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• Aircraft control, including timing, coordination, and anticipation of control inputs.
• Steps required, corresponding instrument display changes, and manual inputs required that occur as different combinations of systems and modes are used for MFO.
• Decision making for selecting the different combinations of management, guidance, and control systems desired for FPM during line operations.
• Appropriately managing unexpected situations (e.g., due to threats, system anomalies, system failures, or pilot input/error).
• Staying engaged in the FPM task, remaining constantly prepared to make manual inputs or make decisions when needed.
• Crew coordination.
• Task and workload management during manual flight (as it pertains to both the PF and PM).
• Information integration.
• Problem solving.
3.3.2.2 Pilots returning from an absence that requires requalification training should be provided training (including simulator training) to enable proficiency in these fundamental skills as well as MFO and instrument flying skills.
3.3.3 N ormal Maneuvers vs . Non-Normal Events. Training pilots on required manual maneuvers (e.g., area departures/arrivals, approaches, slow flight, stalls, upsets, and steep turns) is beneficial to developing and maintaining manual flight skills. However, the need exists to assess pilot proficiency in MFO during expected and unexpected, non-normal events that challenge the pilot’s cognitive as well as psychomotor skills. For example, startle events, systems failures, congested traffic leading to multiple ATC changes during approach, and weather events all provide a significant challenge when coupled with the requirement to fly the aircraft manually. Subtle degradation of control and guidance systems also present a challenge. Accident and incident reports show a pattern of MFO errors during non-normal events related to a deficiency in cognitive skills.
3.3.3.1 MF O Maneuvers. Operators should develop a list of required, recommended, and other manual flight maneuvers with associated tasks, knowledge, and skills to ensure they are identifying, training, and assessing required knowledge and skills for the entire range of tasks required for manually flown maneuvers and profiles. They should also identify which maneuvers and tasks are to be accomplished only in simulator training. This helps to build and maintain overall expertise and proficiency in cognitive, psychomotor, and communication skills required for MFO, not just expertise in certain tasks within a maneuver.
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3.3.3.2 Required Maneuvers. Required manual flight maneuvers are contained within the approved part 121 training program requirements. This includes requirements such as:
1. Manually controlled slow flight (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-111, Upset Prevention and Recovery Training).
2. Manually controlled loss of reliable airspeed (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-111).
3. Manually controlled instrument departure and arrival (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-114, Pilot Training and Checking (14 CFR Part 121 Subparts N and O, Including Appendices E and F)).
4. Upset recovery maneuvers (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-111).
5. Recovery from bounced landing (refer to § 121.423(b) and AC 120-114).
6. Stall prevention and stall recovery (refer to part 121 appendix E, row III(h), and AC 120-109, Stall Prevention and Recovery Training ).
7. Takeoff with simulated engine failure (refer to part 121 appendix E, row II(d) and appendix F, row II(d); and AC 120-114).
8. Manually controlled Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach with simulated engine failure (refer to part 121 appendix E, row III(l)(2) and appendix F, row III(c)(2); AC 120-114; and AC 120-54, Advanced Qualification Program).
9. Manually flown takeoff, departure to cruise (refer to § 121.423(b) and part 121 appendices E and F).
10. Manually flown descent, arrival, approach, and landing (refer to §121.423(b) and part 121 appendices E and F).
3.3.3.3 Recommended Practices. In addition to the required manual flight maneuvers, there are recommended practices that could provide additional opportunities in training for practicing MFO skills, in all flight phases. In some cases, these opportunities should be accomplished in normal line operations as well. The associated maneuvers, tasks, knowledge, and skills are found in guidance material, such as AC 120-114.
3.3.4 Training Scenarios. Training scenarios should address the operator’s specific circumstances (e.g., pilot demographics and operational environment) and common error trends as identified through operator/industry safety programs. Scenarios may be incorporated as part of the Maneuvers Based Training (MBT) required by § 121.423, in a Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenario, or other scenario-based training (SBT) and integrated with the energy management training considerations and training scenarios in Chapter 6, Energy Management.
3.3.4.1 Recommended training scenarios for MFO, in addition to part 121 training requirements, include manually flying to address the following:
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1. Out of trim conditions – how to recover and manually fly to a safe landing.
2. Go-arounds initiated at other than minimum descent altitude (MDA)/decision altitude (DA).
3. Visual approaches in various weather and/or lighting conditions.
4. Operations in different combinations of automated systems and modes based on aircraft equipage. Examples of different combinations include the following:
• FD on, AP off, AT on.
