5-2 time, but it creates a high-risk situation because the crew cannot pay full attention to both the taxi and the checklist.
5.1.4 Roles. The role of providing the right cue at the right time for initiating the checklist is always assigned to one of the two pilots; usually, the pilot in command (PIC) on the ground and the PF in the air. Typically, the cue comes in the form of a verbal call (e.g., “before start checklist”), and serves to prompt the other pilot to retrieve the checklist.
Assuming a checklist for normal operation involves both crewmembers in a challenge-response method, both pilots would then be expected to direct their attention to the checklist task. The pilot responsible for leading the checklist begins by calling out (or “challenging”) the first item on the list. The other pilot verifies that the item has been done correctly and provides the relevant response. There are several variations on the theme of the challenge-response method: Following the response of the responding pilot, the challenging pilot may go on to challenge the next item, may also verify the state of the item, and may or may not provide a verbal response. The verification may or may not involve specific gestures such as pointing to the relevant switch, lever, or indication.
5.1.5 Initiation Anchor. The initiation of a checklist is best anchored in a clear cue that cannot be easily removed, obstructed, or forgotten, such as the occurrence of a particular event
(e.g., arrival at a point 2,000 feet prior to the hold-short line cues the initiation of the Before Takeoff checklist). Often, initiation of a checklist is left open, only constrained by a time window (e.g., Taxi checklist to be completed anytime during taxi) and acceptable circumstances (e.g., when both pilots are free of other duties). Cues for initiating checklists in these situations are often more of a personal technique among pilots, who use internal as well as external flight deck cues to aid them in remembering to initiate the checklist at the correct time. However, such “floating” checklist initiations create a high risk of failing to initiate the checklist on time and thus having to rush through it, or failing to initiate the checklist altogether. The importance of having clear and reliable external cues to trigger the initiation of the checklist procedure at the right pause point cannot be overemphasized.
5.1.6 Completion Signal. The checklist completion signal indicates that the checklist has indeed been performed in its entirety and leads into the next segment of activities. The most common completion cue is a verbal annunciation such as the “Before Taxi checklist complete” by the pilot who has been responsible for leading the respective checklist. The completion call should be written out as the last line item, or centered under each checklist. When the completion call is not explicitly listed on the checklist, a layer of redundancy is removed and the risk of omissions increases.
5.1.7 Checklist Verification. During the design of the checklist it is important to keep in mind that all checklist designs are subject to human error. Crewmembers may omit and skip checklist items or erroneously respond to a checklist at times believing that an item or a task was accomplished when it was not. At other times, crewmembers may see what they expect to see rather than what is actually accomplished or indicated.
One strategy that helps to overcome human error is to develop policies for using checklists which require stringent cross-checking and verification and reinforce those
5-3 policies through crew training programs. The procedures intended for checklist use should be clearly written in the operator’s operating manual and must be compatible with the operator’s CRM philosophy.
The policy should include, but not be limited to, the following items:
1. Flightcrew responsibilities for maintaining aircraft control, analyzing situations, and requesting the appropriate checklist in normal, abnormal, non-normal, and emergency situations.
2. The specified crewmember responsible for initiating each checklist.
3. The specified time when each checklist is to be initiated.
4. The specified crewmember responsible for accomplishing each item on the checklist.
5. The specified crewmember responsible for ensuring that each checklist is completed and reporting that completion to the crew.
6. Crewmember responsibilities for bringing to the attention of the PIC and the rest of the crew any observed deviation from prescribed procedures.
5.2 Methods for Managing Checklist Accomplishment.
5.2.1 Single-Pilot Aircraft. For single-pilot aircraft, operators should mount the Before-Takeoff and the Before-Landing checklists on the instrument panel. When aircraft characteristics allow, the operator should develop touch-verification procedures which include a requirement that the pilot touch each control to verify it is in the correct position.
5.2.2 Multi-Pilot Aircraft.
5.2.2.1 Flight-Related Checklists. Flight-related checklists should be accomplished by one crewmember reading the checklist and the second crewmember confirming and responding to each item, as appropriate. Exceptions to this may be the After-Takeoff and After-Landing checklists. While airborne the PF should not be distracted from controlling the aircraft flightpath to perform a checklist item that another crewmember can accomplish. Only one pilot should be in a head-down posture at any time the aircraft is in motion.
