1-1 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
1.1 Purpose of This Advisory Circular (AC). This AC was created in response to safety recommendations proposed by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as a response to an accident which occurred in the state of Alaska. This document provides information and recommendations to commercial air tour operators on the creation of an Enhanced Flight Following Center (EFFC). In addition, the development, implementation, and integration of enhanced flight-following procedures for improved operational control. The creation of an EFFC is one way, but not the only way, to incorporate procedures for locating each flight as required by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) § 135.79.
Note: This is a guidance document. Its content is not legally binding in its own right and will not be relied upon by the Department as a separate basis for affirmative enforcement action or other administrative penalty.
Conformity with the guidance document is voluntary only. Nonconformity will not affect rights and obligations under existing statutes and regulations.
1.2 Audience. This AC is applicable to and may be used by existing and prospective 14 CFR part 91 operators and 14 CFR part 119 certificate holders (CH) who are currently conducting or intend to conduct commercial air tour operations in accordance with 14 CFR part 136. This AC is applicable to all sizes, scopes, or types of operators, their employees, and others associated with commercial air tours.
1.3 Where You Can Find This AC. You can find this AC on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) website at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_cir culars and the Dynamic Regulatory System (DRS) at https://drs.faa.gov.
1.4 Related 14 CFR Parts. Parts 1, 61, 91, 93, 119, 120, 135, and 136.
1.5 Definitions, Abbreviations, and Descriptions.
1.5.1 Accident/Incident Plan (AIP)/Post-Accident/Incident Plan (PAIP). Emergency response procedures should serve as a foundation for training or a reference in the event of mishaps or emergencies. Typically, this plan is contained within the operator’s General Operations Manual (GOM) or standard operating procedures (SOP).
1.5.2 Enhanced Flight Following Center (EFFC) for Commercial Air Tour Operators. An EFFC is a dedicated facility staffed by trained Operations Control Specialists (OCS).
While EFFCs are not mandated by regulations, they are highly recommended for all commercial air tour operators.
1.5.3 Flight Locating. For the purposes of this AC, and similar to what is described under 14 CFR § 135.79(a)(1), (2), and (3), flight locating procedures should be designed to provide:
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• The CH or operator with at least the information required to be included in a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan;
• For timely notification of an FAA facility or search and rescue facility, if an aircraft is overdue or missing; and
• The CH or operator with the location, date, and estimated time for reestablishing communications if the flight will operate in an area where communications cannot be maintained.
Note: Title 14 CFR § 135.79 requires flight locating procedures for CHs operating under 14 CFR part 135. While the adoption of flight locating procedures are not required for flight operations conducted under 14 CFR part 91, the FAA recommends that all commercial air tour operators consider the recommendations in this AC and also consider the adoption of flight locating procedures as part of their EFFC operating procedures.
1.5.4 Flight Monitoring. Active contact with an aircraft throughout all phases of a flight, including time on the ground, either through voice radio contact with the pilot or through automated flight monitoring systems.
1.5.5 Operations Control Specialist (OCS). A term which may be used for an individual who provides operational support for the air tour operations. An OCS interfaces with the pilot(s) prior to each flight and, as necessary, during flight.
Note: For definitions and abbreviations used in this AC that are not included in the list of definitions and abbreviations above, refer to the related documents and regulations listed in paragraph 1.6 below and in AC 120-96, Operations Control Center (OCC) for Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) Operations.
1.6 Related Source Material. This list identifies some, but not all, published documents that may be applicable to commercial air tour operations.
• Current editions of ACs can be found on the FAA website at https://www.faa.gov/reg ulations_policies/advisory_circulars/.
• Current editions of FAA handbooks can be found on the FAA website at https://www.
faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals.
1.6.1 ACs (current editions):
1. AC 60-22, Aeronautical Decision Making.
2. AC 90-48, Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance.
3. AC 90-114, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Operations.
4. AC 90-117, Data Link Communications.
5. AC 91-32, Safety In and Around Helicopters.
6. AC 91-36, Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Flight Near Noise-Sensitive Area.
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7. AC 91.21-1, Use o f Portable Electronic Devices Aboard Aircraft.