• FD on, AP off, AT off.
• FD on, AP on, AT off.
• FD off, AP off, AT off.
• FD off, AP off, AT on.
5. Engine-out raw data Category (CAT) I ILS approach.
6. Manual flight with hydraulic system malfunction.
7. Manual flight with flight control malfunction(s) affecting aircraft handling characteristics.
8. Visual circuit with partial power.
9. Loss of all engines.
10. Prevention, recognition, and manual recovery from unintended deviation from flightpath.
11. Prevention, recognition, and manual recovery from unintended autoflight states.
3.3.4.1.1 Pilots must have the proficiency to manually fly the aircraft at any time (even for the entire flight), without the aid of automated systems.8 This requires that pilot knowledge and skills be developed, and proficiency maintained, for each task associated with every manually flown flight maneuver. This also requires the pilot to have the ability to regularly exercise required tasks and their associated knowledge and skills in both the airplane and simulator to maintain proficiency. Pilots should be regularly evaluated on their proficiency to manually fly the aircraft while conducting MFO.
3.3.4.1.2 In addition to required knowledge and skills for MFO, pilots need the confidence and cognitive capacity to accomplish and manage the tasks associated with manually flying the airplane. This includes managing time, tasks, workload, and changes due to the variability of operations. For example, if an operator wants to assess pilot proficiency for a manually flown
8 Part 121 appendix E.
3-9 visual approach, the assessment should include a major cross-section of all required tasks and their associated knowledge and skills for the maneuver.
The visual approach maneuver should start during the descent phase where the pilot can demonstrate proficiency in MFO during the arrival, approach, and landing while safely managing such things as approach planning, crew briefing, energy management, ATC communications, time management, task/workload management, and ATC-directed changes. This allows the assessment of a representative set of knowledge and skills that requires the pilot to show proficiency. Experience exercising the skills and developing and maintaining proficiency results in pilot confidence in their performance abilities.
3.3.4.1.3 In contrast, an operator cannot accurately assess overall proficiency in a manually flown visual approach by only requiring a pilot to manually fly a final approach maneuver (airplane fully configured at final approach fix (FAF) to touchdown). This only assesses pilot proficiency in flying a fully configured aircraft from the FAF to landing. It does not assess proficiency for the entire visual approach maneuver. It primarily checks for certain fundamental psychomotor abilities but does very little to verify proficiency in overall pilot knowledge, cognitive, psychomotor, and communication skills, and cognitive capacity to accomplish all tasks required to manually fly a visual approach in line operations.
3.3.4.1.4 It is beneficial for manually flown maneuvers (both normal and non-normal) to be trained and checked to a defined and logical end state consistent with what would happen during line operations, not just to an unrealistic intermediate stopping point. Scenarios that require manual flight, especially scenarios involving aircraft controllability and manual handling issues, should require pilots to continue all the way to a landing. In these situations, the pilots would exercise their skills and gain experience performing their complete set of fundamental flight skills, along with their knowledge and skills (cognitive, psychomotor, and communication) required for MFO, to safely land the airplane.
3.3.4.1.5 For example, consider a runaway trim scenario where the trim operation cannot be fixed, and the pilots are required to manually fly the airplane to a safe landing with the aircraft in a compromised state. The maneuver should start when the trim starts to run away and end when the aircraft lands. The pilots would need to take over manual aircraft control, identify the problem, accomplish any immediate action steps from memory, diagnose the problem, run appropriate checklists, coordinate with ATC, and manually fly the airplane for an approach and landing at a suitable airport. Stopping an assessment after the immediate action steps are completed or after the aircraft state is stabilized does not fully show proficiency in manually flying a runaway trim situation to a safe landing.
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3.3.5 Intervention Strategies. Since situations will occur where intervention in the flightpath control is required, operators should include policies and procedures for pilots to follow when intervening in automated or manual control situations, and for resumption of flightpath control.9 These policies and procedures should apply to both pilot-to-machine intervention and pilot-to-pilot intervention and should include deviation parameters, required call-outs, and conditions for assuming control from the other pilot (e.g., a “two-challenge rule”). Operators should incorporate intervention strategy policies and procedures specific to FPM within their CRM training as well. Chapter 5, Pilot Monitoring (§ 121.544), further discusses topics related to intervention.
3.3.6 T ransfer of Control . There must always be a clear understanding of which pilot has control of the aircraft. Prior to flight, the pilots involved should conduct a briefing that includes reviewing the procedures for exchanging flight controls.
