1-5 Note: OCCs are required for certificate holders authorized to conduct HAA operations with 10 or more HAA-capable helicopters assigned to their OpSpecs, and are strongly encouraged for all operators (refer to § 135.619).
35. Operations Control Specialist (OCS). An individual within the OCC who provides operational support for the certificate holder’s air ambulance operations and is both initially and recurrently trained, as specified in § 135.619(d) and (f). An OCS interfaces with the HAA pilot(s) prior to each flight request acceptance, and as necessary, during flight.
36. Operations Specification (OpSpec). Issued by the FAA to specify the commercial air transportation operations it has authorized the certificate holder to carry out.
OpSpec A021 authorizes HAA service. Before OpSpec A021 can be issued, the operator must meet the regulatory requirements of Part 135, Subpart L, Helicopter Air Ambulance Equipment, Operations, and Training Requirements.
37. Overwater Flight. Operation of a rotorcraft beyond autorotational distance from the shoreline (see Paragraph 1-6, Item 49, Shoreline).
38. Patient. A person under medical treatment. For the purposes of this definition, donor organs or human tissue are not patients, but are explicitly included under HAA operations, regulations, and practices. They are treated in the same manner as people under medical treatment.
39. Pilot in Command (PIC). The PIC of an aircraft is directly responsible for and is the final authority for the operation of that aircraft.
40. Principal Avionics Inspector (PAI). The inspector at the responsible Flight Standards office specifically responsible for aviation safety inspection and oversight of an HAA operator, with respect to avionics.
41. Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI). The inspector at the responsible Flight Standards office specifically responsible for aviation safety inspection and oversight of an HAA operator, with respect to maintenance.
42. Principal Operations Inspector (POI). The inspector at the responsible Flight Standards office specifically responsible for aviation safety inspection and oversight of an HAA operator, with respect to operations.
43. Residual Risk. Residual risk is the safety risk that exists after all controls have been implemented or exhausted and verified (to ensure that the risk acceptance is in accordance with a pre-existing documented risk analysis procedure).
44. Response Scene. Unimproved ad hoc LZ sites and other off-airport and off-heliport site locations where HAA flight landings are authorized under the authority of OpSpec A021.
45. Risk Analysis. Risk Analysis is a formal documented risk identification, assessment or rating, and mitigation methodology used to guide HAA decision making. The terms “risk assessment” and “risk analysis” should not be used interchangeably (see Paragraph 1-6, Item 46, Risk Assessment).
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46. Risk Assessment. Risk assessment is the rating of the probability of a hazard occurring and the severity of the outcome.
47. Safety Management System (SMS). An SMS is a formal, top-down approach to managing risk. It is a system to manage safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures. Implementing an SMS can provide useful tools to the HAA operator for complying with the requirements of § 135.617. Additional information and resources on SMS can be found in the current edition of AC 120-92, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers.
48. Second in Command (SIC).
49. Shoreline. Land adjacent to the water of an ocean, sea, lake, pond, river, or tidal basin that is above the high-water mark at which a rotorcraft could be landed safely. This does not include land areas unsuitable for landing, such as vertical cliffs or land intermittently under water (refer to § 135.168). Additional information is available in 14 CFR part 136, § 136.1.
50. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). An established or prescribed method to be followed routinely for the performance of a designated operation or in a designated situation and is used to guide training to meet such contingencies.
51. Suitable Offshore Heliport Structure. A heliport structure that can support the size and weight of the rotorcraft being operated where a safe landing can be made.
52. Supplemental Type Certificate (STC). A TC issued when an applicant has received approval to modify an aircraft from its original design.
1.7 Related Source Material. This identifies published documents that are applicable to HAA operations.
Note: Current editions of ACs can be found on the FAA website at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars. Current editions of FAA handbooks can be found on the FAA website at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals.
1.7.1 A Cs (current editions):
1. AC 00-6, Aviation Weather.
2. AC 00-64, Air Medical Resource Management.
3. AC 27-1, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft.
4. AC 29-2, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft.
5. AC 91.21-1, Use of Portable Electronic Devices Aboard Aircraft.
6. AC 91-32, Safety In and Around Helicopters.
7. AC 120-27, Aircraft Weight and Balance Control.
8. AC 120-49, Parts 121 and 135 Certification.
9. AC 120-51, Crew Resource Management Training.
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10. AC 120-92, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers.
