AC 120-48A

Advisory circular · Communication and Coordination Between Flightcrew Members and Flight Attendants

Approved
January 27, 2020
Last reviewed
August 8, 2024
Cancels
AC120-48
Family
AC 120-48 · 2 versions
Revision
A
14 CFR parts
1, 91, 121, 125, 135

Guidance, not mandatory unless a rule or AD requires it. DRS record last changed November 22, 2025.

U .S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular Subject: Communication and Coordination Between Flightcrew Members and Flight Attendants Date: 1/27/20 AC No: 120-48A Initiated by: AFS-200 Change:

1 PURPOSE OF THIS ADVISORY CIRCULAR (AC).

1.1 This AC provides updated guidance for flight and cabin crews regarding communications during emergency and unusual situations. The guidance reflects current industry knowledge based on research and lessons learned from relevant accidents and incidents over the last 40 years. The guidance includes information for cabin operations (standard operating procedures (SOP)), crewmember training, and Safety Management System (SMS)/safety culture).

1.2 The contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.

2 AUDIENCE. The primary audience for this AC is managers of flight operations training, in-flight managers, and air carrier curriculum designers who develop, implement, and revise SOPs and training programs on crew communication and coordination. This AC is intended for certificate holders who conduct operations under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) that include both flightcrew members and flight attendants.

Principal Operations Inspectors (POI) and Aviation Safety Inspectors—Cabin Safety (ASI-CS) (where applicable) should also be familiar with the contents of this AC.

3 WHERE YOU CAN FIND THIS AC. You can find this AC on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) website at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars.

4 WHAT THIS AC CANCELS. AC 120-48, Communication and Coordination Between Flight Crewmembers and Flight Attendants, dated July 13, 1988, is canceled.

5 RELATED REGULATIONS. The following regulations are available at https://www.ecfr.gov. Title 14 CFR:

• Part 1, § 1.1.

• Part 91, §§ 91.3, 91.1067, 91.1073, 91.1097, and 91.1105.

• Part 121, §§ 121.131, 121.133, 121.135, 121.392, 121.397, 121.417, 121.421,

121.433, 121.533, 121.542, 121.571, and 121.805(b)(1).

• Part 125, §§ 125.73, 125.269, and 125.289.

• Part 135, §§ 135.23, 135.100, 135.123, 135.295, 135.329, 135.341, and 135.349.

6 RELATED READING MATERIAL.

6.1 Reports and Studies:

• “Both Sides of the Cockpit Door: A Global Study of Pilot/Flight Attendant Coordination and Communication,” Lori J. Brown.

• “The Efficacy of Flight Attendant/Pilot Communication in a Post-9/11 Environment:

Viewed from Both Sides of the Fortress Door,” Lori J. Brown and William G. Rantz (refer to page 227 of the Summer 2010 International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, Volume 10, Number 1 at https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters _offices/arc/programs/academy/journal/pdf/Summer_2010.pdf).

• “Cockpit/Cabin Communication: I. A Tale of Two Cultures,” Rebecca D. Chute and Earl L. Wiener (refer to the 1995 International Journal of Aviation Psychology, Volume 5, Issue 3 at https://humanfactors.arc.nasa.gov/awards_pubs/publication_view.php?publication_id=565.

• “Cockpit/Cabin Communication: II. Shall We Tell the Pilots?” Rebecca D. Chute and Earl L. Wiener (refer to the 1996 International Journal of Aviation Psychology, Volume 6, Issue 3 at https://humanfactors.arc.nasa.gov/awards_pubs/publication_view.php?publication_id=566).

• “The Pilot/Fight [sic] Attendant Communication and Joint Training Survey,” Lori J.

Brown and John Niehaus (refer to “The Efficacy of Flight Attendant/Pilot Communication in a Post-9/11 Environment: Viewed from Both Sides of the Fortress Door”).

• The Airbus “Flight Operations Briefing Notes, Cabin Operations, Effective Briefings for Cabin Operations” (refer to https://www.cockpitseeker.com/wpcontent/uploads/goodies/ac/a320/pdf/data/FLT_OPS-CAB_OPS-SEQ01.pdf).

• “Lithium Battery Fire Tests,” Harry Webster of the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center at https://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/systems/Lithiumion_battery_04112006.pdf.

6.2 FAA Documents (current editions):

• AC 120-51, Crew Resource Management Training.