3.3.6.1 The FAA recommends a positive three-step process for exchanging flight controls between pilots:
1. When one pilot seeks to have the other pilot take control of the aircraft, the first pilot will say, “You have the flight controls.”
2. The second pilot acknowledges immediately by saying, “I have the flight controls.”
3. The first pilot again says, “You have the flight controls,” and visually confirms the exchange.
3.3.6.2 Pilots should follow this procedure during any exchange of flight controls, including any occurrence during the proficiency check. There must never be any doubt as to who is flying the aircraft.
3.3.6.3 Through analysis of accidents and incidents, situations are identified where both pilots ended up acting as the PF while monitoring was overlooked. This could happen when the PM takes over aircraft control from the PF during a critical moment, including takeoff and landing. Normally, it is easier for the PM to revert to PF than the PF to revert to PM instantly. One reason for this is that the PM may make a decision and take action to be the PF, while the PF may be startled, surprised, lost situation awareness, or trying to figure out why the PM took over, but not thinking about switching roles and being the PM.
However, there are also situations where the PM is given control by the PF unexpectedly, such as in the case of lost instrumentation or the PF’s seat sliding back during rotation. In any case, during any takeover or transfer of control, the new PF has to ensure control of the flightpath while the new PM immediately assumes the PM role and responsibilities, while both pilots maintain situation awareness.
3.3.6.4 The purpose of transfer of control training is to:
9 ACT ARC Recommendation 15-10, Guidance Material Addressing Intervention Strategies, August 8, 2015.
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1. Develop proficiency in changing roles (PF to PM, PM to PF) during situations where transfer of control is necessary.
2. Initiate takeover to prevent the situation from becoming critical.
3. Highlight the importance of continuously maintaining aircraft control and monitoring through the takeover and that the pilots change roles as required.
4. Make pilots aware of vulnerabilities and common errors that can occur during transfer of control, either planned or unplanned, including how to mitigate, recognize, and recover from errors.
3.3.6.5 Transfer of control training should include at least the following scenarios:
• The Captain is acting as PM and is required to take over as PF and the F/O reverts to PM.
• The Captain is identified as PM in the briefing and inadvertently assumes PF on the takeoff role and the F/O reverts to PM.
• The F/O (PM) is required to take over as PF and the Captain (PF) reverts to PM immediately.
• The F/O (PM) decides to takeover and the Captain (PF) reverts to PM instantly.
• Unexpected system behavior or failure affecting the roles of PF and PM.
• Rejected takeoff.
• Unstable approaches.
• Decision-making processes.
• PF takeover from automated systems (expected and unexpected).
3.4 Instructor/Evaluator (I/E) Considerations. All I/Es should have the foundational knowledge and fundamental skill proficiency in cognitive, psychomotor, and communication areas recommended in this chapter for effective aircraft FPM and performing MFO. In addition, all I/Es should possess the knowledge and skills to instruct, assess, and evaluate the learning objectives and pilot proficiency for MFO as it relates to FPM, including the interlinking aspects of managing automated systems, PM, and energy management.
3.4.1 Instructors providing training on MFO must have a thorough understanding of FPM and MFO learning objectives.10 Operators should provide instructors training on the recommended strategies, including scenarios that can be used to incorporate these learning objectives.
10 Section 121.412.
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3.4.2 Throughout all aspects of training and checking, the instructors and evaluators should maintain focus on FPM priority. They should be trained to deliver realistic training scenarios for exercising, building, and maintaining proficiency in MFO skills.
4-1 CHAPTER 4. MANAGING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS
4.1 General. There are many automated systems in modern airplanes, including autoflight systems (e.g., AP, AT, and FD), FMS, and envelope protection systems. Automated systems are implemented for different functions, including aircraft control, flight guidance, alerting systems, systems management, and many others. Pilots should be adequately trained and proficient with respect to those systems.11 This chapter focuses on automated systems that affect airplane control and guidance for FPM.
4.1.1 This chapter addresses the following major topics related to managing automated systems:
• Operational use of and training for automated systems in normal, rare normal,12 and non-normal operations. This includes appropriate engagement, disengagement, and combinations of these systems.
• Autoflight mode awareness.
• Prevention, recognition, and response to unintended autoflight states.13
• Prevention, recognition, and management of common errors in use of automated systems, including data entry errors.14
4.1.2 The following sections provide explanation and guidance for operations, operator policy, procedures, and training for each of these topics.
