AC 129-5

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular Subject: Provision of Technical Assistance to Civil Aviation Authorities for Safety Oversight of International Commercial Air Transportation Including by Commercial Technical Assistance Providers Date: 8/16/13 Initiated by: AFS-50 AC No: 129-5 Change:

This advisory circular (AC) provides information about the provision of technical assistance to Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) related to compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices. The AC explains the process the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses to provide assistance to CAAs and also provides guidance CAAs can use to obtain technical assistance from commercial providers if the services of the FAA are not available.

Noncompliance with ICAO standards by CAAs is often identified under the FAA’s International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program. The primary focus for the IASA program is for compliance with ICAO Annex 1, Personnel Licensing; Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, Part 1, International Commercial Air Transport-Aeroplanes; and Annex 8, Airworthiness of Aircraft.

This AC contains information a CAA may use to identify:

• The elements that must be analyzed in order for any technical assistance project to have an opportunity to succeed;

• The actions that should be taken before, during, and after the conduct of any technical assistance relating to the eight critical elements of safety oversight, as defined in ICAO Document 9734, Safety Oversight Manual, Part A, The Establishment and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System (ICAO Document 9734, Part A); and

• The process steps that will facilitate the effective selection of commercial technical assistance providers.

ORIGINAL SIGNED by John M. Allen Director, Flight Standards Service

Page iii (and iv)

CONTENTS Paragraph Page CHAPTER 1. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1-1. Purpose1

1-2. Applicability1

1-3. Related CFR Part1

1-4. Key Terms and Descriptions1

CHAPTER 2. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE EIGHT CRITICAL ELEMENTS

OF SAFETY OVERSIGHT

2-1. SARPs3

2-2. Critical Elements for Oversight3

2-3. Descriptions of Critical Elements3

CHAPTER 3. FAA PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

3-1. Global Aviation Safety9

3-2. Technological Innovation9

3-3. Technical Review9

3-4. Action Planning9

3-5. FAA Determination to Undertake Long-Term Technical Assistance10

3-6. If the FAA Agrees to Undertake Long-Term Technical Assistance10

3-7. If the FAA Cannot Commit to Providing Long-Term Technical Assistance11

CHAPTER 4. SELECTING A COMMERCIAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDER

4-1. Statement of Work (SOW)13

4-2. Commercial Technical Assistance Provider Application13

4-3. FAA Relationship with Commercial Technical Assistance Providers16

CHAPTER 5. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

5-1. Where You Can Find This AC19

5-2. Additional Information19

Par 1-1 Page 1 CHAPTER 1. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1-1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) provides information about the provision of technical assistance to Civil Airworthiness Authorities (CAA) related to compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards. It explains the process the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses to provide assistance to CAAs and also provides guidance that CAAs can use to obtain technical assistance from commercial providers if the services of the FAA are not available.

1-2. APPLICABILITY. This AC contains information that may be helpful in the selection of commercial technical assistance providers. It contains characteristics that have been identified and used by the FAA, resulting in the effective use of a CAA’s resources to meet its obligations with the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) and become compliant with the requirements of applicable ICAO Annexes.

1-3. RELATED CFR PART. Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 129 subpart A.

1-4. KEY TERMS AND DESCRIPTIONS. For purposes of this AC, the following key terms apply:

a. Action Plan. A detailed document that addresses the eight critical elements for safety oversight for an effective CAA, as described in ICAO Document 9734, Safety Oversight Manual, Part A, The Establishment and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System. The plan will identify all of the actions needed to be taken by the CAA to bring each of the elements into compliance with ICAO standards. Action plans are designed to be a systematic way of:

• Identifying the current state of the eight critical elements within a country’s safety oversight system;

• Identifying the findings within each element;

• Identifying the needed corrective actions; and

• Establishing specific timelines for the closure of corrective actions, as appropriate.

b. International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA). An assessment conducted by the FAA to evaluate a country’s compliance with applicable ICAO standards. This evaluation assesses and validates that the safety oversight system of a country that is a signatory to the Chicago Convention is compliant with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) as established by ICAO Annexes 1, 6, and 8 and associated documents.

(1) Such compliance with the applicable standards is a condition for the conduct of commercial air transportation service to the United States under part 129.

(2) The specific level of compliance is determined during an in-country visit that is conducted by a trained and qualified technical team leader and associated team members.

