2-1 CHAPTER 2. OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER (OCC) FUNCTIONS
2.1 Regulatory Requirements. After April 22, 2016, Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 135, § 135.619 requires certificate holders authorized to conduct helicopter air ambulance (HAA) operations, with 10 or more HAAs assigned to the certificate holder’s operations specifications (OpSpecs), to have an OCC staffed by appropriately trained Operations Control Specialist (OCS). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also encourages smaller operators not required by regulation to establish an OCC as an additional safety enhancement.
2.1.1 General. This chapter provides recommendations to assist HAA operators with identifying best practices for implementing OCCs and operations control procedures. It is also intended to encourage and enable operators without a regulatory requirement to establish and operate an OCC to attain the operational benefits of an OCC.
2.1.2 P ublic Aircraft Operations (PAO). Government entities conducting eligible PAO under Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) §§ 40102(a)(41) and 40125 for an associated government function are also highly encouraged to establish OCCs and adopt enhanced operational control procedures reflecting concepts in §§ 135.617 and 135.619.
For more information on the eligibility requirements to conduct PAO, refer to the current edition of AC 00-1.1, Public Aircraft Operations.
2.2 Core Concepts—OCC and Operations Control Procedures. There are three core concepts and one recommendation that define an effective OCC and enhanced operations control procedures:
2.2.1 Joint Flight Safety Responsibility. The first core concept is joint flight safety responsibility for each HAA operation. The joint flight safety responsibility concept requires that at least one qualified ground staff member, in addition to the pilot in command (PIC), is actively involved in reviewing the PIC risk analysis in accordance with the required risk analysis program (refer to § 135.617). When an OCC is required by regulation, or where an OCC has been voluntarily established and is listed on OpSpec A021, it must be staffed with OCS who participate in the duties and responsibilities listed in § 135.619(a) and who continue to provide safety input to the conduct of the flight by monitoring factors affecting flight safety before and during the flight (refer to § 135.619). The qualified OCS on the ground also provides additional Crew Resource Management (CRM) support for pilots during high-workload situations or emergencies.
2.2.2 W ritten Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The second core concept is the development and implementation of documented SOPs that are used to guide training and to standardize operations performance. The process of developing SOPs requires critical thinking and review of established procedures. If this process is conducted with personnel who serve in the OCC, the organization will likely discover differences in how individuals perform certain tasks or processes, and best practices can be identified and implemented. Standardization of written operations control procedures reflects the same
2-2 concerns that mandate the use of checklists on the flight deck. These SOPs may be contained in a GOM or be standalone documents.
2.2.2.1 Documentation. SOPs are documented so they can be referenced and performed the same way each time. The detail and scope of this documentation should reflect the size and complexity of each HAA operation.
SOPs may be accessed either electronically or via hard copy (refer to OpSpec/Management Specification (MSpec) A025 for in-flight use of electronic documentation). Regardless of the primary method for accessing SOPs, a backup independent set of procedures should be readily available, especially in times of high-workload situations such as abnormal or emergency operations.
2.2.2.2 Electronic Media. Though the industry is moving toward a less paperdependent environment, a truly paperless environment has yet to be achieved.
A key technology (e.g., a local area network (LAN) or workstation) may fail in conjunction with an emergency or could even be the cause of emergency or abnormal operations. Technology failures may render electronic access to SOPs unavailable. Therefore, hardcopy or backup electronic versions of all critical SOPs should be housed in non-volatile memory that can be accessed on a computer that is independent from networked workstations or computers.
These backup copies should be maintained and be readily available for use during abnormal situations.
2.2.3 L everaging Technology and Communication. The third core concept of OCCs and enhanced operations control procedures is to leverage technology and communication to enhance safety and efficiency. This includes providing an enhanced level of situational awareness to the PIC, OCS, and other individuals. An OCC can leverage technology to provide communication and safety benefits to HAA operations. For example, an OCC may be able to acquire weather information for situational awareness purposes from non-aviation locations which do not feed into the National Weather Service (NWS) database. This information may come from a variety of weather feeds available at the OCC, including non-aviation sources such as telephone calls, local TV stations, etc.