• AC 120-80, In-Flight Fires.

• AC 120-88, Preventing Injuries Caused by Turbulence.

• The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM).

3 7 BACKGROUND. The FAA published AC 120-48, Communication and Coordination Between Flight Crewmembers and Flight Attendants, on July 13, 1988 to provide information and guidance on common problems associated with crew coordination and communication between the flightcrew and flight attendants. The AC was based on the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) report, DOT/FAA/FS-88/1, Cockpit and Cabin Crew Coordination, which is available through the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center in Cambridge, MA, or the National Transportation Library’s (NTL) Repository and Open Science Access Portal (ROSAP) at https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/9786.

7.1 Crew communication and coordination are the foundation of safety during normal and emergency operations. Since AC 120-48’s original publication in 1988, additional data has been collected through accident investigations and the FAA’s SMS. On May 19, 2009, the FAA received the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation A-09-027, which identified a need to revise AC 120-48 to update guidance provided to cabin and flight crews regarding communications during emergency and unusual situations to reflect current industry knowledge based on research and lessons learned through relevant accidents and incidents over the last 20 to 40 years.

7.2 The lessons learned from aircraft accidents that happened more than 20 years ago still provide relevant information to today’s aviation community. By learning from the past, aviation professionals can use that knowledge to recognize key factors, and potentially prevent another accident from occurring under similar circumstances or for similar reasons in the future. The FAA maintains a web page that catalogues civil aviation accidents and discusses accident causes and ways the accident could have been mitigated or prevented. Refer to the Lessons Learned From Transport Airplane Accidents web page at https://lessonslearned.faa.gov/transport.cfm.

7.3 AC 120-51 provides guidance for certificate holders on how to focus on communication skills, teamwork, task allocation, and risk-based decision making to increase the efficiency of a crewmember’s performance. AC 120-51 and AC 120-48 complement each other and present guidelines for developing solid training for crewmembers and other personnel essential to flight safety.

7.4 To ensure that flightcrew and flight attendants understand the importance of crew communication and coordination, training should address the crucial skills to obtain the results necessary to meet the demands. Standardizing operating procedures and training/qualification programs that include joint training help accomplish those goals.

Aligning flightcrew and flight attendant procedures to ensure a proper and complete interface is critical to control the risks associated with crew miscommunication and lack of crew coordination.

7.4.1 A prerequisite for crew coordination is effective communication between all crewmembers. Improving coordination between crewmembers lies not only in improving communication between them, but also in increasing their knowledge and awareness of each other’s duties at each stage of the flight so they can be sensitive to the other’s level of workload. This knowledge helps to avoid miscommunication, unrealistic expectations,

4 and inappropriate requests of each other. During emergencies, each crewmember should know what to expect from the other crewmembers so they can work together effectively (refer to “Cockpit/Cabin Communication: I. A Tale of Two Cultures”).

7.5 On September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks changed the aviation world in many ways. The flight deck door became a reinforced barrier between the flightcrew and flight attendants, making the interphone the main vehicle for communication. Procedures were established to prohibit the opening of the door during flight, except for certain circumstances

(e.g., physiological break). As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, AC 120-48 was revised to address the communication and coordination issues regarding an increased security in which crewmembers now work.

7.5.1 The 2009 study, “The Pilot/Fight [sic] Attendant Communication and Joint Training Survey,” by Lori J. Brown and John Niehaus, sought to identify gaps that impede effective communication in a post-9/11 environment from a global prospective. Some of the same pre-9/11 issues were identified in the previous study completed by Rebecca D.

Chute and Earl L. Wiener in 1995. Data from the “Pilot/Fight [sic] Attendant Communication and Joint Training Survey” shows many of these same issues exist globally today.

7.5.2 “Flight Attendant/Pilot Communications and Safety Issues in a Post 9/11 Environment,” a 2009 study by Lori J. Brown, states, “A number of factors have influenced the quality of communication between the cockpit and cabin crews over the years. One factor is the growth of industry. Within small airlines, communication between the two crews is rarely a problem; the same cockpit and cabin crews fly together often and tend to know each other quite well. In today’s world of acquisitions or mergers, unfamiliarity among crewmembers complicates the problem. Traditionally, the commercial airliner has been separated into two geographical and sociological environments: the cockpit and the cabin.