5.2.2.2 Verification. Crewmembers should be directed that when they observe that another crewmember is not taking or has not taken a required action, they are required to inform the crewmember.
5.2.2.3 Checklist Completion Tracking. The crewmember responsible for initiating the checklist should be responsible for ensuring that the checklist is completed systematically and expeditiously. This crewmember should be responsible for managing interruptions, cross-checking controls and indicators to ensure that the required actions have been accomplished, and reporting that the checklist has been completed.
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5.2.2.4 Callouts. A callout should be made by the pilot if he or she is accomplishing a task that requires him or her to be “heads down.” This helps ensure the other pilot is not heads down at the same time.
5.2.2.5 Critical Items. Critical items should be verified by both the PF and PM.
1. In the before-start phase, flight guidance and navigation items are considered critical items. Concurrence should be required from both pilots when the same setting is required for more than one device (such as computers, flight instruments, and altimeters). Inertial platform alignment and computer programming should be accomplished by one crewmember and independently confirmed by another. As many of these checklist items as possible should be accomplished and verified before the aircraft is moved.
2. In the taxi and pre-takeoff phases, aircraft configuration (such as flaps, trim, and speed brakes) and flight guidance items (such as heading, flight-director, altitude select panel settings, and airspeed cues) are also critical items.
Consideration must be given to non-standard operations such as deicing which may result in configuration changes from what was previously set.
3. On approach, flight guidance checklist items are critical. The PF and PM should be required to confirm and respond to these items when incorporated in a checklist. Concurrence should be required when the same setting is required on two separate devices (such as computers, flight instruments, or altimeters).
4. Checklist items that are critical in the before-landing phase vary with the type aircraft involved. The landing gear and flaps are critical items and should require a confirmation and response by both pilots when incorporated in a checklist.
5. A checklist should not be depended upon to initiate a change in aircraft configuration. Operators should key aircraft configuration changes to specific operational events (e.g., direct the landing gear to be extended at glide slope intercept). For any change in configuration, a command from the PF and an acknowledgment from the crewmember taking the action should be required.
5.2.3 Interruptions. Crewmembers frequently cannot complete a checklist because of interruption or an item on the checklist has not yet been accomplished. Operating procedures must be established to ensure that the correct checklist sequence is completed after an interruption. If the sequence cannot be re-established or the crew is unclear on where to resume the checklist, the appropriate section of the checklist should be reaccomplished from the beginning.
5.2.4 Representative Items. Representative items are selected items that represent a whole subset of flow actions such that if the selected item was performed, the whole subset must have also been performed. For instance, if all engine indications are in the green, the whole engine start sequence must have been done correctly; therefore, checking the engine indications can serve as a representative item for the engine start sequence.
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5.3 Item Order. The order of the items on the checklist can mirror the sequence of the flow or of the operation if the flow preceding the checklist is carefully designed to:
• Take advantage of the physical layout and location of switches, displays, and indicators in the flight deck (e.g., going from left to right, or from top to bottom);
• Account for the inherent dependencies between the systems involved;
• Support human memory; and
• Be short.
Such order aids in learning and increases ease of use. Another possible ordering consideration is item priority. The probability of interruptions and distractions increases with checklist length and the time it takes to execute it. Thus, even though checklists mainly contain critical items, these could be prioritized, and those with higher importance could be placed first on the checklist.
5.4 Phraseology. The challenge portion of a checklist item is best phrased to mirror the label used in the flight deck for the corresponding switch, lever, indicator, or system. The response portion is best phrased in terms of the actual system status, switch or lever position, or the specific parameter value. For example, the autobrake system may be set to RTO, OFF, ARM, DISARM, 1, 2, 3, etc. The challenge for this system may be “Autobrake,” and the response may be “RTO”. The PF and PM should only use the phrases listed in the SOP or checklist to help reduce any ambiguity or confusion.
The generic responses of “set” or “checked” may not be very informative and does not provide as good of an opportunity to confirm correct action as the actual indication.
5.5 Common Errors That Occur When Using Checklists. Checklist errors can occur in the following areas:
• Crew overlooked item(s) on the checklist.
• Crew failed to verify settings visually.
• Operator or aircraft manufacturer checklist contained error(s) or was incomplete.
• Failing to complete a step after an interruption.
• Failing to complete a checklist.
• Completing the wrong checklist
• Difficulty in finding a checklist.
• Becoming disoriented within the checklist.
