure of any critical system, the pilot must advise ATC as soon as practicable, reminding ATC of the type of aircraft involved, and request expeditious handling.
h. SAR. SAR is a life-saving service provided by many governments assisted by aviation and other organizations. This service provides search, survival aid, and rescue of personnel of missing or crashed aircraft. Before departure, a pilot should file a flight plan and itinerary and communicate that information to an appropriate authority at the departure point. Search efforts are often wasted, and rescue is delayed, because a pilot departs without informing anyone of the flight plan. To protect all personnel on the aircraft, follow these steps:
• File a flight plan with the appropriate authority.
• Close the flight plan with the appropriate authority immediately upon landing.
• If the flight lands somewhere other than the intended destination, report the landing immediately to the appropriate authority.
• If an en route landing is delayed for more than 30 minutes (for turbojets), notify the appropriate authority.
• Failure to close a flight plan within 30 minutes of landing may initiate a search.
i. Crashed Aircraft. If a crashed aircraft is observed, and it is marked with a yellow cross, it has been reported and identified. If the site is not marked with a yellow cross, determine, if possible, the type and number of aircraft and whether there is evidence of survivors. Fix the location of the crash as accurately as possible and transmit the information to the nearest appropriate communication facility. If possible, orbit the scene to guide other assisting aircraft until relieved by another aircraft. Immediately after landing, make a full report to the appropriate authority.
j. Crash Landing Survival and Rescue. To enhance the chances of survival and rescue in the event of a crash landing, it is important to carry survival equipment suitable for the geographic area. If a forced landing occurs at sea, the crew’s proficiency in emergency procedures and the effectiveness of water survival equipment onboard the aircraft govern survival chances. In the event that requires an emergency water landing, the crew should contact the Coast Guard and request Automated Merchant Vessel Rescue (AMVER) system information.
Within minutes the crew will receive the name and location of every merchant vessel within 100 miles of the aircraft’s reported position. The speed of rescue on land or at sea depends upon your accuracy in determining the position. If you follow the flight plan and the position is on course, it will expedite rescue. Unless there is good reason to believe that search aircraft cannot locate the crash site, it is best to remain near the aircraft and prepare to signal when search aircraft approach.
k. Ditching and Evacuation. When ditching is imminent, the first step is to communicate with oceanic control and the passengers. The PIC should initiate the distress call to the appropriate agency per ATC instructions or as indicated in the IFIM. When contacting oceanic Par 3-10 Page 43