Completion of the assessment process results in the determination of the level of safety oversight and an associated assignment of the appropriate category rating (Category 1 or Category 2). The category rating is released to the public.

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(a) Category 1: The FAA has assessed the country’s CAA and has determined that the CAA licenses and oversees its air carriers in accordance with applicable ICAO aviation safety standards.

(b) Category 2: The FAA has assessed the country’s CAA and has determined that the CAA does not provide appropriate safety oversight of its air carrier operators in accordance with the minimum safety oversight standards established by ICAO.

c. Management Review. A progress review conducted on an as-needed basis during the course of technical assistance to determine the needs of the country and the service provider are being met. A management review is normally conducted by a team of two or more management personnel selected by the technical assistance provider.

d. Political Will. The capability and commitment of a foreign government to follow through and maximize the benefits of technical assistance. Foreign political will must be demonstrated by a documented commitment of manpower and budgetary resources.

e. Technical Assistance. The process to provide assistance to the CAA in obtaining compliance with ICAO SARPs. Technical assistance activities are normally a result of an FAA IASA, a technical review, or a past ICAO activity such as the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP) or the ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission (ICVM). Technical assistance is provided by personnel that are trained and qualified to do so, and providers are typically ICAO, other CAAs, or commercial entities. Some form of technical evaluation must first be conducted as part of the development of a technical assistance package.

f. Technical Assistance Provider. A technical assistance provider, being comprised of a single person or several people appropriate to the task at hand, provides services to a CAA to improve its system of safety oversight.

(1) The technical assistance process for a CAA is complex, and the success of the assistance depends on the quality of the information and materials provided by the provider.

Consequently, a technical assistance provider should be familiar enough with the technical assistance process to understand what is required to establish an ICAO-compliant system of aviation safety oversight.

(2) No technical assistance provider may advertise or otherwise offer to perform services using words such as “FAA-approved,” “FAA-designated,” or words of similar meaning.

Advertising with words such as “approved” or “designated” are sufficient grounds for termination of any working relationship in such matters with the FAA.

g. Technical Review. An evaluation of a country’s compliance with applicable ICAO standards as a signatory to the Chicago Convention, as determined by a technical team.

A technical review does not result in the assignment of a specific category (1 or 2) regarding compliance with ICAO standards. The FAA conducts technical reviews on countries that are not presently rated under the IASA program or that have an existing IASA Category 2 rating.

Par 2-1 Page 3 CHAPTER 2. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE EIGHT CRITICAL

ELEMENTS OF SAFETY OVERSIGHT

2-1. SARPs. The SARPs, as set forth by the ICAO, have been providing a baseline for which every signatory State must develop and implement an effective Aviation Oversight System with which to control every aspect of civil aviation in each State. Each country, as a signatory to the Chicago Convention, must strive to meet or exceed these SARPs by way of regulations and guidance.

2-2. CRITICAL ELEMENTS FOR OVERSIGHT. In a country’s efforts to establish or re-establish and implement an effective aviation safety oversight system, it must consider the eight critical elements as defined by ICAO Document 9734, Part A. The critical elements are an essential part of any effective system of oversight and are required for the implementation of safety-related policy and associated procedures. Each country, as a signatory to the Chicago Convention, is expected to implement the elements in a way that assumes the shared responsibility of the State and its aviation community. The effective implementation of the critical elements is one of the primary indicators of a State’s ability to perform safety oversight.

These elements are the primary factors for both the ICVM and the FAA’s IASA program.

2-3. DESCRIPTIONS OF CRITICAL ELEMENTS. A brief description of each of the eight critical elements of safety oversight is listed below from ICAO Document 9734, Part A, paragraph 3.1.2. Along with the description of each element are observations based on FAA experiences as to what a CAA, its applicable transport ministry and national government, and, in some instances, its aviation industry must be willing to address during a technical assistance program to become compliant with international safety oversight obligations.

a. Primary Aviation Legislation. The provision of a comprehensive and effective aviation law consistent with the environment and complexity of the State’s aviation activity and compliant with the requirements contained in the Chicago Convention.

(1) In those situations necessary, the CAA must first decide if they are going to update or develop their own national legislation. The primary aviation legislation is one of the most critical elements to the authority itself. The authority and functions of the CAA must be founded in law. In most countries, it has been found to be the most time-intensive, and difficult element to change, usually requiring a minimum of a year to fully work through the State’s legislative process.

(2) The legislation should support the implementation of the obligations outlined in the Chicago Convention and the SARPs contained in the applicable ICAO Annexes. Without ICAO-compliant aviation legislation in place, the other seven critical elements cannot be adequately or fully implemented.

b. Specific Operating Regulations. The provision of adequate regulations to address, at a minimum, are national requirements emanating from the primary aviation legislation and providing for standardized operational procedures, equipment, and infrastructures (including safety management and training systems), in conformance with the SARPs contained in the Annexes to the Chicago Convention.

Par 2-3 Page 4 NOTE: The term “regulations” is used in a generic sense to include, but is not limited to, instructions, rules, edicts, directives, sets of laws, requirements, policies, and orders.

(1) In those situations necessary, the CAA must first decide if they are going to develop their own set of regulations or will adopt ones from another country. The regulations are one of the critical elements of the authority itself. In the first case, it will be time-intensive and difficult to do. The best course of action, for both time and cost, is to adopt regulations that are already developed and proven effective (such as the Model Civil Aviation Regulations (MCAR)). Even these will require minor modifications, and must be tailored to fit a particular State’s situation.

(2) Once a commitment is made in a direction and content, there cannot be a commingling of regulations (i.e. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)/Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR), CFRs, Latin American Aeronautical Regulations (LAR) and MCARs).

There are enough differences in all to make them difficult or incompatible. Mixing parts of one with another has been found to create more problems than it solves.

c. State Civil Aviation System and Safety Oversight Functions. The establishment of a CAA and/or other relevant authorities or government agencies headed by a chief executive office, supported by the appropriate and adequate technical and non-technical staff, and provided with adequate financial resources. The State authority must have stated safety regulatory functions, objectives, and safety policies.

NOTE: The term “State civil aviation system” is used in a generic sense to include all authorities with aviation safety oversight responsibility which may be established by the State as separate entities, such as: CAA, airport authorities, Air Traffic Service (ATS) authorities, accident investigation authority, and meteorological authority.

NOTE: Without an adequate infrastructure and facilities already in place, the CAA will be ill-advised to start any technical assistance project.

d. Technical Personnel Qualification and Training. The establishment of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical personnel performing safety oversight functions and the provision of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should include initial and recurrent (periodic) training.

(1) The hiring of highly qualified and well-rounded individuals for inspector positions has proven to be difficult for many States. In some cases, salary, not career expectations, will determine the availability and willingness of individuals to seek an inspector position. More than likely, the industry offers a much better salary and compensation package. The lack of a career civil service system in most developing countries will be a stumbling block that will be difficult to overcome. Or, if there is a civil service system, it may only allow a standard government salary that is not commensurate with the experience, knowledge, and skills required for aviation oversight positions. Rare is the case where one can expect to find highly qualified individuals in a job after a total change of government personnel has occurred. Even in those cases where

Par 2-3 Page 5 highly qualified individuals are hired, they may be reluctant to take any strong actions for several reasons, including:

• Old friendships with industry personnel;

• Expectations of future employment by the aviation entities they oversee;

• No support by the government regime if the country’s legal system does not protect government employees in case of lawsuits; and

• Aggressive action not being a cultural norm.

(2) The FAA has experienced all of these situations in past technical assistance projects.

There is no clear-cut solution to any of these situations of hiring and retaining qualified inspector personnel, and overcoming inspector reluctance to take strong CAA action. This area may likely be the most difficult hindrance to overcome. All that may be expected during the period of technical assistance is that the individuals hired be professional and motivated enough in order to move ahead. A CAA must be prepared to continually lobby within its own government for the authority and funding to pay its staff an adequate compensation system in order to retain qualified staff.

e. Technical Guidance, Tools, and the Provision of Safety-Critical Information. The provision of technical guidance (including processes and procedures), tools (including facilities and equipment), and safety-critical information, as applicable to the technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions in accordance with the requirements and in a standardized manner. In addition, this includes the provision of technical guidance by the oversight authority to the aviation industry on the implementation of applicable regulations and instructions.

(1) Technical guidance has to go hand-in-hand with the national law and regulations.

In other words, it must be consistent and refer to the same regulations that have been implemented. In one case, a country adopted guidance based on regulations from one country and adopted regulations from another. In certain instances, there were inconsistencies, and in many cases, the guidance and regulations contradicted each other. The guidance should be developed as the regulations are being developed. The trainee inspectors need to be trained to both avoid misunderstandings in what the regulations require and how they will be implemented.

(2) The foreign CAA must provide adequate facilities for the technical assistance personnel and for its own inspectors. Lack of such items as desks, computers, and Internet access will hinder the effective implementation of the project. Cramped quarters, lack of rooms for training, insufficient telephone lines, and/or nonrecognition of inspector’s credentials by airport security personnel for access to the airport/aircraft are just a few of the examples of impediments that have affected the outcome of some technical assistance projects and must be addressed by a CAA in order to have the basis for a functional CAA office.

f. Licensing, Certification, Authorization, and Approval Obligations. The implementation of processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise the privileges of a license, certificate, authorization, and/or approval to conduct the relevant aviation training.

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(1) The concept of developing requirements for obtaining licenses and the necessary standards under which to test for them may be encountered with resistance from the industry;

being perceived as too harsh and unnecessary.

(2) The CAA must recognize that ICAO Annex 1, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1 establishes that “An applicant shall…meet such requirements in respect of…knowledge…skill…as are specified for that license or rating.” The importance of these requirements cannot be overemphasized, nor should it be minimized. The competency of airmen is one of the key elements in the day-to-day safe operations of any airline, considering that human factors are the main cause of aviation accidents in the world.

(3) As for operator certification, both the CAA and the operator must work from the premise that ICAO requires that the operator maintain the same standards that were required for certification (ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, Chapter 4, 4.2.1). The operator and the CAA must both understand that air carrier certification is a continuous process which will be ongoing as long as the operator holds that aircraft operator certificate (AOC). A comprehensive and thorough process for the certification of the operator, in accordance with the country’s regulation and guidance is a must.

g. Surveillance Obligations. The implementation of processes, such as inspections and audits, to proactively ensure that aviation license, certificate, authorization and/or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements and function at the level of competency and safety required by the State to undertake an aviation-related activity for which they have been licensed, certified, authorized and/or approved to perform. This includes the surveillance of designated personnel who perform safety oversight functions on behalf of the CAA.

(1) ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 4, 4.2.1, specifies that the operator must continue to operate in accordance with those standards required for initial certification and that the State shall establish a program for the continued surveillance of such operator. ICAO Document 9734, Part A, Chapter 3, 3.8, also expands on this issue.

(2) The lack of enough human and financial resources will frequently be the main problem encountered in the proper execution of an ongoing surveillance program. The CAA should also be made aware that the types and number of inspections detailed in ICAO Document 8335, Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance, Chapter 9, are only examples of some of the areas to be inspected. It can be expected the more complex an operator, the more types and greater frequency of inspections will need to be accomplished.

h. Resolution of Safety Concerns. The implementation of processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies impacting aviation safety, which may have been residing in the aviation system and have been detected by the regulatory authority or other appropriate bodies.

NOTE: This would include the ability to analyze safety deficiencies, forward recommendations, support the resolution of identified deficiencies, as well as take enforcement action when appropriate.

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(1) The CAA should be aware of when it is appropriate to file a sanction and when to get compliance some other way. The CAA must also understand that safety comes first and foremost when dealing with a safety of flight or critical findings.

(2) Whenever it is decided that an operator will be given time to correct something, that amount of time should be commensurate with the severity of the issue. For example, if an operator has not been correctly recording training given, it would be expected that the operator correct the mistake as soon as possible, not granting time until the next training cycle of the airman to correct the issue. In a case like this, safety was not compromised because training was accomplished, it was just not recorded. The operator needs to be penalized but it could be in the form of an administrative warning. If on the other hand, the operator has failed to train in accordance with the regulations, then enforcement would be the appropriate way to proceed.

Repeat violations on the same issues would of course require that the sanction increase accordingly.

(3) The CAA must understand that they are not the quality control for the operator. In other words, if the operator cannot seem to comply, as a result of unsatisfactory inspection findings, the only recourse is by way of enforcement. CAAs have historically shown a propensity to allow operators to continue to operate because they felt it was their duty to make them comply when they found noncompliance. It should be clear to everyone concerned that the onus is on the operator to comply with the law rather than on the CAA to make the operator comply.

(4) The resolution of safety issues by way of enforcement (sanctions) should come as a last result. The main purpose of sanctioning is to deter noncompliance with the regulations, thus ensuring an acceptable level of compliance. Enforcement should not be taught as a method of punishment but rather as a way to exercise control, discourage repeats, and empower the inspector workforce.