• Difficulty in confirming that the checklist action was carried out correctly.
• Problems in understanding and interpreting the checklist.
• Difficulty in determining who should be carrying out the checklist actions (PF vs.
PM).
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5.6 Preventing Checklist Errors. All checklists are subject to interruption at any point in the flight by ATC or for other operational reasons. However, operational data indicates that flightcrews are most susceptible to interruption and distraction during the ground phases before flight (i.e., “BEFORE START,” “PUSHBACK,” “START,” “TAXI,” and “BEFORE TAKEOFF”) due to time pressure and interruptions from support personnel
(e.g., ramp crew, deice crew).
5.6.1 Training Support Personnel. Many of the distractions or interruptions occurring on the ramp area can be reduced to a minimum by the aircraft operators through training of support personnel. Operators should ensure that ground support personnel who communicate directly with flightcrews are familiar with the procedures used on the flight deck and the need to avoid interrupting the crew during a checklist flow. Persons entering the flight deck to talk to the crew, or contacting the crew via interphone, should make their presence known and unless an emergency exists, refrain from interrupting any flight deck activity or talking to the crew until the crew indicates that they have completed their task and acknowledges their presence.
5.6.2 Restarting From the Beginning. It is recommended that anytime the crew is not clear as to their progress through the checklist the PIC should, without hesitation, direct that the appropriate section of the checklist be reaccomplished from the beginning.
5.6.3 Cognitive Limitations. Cognitive limitations experienced by humans when dealing with stress, concurrent task demands, and time pressure underlie many of the errors made by crews when responding to emergencies. Including more information in checklists can reduce memory load and other cognitive demands. However, the more information included in a checklist, the longer it becomes and the more time needed to complete it.
Checklist designers should include items within checklists that remind crews of information they may not easily recall and other cues they should attend to as they respond to a particular situation.
5.6.4 Checklist Error Prevention Tips.
1. Remember to use the checklist.
2. Check every item, every time.
3. Slow down and confirm significant items.
4. Deliberately read the checklist.
5. If interrupted, restart from the beginning.
6-1 CHAPTER 6. PILOT MONITORING
6.1 General. Several studies of crew performance, incidents, and accidents have identified inadequate monitoring and cross-checking as vulnerabilities for aviation safety. Effective monitoring and cross-checking can be the last barrier or line of defense against accidents because detecting an error or unsafe situation may break the chain of events leading to an accident. Conversely, when this layer of defense is absent, errors and unsafe situations may go undetected, potentially leading to adverse safety consequences. Flightcrews must use monitoring to help them identify, prevent, and mitigate events that may impact safety margins. Therefore, it is imperative that operators establish operational policy and procedures on PM duties, including monitoring, and implement effective training for flightcrews and instructors on the task of monitoring to help the PM expeditiously identify, prevent, and mitigate events that may impact safety margins.
This section describes effective monitoring, how to define and train PM duties, and integration of monitoring into SOPs. Additionally, the section discusses special considerations for monitoring autoflight operations.
6.2 Effective Monitoring. A pilot is effectively monitoring if he or she is:
1. Following SOPs consistently;
2. Clearly communicating deviations to other crewmembers;
3. Effectively managing distractions;
4. Remaining vigilant;
5. Advising the PF if the flight guidance modes or aircraft actions do not agree with expected or desired actions and intervening if necessary;
6. Continuously comparing known pitch/power settings to current flightpath performance; and
7. Considering that the primary flight displays (PFD), navigation displays (ND), and other sources of information (for example, electronic flight bag (EFB)), might be displaying incorrect information and always on the lookout for other evidence that confirms or disconfirms the information the displays are providing.
6.3 Challenges and Barriers to Effective Monitoring. There are several potential challenges and barriers to effective monitoring:
6.3.1 Time Pressure. Time pressure can exacerbate high workload and increase errors. It can also lead to rushing and “looking without seeing.”
6.3.2 Lack of Feedback to Pilots When Monitoring Lapses Occur. Pilots are often unaware that monitoring performance has degraded.
6.3.3 Design of SOPs. SOPs may fail to explicitly address monitoring tasks.
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6.3.4 Pilots’ Inadequate Mental Model of Autoflight System Modes. Pilots may not have a complete or accurate understanding of all functions and behaviors of the autoflight system. Some aspects of automated systems for flightpath management are not well matched to human information processing characteristics.