Each environment has distinct boundaries, space constraints, technological differences, and cultures. Additionally, in most U.S. airlines, pilots and flight attendants are administratively separated into two departments that operate independently. This separation of the two departments can even lead to inconsistencies such as discrepancies in manuals and procedures. The fragmentation fosters the feeling that there are two crews rather than one.”

7.5.3 “Cockpit/Cabin Communication: I. A Tale of Two Cultures,” states, “It is these differences (and more) that contribute to misunderstandings and problems in coordination and communication on the part of airline crews in the performance of their duties. These issues can become even more apparent when, in abnormal situations, the two crews must unite and act as a cohesive team.”

8 AREAS TO CONSIDER. The areas in paragraphs 8.1 through 8.12 below should be considered as air carriers develop training programs/scenarios for communication and coordination between crewmembers.

8.1 SOPs. Develop SOPs for crew communication and coordination. Aligning procedures in the flightcrew and flight attendant manual is necessary to achieve effective communication and coordination.

8.1.1 Flight attendants should provide pertinent information and updates to the captain to help in their decision making. Flight attendants are the eyes, noses, and ears for the flightcrew, and the information they relay is vital to ensure the safety of both passengers and crew.

8.1.2 It is vitally important that flight attendants are given adequate time to prepare the cabin and themselves for taxi, takeoff, and landing. SOPs will establish a procedure for the flightcrew to inform the flight attendants when takeoff or landing is imminent. In addition, an air carrier should establish procedures for a flight attendant to inform the flightcrew when the cabin is secure for pushback/door closure, takeoff, and landing.

8.1.3 Due to increased air traffic, taxi times can be extended and therefore require additional communication between the flightcrew, flight attendants, and passengers. It is important to establish procedures with standardized communication to avoid miscommunications when a flightcrew stops during taxi for an extended period. It is vital that flight attendants are given adequate time to prepare the cabin and themselves for takeoff and landing, especially since most accidents occur during these critical phases of flight.

8.1.4 The potential for problems is heightened when meal or beverage service is offered on very short flights and/or during extended tarmac delays (refer to the DOT Tarmac Delays web page at https://www.transportation.gov/individuals/aviation-consumerprotection/tarmac-delays).

8.1.5 The flightcrew should allow the flight attendants sufficient time to be seated with their seatbelts fastened, and flight attendants should notify the flightcrew when all pretakeoff and prelanding duties have been completed and the cabin has been secured. When flight attendants convey information to the flightcrew, the information should be timely and specific.

8.2 Common Language. Establish a common language for both normal and emergency operations. Crewmembers should understand the procedures to follow for a specific event and its severity, and should have a clear understanding of the duties and responsibilities performed by each crewmember.

8.3 Threat and Error Management. Incorporate threat and error management tools to ensure crewmembers actively assess their surroundings, communicate with other crewmembers, and verify the information to reduce the possibility of error.

1. Actively Assess—Standards to monitor the activity in the flight deck and the cabin prevent a crewmember from making a decision that could compromise the safety of the flight.

2. Communicate—Ensure both pilots and flight attendants are verbalizing events and concerns in a timely manner. Crew coordination can only occur if all parties are aware of the situation or concern.

3. Verify—Verifying the information will prevent miscommunication and provide additional understanding of the scope of the situation or concern.

4. Situational Awareness—A person’s ability to identify process and comprehend the critical elements of information within their surroundings to determine options for the best outcome of an event.

8.4 Crew Briefing. Perhaps the single most important procedure for setting the stage for good coordination between flightcrew members and flight attendants is the preflight briefing, as it sets the expectations and tone for the flight. Conducting relevant and timely briefings, including feedback, supports effective communication. Most airlines consider the preflight briefing an SOP.

8.4.1 It is recommended that the captain, with all crewmembers present, conduct a preflight briefing before each flight. If all crewmembers cannot be present, a designated crewmember will ensure crewmembers not present are provided the information prior to departure.

8.4.2 The Airbus “Flight Operations Briefing Notes, Cabin Operations, Effective Briefings for Cabin Operations” state, “The aim of briefings is to establish a clear plan of action, communicate and exchange information, to ensure there is a common understanding between all crewmembers.… Although the work of the flight crew and cabin crew is very different in nature, the flight crew and the cabin crew work as one crew, with a common goal, the safe completion of the flight. The sharing of information from the cockpit to the cabin, and from the cabin to the cockpit is essential to the safety of the flight.” See paragraph 7.4 for more information on improving coordination between crewmembers.