8. AC 120-27, Aircraft Weight and Balance Control.
9. AC 120-51, Crew Resource Management Training.
10. AC 120-78, Electronic Signatures, Electronic Recordkeeping, and Electronic Manuals.
11. AC 120-92, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers.
12. AC 120-96, Operations Control Center (OCC) for Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) Operations.
13. AC 136-1, Commercial Air Tour Operations Conducted Over National Parks and Tribal Lands.
14. AC 136-2, Recommended Aircraft Maintenance Practices for Commercial Air Tour Operators.
1.6.2 Handbooks and Manuals (current editions):
• FAA-H-8083-3, Airplane Flying Handbook.
• FAA-H-8083-16, Instrument Procedures Handbook.
• FAA-H-8083-21, Rotorcraft Flying Handbook.
• FAA-H-8083-28, Aviation Weather Handbook.
• Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) (published by the Department of Transportation (DOT)/FAA).
1.6.3 Pamphlets (current editions):
• DOT/FAA/PM-86/45, Aeronautical Decision Making for Helicopter Pilots.
• Flying in Flat Light and White Out Conditions.
1.6.4 Operations Specifications (OpSpecs)/Letters of Authorization (LOA) (current editions).
OpSpecs and LOAs are issued to the commercial air tour operators to authorize certain types of air tour operations (e.g., operations over or within national parks under 14 CFR part 136 or commercial air tour operations conducted under 14 CFR § 91.147).
Note: Not all OpSpecs or LOAs apply to all commercial air tour operators. For specific OpSpec/LOA information, refer to FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 18.
1.7 AC Feedback Form. For your convenience, the AC Feedback Form is the last page of this AC. Note any deficiencies found, clarifications needed, or suggested improvements regarding the contents of this AC on the Feedback Form.
2-1 CHAPTER 2. ENHANCED FLIGHT FOLLOWING CENTER (EFFC) FUNCTIONS
2.1 Regulatory Requirements. There are no specific regulatory requirements associated with EFFCs for commercial air tours. However, to promote safety in the National Air Space (NAS), the FAA strongly encourages commercial air tour operators to establish an EFFC as an additional safety enhancement to their existing programs and manuals.
2.2 Core Concepts—EFFC and Operational Control Procedures. There are three core concepts that define an effective EFFC with enhanced operational control procedures.
2.2.1 Joint Flight Safety Responsibility. The first core concept to establish an effective EFFC is a joint flight safety responsibility for each commercial air tour operation. Joint responsibility conveys ownership of the flight by all involved. The joint flight safety responsibility concept should include at least one qualified ground staff member, in addition to the pilot in command (PIC), to be actively involved in determining whether a flight can be completed safely. This involvement may include reviewing pilot and aircraft readiness (pilot currency, medical, and checkride status, aircraft airworthiness) current and forecast weather, Weight and Balance (W&B), and aircraft performance analysis, along with other risk factors and concurring with a risk analysis in accordance with a risk analysis program.
2.2.1.1 The EFFC should be staffed with trained personnel, referred to in this AC as Operations Control Specialists (OCS), who continuously provide safety input to each flight by monitoring factors affecting flight safety before, during, and after completion of every single flight.
2.2.1.2 The OCS personnel on the ground may provide additional Crew Resource Management (CRM) support for pilots during an emergency or situations where there is a potential for an emergency to occur, such as unforeseen weather or potential, unexpected airspace congestion of a known site-specific area.
2.2.2 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The second core concept is the development and implementation of documented SOPs that are used to guide training and to standardize EFFC operations. The FAA recommends OCS involvement in the creation of the operator’s SOPs. OCS involvement in the SOP process will likely result in organizational efficiency. These SOPs may be contained in the operator’s General Operations Manual (GOM), which is required for 14 CFR part 135 operators. In the same manner, OCS training may be a part of the operator’s Training Program Manual (TPM) or procedures may be self-contained in standalone documents.