6.3.5 Training. Training may overlook the importance of monitoring and how to do it effectively. Lack of emphasis on monitoring may occur in training and evaluation.
6.3.6 Pilot Performance. High workload, distraction, and inattention can all lead to monitoring errors.
In addition, human performance limitations should be acknowledged as potential challenges for effective monitoring. The human brain has difficulty with sustained vigilance and has quite limited ability to multitask. Pilots are vulnerable to interruptions and distractions and to cognitive limitations that affect what they notice and do not notice.
It can be difficult for humans to monitor for errors and deviations on a continuous basis when errors and deviations rarely occur. This is true for the range of workload conditions experienced by the flightcrew members. Monitoring during high-workload periods is important since these periods present situations in rapid flux and because high workload increases vulnerability to error. However, studies show that poor monitoring performance can be present during low-workload periods as well. Lapses in monitoring performance during lower-workload periods are often associated with boredom, complacency, or both.
6.4 Defining Pilot Monitoring Duties. In a two-pilot operation, one pilot is designated as PF and one pilot is designated as PM. A review of operators’ manuals indicates that the roles and associated tasks of the PF and PM are not always clearly defined. Each operator should explicitly define the roles of the PF and PM to include:
1. At any point in time during the flight, one pilot is the PF and one pilot is the PM.
2. The PF is responsible for managing, and the PM is responsible for monitoring the current and projected flightpath and energy of the aircraft at all times.
3. The PF is always engaged in flying the aircraft (even when the aircraft is under AP control) and avoids tasks or activities that distract from that engagement. If the PF needs to engage in activities that would distract from aircraft control, the PF should transfer aircraft control to the other pilot, and then assume the PM role.
4. Transfer of PF and PM roles should be done positively with verbal assignment and verbal acceptance to include a short brief of aircraft state.
5. The PM supports the PF at all times, staying abreast of aircraft state and ATC instructions and clearances.
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6. The PM monitors the aircraft state and system status, calls out any perceived or potential deviations from the intended flightpath, and intervenes if necessary.
7. The PF provides a briefing to a pilot returning from a break. The briefing should include appropriate information to ensure the pilot returning from the break is updated on aircraft and systems states and current ATC instructions and assignments.
6.5 Operational Policies and Procedures. Operational policies and procedures should be reviewed or developed to ensure the division of duties and responsibilities between flightcrew members protects the ability of the PF to control the flightpath. Assigning non-flightpath-related tasks to the PF should generally be avoided. Operational data should be collected and used to revise definitions of PF and PM roles and responsibilities to ensure their effectiveness. Operators are encouraged to take an integrated approach in operations and training (e.g., initial and recurrent) to emphasize the responsibilities and importance of PF and PM roles.
A critical aspect of monitoring duties includes intervention when a deviation is identified.
Each operator’s policies, procedures, and training should adequately cover flightpath intervention including human-to-human intervention.
6.6 Intervention Strategies.
6.6.1 What Intervention Strategies Should Include. Intervention assumes an actual, or potential, problem has been detected. Effective PM can help detect a problem, which is necessary before intervention can begin. This is an important point since the pilot cannot intervene unless a condition requiring intervention is correctly recognized. If the monitoring activity is successful (problematic condition is recognized) then the pilot must know what intervention is appropriate for that situation.
Policies and procedures for expected interventions should be established and include:
1. Deviation parameters;
2. Required callouts; and
3. Conditions for takeover.
6.6.2 Human-to-Human Intervention. If a flightpath problem occurs, the PM should notify the PF about the problem and expect that the PF will then correct the problem. One way for the PM to accomplish notifying the PF is to verbalize a deviation callout followed by an expected response from the PF to that callout with corrective action.
6.6.2.1 SOPs should indicate what to say, how to say it, when to say it, and with what level of appropriate assertiveness. SOPs should also address if or when the PM should take over the PF role if it is determined that the PF is not correcting the flightpath problem in a timely manner. Considerations for the decision to take over control should include subtle incapacitation or no
6-4 response or flightpath correction after two challenges. The SOP should also specify what the specific callouts and associated actions are required with a takeover to ensure a positive exchange of aircraft control occurs. Policies must be clear to ensure there is no confusion over who is PF at any time.
