PROPERTY OF FAA AERO CENTER AAC-440 RECEIVED AC NU: 135-4A 0014730 JUL2 3 1976 DATE: April 15, 1976
LIBRARY ADVISORY
AND TALES ORAN CIRCULAR
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SUBJECT: AVIATION SECURITY: AIR TAXI COMMERCIAL OPERATORS (AICOS)
1. PURPOSE. This circular provides recommended security measures applicable to ATCO operations that should minimize the effects of crimes directed against air transportation. It advises ATCOs of the availability of operations specifications whereby they may implement security procedures to improve their security posture and facilitate operations that interface with certain 121 air carrier operators required to have security programs.
Guidance is also provided regarding Federal Aviation Administration security requirements for the discharge of ATCO passengers into Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121 certificate holders' sterile concourses.
2. CANCELIATION. Advisory Circular 00-38A, August 28, 1973, and Advisory Circular 135-4, January 22, 1975.
3. REFERENCES. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 Subsection 902 (h) (2) which sets forth criminal penalties governing persons who deliver, or cause to be delivered, hazardous material for transportation in air commerce.
Subsection 902 (1) of this Act sets forth criminal penalties for any person who carries a dangerous weapon or places any bomb, explosive or incendiary device aboard any aircraft in, or intended for operation in air transportation or intrastate air transportation. FAR Part 135, which provides rules governing Air Taxi Operators and Commercial Operators of small aircraft. FAR Part 121, Section 121.538 which requires screening systems and other security measures designed to prevent or deter the carriage of weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices aboard aircraft of certain Part 121 certificate holders. Section 121.584 which provides for the carriage of persons in the custody of law enforcement personnel and Section 121.585 which provides rules for the carriage of deadly or dangerous weapons. FAR Part 103 which sets forth requirements for the transportation of dangerous articles in civil aircraft and Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Chapter I, Parts 170 through Parts 173 related to the shipment of designated materials. FAR Part 107 prescribes aviation security rules for the operators of airports regularly serving Initiated by: ACS-100
AC 135-4A April 15, 1976 certain scheduled air carriers and commercial operators under FAR Section 121.7.
4. HOW TO GET THIS PUBLICATION.
a. Order copies of this publication from:
Department of Transportation Publication Section, TAD~443.1 Washington, D.C. 20590
b. Identify the publication in your order as FAA Advisory Circular 135-4A, Aviation Security: Air Taxi Commercial Operators (AICOS), dated April 15, 1976.
5. APPLICABILITY. This Advisory Circular is written for the benefit of ATCO certificate holders who conduct scheduled passenger operations in accordance with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Economic Regulations Part 298 that may desire to amend their operations specifications and establish a FAA approved security program. These include scheduled passenger operators which involve:
a. The carrying of persons and/or property by aircraft pursuant to an interline traffic agreement with an air carrier holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CC & N) issued by CAB.
b. The carrying of persons and/or property by aircraft for compensation or hire in accordance with a published or advertised schedule of departure times, arrival times, or both.
The carrying of persons and/or property by aircraft for compensation or hire with a frequency of at least five (5) round trips per week between two or more points on the same day or days in accordance with a published flight schedule which specifies the times, days of the week and places between which such flights will be performed.
6. BACKGROUND.
a. Security measures now in use by domestic and flag air carriers and certain commercial operators under Part 121 have brought about a drastic reduction in the number of hijackings for these certificate However, in general aviation, ten hijackings occurred during 1974 and 1975, seven of which were successful. In addition, the number of sabotage type of incidents has increased to a point where positive and practical security measures are needed to meet this threat. The bomb incidents at New York, Miami and Los Angeles Airports, the destruction by bombs of passenger aircraft in the air and on the ground, and the discovery of active bombs in passenger checked baggage and in air cargo facilities demonstrates the need for adequate security measures which will preclude an explosive Page 2 Par 3
April 15, 1976 AC 135-4A device from being introduced into the air transportation system.
It is vital that the air transportation industry develop and implement improved and effective security measures which will ensure safe air transportation. These measures should be economically acceptable and pperationally sound.