2.2.3 Leveraging Technology and Communication. The third core concept of an EFFC is to enhance operations control procedures by leveraging advanced technology to continuously track and monitor all aircraft operations with the purpose of augmenting safety and efficiency. This technology should only be implemented if it provides an improved level of situational awareness to the PIC and the OCS personnel. An EFFC
2-2 may implement multiple forms of technology to provide communication and safety benefits to commercial air tour operations.
2.2.3.1 Example. For example, an EFFC may be able to acquire weather information for situational awareness purposes from non-aviation sources that do not feed into the National Weather Service (NWS) database. This information may come from a variety of non-aviation-related weather sources available at the EFFC, such as telephone calls, local television (TV) stations, state Department of Transportation (DOT) roadside weather monitoring stations, non-government weather cameras, etc., which should be used to enhance situational awareness and “no-go” decision making only. Such non-NWS/FAA sources may not be used for “go” decisions.
2.2.3.2 Provision of Situational Awareness Information. Operators are highly encouraged to implement advanced communication technology and Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking in their tour aircraft. To best utilize an EFFC, the operator should establish a tracking system and document procedures for acquiring and providing situational awareness information to the PIC via direct communication from the OCS or via relay through other individuals. Leveraging technology and communications is key to reducing risks associated with commercial air tour operations.
2.3 EFFC Models. Many physical configurations are possible depending on the size and scope of the operator. The EFFC provides a physical location where the OCS and any other personnel can access information technologies to assist the PIC.
2.3.1 Locations. EFFCs may be co-located with a communications center that schedules flights, passes flight information to the pilot, and performing flight monitoring, etc.
Alternatively, EFFCs may be located at one central site with one or more remotely sited communications centers that communicate flight information to the EFFC through various means.
2.3.2 Communication. Several key concepts should be considered regardless of the physical relationship between the EFFC and communications centers:
2.3.2.1 Direct communications between the EFFC and the PIC through the communications center should only be used for flight advisory information critical to flight.
2.3.2.2 The OCS should establish two-way communication with the PIC of the commercial air tour, if possible. This may occur through direct communication or established indirect procedures, such as relay through the communications center. The OCS should have the means available to immediately and directly communicate critical in-flight information or weather changes to the in-flight pilot. Additionally, the OCS should evaluate and concur or not with the pilot’s mitigation plan (e.g., turn around, land offsite, divert, deviate from planned course, etc.). The OCS should also
2-3 possess a means of continually updating the risk analysis due to changing conditions to relay dynamic updates and collaborate on flight plan changes that may not have been considered at the beginning of the commercial air tour.
2.4 EFFC Facilities.
2.4.1 Hardware and Software Resources. A well-functioning EFFC should be equipped with sufficient hardware and software resources for effective flight monitoring and operational control. This includes:
2.4.1.1 Enabling technologies (e.g., internet access, non-FAA weather resources, digital signature capabilities for form completion, computers, cellphones, TV, etc.).
2.4.1.2 Ground-based aircraft situational displays (ASD) depicting the position and status on a viewable display (e.g., large computer monitor, laptop computer, tablet, phone, etc.) of all certificate holder (CH) commercial air tour flights and other local operator flights, as well as non-air tour flights airborne inside the air tour airspace from all aircraft transmitting Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out or from linked GPS trackers.
2.4.1.3 Aviation weather analysis tools (e.g., textual, graphical, Geographic Information System (GIS)-enabled, and weather cameras).
2.4.1.4 Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) tools (both textual and graphical).
2.4.1.5 Air traffic flow tools (e.g., temporary flight restrictions (TFR), special-use airspace, Special Areas of Operation, military operations airspace, high-density congested airspace, warning areas, and weather watch boxes).
2.4.1.6 Communication tools (e.g., telephones, email, datalink, radio, Voice, or Radio over Internet Protocol (VoIP/RoIP) capabilities), satellite communications (SATCOM), and advanced communication consoles.