6.6.2.2 Similarly, SOPs should describe how the PF notifies the PM about a flight guidance issue. For example, in some operations, if the AP is off with the flight director (FD) on, the PF hand-flies the aircraft, but the PM makes all flight guidance inputs. In this situation, consider the case where the PM makes an erroneous flight guidance input, and the PF notices it. In this case, Humanto-Human intervention would involve the PF verbalizing to the PM the error and desired correction. (e.g., “approach mode still isn’t armed – arm approach, please.”). To capture all of this, the recommendation wording may be something like: “PM communicating effectively to the PF about the flightpath problem, expecting that the PF will then correct the problem, or the PF communicating to the PM about a flight guidance problem (if the PM is responsible for flight guidance inputs), expecting that the PM will correct that problem.”
6.6.2.3 Another example is where a PM calls “1-dot high” and the PF responds with “correcting” and returns to glidepath in a timely manner. If, for example, the PF does not respond to two successive challenges, then, per operator’s SOP, if safety indicates, the PM calls “I have control, going around” and initiates a go around as PF.
Note: Flightpath control is the responsibility of the PF, whereas flightpath guidance may be the responsibility of either pilot, depending on the operator’s SOPs.
6.7 Training for PM. An operator should train its pilots on all policies and procedures related to monitoring the flightpath (e.g., callouts, double-pointing, etc.). This training should also include any of the operator’s recommended practices.
1. Pilots should be trained on the responsibilities of the PM to monitor the flightpath. In particular, pilots should be trained to recognize when the PF is not adequately controlling the flightpath or when the PM is not adequately monitoring the flightpath. This training should include pilot task loading and signs of diminished performance. Some examples include lack of communication, channelized attention, and failure to make required callouts.
2. Pilots should be trained on applicable common errors in monitoring the flightpath. This includes training on appropriate methods of recognizing precursors to, and signs of, degraded monitoring and on resolving monitoring errors and/or lapses.
3. Pilots should be trained on the concept that there are predictable situations during each flight when the risk of a flightpath deviation is increased, heightening the importance of proper task/workload management. If the PM is
6-5 trained to recognize the flight phases or situations when they are most vulnerable to flightpath deviations (including when little time exists to correct deviations), he or she could strategically plan tasks and workload to maximize monitoring during those phases.
4. Pilots should be trained on CRM/threat and error management (TEM) principles and human performance vulnerabilities related to monitoring, the importance of monitoring, and the operator approved practices that achieve effective monitoring of the flightpath.
5. Pilots should be trained on system failures that may distract from effective monitoring and proper flightpath management.
6. Pilots should be trained to manage distractions that interfere with monitoring the flightpath. Provide guidance on managing task priorities and train them to effectively switch between other tasks and monitoring of the flightpath so that flightpath vigilance is always maintained. Include information and task management strategies that enable pilots to use charts, EFB, ACARS, etc.
while also effectively monitoring the flightpath and airplane energy state.
7. Pilots should be trained on intervention methods that the PM can use to help the PF regain proper control of the flightpath and provide opportunities for the PM to practice these methods (e.g., calling out deviations, levels of assertiveness).
8. Pilots should be trained on and be able to demonstrate understanding of operationally relevant combinations/levels of flight guidance and flight control automation (e.g., given a certain set of circumstances, what will happen next?).
9. Ensure pilots can transition seamlessly between combinations/levels of flight guidance/flight control automation (including manual flight) by training them to anticipate, recognize, and recover from known flight guidance (includes Flight Management System (FMS)) and flight control (includes AP and, autothrottles) system-behavioral challenges (e.g., subtle mode reversions), and environmental/ circumstantial traps that are known to lead to flightpathrelated errors (e.g., vectors off, then back on, a Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) during a “descend via” clearance).
10. Flight guidance and flight control systems training should include an assessment of a pilots understanding of those systems and what will happen ‘next’ given a certain set of flight circumstances, and the reasons why. The training should incorporate FMS degradations and failures and operational consequences requiring flightcrew action, known flight guidance and flight control system-behavioral challenges (e.g., subtle mode reversions), and environmental/circumstantial traps (e.g., vectors off, then back on, a STAR during a “descend via” clearance) that are known to lead to flightpath-related errors.
6.8 Incorporate Monitoring into SOPs. Monitoring performance can be significantly improved by: (1) developing and implementing effective SOPs to support monitoring and
6-6 cross-checking functions, and appropriate interventions, (2) by training crews on monitoring strategies, and (3) by pilots following those SOPs and strategies.