11. AC 135-14, Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations.
12. AC 150/5390-2, Heliport Design.
13. AC 150/5230-4, Aircraft Fuel Storage, Handling, Training, and Dispensing on Airports.
1.7.2 Orders (current editions):
1. Order 8040.4, Safety Risk Management Policy.
2. Order 8900.1 Volume 3, Chapter 65, Helicopter Air Ambulance Non-Flightcrew Personnel Training Programs.
1.7.3 Handbooks and Manuals (current editions):
1. FAA-H-8083-16, Instrument Procedures Handbook.
2. FAA-H-8083-21, Helicopter Flying Handbook.
3. FAA-H-8083-25, Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge.
4. Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM).
1.7.4 Pamphlets (current editions):
1. DOT/FAA/PM-86/45, Aeronautical Decision Making for Helicopter Pilots.
2. DOT/FAA/DS-88/7, Risk Management for Air Ambulance Helicopter Operators.
3. Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team (FAASTeam) Library, Flying in Flat Light and White Out Conditions.
4. National EMS Pilots Association (NEMSPA), Preparing a Landing Zone. NEMSPA is located in Collierville, TN 38027; telephone 760-563-6772.
5. Helicopter Association International (HAI). HAI is located at 1920 Ballenger Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314-2898; telephone 703-683-4646. Check their website for other documents and links to resources, including their Fly Neighborly Guide.
6. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is located at 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA, 02169-7471, telephone 800-344-3555. They have many publications about fire protection. The 400 series may be the most helpful. For example, the current edition of NFPA 418, Standard for Heliports, has fire standards for heliports.
7. Air Ambulance Guidelines published by both the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Commission on Emergency Medical Services.
8. Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) SW-10-43, Non-Aviation Transmitters. (Includes, for example, 800 megahertz (MHz) radios used to communicate with hospitals.)
9. DOT/FAA/AR-99/50, High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Risk Analysis.
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10. TSO-C194, Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS).
11. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 9977-AN/489, Manual on Civil Aviation Jet Fuel Supply.
12. RTCA Inc. DO-160, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment.
13. RTCA Inc. DO-178, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification.
14. RTCA Inc. DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware.
15. RTCA Inc. DO-309, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS) Airborne Equipment.
1.7.5 OpSpecs/Management Specifications (MSpecs) (current editions):
1. OpSpec/MSpec A005—Exemptions and Deviations.
2. OpSpec A008—Operational Control.
3. MSpec A008—Flight Management.
4. OpSpec/MSpec A010—Aviation Weather Information.
5. OpSpec A021—Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) Operations.
6. OpSpec A050—Helicopter Night Vision Goggle Operations (HNVGO).
7. OpSpec/MSpec A061—Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) Program.
8. OpSpec/MSpec A096—Actual Weight Program For All Aircraft.
9. OpSpec/MSpec A097—Small Cabin Aircraft Passenger and Baggage Weight Problem.
10. OpSpec/MSpec D085—Aircraft Listing.
1.8 AC Feedback Form. For your convenience, the AC Feedback Form is the last page of this AC. Note any deficiencies found, clarifications needed, or suggested improvements regarding the contents of this AC on the Feedback Form.
2-1 CHAPTER 2. OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER (OCC) FUNCTIONS
2.1 Regulatory Requirements. After April 22, 2016, Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 135, § 135.619 requires certificate holders authorized to conduct helicopter air ambulance (HAA) operations, with 10 or more HAAs assigned to the certificate holder’s operations specifications (OpSpecs), to have an OCC staffed by appropriately trained Operations Control Specialist (OCS). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also encourages smaller operators not required by regulation to establish an OCC as an additional safety enhancement.
2.1.1 General. This chapter provides recommendations to assist HAA operators with identifying best practices for implementing OCCs and operations control procedures. It is also intended to encourage and enable operators without a regulatory requirement to establish and operate an OCC to attain the operational benefits of an OCC.
2.1.2 P ublic Aircraft Operations (PAO). Government entities conducting eligible PAO under Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) §§ 40102(a)(41) and 40125 for an associated government function are also highly encouraged to establish OCCs and adopt enhanced operational control procedures reflecting concepts in §§ 135.617 and 135.619.