These non-standard weather sources should be used to enhance situational awareness, and “No-Go” decisionmaking only. Such non-NWS/FAA-approved sources may not be used for “Go” decisions.
2.2.4 Provision of Situational Awareness Information. In addition to the regulatory requirements, the operator should establish and document procedures for acquiring and providing situational awareness information to the PIC via the OCS and other individuals and capabilities as appropriate. This is an example of the use of leveraging technology and communications to reduce risk in HAA operations.
2.3 OCC Models. OCCs may take on many possible physical configurations depending on the size and scope of the HAA operator. The OCC provides a physical location where the OCS and any other personnel can access information technologies to assist the PIC.
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2.3.1 Locations. Some OCCs may be co-located with a communications center that normally receives flight requests, passes the flight request to the HAA pilot, performs flight monitoring, etc. Other OCCs may be located at one location and have one or more remotely sited communications centers that communicate flight information to the OCC through various means.
2.3.2 C ommunication. Several key concepts should be considered regardless of the physical relationship between the OCC and communications centers.
2.3.2.1 Direct communications capabilities between the OCC and the PIC, through the communications center if necessary, is essential. This allows the OCS to receive early notification of a pending flight and begin processes such as reviewing weather in the proposed flight area as part of the risk analysis concurrence requirement.
2.3.2.2 The OCS must provide two-way communication with the HAA pilot. This may be direct communication, or through established procedures, via relay through the communications center. The OCS must have the means available to immediately communicate hazards such as deteriorating weather to the HAA pilot. The OCS must also possess a means of verifying risk analysis data for flight diversions that may have been considered at the beginning of an HAA operation.
2.4 OCC Facilities.
2.4.1 Hardware and Software Resources. A well-functioning OCC should have available the following hardware and software resources:
1. Enabling technologies (to include LANs, Internet access, and digital signature capabilities for form completion);
2. Database for determining pilot currency, qualifications, and rest and duty status to be used during preflight risk analysis;
3. Aircraft situational displays (ASD) depicting the status of all certificate holder HAA aircraft;
4. Aviation weather analysis tools (to include textual, graphical, and Geographic Information System (GIS)-enabled);
5. Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) tools (both textual and graphical);
6. Air traffic flow tools (to include temporary flight restrictions (TFR), special use airspace, special areas of operation, military operations airspace, high density and congested airspace, warning areas, and weather watch boxes);
7. Communication tools (to include telephones, email, datalink, radio (aircraft and first responders, including Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) capabilities), satellite communications (SATCOM) and advanced communication consoles);
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8. Non-aviation situational awareness tools such as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Meteorological Assimilation Data Ingest System (MADIS), Internet capable of accessing weather cams, or TV capable of receiving cable news channels. These types of tools should be only used for situational awareness and for making a “No-Go” decision; and
9. In the event of a national security emergency or local disaster, news, websites, and phone lines (both landlines and mobile phones) may become inoperative due to the sheer volume of people trying to simultaneously access these resources. Therefore, a TV may be the best means of acquiring information regarding where to send aircraft, where not to send aircraft, and where an accident is located if it is one of the operator’s own aircraft.
2.4.2 Adapting OCC Facilities and Capabilities to Smaller Operators. Smaller (fewer than 10 HAAs) operators are not required by regulation to have an OCC staffed by an OCS.
However, regardless of the size of the organization, operations control concepts should be carefully planned and implemented to avoid unintended gaps or errors that may result in actions or omissions that would be detrimental to safety. The following guidelines are provided to assist the operator in avoiding such failures. If an OCC is not required and the operator chooses to voluntarily implement a similar capability or function, the operator’s applicable governing policies and procedures (and details of training specialists in operations control subject matter) should be established and documented by the operator in their General Operations Manuals (GOM) or other permissible forms of documentation. This documentation system must be acceptable to the Principal Operations Inspector (POI) just as any other process or procedure documented in the operator’s manual system.
2.4.2.1 The operator must demonstrate that operational control and PIC responsibility and authority is maintained, and safety is not compromised as a result of the delegation of duties and responsibilities to the non-required individuals staffing that non-regulatory function.
2.4.2.2 Smaller operators may choose to incorporate this function within their operations control organization. Staff members providing OCS-type services within such an organization should receive the training required by § 135.619(d) and (f).
2.4.2.3 Create SOPs appropriate for the size and complexity of the operation. A small operator, using SOPs that are founded in the concepts used within larger organizations, may increase the safety of their HAA operations with minimal expense.
2.5 OCC Physical Space Design Considerations. The following human factors and physical space considerations should be taken into account when designing the layout of an OCC.
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1. Physical Room Layout. Interpersonal communication, visual lines of sight, and the auditory profile of a room are key considerations when designing the physical layout of an OCC.
2. Size of Room. The room should be small enough for individuals to be able to see and hear discussions within the room for situational awareness. However, the room should not be so loud as to hamper communication.
3. Visual Lines of Sight. Personnel should be able to see their colleagues. Walls that segregate personnel are undesirable.
4. Pods. Pod-type workstation areas, where one to four OCC personnel work in small work groups, easily provide for the interactions and load shedding that may be necessary when abnormal or emergency situations develop.
5. Physical Workstation Areas. Because OCC personnel often work long shifts and sit for extended periods of time, the design of physical workstation areas is important.
6. Chairs. Chairs should be comfortable. High-backed chairs that rock, swivel, and have wheels are preferable.
7. Main Desk Surface Area. The main horizontal surface plan of the desk or workstation should not be too high or too low. Workstations that are adjustable to allow for sitting and standing are ideal. There should be ample desk surface area to comfortably spread out work materials.
8. Shelving and Storage. There should be ample shelving to aid in keeping items off the desk surface area. There should also be ample enclosed filing and storage capacity.
This will allow for ease of accessibility to SOPs, the Post-Accident/Incident Plan (PAIP), etc. Shelving and filing containing items such as these should be centrally located and clearly labeled.
2.6 OCC Technology and Design Considerations.
2.6.1 Failure and Redundancy Considerations for Both Systems and Processes. As technology increasingly becomes an essential part of flight operations, failure becomes a greater concern. For example, the temporary failure of an OCC’s LAN may render most of an OCC’s functionality inoperative (e.g., phone system, communication console, email, Internet access, ASDs, weather systems, data link, radios, etc.). Thus, it is important to plan for technology failures and design redundant systems and processes to ensure that the end results provided by contingency systems remain the same. In addition to planning for temporary or less-severe failures and outages, severe technology failures should also be expected and prepared for by the development of an OCC information technology (IT) disaster recovery plan. This plan should be documented, and OCC staff should periodically practice contingency operations so they are prepared for such an eventuality.
2.6.2 C ommon Tec hnology Interruptions. Common technology interruptions that should be planned for when developing, implementing, and integrating an OCC include:
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• Electrical power outages (localized to the building, the local area, or to a broader geographic area),
• LAN outages, and
• Internet Service Provider (ISP) or ISP connectivity outages.
2.6.3 Key Redundancy Considerations for Hardware and Infrastructure. The following considerations should be taken into account when designing redundancy into OCC systems:
2.6.4 IS P Connectivity . Software applications used by OCCs are increasingly becoming Web-based. This means that if an OCC loses its connectivity to the Internet, any Webbased applications become inoperative. Therefore, the FAA recommends that an OCC maintain at least two wholly independent connections to the Internet. The physical connections should enter the facility at physically opposite ends of the building, and they should be provided by two wholly independent companies. For example, two connections from the local telecommunications service providers will both become unavailable if the local telephone company’s network switch goes down. Ideally, these connections should also be load-balanced with automatic failover.
2.6.5 S erver Location . Ideally, OCC servers should be located in a secure data center that is hardened to protect against potential threats (e.g., flooding, hurricanes, tornados, etc.). If a hardened data center is not economically viable, then servers should be located in a secure location, preferably temperature controlled and shielded from fire sprinkler systems.
2.6.6 S ervers. Ideally, servers should be redundant with automatic failover and be Redundant Array of Independent Drives (RAID) configured.
2.6.7 W orkstations . Workstations should be standardized for full interoperability so that any staff member can perform their duties at any workstation. For example, either an OCS or a communications specialist (CS) should be able to comfortably work at the same workstation on alternate shifts. Additionally, an OCC should maintain at least one “hot spare” workstation for immediate use, in case one of the workstations normally in use becomes inoperative.
2.6.8 U ninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). All workstations, servers, switches, and other key infrastructure should have UPS batteries in the power supply chain. The sustainable uptime of various UPS configurations is a cost consideration: the longer the time, the higher the cost. A good middle ground approach may be to install stronger UPS units on vital infrastructure and lighter UPS units on less critical infrastructure. As an example, a good plan may be to install three-hour UPS units on key servers and two workstations, and then install 30-minute UPS units on remaining workstations. It is also worthwhile discussing interruption restoration priorities with the utility companies so they are aware of the critical nature of the HAA operation and could plan restoration priorities accordingly.
2-7 Note: Ensure all staff members and supervisors are aware of VoIP system redundancy characteristics, including whether or not the phone system is operational when the local ISP network is inoperative.
2.6.9 K ey Redundancy Considerations—Processes. OCC SOPs should include alternate processes that provide an equivalent level of safe operations during abnormal conditions.
For example, if an OCC LAN or local workstation fails, then phone numbers and radio frequencies that are accessed electronically may become unavailable. Therefore, a key process for which redundancy is required is an alternate means of accessing phone numbers. The following are basic core processes for which alternate (redundant) processes should be developed. While the list below may look as if it is hardware centric, the list is actually process centric; many processes are now hardware-dependent.
2.6.10 Phones and Communication. Mobile phones may provide a temporary workaround for inoperative main phone systems and radios.
2.6.11 Phone Numbers. A hard copy set of all phone numbers should be kept at each workstation. If the LAN or local workstation fails, all phone numbers that are generally accessed electronically may become inaccessible.
2.6.12 Internet Access. Laptop computers with cellular data modems may provide temporary Internet connectivity while primary connectivity is down.
2.6.13 Flight Monitoring. F light monitoring (refer to § 135.619(a)(3)) processes often rely on electronic applications such as ASDs or specialized communication gear (radio, data link, SATCOM, etc.). In turn, these specialized flight monitoring technologies often rely on Internet and/or LAN connectivity somewhere in the data chain to transmit the aircraft location information to personnel responsible for flight monitoring functions. Therefore, it is important that an operator identifies alternate flight locating procedures in the event that the primary flight monitoring application and procedures become inoperative.
Alternate flight monitoring processes generally call for alternate means of communication to track the aircraft (e.g., communication with outstations, hospitals, law enforcement, other aircraft, air traffic control (ATC), Flight Service Station (FSS), etc.).
2.6.14 IT Support Staff and Processes. An OCC’s technology infrastructure requires IT support staff for ongoing maintenance and support.
2.6.14.1 A n OCC requires IT support to repair inoperative items, including on-call support for critical items that require immediate repair. IT support can be achieved via in-house support staff or external outsourced support staff.
2.6.14.2 An OCC will require an SOP for reporting and tracking inoperative technology resources. Helpdesk ticket software applications can be acquired relatively inexpensively.
2.6.14.3 Information Security (INFOSEC) SOPs should be developed to protect the OCC IT infrastructure from damage, both malicious and unintentional.
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2.6.14.4 Various IT industry best practices should be put in place by an OCC’s IT support staff in order to provide the OCC with business continuity in the event of an IT failure or interruption. Typical IT SOPs provide for information failover, backup, recovery, restoration, and reconstruction. Each of these processes is distinct and requires SOPs to be in place prior to a technology failure event.
1. “Failover” refers to seamless data and process continuity as one system fails (e.g., a hard drive) and a redundant system immediately provides resource continuity despite the failure of the first system.
2. “Backup” refers to the process of preparing a copy of data for later use in the event that the original operational data becomes lost or unusable.
3. “Recovery” refers to the process of recovering data that has been lost from a system.
4. “Restoration” refers to the act of restoring data to an otherwise functioning system.
5. “Reconstruction” refers to the act of reconstructing a software application that has become unusable and needs to be rebuilt from the ground-up.
2.7 Emergency and Abnormal Operations. HAA operators should prepare in advance procedures that most effectively leverage OCC resources during abnormal or emergency operations.
2.7.1 Partial or Full Loss of Function of an OCC. These procedures should address how to effectively manage the partial or full shutdown of an OCC and operational control procedures during partial shutdown events such as power failure, loss of connectivity with the primary ISP, or a complete OCC shutdown event that requires evacuation of the OCC or renders the OCC inaccessible (e.g., fire, earthquake, tornado, flood, etc.).
2.7.2 T otal Shutdown of an OCC. In the event of a total shutdown of the OCC, alternate locations for relocation of the OCC should be preplanned and “go-kits” containing laptop computers and other essential equipment should be immediately available for the OCS to “grab and go” should an emergency evacuation be necessary.
2.7.3 U navailable Facilities. The operator should consider situations where no local facilities are available for re-location of the OCC. In such cases, procedures should be available for maintaining flight monitoring and other processes assigned to the OCC involving flights already airborne, and if mitigation measures to recover functionality fail, the operator should consider invoking a temporary moratorium on launching any new flights during an event that requires temporary shutdown of the OCC. This might include the temporary transfer of OCC duties to other OCC facilities or to mobile resources until an alternate OCC facility is established.
3-1 CHAPTER 3. OPERATIONS CONTROL SPECIALISTS (OCS) DUTIES
AND RESPONSIBILITIES
3.1 OCS Duties. Each certificate holder must describe in its General Operations Manual (GOM) the duties and responsibilities of an OCS, including preflight risk mitigation strategies and risk control measures, and the use of a shift change checklist. The level of operational control authority delegated to the OCS should also be clearly defined in the certificate holder’s Manual and/or described in operations specification (OpSpec) A008.
Per Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 135, § 135.619, the minimum duties of an OCS include:
3.1.1 Communications. Ideally, the OCS should be able to communicate, via radio or other means, directly with the helicopter air ambulance (HAA) pilot in order to provide weather advisories and notifications to the pilot if any other factors affecting the overall safety of the flight arise and any mitigation strategies that may be available. If the OCS is routinely unable to communicate directly with pilots, a secondary means, such as relay through a communications center staffed by trained communications specialist (CS), must be available. These procedures should be incorporated into the certificate holder’s Manual or other written standard operating procedure (SOP).
3.1.2 W eather Reporting . The OCS provides pilots with weather briefings, to include current and forecast weather along the planned route of flight. While the OCS may obtain weather from non-National Weather Service (NWS) sources to aid in situational awareness, only information derived from the NWS or other FAA-approved sources should be relayed to the HAA pilot for use in making a “Go” decision. This information provided may be relayed to the HAA pilot by an appropriately trained CS.
• The certificate holder should authorize each OCS to exercise operational control to direct the pilot to decline, divert, abort, or reroute the flight. The OCS should never provide an opinion to the pilot suggesting that a flight can be initiated or completed when weather is a factor. Likewise, in the opinion of the pilot, whenever a flight should not be initiated or continued due to weather or other safety factors, the OCS should not suggest or direct otherwise.
• One principle employed by several operators is the “advise, suggest, direct” concept.
This means the OCS should advise the HAA pilot of any potential hazards along proposed routes, suggest possible mitigation strategies, and in the absence of any effective mitigation strategies, have the operational control authority to direct the HAA pilot to decline the flight, divert the flight, or terminate the flight.
3.1.3 Monitor the Progress of the Flight. The OCS is required to monitor the progress of each HAA flight. This may be accomplished through a variety of means, including satellite tracking, position reports, etc. Weather conditions in the area(s) of operation should be monitored with respect to each HAA flight’s progress, and a documented method should be established to communicate adverse or unforecast deteriorating weather conditions to the HAA pilot. In the event the OCS cannot directly monitor a flight’s progress via satellite or other graphic means, certificate holders should have established procedures for monitoring the flight via position reports or other means.
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3.1.4 Preflight Risk Analysis. Risk Analysis procedures, principles, and policies are documented and are the subject of training by HAA operators. Multiple people with defined and documented roles and who receive specific training are typically involved in an FAA-approved HAA flight operations risk analysis program.
3.1.5 R isk Analysis. Risk analysis is an iterative risk assessment, mitigation, and reassessment process. Risk assessment is one key element of the broader risk analysis process. The risk assessment process should identify hazards, the probability of their occurrence, and the likely severity of the outcome should a hazard occur.
3.1.6 R isk Mitigation . Risk mitigation and its effectiveness in reducing risk is an essential component of the risk analysis program. If the risk assessment rates an individual risk element highly, mitigations may be advisable. Risk mitigations should be preplanned and preapproved, not assembled at the time of need, as unintended consequences may result.
Following application of an effective mitigation, the associated individual and total residual risk factor should be reassessed. This risk mitigation/re-assessment cycle should be repeated until all higher risks are effectively mitigated. Risks that remain high must either be acknowledged and accepted in accordance with the operator’s risk analysis program, or the proposed original flight operation or proposed flight operation modification should be declined.
3.1.7 R isk Threshold. Each individual risk element is weighed against an operator’s individual risk threshold and aggregated (combined risk scores remaining after application of approved mitigation strategies) into a total risk which, in turn, is weighed against the operator’s predetermined aggregate risk threshold. If the final aggregate residual risk and/or individual risk elements exceed the operator’s predetermined thresholds, approval of a higher level of operator management (above the OCS) is required. If this approval cannot be obtained, the flight should be refused (refer to §§ 135.615 and 135.617(a)(5)).
Section 135.617 requires HAA operators to have an FAA-approved and documented risk analysis program that includes procedures for elevating the final post mitigation residual risk to a higher management level for approval when the total risk exceeds a predetermined threshold.
3.1.8 P articipation Requirements . By regulation, the OCS must participate in the preflight risk analysis required by § 135.617. This section contains a brief description of the minimum participation requirements. HAA operators are encouraged to include in their risk analysis program any other requirements they deem appropriate to enhance safety.
3.1.8.1 The OCS must ensure the pilot has completed all required items on the preflight risk analysis worksheet. Procedures for determining the minimum items to be completed on the risk analysis should be detailed in the certificate holder’s approved risk analysis program. Risk analysis is discussed in detail in the current version of AC 135-14, Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations.
3.1.8.2 The OCS must confirm and verify all entries on the preflight risk analysis worksheet. The process of confirming and verifying the risk analysis entries
3-3 should be documented in each certificate holder’s Manual or approved risk analysis program.
3.1.8.3 The OCS must assist the pilot in mitigating any identified risks prior to takeoff and during flight if conditions change unexpectedly.
3.1.8.4 Risk mitigation strategies offered by the OCS should be offered in the form of suggested options that are previously validated by the operator. Risk mitigation strategies made on an ad hoc basis may result in unintended consequences. It’s important to note that the pilot in command (PIC) makes the final decision whether or not a recommended risk mitigation strategy is acceptable for the circumstances at hand. Conversely, the OCS is expected to evaluate mitigation strategies proposed by the PIC and determine their adequacy. The OCS should have the authority to direct the PIC to decline or abort a flight if the proposed risk mitigation is inadequate or inappropriate for the circumstances or if the residual risk remains excessive.