Part 121 air carriers and commercial operators as identified in FAR Section 121.538 are required to have approved security programs which require the screening of passengers and baggage. Checked baggage must be screened to preclude the carriage of any explosive or incendiary device in checked baggage aboard aircraft operated by Part 121 certificate holders subject to 121.538. Additional procedures are in use to assure that checked baggage and cargo are accepted only by a responsible agent or representative and loaded aboard aircraft in accordance with air carrier specified procedures.
These procedures are designed to prevent unauthorized access to checked baggage and cargo, to preclude tampering with or adding to the content of the baggage and to assure that baggage is accepted from only ticketed passengers. They include measures for the safeguarding of cargoes, including small package service cargo.
7. DISCUSSION.
Current intelligence indicates that the threat of terrorism to include hijacking and sabotage remains significant throughout the world. The U.S. civil aviation security program, placed in efféct early in 1973, continues to be effective with no successful air carrier hijackings since 1972. However, the threat of hijacking, sabotage and other criminal acts against civil aviation persists; in fact, the danger to lives and property has increased. The shift from the hijacking problem to that of the bombing of aircraft and airport facilities was highlighted by the December 29, 1975, tragedy at La Guardia Airport, Flushing, New York, where 1l persons were killed and 54 injured. Service to and from La Guardia was interrupted for approximately 24 hours resulting in inconvenience to thousands of air travelers. As a result of this tragedy and in consideration of available intelligence information indicating a continuance of these activities, the President ordered the Secretary of Transportation to immediately identify courses of action to prevent and deter future related disasters and to suggest alternatives to increase security and safety at airport terminals and in the air.
b. To accomplish the above Presidential mandate, the Civil Aviation Security Service considers it necessary that action be taken to prevent the introduction of bombs and other explosive devices into the air transportation system. An area of vulnerability to sabotage and hijackings, that of ATCO operations, has not been adequately resolved. To reduce this vulnerability, action should be taken to provide reasonable assurance that ATCO passengers connecting with FAR 121 carriers are not carrying dangerous weapons and their Par 6 Page 3
AC 135-4A April 15, 1976 baggage does not contain explosive or incendiary devices.
plish this objective appropriate screening should be used for all passengers and all baggage (carry-on and checked). Recently adopted regulations require all scheduled air carriers and commercial operators conducting intrastate operations utilizing large aircraft to implement a method acceptable to the Administrator to conduct checked baggage screening to preclude the introduction of explosive or incendiary devices into the air transportation system. In this connection security measures should be adopted by ATCOs to meet this objective. Passengers accepted by AICOs should be assured that reasonable and effective security measures are in use for their safety. It is believed that this can be accomplished on a voluntary basis by AICOs adopting security procedures recommended in this circular.
8. PROCEDURES. It is recommended that ATCOs adopt and put into use security procedures that will address the following areas of their operation;
predeparture screening and access to sterile areas, aircraft ground security, baggage security and threat response.
a. Predeparture Screening Regulatory requirements applicable to scheduled air carriers and commercial operators conducting intrastate operations utilizing large aircraft are set forth in FAR 121.538. FAR Part 107 prescribes aviation security rules for airport operators as defined in Section 107.1, including requirements for law enforcement support for passenger screening. The benefits of security programs which comply with FAR requirements are well recognized.
FAR 107 Airports, FAR 121 Operator Terminals. It is recommended that enplaning ATCO passengers be screened using procedures, facilities and equipment now in use by scheduled air carriers.
Coordination between affected air carriers and airport management will need to have been accomplished prior to the implementation of these procedures.
(2) Non-107 Airports. It is recommended that AICOs voluntarily implement screening procedures to include:
(a) 100% screening of passengers and their baggage prior to boarding.
(b) The presence of at least one law enforcement officer during the screening process. This officer can be a privately employed deputized security officer.
(3) Access to Sterile Areas.
(a) ATCO passengers may be permitted access to a sterile area Page 4 Par 7
April 15, 1976 AC 135-4A upon deplanement if they have been screened in accordance with approved procedures as a result of having enplaned through an established sterile concourse.