For more information on the eligibility requirements to conduct PAO, refer to the current edition of AC 00-1.1, Public Aircraft Operations.
2.2 Core Concepts—OCC and Operations Control Procedures. There are three core concepts and one recommendation that define an effective OCC and enhanced operations control procedures:
2.2.1 Joint Flight Safety Responsibility. The first core concept is joint flight safety responsibility for each HAA operation. The joint flight safety responsibility concept requires that at least one qualified ground staff member, in addition to the pilot in command (PIC), is actively involved in reviewing the PIC risk analysis in accordance with the required risk analysis program (refer to § 135.617). When an OCC is required by regulation, or where an OCC has been voluntarily established and is listed on OpSpec A021, it must be staffed with OCS who participate in the duties and responsibilities listed in § 135.619(a) and who continue to provide safety input to the conduct of the flight by monitoring factors affecting flight safety before and during the flight (refer to § 135.619). The qualified OCS on the ground also provides additional Crew Resource Management (CRM) support for pilots during high-workload situations or emergencies.
2.2.2 W ritten Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The second core concept is the development and implementation of documented SOPs that are used to guide training and to standardize operations performance. The process of developing SOPs requires critical thinking and review of established procedures. If this process is conducted with personnel who serve in the OCC, the organization will likely discover differences in how individuals perform certain tasks or processes, and best practices can be identified and implemented. Standardization of written operations control procedures reflects the same
2-2 concerns that mandate the use of checklists on the flight deck. These SOPs may be contained in a GOM or be standalone documents.
2.2.2.1 Documentation. SOPs are documented so they can be referenced and performed the same way each time. The detail and scope of this documentation should reflect the size and complexity of each HAA operation.
SOPs may be accessed either electronically or via hard copy (refer to OpSpec/Management Specification (MSpec) A025 for in-flight use of electronic documentation). Regardless of the primary method for accessing SOPs, a backup independent set of procedures should be readily available, especially in times of high-workload situations such as abnormal or emergency operations.
2.2.2.2 Electronic Media. Though the industry is moving toward a less paperdependent environment, a truly paperless environment has yet to be achieved.
A key technology (e.g., a local area network (LAN) or workstation) may fail in conjunction with an emergency or could even be the cause of emergency or abnormal operations. Technology failures may render electronic access to SOPs unavailable. Therefore, hardcopy or backup electronic versions of all critical SOPs should be housed in non-volatile memory that can be accessed on a computer that is independent from networked workstations or computers.
These backup copies should be maintained and be readily available for use during abnormal situations.
2.2.3 L everaging Technology and Communication. The third core concept of OCCs and enhanced operations control procedures is to leverage technology and communication to enhance safety and efficiency. This includes providing an enhanced level of situational awareness to the PIC, OCS, and other individuals. An OCC can leverage technology to provide communication and safety benefits to HAA operations. For example, an OCC may be able to acquire weather information for situational awareness purposes from non-aviation locations which do not feed into the National Weather Service (NWS) database. This information may come from a variety of weather feeds available at the OCC, including non-aviation sources such as telephone calls, local TV stations, etc.
These non-standard weather sources should be used to enhance situational awareness, and “No-Go” decisionmaking only. Such non-NWS/FAA-approved sources may not be used for “Go” decisions.
2.2.4 Provision of Situational Awareness Information. In addition to the regulatory requirements, the operator should establish and document procedures for acquiring and providing situational awareness information to the PIC via the OCS and other individuals and capabilities as appropriate. This is an example of the use of leveraging technology and communications to reduce risk in HAA operations.
2.3 OCC Models. OCCs may take on many possible physical configurations depending on the size and scope of the HAA operator. The OCC provides a physical location where the OCS and any other personnel can access information technologies to assist the PIC.
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2.3.1 Locations. Some OCCs may be co-located with a communications center that normally receives flight requests, passes the flight request to the HAA pilot, performs flight monitoring, etc. Other OCCs may be located at one location and have one or more remotely sited communications centers that communicate flight information to the OCC through various means.
2.3.2 C ommunication. Several key concepts should be considered regardless of the physical relationship between the OCC and communications centers.