3.1.8.5 Certificate holders are encouraged to document when mitigation strategies are employed and their effect on the safe conduct of a flight.
3.1.8.6 The OCS must acknowledge, in writing, specifying the date and time that the preflight risk analysis worksheet has been accurately completed and that, according to their professional judgment, the flight can be conducted safely.
3.1.8.7 The method of this acknowledgement may be in any manner specified by the certificate holder in their approved risk analysis program. A signature is not required. This acknowledgement may be on the same risk analysis worksheet the PIC completes or on a separate record as long as the record contains the date and time of the acknowledgment, enough information to identify the PIC, the date of flight, the route of flight, that the preflight analysis worksheet has been accurately completed and that, according to the professional judgment of the OCS, the flight may be conducted safely, and any other information deemed appropriate by the certificate holder. The method of acknowledgement may be in writing, electronic, etc., as specified in the approved risk analysis program.
Note: Electronic signature safeguards and data security techniques are evolving rapidly. Discuss this section with your Principal Operations Inspector (POI) at the time of implementation planning (refer to the current edition of AC 120-78, Electronic Signatures, Electronic Recordkeeping, and Electronic Manuals, for more details regarding electronic signatures).
3.1.8.8 When an OCS, in their professional opinion, cannot concur that a flight can be conducted safely, the OCS should direct the PIC not to accept the flight. If the OCS observes a change in the risk analysis factors during the course of an HAA operation, the OCS should advise the PIC, recommend possible
3-4 mitigation strategies, and if the risk becomes unacceptable, direct the PIC to divert or abort the flight. This OCS authority should be documented in the certificate holder’s risk analysis program and GOM.
3.1.9 Emergency Assistance Capabilities. In addition to those duties required by regulation, the OCS can play an important role in providing emergency assistance to PICs during emergency situations such as an encounter with inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC). In many circumstances, the OCS may be able to observe aircraft position and maintain communications with the PIC when the aircraft is below air traffic control (ATC) radar and communications coverage. Under these circumstances, the OCC may need to relay information to ATC regarding an aircraft declaring an emergency and the pilot’s intentions. Additionally, the only means by which the PIC may be able to receive accurate weather information or route recommendations to escape severe or deteriorating weather may be through the OCS.
3.2 OCS Shift Change/Relief Procedures. In accordance with § 135.619(c), certificate holders must develop a shift change checklist to be used by OCS personnel during OCS shift changes. Procedures for briefing the on-coming OCS of HAA operations currently in progress and those expecting to begin shortly should be developed, documented, and trained. A similar checklist should be available when relief is being provided to an onduty OCS for breaks, etc. These checklists should, at a minimum, contain:
1. Active HAA operations.
2. Any HAA operations being conducted with a risk level higher than “low” or that required management review that employed risk mitigation strategies.
3. Weather affecting possible flight areas including but not limited to a review of current surface analysis, radar/radar summary, surface prognostic charts, and other information deemed appropriate.
4. Available flight monitoring procedures.
5. Temporary flight restrictions (TFR).
6. Pertinent Notices to Air Missions (NOTAM).
7. Any technology anomalies.
8. Any new flight operations policies, manual changes, etc., that have taken effect since the on-coming OCS’ last shift.
9. Human factors affecting any HAA pilot, OCS, CS, or other company personnel that could affect operations.
10. Helicopter maintenance status.
3.3 CS/OCS Interfaces. Some HAA operators consider it a best practice for OCS to pass routine, non-critical information to the PIC through the communications center in order to ensure all parties (OCC, pilot, and communications center personnel) are aware of information being provided and of any possible route deviations, etc., that might occur as a result of OCS suggestions or direction.