4.2 Operational Policy and Procedures for Managing Automated Systems. Effective operational use of automated systems in normal, rare normal, and non-normal operations for FPM requires the pilot to understand how the automated systems work, how to use/operate those systems, how to monitor them, and how to respond in case of failure or unintended system behavior.
4.2.1 To support effective use of automated systems for FPM, operators should provide flightcrews with:
11 Section 121.415(h).
12 The use of “rare normal” refers to environmental conditions that are experienced infrequently but considered to be operationally relevant. Examples may include significant winds/gusts, wind shear/microburst, severe turbulence, and asymmetric icing.
13 An “unintended autoflight state” means a situation in which any aspect of flight guidance or flight control automation is guiding or controlling the aircraft’s trajectory or energy in a manner contrary to that desired/intended by the pilot(s). This does not necessarily imply situations driven by system failures, flightcrew failures, or design deficiencies, as there are many possible causes for the mismatch between pilot intent an d the autoflight system state.
14 Flightcrews routinely input data and use automated systems properly to maintain the desired flightpath. However, industry studies note that input or usage errors occur and result in flightpath deviations, and one report sampling noted that “44% of…these errors went unnoticed by the pilots…” (International Air Transport Association (IATA), FMS Data Entry Error Prevention Best Practices, 1st Edition, 2015).
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1. Operational policy with recommended strategies and procedures on the use of automated systems, including appropriate engagement, disengagement, re-engagement, and combinations of use of these systems.
2. Guidance and procedures for the use of the automated system or combination of systems, when to not use them, and which system or combinations are best suited to the different operational scenarios, including:
• Procedures and communications strategies to support autoflight mode awareness, and
• Flightcrew actions when an automated system does not respond or behave as expected or disengages unexpectedly. The objective is for pilots to develop an understanding of the automated system, its integration with other aircraft systems, and what might affect the automated systems’ ability to function as expected.
3. Integration of strategies for achieving autoflight mode awareness into SOPs.
Equipment and/or company culture may influence how the mode awareness procedures for flightcrews are designed. Therefore, the operator should create mode awareness procedures that reflect the equipment and how the company employs the equipage and should train/assess the procedures.
4. Policy and procedures for prevention, recognition and recovery from unintended autoflight states. Procedures should emphasize that the PF’s primary duty is to control the flightpath and the PM’s duty is to (1) monitor/ensure the flightpath, then (2) assist the PF by assessing any actual or potential deviations from the flightpath and helping to correct the autoflight settings as needed to restore desired behavior.
5. Policy and procedures for preventing, recognizing and managing common errors in use of automated systems, including data entry errors.
4.2.2 Strategies for using automated systems sometimes refer to levels of automation, defined as simple hierarchies of combinations of certain autoflight systems. While the concept of levels may be useful for communication, such a description assumes a linear hierarchy that is difficult to apply operationally. The various features of the autoflight system (AP, FD, AT, FMS, etc.), can be, and are, selected independently and in different combinations that do not lend themselves to simple hierarchical description. Therefore, operator’s policies should provide strategies for the pilot to use the appropriate combination of automated system features for the situation, without rigidly defining them in terms of levels, except for the highest (everything is on) or the lowest (everything is off). The strategies should provide flightcrews with the options that match the specific operationally relevant scenario, but also allow flexibility for those unusual operations that occur. Equipping flightcrews with such practical strategies may also equip them with the knowledge to select the appropriate combination of automated systems and modes (or none at all) for those unexpected events that require informed and timely decisions
(e.g. those events which may not be addressed in flightcrew checklists).
4.3 Training Considerations. As described above, effective operational use of automated systems requires the pilot to understand how the automated systems work, how to use/operate those systems, how to monitor them, and how to respond in case of failure or
4-3 uni ntended system behavior. In designing training programs, operators should develop specific learning objectives with associated training methodologies that address knowledge and skills for managing automated systems. Pilots must be trained on the operator’s policies and procedures for the use of automated systems in normal, rare normal, and non-normal operations, including appropriate engagement, disengagement, and combinations of these systems.15 Training these strategies should be scenario-based and operationally relevant.
4.3.1 Appropriate strategies on the use and application of the respective system(s) are situation-dependent, and operators should provide training on these strategies and procedures. The training should reflect actual events captured from the various data sources.
4.3.2 Operators should train flightcrews on the following topics:
4.3.2.1 Pilots should be able to correctly interpret the automated system’s engagement mode and whether the aircraft is responding as intended. If a system is not responding as intended, whoever detects an anomaly should communicate with other members of the flightcrew to ensure a shared understanding.