2.3.2.1 Direct communications capabilities between the OCC and the PIC, through the communications center if necessary, is essential. This allows the OCS to receive early notification of a pending flight and begin processes such as reviewing weather in the proposed flight area as part of the risk analysis concurrence requirement.
2.3.2.2 The OCS must provide two-way communication with the HAA pilot. This may be direct communication, or through established procedures, via relay through the communications center. The OCS must have the means available to immediately communicate hazards such as deteriorating weather to the HAA pilot. The OCS must also possess a means of verifying risk analysis data for flight diversions that may have been considered at the beginning of an HAA operation.
2.4 OCC Facilities.
2.4.1 Hardware and Software Resources. A well-functioning OCC should have available the following hardware and software resources:
1. Enabling technologies (to include LANs, Internet access, and digital signature capabilities for form completion);
2. Database for determining pilot currency, qualifications, and rest and duty status to be used during preflight risk analysis;
3. Aircraft situational displays (ASD) depicting the status of all certificate holder HAA aircraft;
4. Aviation weather analysis tools (to include textual, graphical, and Geographic Information System (GIS)-enabled);
5. Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) tools (both textual and graphical);
6. Air traffic flow tools (to include temporary flight restrictions (TFR), special use airspace, special areas of operation, military operations airspace, high density and congested airspace, warning areas, and weather watch boxes);
7. Communication tools (to include telephones, email, datalink, radio (aircraft and first responders, including Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) capabilities), satellite communications (SATCOM) and advanced communication consoles);
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8. Non-aviation situational awareness tools such as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Meteorological Assimilation Data Ingest System (MADIS), Internet capable of accessing weather cams, or TV capable of receiving cable news channels. These types of tools should be only used for situational awareness and for making a “No-Go” decision; and
9. In the event of a national security emergency or local disaster, news, websites, and phone lines (both landlines and mobile phones) may become inoperative due to the sheer volume of people trying to simultaneously access these resources. Therefore, a TV may be the best means of acquiring information regarding where to send aircraft, where not to send aircraft, and where an accident is located if it is one of the operator’s own aircraft.
2.4.2 Adapting OCC Facilities and Capabilities to Smaller Operators. Smaller (fewer than 10 HAAs) operators are not required by regulation to have an OCC staffed by an OCS.
However, regardless of the size of the organization, operations control concepts should be carefully planned and implemented to avoid unintended gaps or errors that may result in actions or omissions that would be detrimental to safety. The following guidelines are provided to assist the operator in avoiding such failures. If an OCC is not required and the operator chooses to voluntarily implement a similar capability or function, the operator’s applicable governing policies and procedures (and details of training specialists in operations control subject matter) should be established and documented by the operator in their General Operations Manuals (GOM) or other permissible forms of documentation. This documentation system must be acceptable to the Principal Operations Inspector (POI) just as any other process or procedure documented in the operator’s manual system.
2.4.2.1 The operator must demonstrate that operational control and PIC responsibility and authority is maintained, and safety is not compromised as a result of the delegation of duties and responsibilities to the non-required individuals staffing that non-regulatory function.
2.4.2.2 Smaller operators may choose to incorporate this function within their operations control organization. Staff members providing OCS-type services within such an organization should receive the training required by § 135.619(d) and (f).
2.4.2.3 Create SOPs appropriate for the size and complexity of the operation. A small operator, using SOPs that are founded in the concepts used within larger organizations, may increase the safety of their HAA operations with minimal expense.
2.5 OCC Physical Space Design Considerations. The following human factors and physical space considerations should be taken into account when designing the layout of an OCC.
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1. Physical Room Layout. Interpersonal communication, visual lines of sight, and the auditory profile of a room are key considerations when designing the physical layout of an OCC.
2. Size of Room. The room should be small enough for individuals to be able to see and hear discussions within the room for situational awareness. However, the room should not be so loud as to hamper communication.
3. Visual Lines of Sight. Personnel should be able to see their colleagues. Walls that segregate personnel are undesirable.
4. Pods. Pod-type workstation areas, where one to four OCC personnel work in small work groups, easily provide for the interactions and load shedding that may be necessary when abnormal or emergency situations develop.