(b) Access to sterile areas may also be permitted ATCO passengers when they are screened in accordance with approved security procedures upon deplanement.
(c) A certificated air carrier with an approved security program may amend its program to include provisions for screening passengers for an ATCO at certain selected airports. Security standards must be the same as those for their Part 121 operations (compliance responsibility to rest upon the Part 121 operator).
(d) Access to sterile areas upon deplanement may also be granted when AICO passengers are escorted through a sterile concourse by a law enforcement officer (s) or a designated representative (s) of the airport or the air carrier having security responsbility for the sterile concourse or gate utilized.
(e) It is recommended that ATCOs implement their own security program by obtaining an appropriate amendment to their operations specifications in accordance with guidance provided in this circular. The basis for operations specifications are set forth in FAR Sections 135.13 and
135.19. Air Transportation Security Field Offices (ATSFO) (Appendix 1) and local Flight Standards District Offices are prepared to handle requests for these operations specifications.
b. Aircraft Ground Security. Passenger screering alone cannot provide adequate protection against the hijacker or saboteur. Obviously, in the interest of aviation safety, access to aircraft must be controlled. To preclude unauthorized access to aircraft the following procedures are recommended:
(1) Attended aircraft to include aircraft being serviced.
(a) Passengers should not be allowed to enplane until the flight is ready for departure.
(b) Operators agent or a crewmember should remain in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft.
(c) Unauthorized persons approaching the aircraft should be challenged and kept away from the aircraft.
Par 8 Page 5
AC 135-4A April 15, 1976
(2) Unattended aircraft to include overnight aircraft and turn around aircraft during the period that servicing functions are not being performed.
(a) Close and/or secure all aircraft doors and hatches.
(b) Stairs should be removed from the aircraft and secured.
(c) Parking area should be well lighted.
During walk around inspection, prior to departure, special emphasis should be placed on inspection of accessible spaces for explosives or foreign objects placed aboard the aircraft.
c. Checked Baggage Security. ATCO should implement a checked baggage screening system which will preclude the carriage of explosive or incendiary devices in passenger checked baggage. The following procedures are recommended for use:
(1) Baggage should be accepted for check in only by an authorized representative of the operator and only at the designated baggage check point.
(2) Baggage should not be accepted for check-in unless it has been received from a properly identified passenger and has identification affixed to the outside of the baggage which corresponds to the passenger's identification.
(3) Baggage or cargo should not be loaded unless it is properly identified by an ATCO employee.
(4) The number of passengers boarded should match the number of passengers who have checked in.
(5) In the event fewer passengers are boarded than checked in, nonboarding passengers should be identified.
(6) The operator/representative should evaluate the circumstances by which person (s) have not boarded, and if appropriate remove his checked baggage prior to flight departure.
(7) Baggage should be safeguarded to prevent tampering or unauthorized access.
(8) Baggage tags/claims should be under the control of the operator/ representative and secured when operator/representative is not in attendance.
Page 6 Par 8
April 15, 1976 AC 135-4A
d. Threat Response. Whether an aircraft is on the ground or in flight, the threat of a hijacking, or of an explosive, or incéndiary device on board poses a serious threat. On the ground, the aircraft can be evacuated, isolated and thoroughly searched as recommended below.
In-flight procedures are designed to determine to the extent possible if an explosive device is aboard an aircrait, to lessen the possibility of an inadvertent initiation of a device and to reduce the effects of an initiation. FAA recommended procedures for use in bomb threat response are available upon request. These procedures are included in the following audio/visual technical guidance programs for the briefing and training of ACTO personnel.
(1) Flight and cabin-crew tactics for defenses against hijackers.
(2) Aviation explosives security for ground operations.
(3) Aviation explosives security - in-flight emergency procedures.
e . Bomb Threat Procedures. The following basic bomb threat response measures are recommended for use:
(1) These procedures apply whether the aircraft is parked or being operated on the ground. The principal goal is the avoidance of casualties and property damage.
(a) Inform the pilot-in-command.
(b) Evacuate aircraft, including passenger's personal property.
(c) Isolate the aircraft at least 100 yards from personnel and explosion or fire sensitive facilities.
(d) Unload aircraft using predesignated air carrier bomb search crews and move baggage and cargo to a search location.
(e) Search aircraft to spot "foreign" items.
(E) If any suspect item is located, do not disturb it; evacuate aircraft and leave item for Bomb Disposal Unit.
After the area is declared safe by the Bomb Disposal Unit, resume search and continue until the entire aircraft has been inspected.
When the search is completed, the aircraft should be secured to preclude subsequent contamination.
Par 8 Page 7
AC 135-4A April 15, 1976
(i) Cargo and hold baggage must be checked. This may be accomplished by verifying points of origin and destination.
Hold baggage should be matched with passengers. Unverified cargo and baggage should be inspected to assure that it contains no explosive device or be refused for shipment.
(2) The following procedures apply when the aircraft is in flight.
Detailed procedures are included in Federal Aviation Administration audio/visual technical guidance programs for flight crew training, which are available upon request.
(a) Notify the pilot-in-command.
(b) The decision whether to continue the flight to destination the fre based upon sy pilotor to land at another airport should be based upon all available intelligence; final decision to be made by pilotin-command.
(c) All areas accessible in flight should be searched as time permits.
(d) The aircraft should not normally return to the airport or " at of the the be un gate where threat was made, nor should any public announce-
(e) It is recommended that the flight crew implement the FAA Aviation Explosives Security Inflight Emergency Safety Procedures as outlined in the audio/visual programs.
f. Recommended Procedures/Hijacking Threats. All hijacking threats should be evaluated. Simply to ignore a threat could be disastrous.
Reasonable responses based on objective assessments of the facts in each instance should be the rule. Vague, general threats do not usually warrant anything more than alerting interested personnel.
Specific threats involving particular aircraft or flights, however, do suggest that the following additional precautions be taken.
(1) Notification of the appropriate law enforcement agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2) Notification of nearest FAA Security Office.
(3) Notification of the pilot-in-command. Certificate holders' security plans should include instructions and guidance to be furnished to the pilot-in command in these situations.
(4) Preflight and postflight inspections of affected aircraft as appropriate for the purpose of assuring that weapons have not been placed aboard aircraft.
Page 8 Par 8
April 15, 1976 AC 135-4A
9. ACTION. Operations specifications authorizing the use of an approved security program may be issued to ATCOs on request in accordance with Section 135.19 FAR Part 135. ATCOs desiring to implement an approved security program should contact the nearest Air Transportation Security Field Office (ATSFO) to obtain further information and assistance in developing its program. When it is ready for approval, the AICO should submit the program in quadruplicate (original and 3 copies) to the local FAA ATSFO. The ATSFO will review the program to determine if it meets minimum acceptable standards for approval. When the program is approved, it should be submitted together with an application to amend the ATCOs operations specifications in accordance with Section 135.19. The FAA District Office having jurisdiction will issue the operations specifications.
10. CONCLUSION.
While establishment of a security program encompassing the above recommendations is not required, it is believed that such action will assure consistency in the application of security procedures and reduce the possibility of successful criminal acts being perpetrated against an ATCO's passengers and aircraft. Program approval by FAA and implementation of the operations specifications by the ATCO permits the ATCO to deplane passengers in a sterile concourse and provides for the transfer of interline checked baggage to Part 121 carriers without further screening. ATCOs desiring technical guidance or further information should contact the local Air Transportation Security Field Office (see Appendix 1).
b - It should be noted that while a request for amendment of operations specifications by ATCO certificate holders is voluntary, operations specifications issued under Part 135 are regulatory requirements under Section 135.9 and may be amended or rescinded only in accordance with Section 135.19 of Part 135.
Rickard 7 lally RICHARD F. LALLY Director, Civil Aviation Security Service Par 9 Page 9
April 15, 1976 AC 135-4A Appendix 1
REGIONS ATSFOS
FAA ALASKAN REGION Air Transportation Security Division, AAL-90 632 Sixth Avenue Anchorage, Alaska 99501 Commercial: 907-265-4477 FTS: Seattle operator 8-399-0150 ask for 265-4477 Air Transportation Security Field Office - ANC AISFO P. O. Box 6478, Annex Anchorage, Alaska 99502 Commercial: 907-265-4632 FTS: Seattle operator 8-399-0150 ask for 265-4632
FAA CENTRAL REGION Air Transportation Security Division, ACE-90 601 East 12th Street Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Commercial: 816-374-3901 Air Transportation Security Field Office - MCI ATSFO P. O. Box 20003 Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Commercial: 816-243-3820 FTS: 8-758-3901 FTS: 8-754-3820 Air Transportation Security Field Office - STL ATSFO Lambert Field P.O. Box 10306 St. Louis, Missouri 63145 Commercial: 314-425-7050 FTS: 8-279-7050
FAA EASTERN REGION Air Transportation Security Air Transportation Security Field Office - BAL ATSFO Federal Building # 111 Division, AEA-90 Baltimore-Washington International Airport JFK International Airport Baltimore, Maryland 21240 Jamaica, New York 11430 Commercial: 301-962-2795 Commercial: 212-995-9520 FIS: 8-922-2795 FTS: 8-665-9520 Air Transportation Security Field Office - EWR ATSFO % Butler Aviation, Hangar #12 Newark Airport Newark, New Jersey 07114 Commercial: 201-645-3701 FTS: 8-341-3701 Page 1
AC- 135-4A April 15, 1976 APPENDIX 1
REGIONS ATSFOS FAA EASTERN REGION (Continued) Air Transportation Security Field Office - DCA ATSFO Room 11, Commuter Terminal WNA, Washington, D.C. 20001 Commercial: 703-557-0265 FTS: 8-557-0265 Air Transportation Security Field Office - IAD ATSFO Box 17174 Dulles International Airport Washington, D.C. 20041 Commercial: 703-661-8222 FTS: 8-557-0266 Air Transportation Security Field Office - JFK ATSFO Building #197 JFK International Airport Jamaica, New York 11434 Commercial: 212-995-7080 FIS: 8-665-7080 Air Transportation Security Field Office - LGA ATSFO United Airlines Hangar #2 Room 322, La Guardia Airport Flushing, New York 11371 Commercial: 212-995-2860 FTS: 8-665-2860 Air Transportation Security Field Office - PIT ATSFO P.O. Box 12406.
Greater Pittsburgh International Airport Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15231 Commercial: 412-644-2845 FTS: 8-722-2845 Air Transportation Security Field Office - PHL ATSFO % TWA Hangar, Room 310 Philadelphia International Airport Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19153 Commercial: 215-596-1970 FTS: 8-596-1970 Page 2
April 15, 1976 AC 135-4A APPENDIX 1
REGIONS ATSFOS
FAA EUROPE, AFRICA AND MIDDLE
EAST REGION (PROPOSED)
FAA SOUTHWEST REGION Air Transportation Security Air Transportation Security Division, ASW-90 Field Office - DFW ATSFO P. O. Box 1689 1701 W. Euless Boulevard Fort Worth, Texas 76101 Suite 350 Commercial: 817-624-4911 x217 Euless, Texas 76039 FTS: 8-736-9217 Commercial: 817-283-5353 FTS: 8-334-1401 Air Transportation Security Field Office - IAH ATSFO P.O. Box 60366 Houston, Texas 77050 Commercial: 713-443-2390 FTS: 8-527-5475 Air Transportation Security Field Office - MSY ATSFO P.O. Box 20022 New Orleans, Louisiana 70141 Commercial: 504-729-1721 FTS: 8-682-2993
FAA NORTHWEST REGION Air Transportation Security Division, ANW-90 Boeing Field, FAA Building Seattle, Washington 98108 Commercial: 206-767-2555 FTS: 8-396-2555 Air Transportation Security Field Office - SAT ATSFO P.O. Box 16052 San Antonio, Texas 78246 Commercial: 512-824-2602 FTS: 8-730-4836 Air Transportation Security Field Office - SEA ATSFO Room 201, Administration Building SEA-TAC International Airport Seattle, Washington 98158 Commercial: 206-767-2580 FTS: 8-396-2580 Page 3