8.4.3 The preflight briefing should include the following topics, but are not limited to:

• Crew introductions/crew complement;

• Passenger count;

• Weather conditions;

• Security information;

• Aviation safety inspector (ASI), Federal Air Marshal (FAM), Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), Law Enforcement Officer (LEO), or jump seat riders;

• Preflight inspections, writeups, or maintenance issues;

• Flight deck entry/exit procedures and jump seat and oxygen operation;

• Issues related to taxi, takeoff, and landing (e.g., short/long taxi); and

• Chimes used for normal and emergency signals.

8.4.3.1 Additional briefing topics include, but are not limited to:

1. Procedures for lithium battery overheating:

• AC 120-80;

• “Lithium Battery Fire Tests,” by Harry Webster of the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center; and

• Notice N 8900.430, Procedures for Fighting In-Flight Fires Associated With Portable Electronic Devices and Lithium Batteries When Using Commercially Marketed Containment Products;

2. Passenger information (e.g., passengers with disabilities, prisoners, FAA inspectors); and

3. Aircraft configurations and equipment (familiarity of the variations within the fleet, i.e., door operation, public address (PA) system, inoperative (INOP) equipment reporting once in flight, etc.).

8.5 Sterile Flight Deck Procedures. Ensure both pilots and flight attendants have the same understanding of what “sterile flight deck” means and the risks associated with communication during this time. Section 121.542 requires compliance with sterile flight deck rules.

8.5.1 Section 121.542 prohibits flightcrews from performing nonessential activities during the following phases of flight: taxi, takeoff, landing, and all other flight operations conducted below 10,000 feet, except cruise flight. Compliance is vital, since sterile flight deck infractions have been identified in several accidents as a latent hazard.

8.5.2 Training and testing will improve flight attendant decision making regarding what warrants contacting the pilots during sterile flight deck. Serious repercussions could be the result of any hesitancy or reluctance on the part of the flight attendant to contact the flightcrew with important safety information (i.e., abnormal situations; passenger(s) not seated for takeoff or landing; medical emergency; fire, fumes, or smoke in the cabin; a security threat; unusual aircraft noises or smells; etc.) due to a misconception of the sterile flight deck rule.

8.6 Turbulence.

8.6.1 During turbulence, if the flightcrew has not notified the flight attendants to take their seats and it is too severe to continue the service, flight attendants should sit down immediately and fasten their restraint/seatbelt or sit in an empty passenger seat until it is safe to get up. If no seats are available, instruct a passenger to hold onto them until it is safe for them to return to their jump seat. If possible, notify the flightcrew, as they may be unaware of the intensity of turbulence experienced in the cabin. This will encourage the flightcrew to illuminate the “Fasten Seatbelt” sign and coordinate with air traffic control (ATC) for possible flight altitude level adjustments, if applicable.

8.6.2 Close coordination between cabin and flightcrew members can facilitate the timely completion of cabin services and preclude the exposure of flight attendants to potential injury during known or anticipated encounters with turbulence.

8.6.3 Communication between the flight deck and the cabin should include turbulence intensity. Using common language is encouraged because having too many types or levels of turbulence may cause interpretation issues based on a person’s subjective understanding of turbulence levels. Developing common language in the manual system should assist both the pilot and the flight attendants in understanding the actions to be taken during the turbulence, and to identify the level of intensity (e.g., the turbulence levels described in the AIM). If there has not been communication from the flightcrew, and flight attendants feel that the turbulence poses a risk to be in the aisles (especially with carts), that information should be relayed to the pilots. This communication is necessary in determining the actions flight attendants will take (e.g., stowing carts, securing themselves in jump seats).

8.6.4 The flightcrew should inform the flight attendants of anticipated turbulence prior to flight (during the preflight crew briefing) because notification en route may come too late to prevent injury.

8.6.5 During flight, pilots should inform flight attendants of the immediacy and intensity of unexpected turbulence so they can secure the cabin or be seated immediately. Flight attendants should call the pilots when they feel there is a safety issue with moving throughout the cabin during turbulence.

Note: Refer to AC 120-88.

8.7 Seatbelts. Flight attendants should inform the flightcrew when the “Fasten Seatbelt” sign has been left on for an extended period. The flightcrew and cabin crew are encouraged to keep the passengers updated during extremely long flights to prevent passengers from ignoring the “Fasten Seatbelt” sign due to physiological necessity.