If not designed appropriately, some SOPs may actually detract from effective monitoring.
For example, one operator required a passenger address (PA) announcement when climbing and descending through 10,000 feet. This requirement had the unintended effect of “splitting the flight deck” at a time when frequency changes and new altitude clearances were likely. When the operator reviewed its procedures it realized that this procedure detracted from having both pilots “in the loop” at a critical point and consequently decided to eliminate it. Operators should review existing SOPs and modify those that can detract from monitoring.
6.9 Autoflight Considerations.
6.9.1 Autoflight Mode Confusion. Safety data (including accident, incidents, Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), FOQA, and ASAP data) have shown that autoflight mode confusion is a potential vulnerability in flight operations and merits special attention during monitoring tasks. Pilots should be able to demonstrate the knowledge and skill necessary to correctly select, interpret, and anticipate normal autoflight modes as well as be able to demonstrate appropriate remedial actions for inappropriate or unexpected autoflight modes. This should include the ability to:
1. Correctly identify and interpret individual flight mode annunciations;
2. Describe the respective mode’s impact on the related systems and airplane operation; and
3. Understand pitch mode annunciations and their relationship to available thrust as well as the aircraft’s energy state (e.g. the risk of using vertical speed mode to climb at high altitudes with limited available thrust).
6.9.1.1 Equipment and operator culture may influence how mode awareness protocols are designed and implemented. Therefore, an operator should create mode awareness procedures that reflect the equipment and how the operator employs the equipage and train/assess the procedures. When formulating mode awareness SOPs, consider the following:
1. When to require verbal callouts of mode status and changes, keeping in mind workload during specific phases of flight, pilot tasks, and unanticipated mode changes;
2. Operators should describe the mode confirmation methodology for the PF/PM roles. It is important that an operator’s procedures for mode confirmation take into account differences in phases of flight, pilot tasks, and high workload situations.
3. One example is briefing current autoflight mode status to any pilot that is returning to a pilot seat after a physiological break or distraction from flying (communicating with dispatch, flight attendant, etc.). Following a distraction,
6-7 pilots should discuss flight deck status. For a pilot that is returning to a pilot seat after a break, develop a formal briefing that is appropriate for the equipment with required items to ensure the pilot is updated on systems status.
4. Create phase of flight procedures/dialog boxes (for example: takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach) that include mode changes and indications for each level of automation allowed.
5. Include mode change indication in maneuver procedures/dialog boxes. When possible, associate callout names and timing to match mode changes. For example, some operators have implemented operator standard procedures such as “Confirm, Activate, Monitor, Intervene (CAMI),” or “Verbalize, Verify, and Monitor (VVM),” or similar systems, or even variations thereof.
Such procedures provide the flightcrew with a structured method to conduct operations within the flight deck that help to trap errors. Regardless of the form of the strategy, the objective is to ensure that everyone in the flight deck understands the active mode, the effects of the newly engaged mode, and skillfully reacts to ensure the aircraft trajectory and energy remains as desired.
Some effects of input and selection are delayed (e.g., armed to active) and latent errors may not become apparent until some time has passed.
Verification of intended path/functions and awareness of modes is important throughout all phases of flight, including ground operations.
6.9.2 Autoflight Mode Awareness. The Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) provides the flightcrew with information on the status of the autoflight/automated systems, specifically with respect to the guidance and control functions being utilized. Whether manually controlling the aircraft, using the automated systems to control the aircraft flightpath and energy, or various combinations of both, the FMAs are the information source for depicting “who is doing what.”
6.9.2.1 It is important that flightcrews are thoroughly trained to understand the implications and relationships of each mode since the respective mode communicates the source of the aircraft flightpath and energy. It is also imperative that both crewmembers, as a team, understand the current mode status and its controlling system to effectively manage flightpath and energy.
Just as the monitoring function is the concurrent responsibility of both pilots (and potential auxiliary crews when in the flight deck), awareness of the FMAs and their affects are also the duty of both pilots. Understanding the consequences of modes, either expected or unanticipated, and the ability to anticipate subsequent modes and the comprehension of the significance and system effects of the mode is central to flightpath management.
6.9.2.2 Autoflight system mode awareness requires effective monitoring of autoflight modes. Below are a few strategies that could be trained to improve monitoring of the autoflight modes: