AC 120-123

Advisory circular · Flightpath Management

Approved
November 21, 2022
Last reviewed
August 28, 2024
Family
AC 120-123 · 1 version
14 CFR parts
1, 60, 61, 91, 121, 125, 135, 142

Guidance, not mandatory unless a rule or AD requires it. DRS record last changed November 21, 2025.

Show pages 1–11

3-2 communicating/coordinating with the other pilot(s) and ATC. It requires an integrated application of cognitive, psychomotor, and communications skills.

3.1.3 MFO Proficiency. Operational data have shown that, on average, pilots exercise manual flight control for only a small portion of total flight time (usually only during takeoff and landing). This somewhat limited operational practice in MFO may contribute to a gap between proficiency in MFO and the ability of pilots to perform manual operations when various situations require immediate manual control. Operators should promote and provide pilots with opportunities to exercise their knowledge and skills required for proficiency in MFO in training and during line operations.

3.1.4 MFO Skill Degradation. Analyses of operational, accident, and incident data show that degradation of pilot skills in MFO has been identified as a potential vulnerability to successful FPM. Therefore, policies that promote the development and maintenance of pilot skills for MFO remain important for the safety and effectiveness of air carrier operations.6 Proficiency in MFO skills is necessary for safe flight operations, regardless of the autoflight equipment installed, or used, in the aircraft.

3.2 Operator Policy and Procedure Considerations for MFO. Many aspects of operator policies and procedures can affect the readiness of pilots to perform MFO effectively. For example, operator policies on FPM that excessively require the use of automated systems may negatively affect the retention of MFO skills. Therefore, policy should not be overly prescriptive on requiring the use of automated systems at all times but instead encourage a culture that promotes joint responsibility of operator and individual pilots for maintaining pilot proficiency in MFO.

3.2.1 Maintaining MFO Proficiency in Operations and Training. Flight operations and training for MFO are interdependent. Therefore, operators should encourage an integrated approach by incorporating emphasis of pilots maintaining proficiency of their MFO knowledge and skills using both line operations and training (initial/upgrade, requalification, and recurrent). This includes emphasizing and exercising MFO during operational experience, and consolidation of training.

3.2.2 E xercising Manual Flying Skills and Knowledge. The operator policies should ensure there are appropriate opportunities for pilots to exercise manual flying skills during both training and line operations, such as during certain weather conditions and/or low workload periods. In addition, policies should ensure that pilots understand when to use the automated systems, including during conditions or airspace procedures that require use of AP for precise operations. The operator’s policy should address how to regain proficiency of MFO skills after pilots have short and long absences and include exercising skills for MFO during takeoffs, departures, arrivals, and landings.

3.2.2.1 An operator’s line operations policy should permit and encourage MFO and should incorporate the following:

6 Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 17007, Manual Flight Operations Proficiency.

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1. Encouragement to manually fly the aircraft including, at least periodically, the entire departure and arrival phases and potentially the entire flight.

2. When deciding whether to fly manually, crews should apply basic TEM7 principles and take into account the various factors affecting operational workload. Factors to consider include:

• Weather conditions, terrain, and/or other environmental threats.

• Time of day.

• Psychological and/or physiological factors.

• Level of crew experience.

• Traffic density.

• Condition of the aircraft, and/or any non-normal conditions.

• ATC and/or instrument procedural challenges.

• Any other operational threats.

3. Allow and encourage pilots to conduct manual flight with different combinations of automated systems and modes based on aircraft equipage and operational situations. Examples of different combinations of autoflight systems include the following:

• FD on, AP off, AT on.

• FD on, AP off, AT off.

• FD off, AP off, AT off.

• FD on, AP on, AT off.

• FD off, AP off, AT on.

4. A clear statement that the pilot in command (PIC) should use good judgment to consider the factors described above and to decide, on a case-by-case basis, when it is appropriate to conduct manual flying.

3.2.2.2 Operational policy guidance for manual flying during line operations should avoid:

1. Overly general statements, such as “shall never manually fly at night” or “shall always manually fly in day visual meteorological conditions (VMC).” The policy should allow the PIC to weigh all of the factors based on the situation and to apply good judgment.

2. Quotas for manual flying, unless based on validated scientific evidence

(e.g., “shall fly manually at least 10 hours/month”).

7 Or comparable operational risk management principles.

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3.2.2.3 Augmented crew operations may also limit the ability of some pilots to obtain practice and maintain proficiency in FPM skills during MFO. Operational and training policies should ensure that all pilots have appropriate opportunities to exercise knowledge and skills in MFO during operational line flying as well as in the simulator. Operators should ensure they have specific policies to address and provide opportunities for augmented crew pilots to gain hands-on MFO experience in a control seat managing the flightpath on a consistent basis to maintain proficiency in skills required for FPM.

3.2.3 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Operators should implement specific SOPs to support the MFO portion of their FPM policy. FPM policies and procedures should protect the PF’s ability to maintain focus on FPM.

3.2.3.1 FPM policies and procedures related to MFO should be validated for operational effectiveness from different data sources and should take into account lessons learned from a regular review of feedback/data sources from training, line experience, operational, and safety data. Operators should conduct a formal Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) of the threats identified by data analysis relating to FPM during MFO. This assessment will inform the operator of necessary changes to the policies and procedures in the operator’s manuals. Additional information can be found in AC 120-71, Standard Operating Procedures and Pilot Monitoring Duties for Flight Deck Crewmembers, Chapter 2, Determining When Procedures Need to be Designed or Modified.

3.2.3.2 Some examples of data sources that may be used for validation include:

• Testing and checking results.

• Periodic evaluations and analyses by those who have knowledge of the training program, its content, and its goals and purpose.

• Pilot surveys, instructor surveys, peer surveys, and training data.

• Critiques from managers, instructors, check pilots, and students regarding the training, testing, checking, or qualification process as it relates to FPM.

• Data from voluntary safety programs, such as the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA), and Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA).

• Other data from an operator’s Safety Management System (SMS).

3.3 Training and Checking Considerations. In designing their training programs (initial, transition, upgrade, and recurrent), operators should develop specific learning objectives with associated training methodologies that address knowledge and skills for MFO. MFO knowledge and skills should be emphasized throughout all flight training programs. An operator’s training policy should incorporate the following:

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1. All curricula should be designed in accordance with the philosophy that manual flight is the foundation upon which other technical flying skills are built. Therefore, the importance of manual flight should be emphasized throughout all flight training syllabi, while recognizing that MFO involve more than motor skills. Manual flight requires an integrated combination of cognitive, psychomotor, and communications skills.

2. All curricula should include training and proficiency assessment of MFO skills.

3.3.1 Unexpected Training and Checking Scenarios. Operators should consider that many exercises required to be hand flown are well-known and repetitive and may not measure the true underlying skill level outside of those specific exercises (e.g., single-engine, hand-flown approaches). Rather, operators should use safety system data and industry best practices to identify opportunities to present both expected and unexpected scenarios requiring manual flight that better measure and improve proficiency in FPM skills during MFO. For example, flying a hand-flown visual approach from 20 miles out without FDs, autothrust, and ATC guidance.

3.3.2 D evelopment and Maintenance of Knowledge and Skills. The importance of developing and maintaining MFO knowledge and skills should be emphasized throughout all flight-training segments. It is essential that knowledge and both cognitive and psychomotor skills for MFO are developed from the beginning of pilot training and practiced throughout a pilot’s career. Pilot knowledge and skills are not static. While pilots achieve initial skill development through training and practice over time, the variability encountered in line operations should allow pilots to continually gain experience, refine, and improve their knowledge and skills.

3.3.2.1 Fundamental skills are those skills that may be necessary across many tasks and can include cognitive, psychomotor, and communication skills.

Performing MFO requires foundational knowledge and skill proficiency in the following cognitive, psychomotor, and communication areas including, but not limited to, the following:

• Pitch and power basics.

• Energy management.

• High vs. low altitude aircraft performance.

• Aircraft type-specific factors with an impact on handling (e.g., effects of swept- vs. straight-wings, turbojet vs. turboprop vs. piston prop engines, underwing- vs. tail-mounted engines, trimmable stabilizer vs. trimmable elevator, etc.).

• Scan.

• Instrument interpretation.

• Cross-check of other pilot actions.

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• Aircraft control, including timing, coordination, and anticipation of control inputs.

• Steps required, corresponding instrument display changes, and manual inputs required that occur as different combinations of systems and modes are used for MFO.

• Decision making for selecting the different combinations of management, guidance, and control systems desired for FPM during line operations.

• Appropriately managing unexpected situations (e.g., due to threats, system anomalies, system failures, or pilot input/error).

• Staying engaged in the FPM task, remaining constantly prepared to make manual inputs or make decisions when needed.

• Crew coordination.

• Task and workload management during manual flight (as it pertains to both the PF and PM).

• Information integration.

• Problem solving.

3.3.2.2 Pilots returning from an absence that requires requalification training should be provided training (including simulator training) to enable proficiency in these fundamental skills as well as MFO and instrument flying skills.

3.3.3 N ormal Maneuvers vs . Non-Normal Events. Training pilots on required manual maneuvers (e.g., area departures/arrivals, approaches, slow flight, stalls, upsets, and steep turns) is beneficial to developing and maintaining manual flight skills. However, the need exists to assess pilot proficiency in MFO during expected and unexpected, non-normal events that challenge the pilot’s cognitive as well as psychomotor skills. For example, startle events, systems failures, congested traffic leading to multiple ATC changes during approach, and weather events all provide a significant challenge when coupled with the requirement to fly the aircraft manually. Subtle degradation of control and guidance systems also present a challenge. Accident and incident reports show a pattern of MFO errors during non-normal events related to a deficiency in cognitive skills.

3.3.3.1 MF O Maneuvers. Operators should develop a list of required, recommended, and other manual flight maneuvers with associated tasks, knowledge, and skills to ensure they are identifying, training, and assessing required knowledge and skills for the entire range of tasks required for manually flown maneuvers and profiles. They should also identify which maneuvers and tasks are to be accomplished only in simulator training. This helps to build and maintain overall expertise and proficiency in cognitive, psychomotor, and communication skills required for MFO, not just expertise in certain tasks within a maneuver.

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3.3.3.2 Required Maneuvers. Required manual flight maneuvers are contained within the approved part 121 training program requirements. This includes requirements such as:

1. Manually controlled slow flight (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-111, Upset Prevention and Recovery Training).

2. Manually controlled loss of reliable airspeed (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-111).

3. Manually controlled instrument departure and arrival (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-114, Pilot Training and Checking (14 CFR Part 121 Subparts N and O, Including Appendices E and F)).

4. Upset recovery maneuvers (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-111).

5. Recovery from bounced landing (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-114).

6. Stall prevention and stall recovery (refer to part 121 appendix E, row III(h), and AC 120-109, Stall Prevention and Recovery Training ).

7. Takeoff with simulated engine failure (refer to part 121 appendix E, row II(d) and appendix F, row II(d); and AC 120-114).

8. Manually controlled Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach with simulated engine failure (refer to part 121 appendix E, row III(l)(2) and appendix F, row III(c)(2); AC 120-114; and AC 120-54, Advanced Qualification Program).

9. Manually flown takeoff, departure to cruise (refer to § 121.423(b) and part 121 appendices E and F).

10. Manually flown descent, arrival, approach, and landing (refer to §121.423(b) and part 121 appendices E and F).

3.3.3.3 Recommended Practices. In addition to the required manual flight maneuvers, there are recommended practices that could provide additional opportunities in training for practicing MFO skills, in all flight phases. In some cases, these opportunities should be accomplished in normal line operations as well. The associated maneuvers, tasks, knowledge, and skills are found in guidance material, such as AC 120-114.

3.3.4 Training Scenarios. Training scenarios should address the operator’s specific circumstances (e.g., pilot demographics and operational environment) and common error trends as identified through operator/industry safety programs. Scenarios may be incorporated as part of the Maneuvers Based Training (MBT) required by § 121.423, in a Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenario, or other scenario-based training (SBT) and integrated with the energy management training considerations and training scenarios in Chapter 6, Energy Management.

3.3.4.1 Recommended training scenarios for MFO, in addition to part 121 training requirements, include manually flying to address the following:

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1. Out of trim conditions – how to recover and manually fly to a safe landing.

2. Go-arounds initiated at other than minimum descent altitude (MDA)/decision altitude (DA).

3. Visual approaches in various weather and/or lighting conditions.

4. Operations in different combinations of automated systems and modes based on aircraft equipage. Examples of different combinations include the following:

• FD on, AP off, AT on.

• FD on, AP off, AT off.

• FD on, AP on, AT off.

• FD off, AP off, AT off.

• FD off, AP off, AT on.

5. Engine-out raw data Category (CAT) I ILS approach.

6. Manual flight with hydraulic system malfunction.

7. Manual flight with flight control malfunction(s) affecting aircraft handling characteristics.

8. Visual circuit with partial power.

9. Loss of all engines.

10. Prevention, recognition, and manual recovery from unintended deviation from flightpath.

11. Prevention, recognition, and manual recovery from unintended autoflight states.

3.3.4.1.1 Pilots must have the proficiency to manually fly the aircraft at any time (even for the entire flight), without the aid of automated systems.8 This requires that pilot knowledge and skills be developed, and proficiency maintained, for each task associated with every manually flown flight maneuver. This also requires the pilot to have the ability to regularly exercise required tasks and their associated knowledge and skills in both the airplane and simulator to maintain proficiency. Pilots should be regularly evaluated on their proficiency to manually fly the aircraft while conducting MFO.

3.3.4.1.2 In addition to required knowledge and skills for MFO, pilots need the confidence and cognitive capacity to accomplish and manage the tasks associated with manually flying the airplane. This includes managing time, tasks, workload, and changes due to the variability of operations. For example, if an operator wants to assess pilot proficiency for a manually flown

8 Part 121 appendix E.

3-9 visual approach, the assessment should include a major cross-section of all required tasks and their associated knowledge and skills for the maneuver.

The visual approach maneuver should start during the descent phase where the pilot can demonstrate proficiency in MFO during the arrival, approach, and landing while safely managing such things as approach planning, crew briefing, energy management, ATC communications, time management, task/workload management, and ATC-directed changes. This allows the assessment of a representative set of knowledge and skills that requires the pilot to show proficiency. Experience exercising the skills and developing and maintaining proficiency results in pilot confidence in their performance abilities.

3.3.4.1.3 In contrast, an operator cannot accurately assess overall proficiency in a manually flown visual approach by only requiring a pilot to manually fly a final approach maneuver (airplane fully configured at final approach fix (FAF) to touchdown). This only assesses pilot proficiency in flying a fully configured aircraft from the FAF to landing. It does not assess proficiency for the entire visual approach maneuver. It primarily checks for certain fundamental psychomotor abilities but does very little to verify proficiency in overall pilot knowledge, cognitive, psychomotor, and communication skills, and cognitive capacity to accomplish all tasks required to manually fly a visual approach in line operations.

3.3.4.1.4 It is beneficial for manually flown maneuvers (both normal and non-normal) to be trained and checked to a defined and logical end state consistent with what would happen during line operations, not just to an unrealistic intermediate stopping point. Scenarios that require manual flight, especially scenarios involving aircraft controllability and manual handling issues, should require pilots to continue all the way to a landing. In these situations, the pilots would exercise their skills and gain experience performing their complete set of fundamental flight skills, along with their knowledge and skills (cognitive, psychomotor, and communication) required for MFO, to safely land the airplane.

3.3.4.1.5 For example, consider a runaway trim scenario where the trim operation cannot be fixed, and the pilots are required to manually fly the airplane to a safe landing with the aircraft in a compromised state. The maneuver should start when the trim starts to run away and end when the aircraft lands. The pilots would need to take over manual aircraft control, identify the problem, accomplish any immediate action steps from memory, diagnose the problem, run appropriate checklists, coordinate with ATC, and manually fly the airplane for an approach and landing at a suitable airport. Stopping an assessment after the immediate action steps are completed or after the aircraft state is stabilized does not fully show proficiency in manually flying a runaway trim situation to a safe landing.

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3.3.5 Intervention Strategies. Since situations will occur where intervention in the flightpath control is required, operators should include policies and procedures for pilots to follow when intervening in automated or manual control situations, and for resumption of flightpath control.9 These policies and procedures should apply to both pilot-to-machine intervention and pilot-to-pilot intervention and should include deviation parameters, required call-outs, and conditions for assuming control from the other pilot (e.g., a “two-challenge rule”). Operators should incorporate intervention strategy policies and procedures specific to FPM within their CRM training as well. Chapter 5, Pilot Monitoring (§ 121.544), further discusses topics related to intervention.

3.3.6 T ransfer of Control . There must always be a clear understanding of which pilot has control of the aircraft. Prior to flight, the pilots involved should conduct a briefing that includes reviewing the procedures for exchanging flight controls.

3.3.6.1 The FAA recommends a positive three-step process for exchanging flight controls between pilots:

1. When one pilot seeks to have the other pilot take control of the aircraft, the first pilot will say, “You have the flight controls.”

2. The second pilot acknowledges immediately by saying, “I have the flight controls.”

3. The first pilot again says, “You have the flight controls,” and visually confirms the exchange.

3.3.6.2 Pilots should follow this procedure during any exchange of flight controls, including any occurrence during the proficiency check. There must never be any doubt as to who is flying the aircraft.

3.3.6.3 Through analysis of accidents and incidents, situations are identified where both pilots ended up acting as the PF while monitoring was overlooked. This could happen when the PM takes over aircraft control from the PF during a critical moment, including takeoff and landing. Normally, it is easier for the PM to revert to PF than the PF to revert to PM instantly. One reason for this is that the PM may make a decision and take action to be the PF, while the PF may be startled, surprised, lost situation awareness, or trying to figure out why the PM took over, but not thinking about switching roles and being the PM.

However, there are also situations where the PM is given control by the PF unexpectedly, such as in the case of lost instrumentation or the PF’s seat sliding back during rotation. In any case, during any takeover or transfer of control, the new PF has to ensure control of the flightpath while the new PM immediately assumes the PM role and responsibilities, while both pilots maintain situation awareness.

3.3.6.4 The purpose of transfer of control training is to:

9 ACT ARC Recommendation 15-10, Guidance Material Addressing Intervention Strategies, August 8, 2015.

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1. Develop proficiency in changing roles (PF to PM, PM to PF) during situations where transfer of control is necessary.

2. Initiate takeover to prevent the situation from becoming critical.

3. Highlight the importance of continuously maintaining aircraft control and monitoring through the takeover and that the pilots change roles as required.

4. Make pilots aware of vulnerabilities and common errors that can occur during transfer of control, either planned or unplanned, including how to mitigate, recognize, and recover from errors.

3.3.6.5 Transfer of control training should include at least the following scenarios:

• The Captain is acting as PM and is required to take over as PF and the F/O reverts to PM.

• The Captain is identified as PM in the briefing and inadvertently assumes PF on the takeoff role and the F/O reverts to PM.

• The F/O (PM) is required to take over as PF and the Captain (PF) reverts to PM immediately.

• The F/O (PM) decides to takeover and the Captain (PF) reverts to PM instantly.

• Unexpected system behavior or failure affecting the roles of PF and PM.

• Rejected takeoff.

• Unstable approaches.

• Decision-making processes.

• PF takeover from automated systems (expected and unexpected).

3.4 Instructor/Evaluator (I/E) Considerations. All I/Es should have the foundational knowledge and fundamental skill proficiency in cognitive, psychomotor, and communication areas recommended in this chapter for effective aircraft FPM and performing MFO. In addition, all I/Es should possess the knowledge and skills to instruct, assess, and evaluate the learning objectives and pilot proficiency for MFO as it relates to FPM, including the interlinking aspects of managing automated systems, PM, and energy management.

3.4.1 Instructors providing training on MFO must have a thorough understanding of FPM and MFO learning objectives.10 Operators should provide instructors training on the recommended strategies, including scenarios that can be used to incorporate these learning objectives.

10 Section 121.412.

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3.4.2 Throughout all aspects of training and checking, the instructors and evaluators should maintain focus on FPM priority. They should be trained to deliver realistic training scenarios for exercising, building, and maintaining proficiency in MFO skills.

4-1 CHAPTER 4. MANAGING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS

4.1 General. There are many automated systems in modern airplanes, including autoflight systems (e.g., AP, AT, and FD), FMS, and envelope protection systems. Automated systems are implemented for different functions, including aircraft control, flight guidance, alerting systems, systems management, and many others. Pilots should be adequately trained and proficient with respect to those systems.11 This chapter focuses on automated systems that affect airplane control and guidance for FPM.

4.1.1 This chapter addresses the following major topics related to managing automated systems:

• Operational use of and training for automated systems in normal, rare normal,12 and non-normal operations. This includes appropriate engagement, disengagement, and combinations of these systems.

• Autoflight mode awareness.

• Prevention, recognition, and response to unintended autoflight states.13

• Prevention, recognition, and management of common errors in use of automated systems, including data entry errors.14

4.1.2 The following sections provide explanation and guidance for operations, operator policy, procedures, and training for each of these topics.

4.2 Operational Policy and Procedures for Managing Automated Systems. Effective operational use of automated systems in normal, rare normal, and non-normal operations for FPM requires the pilot to understand how the automated systems work, how to use/operate those systems, how to monitor them, and how to respond in case of failure or unintended system behavior.

4.2.1 To support effective use of automated systems for FPM, operators should provide flightcrews with:

11 Section 121.415(h).

12 The use of “rare normal” refers to environmental conditions that are experienced infrequently but considered to be operationally relevant. Examples may include significant winds/gusts, wind shear/microburst, severe turbulence, and asymmetric icing.

13 An “unintended autoflight state” means a situation in which any aspect of flight guidance or flight control automation is guiding or controlling the aircraft’s trajectory or energy in a manner contrary to that desired/intended by the pilot(s). This does not necessarily imply situations driven by system failures, flightcrew failures, or design deficiencies, as there are many possible causes for the mismatch between pilot intent an d the autoflight system state.

14 Flightcrews routinely input data and use automated systems properly to maintain the desired flightpath. However, industry studies note that input or usage errors occur and result in flightpath deviations, and one report sampling noted that “44% of…these errors went unnoticed by the pilots…” (International Air Transport Association (IATA), FMS Data Entry Error Prevention Best Practices, 1st Edition, 2015).