Note: Consider having periodic check-in calls on longer flights to ensure effective communication and to provide updates.

8.8 Emergency Operations. Threats to the safety of the flight increase during an emergency.

When good crew communication and coordination are utilized, errors can be avoided or at least recognized quickly. It is essential that the procedures between the flightcrew and the flight attendants be aligned and properly and completely interface.

Note: It is understood that preparation time and conditions could change without notification. Situational awareness is critical (refer to the FAA TV Human Factors: Situational Awareness video at https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaid=1150).

8.8.1 Due to the nature of an emergency, there is no way to create procedures for every possible scenario. Training programs should include (but are not limited to) procedures for the following:

• Unplanned/planned emergencies;

• Water/land evacuations;

• Medical emergencies;

• Decompression;

• Fire and smoke;

• Incapacitated crewmember(s); and

• Crew briefings/emergency.

8.8.2 During emergency conditions, the flightcrew is primarily responsible for maintaining control of the airplane. However, as conditions permit, it is critical that the flightcrew brief the flight attendants as soon as practical on:

• The nature of the emergency;

• Time available;

• Preparation for possible evacuation, if necessary;

• Special instructions (e.g., to use only one side of the aircraft for evacuation); and

• Brace signal.

Note: One example of a mnemonic device used in industry for emergency operations is the acronym, TESST:

T: Type of emergency.

E: Evacuation necessary?

S: Signal for brace position.

S: Special instructions.

T: Time available.

8.8.3 The quality and timing of the information given to the flight attendants is extremely important in an emergency. Communications from the flightcrew should be clear, precise, and instructional. This will enable the flight attendants to carry out their duties/procedures more effectively. This also applies to the flight attendants as they communicate with the flightcrew.

8.8.4 The study, “Cockpit/Cabin Communication: II. Shall We Tell the Pilots?” by Rebecca D. Chute and Earl L. Wiener states, “It is essential that cabin crews are knowledgeable concerning aircraft systems and basic components. Valuable time can be wasted in the inaccurate transfer of information, especially when pilots cannot leave the flight deck to validate the accuracy of the information. Nobody expects a flight attendant to possess a pilot’s knowledge of an aircraft, but some basic knowledge of the parts and terminology is necessary in order to convey information in a timely and accurate manner.

When the information is not correctly stated, misunderstanding, distrust, and possibly derision ensue.”

8.9 Postflight Debriefing and Safety Reports.

8.9.1 At the conclusion of the trip, the flight attendant in charge (IC)1 or the single flight attendant can utilize the postflight debriefing concept to enhance crew communication and coordination.

8.9.2 A debriefing provides an opportunity for the crew to provide timely feedback regarding the flight. This is especially helpful when there have been operational challenges with lengthy delays, excessive carry-on luggage, problems with child restraint devices, disruptive or disgruntled passengers, exit seating, and groups of passengers with special needs. Ensure crew coordination involving incidents that require the use of the company’s safety reporting system (e.g., passenger smoking, tampering with or disabling a lavatory smoke detector, disturbances involving alcohol, or a passenger’s serious illness or death) is documented.

8.10 Training. Crew coordination should include instructing flightcrew members and flight attendants on each other’s emergency procedures, codes, signals, and safety-related duties. In an emergency, it is vital that each crewmember interpret emergency signals and codes in the same way. For example, code words or signals for hijacking or evacuation are useless unless each crewmember is aware of their meaning.

8.10.1 The FAA strongly endorses joint crewmember training, especially for emergency training and Crew Resource Management (CRM), to develop and practice skills and procedures as a team.

8.10.2 Emergency procedures for flightcrew members and flight attendants should be compatible, creating an understanding of what each one’s duties and responsibilities are.

The study, “Cockpit/Cabin Communication: I. A Tale of Two Cultures,” states, “Segregated training compounds the problem by creating gaps in the instruction that crews receive. As an example, through personal observation in a recurrent training class at a major air carrier, we learned that flight attendants from one airline had been trained for nine years that in an emergency they could expect to receive four critical pieces of information from the cockpit crew: type of emergency, signal to brace, signal to evacuate, and time available to prepare. Not one of the pilots had ever heard of this and all had difficulty guessing what the four pieces of information might be.”