Should the system not engage as desired, engage into an undesired mode, or disengage unexpectedly, flightcrews should be capable of returning to the previous state or manually disengaging the system in accordance with established aircraft operating procedures. Subsequently, flightcrews should be capable of analyzing the anomaly and selecting alternative options and/or corrective actions.
4.3.2.2 Flightcrews should also receive training for operational situations in which it is not appropriate to engage an automated system, such as when known system failures/anomalies exist that may adversely affect aircraft control or when the aircraft is in an undesired state (e.g., upset). An exception when the undesired state is an upset is when the aircraft is specifically designed with a recovery system to facilitate an upset recovery. In this case, flightcrews should be thoroughly trained on the use of the recovery system and recognize if it is not operating as intended to quickly intervene and manually recover from the upset before conditions deteriorate.
4.3.2.3 Operators should train flightcrews on autoflight mode awareness. The pilot should be able to demonstrate the knowledge and skill to correctly select, interpret, and anticipate normal autoflight modes, and demonstrate appropriate remedial actions for inappropriate or unexpected modes. Learning objectives include but are not limited to:
15 Section 121.419(a)(2)(v).
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• Correctly interpret individual flight mode annunciations (FMA) (e.g., AP, AT, and FD).
• Describe the respective mode’s impact on the related systems and aircraft operation.
• Identify autothrottle system mode annunciations and the effects on aircraft performance.
• Describe autothrottle system effects on related system operation.
• Identify pitch mode annunciations and their relationship to AT and FD
(i.e., demonstrate understanding of speed-on-pitch (speed controlled by varying the airplane pitch attitude) and speed-on-thrust (speed controlled by varying the engine thrust level)).
4.3.2.4 Managing automated system failures. This should include failures of other systems that affect the operation of automated systems, including sensor failures. Training on failures should consider operationally relevant situations and should include failures of items that provide input to the automated systems. Examples include situations where assessment is difficult; situations where recovery is difficult if not properly recognized; and conditions that do not have a checklist. For these training sessions, it is appropriate to note that it is not possible to train pilots in all possible malfunctions or failure scenarios, nor is it possible (or desirable) for line pilots to perform functions as test pilots. Pilots must be prepared to recognize the results of both complete and partial system failures (including sensor failures) and intervene appropriately.16
4.3.2.5 Operators should train flightcrews on how to manage automated systems after input errors (pilot- or system-generated). To reduce the likelihood of automated system input and usage errors, flightcrews should first be trained on what to look for, and then be given procedures, tools, and techniques to cross-check each other and the automated system in a combined effort to trap potential errors. The 2015 International Air Transport Association (IATA) FMS Data Entry Error Prevention Best Practices document lists some common error categories: mass/balance, flight plan, load/trim, navigation database, FMS limitations, configuration errors, data calculation, and data transcription. Instructors should offer methods for prioritizing the errors that are most likely to have significant negative consequences. Gross error checks (sometimes known as reasonableness checks, as discussed in Chapter 5) are important characteristics to instill, because such automated systems are correct in most cases, but sometimes wrong. Pilots should be trained to cross-check
16 Part 121 appendix E.
4-5 each other so errors with a potential for significant negative consequences are detected and mitigated. This training17 should include, but not be limited to:
• Strategies to detect and identify input or usage errors;18
• Training pilots on operationally relevant input and usage errors and their consequences;
• Methods for flightcrews to correct the input or usage error; and
• Methods to ensure the intended flightpath is maintained.19
4.4 Instructor/Evaluator (I/E) Considerations. I/Es should have a thorough understanding of FPM and associated automated systems, including but not limited to the AP, AT, and FD; FMS; and flight envelope protection. Operators should train their instructors on the recommended strategies and procedures for use of the automated systems and provide appropriate scenarios for the training topics.
4.4.1 Instructors should have a clear understanding of managing automated systems under failure conditions and accepted recovery techniques before training other crewmembers.
17 Training elements listed relate to ACT ARC Recommendation 17-8, Management of Automated Systems, recommendations 17-8(c) and (d).
18 Refer to ACT ARC Recommendation 15-11, Guidance Material Addressing Auto Flight Mode Training, for complementary recommended guidance.
19 Refer to ACT ARC Recommendation 15-10 and Recommendation 16-10, Flight Path Management Philosophy, Policy, and Procedures, for complementary recommended guidance.