5. Physical Workstation Areas. Because OCC personnel often work long shifts and sit for extended periods of time, the design of physical workstation areas is important.
6. Chairs. Chairs should be comfortable. High-backed chairs that rock, swivel, and have wheels are preferable.
7. Main Desk Surface Area. The main horizontal surface plan of the desk or workstation should not be too high or too low. Workstations that are adjustable to allow for sitting and standing are ideal. There should be ample desk surface area to comfortably spread out work materials.
8. Shelving and Storage. There should be ample shelving to aid in keeping items off the desk surface area. There should also be ample enclosed filing and storage capacity.
This will allow for ease of accessibility to SOPs, the Post-Accident/Incident Plan (PAIP), etc. Shelving and filing containing items such as these should be centrally located and clearly labeled.
2.6 OCC Technology and Design Considerations.
2.6.1 Failure and Redundancy Considerations for Both Systems and Processes. As technology increasingly becomes an essential part of flight operations, failure becomes a greater concern. For example, the temporary failure of an OCC’s LAN may render most of an OCC’s functionality inoperative (e.g., phone system, communication console, email, Internet access, ASDs, weather systems, data link, radios, etc.). Thus, it is important to plan for technology failures and design redundant systems and processes to ensure that the end results provided by contingency systems remain the same. In addition to planning for temporary or less-severe failures and outages, severe technology failures should also be expected and prepared for by the development of an OCC information technology (IT) disaster recovery plan. This plan should be documented, and OCC staff should periodically practice contingency operations so they are prepared for such an eventuality.
2.6.2 C ommon Tec hnology Interruptions. Common technology interruptions that should be planned for when developing, implementing, and integrating an OCC include:
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• Electrical power outages (localized to the building, the local area, or to a broader geographic area),
• LAN outages, and
• Internet Service Provider (ISP) or ISP connectivity outages.
2.6.3 Key Redundancy Considerations for Hardware and Infrastructure. The following considerations should be taken into account when designing redundancy into OCC systems:
2.6.4 IS P Connectivity . Software applications used by OCCs are increasingly becoming Web-based. This means that if an OCC loses its connectivity to the Internet, any Webbased applications become inoperative. Therefore, the FAA recommends that an OCC maintain at least two wholly independent connections to the Internet. The physical connections should enter the facility at physically opposite ends of the building, and they should be provided by two wholly independent companies. For example, two connections from the local telecommunications service providers will both become unavailable if the local telephone company’s network switch goes down. Ideally, these connections should also be load-balanced with automatic failover.
2.6.5 S erver Location . Ideally, OCC servers should be located in a secure data center that is hardened to protect against potential threats (e.g., flooding, hurricanes, tornados, etc.). If a hardened data center is not economically viable, then servers should be located in a secure location, preferably temperature controlled and shielded from fire sprinkler systems.
2.6.6 S ervers. Ideally, servers should be redundant with automatic failover and be Redundant Array of Independent Drives (RAID) configured.
2.6.7 W orkstations . Workstations should be standardized for full interoperability so that any staff member can perform their duties at any workstation. For example, either an OCS or a communications specialist (CS) should be able to comfortably work at the same workstation on alternate shifts. Additionally, an OCC should maintain at least one “hot spare” workstation for immediate use, in case one of the workstations normally in use becomes inoperative.
2.6.8 U ninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). All workstations, servers, switches, and other key infrastructure should have UPS batteries in the power supply chain. The sustainable uptime of various UPS configurations is a cost consideration: the longer the time, the higher the cost. A good middle ground approach may be to install stronger UPS units on vital infrastructure and lighter UPS units on less critical infrastructure. As an example, a good plan may be to install three-hour UPS units on key servers and two workstations, and then install 30-minute UPS units on remaining workstations. It is also worthwhile discussing interruption restoration priorities with the utility companies so they are aware of the critical nature of the HAA operation and could plan restoration priorities accordingly.
2-7 Note: Ensure all staff members and supervisors are aware of VoIP system redundancy characteristics, including whether or not the phone system is operational when the local ISP network is inoperative.
2.6.9 K ey Redundancy Considerations—Processes. OCC SOPs should include alternate processes that provide an equivalent level of safe operations during abnormal conditions.
For example, if an OCC LAN or local workstation fails, then phone numbers and radio frequencies that are accessed electronically may become unavailable. Therefore, a key process for which redundancy is required is an alternate means of accessing phone numbers. The following are basic core processes for which alternate (redundant) processes should be developed. While the list below may look as if it is hardware centric, the list is actually process centric; many processes are now hardware-dependent.
2.6.10 Phones and Communication. Mobile phones may provide a temporary workaround for inoperative main phone systems and radios.
2.6.11 Phone Numbers. A hard copy set of all phone numbers should be kept at each workstation. If the LAN or local workstation fails, all phone numbers that are generally accessed electronically may become inaccessible.
2.6.12 Internet Access. Laptop computers with cellular data modems may provide temporary Internet connectivity while primary connectivity is down.
2.6.13 Flight Monitoring. F light monitoring (refer to § 135.619(a)(3)) processes often rely on electronic applications such as ASDs or specialized communication gear (radio, data link, SATCOM, etc.). In turn, these specialized flight monitoring technologies often rely on Internet and/or LAN connectivity somewhere in the data chain to transmit the aircraft location information to personnel responsible for flight monitoring functions. Therefore, it is important that an operator identifies alternate flight locating procedures in the event that the primary flight monitoring application and procedures become inoperative.
Alternate flight monitoring processes generally call for alternate means of communication to track the aircraft (e.g., communication with outstations, hospitals, law enforcement, other aircraft, air traffic control (ATC), Flight Service Station (FSS), etc.).
2.6.14 IT Support Staff and Processes. An OCC’s technology infrastructure requires IT support staff for ongoing maintenance and support.
2.6.14.1 A n OCC requires IT support to repair inoperative items, including on-call support for critical items that require immediate repair. IT support can be achieved via in-house support staff or external outsourced support staff.
2.6.14.2 An OCC will require an SOP for reporting and tracking inoperative technology resources. Helpdesk ticket software applications can be acquired relatively inexpensively.
2.6.14.3 Information Security (INFOSEC) SOPs should be developed to protect the OCC IT infrastructure from damage, both malicious and unintentional.
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2.6.14.4 Various IT industry best practices should be put in place by an OCC’s IT support staff in order to provide the OCC with business continuity in the event of an IT failure or interruption. Typical IT SOPs provide for information failover, backup, recovery, restoration, and reconstruction. Each of these processes is distinct and requires SOPs to be in place prior to a technology failure event.
1. “Failover” refers to seamless data and process continuity as one system fails (e.g., a hard drive) and a redundant system immediately provides resource continuity despite the failure of the first system.
2. “Backup” refers to the process of preparing a copy of data for later use in the event that the original operational data becomes lost or unusable.
3. “Recovery” refers to the process of recovering data that has been lost from a system.
4. “Restoration” refers to the act of restoring data to an otherwise functioning system.
5. “Reconstruction” refers to the act of reconstructing a software application that has become unusable and needs to be rebuilt from the ground-up.
2.7 Emergency and Abnormal Operations. HAA operators should prepare in advance procedures that most effectively leverage OCC resources during abnormal or emergency operations.
2.7.1 Partial or Full Loss of Function of an OCC. These procedures should address how to effectively manage the partial or full shutdown of an OCC and operational control procedures during partial shutdown events such as power failure, loss of connectivity with the primary ISP, or a complete OCC shutdown event that requires evacuation of the OCC or renders the OCC inaccessible (e.g., fire, earthquake, tornado, flood, etc.).
2.7.2 T otal Shutdown of an OCC. In the event of a total shutdown of the OCC, alternate locations for relocation of the OCC should be preplanned and “go-kits” containing laptop computers and other essential equipment should be immediately available for the OCS to “grab and go” should an emergency evacuation be necessary.
2.7.3 U navailable Facilities. The operator should consider situations where no local facilities are available for re-location of the OCC. In such cases, procedures should be available for maintaining flight monitoring and other processes assigned to the OCC involving flights already airborne, and if mitigation measures to recover functionality fail, the operator should consider invoking a temporary moratorium on launching any new flights during an event that requires temporary shutdown of the OCC. This might include the temporary transfer of OCC duties to other OCC facilities or to mobile resources until an alternate OCC facility is established.