8.10.3 Initial and recurrent training curriculum elements for crewmembers should include, but are not limited to, notification and communication procedures between the cabin and flight deck that consist of:

• Flight deck and cabin chimes, and interphone signals for routine situations;

• Flight attendant notification to the flightcrew that the aircraft is ready for movement on the surface;

• Flightcrew notification to the flight attendants to be seated prior to takeoff;

1 Flight attendant “in charge” may also be referred to as the “A,” lead, Purser, or Senior Flight Attendant.

• Flight attendant recognition of the critical phases of flight;

• Crewmember coordination and notification regarding access to the flight deck;

• Notification to the flight attendants of turbulent air conditions;

• Notification between the flightcrew and the flight attendants of emergency or unusual situations;

• Notification between the flightcrew and the flight attendants of inoperative equipment that is pertinent to flight attendant duties and responsibilities;

• Normal and emergency communication procedures to be used in the event of inoperative communication equipment; and

• In-flight medical emergencies.

8.10.4 It is recommended that training involving crew coordination extensively utilize scenario-based training (SBT). Through SBT, a training organization can identify areas where the flightcrew or flight attendants are not performing at or above the margin of safety. The data collected through knowledge validations drives continuous improvement and a higher level of safety.

8.11 Crew Interference/Passenger Misconduct.

8.11.1 An incident that constitutes interference with a crewmember in the performance of his or her duties occurring during the time the aircraft is operational is a violation of Federal regulations and statutes and must be investigated and processed by a Federal officer.

8.11.2 Within the United States, the jurisdiction for investigation of criminal offenses aboard aircraft rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In cases of aircraft arrivals at an airport where the agent has to drive from a downtown office or from his or her residence after normal duty hours, early notification and coordination with the company and pilots is essential. Local police and the FBI will provide mutual support for responses and the processing of cases that are criminal violations.

8.11.3 Regardless of the agency or department that provides the initial law enforcement response, the crew should be able to identify the suspect, the victim, and, if possible, several witnesses. The more information that can be obtained by the crew prior to landing, the faster processing will go after the aircraft lands.

8.11.4 The involvement of the crew supports the successful prosecution of the offense. If the crew does not have time to coordinate and provide written statements, law enforcement efforts are significantly hampered (refer to the FAA Passengers & Cargo: Unruly Passengers web page at https://www.faa.gov/data_research/passengers_cargo/unruly_pas sengers/).

8.12 Monitor and Measure. Monitor and measure the crew communication and coordination SOPs and training to evaluate their performance and effectiveness. Identify deficiencies to improve the level of safety. Through the collection, analysis, and assessment of the

12 information gathered, the organization can continuously improve the level of safety performance (i.e., SMS, Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), Safety Assurance System (SAS), and Internal Evaluation Program (IEP)).

8.12.1 Continuing Qualification or Recurrent Training. Flightcrews and flight attendants work independently of supervision and may not interact with the organization for extended periods. Continuing qualification or recurrent SBT provides the crews the opportunity to practice (classroom and hands-on) scenarios that could become actual emergencies on board the aircraft.

Note: The NTSB Aviation Accident Reports web page (https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx) and the FAA Lessons Learned from Civil Aviation Accidents web page (https://lessonslearned.faa.gov/index.cfm) will assist in obtaining reports for training scenarios.

8.12.2 Computer-Based Training (CBT). CBT is also referred to as distance learning, electronic learning, and virtual training. This training can be utilized to validate a crewmember’s knowledge of the crew communication and coordination procedures not covered during the scenario-based module, and serves as a data stream for crew understanding and knowledge retention. It will also identify areas in the data analysis for continued improvement. It is used only to supplement training.

8.12.3 Data Collection. The data acquired through monitoring the operation, training validations, employee reporting systems, and investigations will identify trends that may lead to an unsafe operating environment.

8.12.4 Analysis. Analysis of the data collected will determine if the procedures and/or associated training currently in use will or will not provide an acceptable level of safety.

The organization utilizes the analysis to validate the crew communication, coordination procedures, and training or validate the need for change.

8.12.5 Evaluate Effectiveness. To encourage and support ongoing learning at a dynamic level, it is important that the training departments monitor and measure the effectiveness of the procedures and associated training once developed. The data collected provides a source of information to the organization regarding crew communication and coordination safety performance. This safety assurance process ensures the highest level of safety through continuous improvement.