2.4.1.7 Non-aviation situational awareness tools capable of accessing weather cameras or TV capable of receiving cable news channels. These tools should be used solely for situational awareness and making a “no go” decision.
2.4.1.8 In the event of a national security emergency or local disaster, news, websites, and phone lines (both landlines and cellular phones) may become inoperative due to the sheer volume of people trying to simultaneously access these resources. Therefore, news broadcasts delivered via TV may be the best means of acquiring information regarding the airspace where air tour flights may be directed to immediately land, other areas where flights might be prohibited, and as a tool to locate an aircraft in distress or that have been involved in an accident.
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2.4.2 Scoping of EFFC Facilities and Capabilities. Regardless of the organization’s size, EFFC concepts should be carefully planned and implemented to avoid unintended gaps or errors that may result in actions or omissions detrimental to safety. The following guidelines are provided to assist the operator in avoiding such failures:
2.4.2.1 Establish and document applicable governing policies, procedures, and personnel training curriculum, which may be included in the operator’s GOM or in the training program.
2.4.2.2 Demonstrate the maintenance of operational control and PIC responsibility and authority is maintained, ensuring safety is not compromised due to delegation of duties to staff members without proper OCS training.
2.4.2.3 Smaller operators may incorporate EFFC functions within their operational control system, with staff members providing OCS type services after receiving appropriate training.
2.4.2.4 Create SOPs suitable for the size and scope of the operation.
2.5 EFFC Physical Space Design Considerations. Consideration of human factors and physical space considerations should be considered when designing the layout of an EFFC for multiple aircraft operations.
2.6 EFFC Technology and Design Considerations.
2.6.1 Failure and Redundancy Considerations for Both Systems and Processes. As technology becomes increasingly integral to flight operations, the potential for its failure raises concerns. It is important to proactively plan for technology failures and implement redundant systems and processes. This ensures that contingency systems can deliver results without compromising the safety of normal operations or, when necessary, emergency operations. In addition to planning for temporary or minor failures and outages, comprehensive planning should also account for major technology failures. The development of an EFFC information technology (IT) disaster recovery plan is important to the success of an effective EFFC. This plan should be well-documented, and EFFC staff should periodically practice contingency operations, so they are prepared for such eventualities.
2.6.2 Common Technology Interruptions. When developing, implementing, and integrating an EFFC, it is important to plan for common technology interruptions. These include:
• Electrical power outages (localized to the building, the local area, or to a broader geographic area).
• Internet Service Provider (ISP) or ISP connectivity outages.
• Virus protection and firewalls to prevent system hackers.
2.6.3 ISP Connectivity. Software applications utilized by EFFCs are increasingly shifting to web-based platforms. Consequently, if an EFFC loses internet connectivity, web-based
2-5 applications become inoperative. The FAA recommends EFFCs to maintain at least two wholly independent internet access connections. For example, a primary internet source can be supported with a cellular system, such as a remote hot spot.
2.6.4 Phone Numbers. In the event of a Local Area Network (LAN) or local workstation failure, electronically accessible phone numbers may become inaccessible (see Appendix B, Diagrams and Examples, for examples of operator and out-of-company contact lists). Consequently, it is recommended to maintain hard copies of all phone number lists at each workstation.
2.6.5 Flight Monitoring. Flight-monitoring processes often rely on electronic applications or specialized communication equipment (e.g., radio, data link, SATCOM, etc.). These specialized flight monitoring technologies, in turn, often rely on internet or LAN connectivity or both within the data chain to transmit the aircraft location information to personnel responsible for flight monitoring functions. Therefore, it is important that an operator establishes and documents alternate flight locating procedures in the event the primary flight monitoring application and procedures become inoperative. Alternate flight monitoring processes typically involve alternate communication methods for tracking the aircraft, such as communicating with outstations, other aircraft, air traffic control (ATC), Flight Service Station (FSS), etc. An acceptable industry standard for flight monitoring is for all aircraft to update their position (electronically or verbally) every 15 minutes or less (see Appendix B for a flight monitoring procedures flowchart example).
2.7 Emergency and Abnormal Operations. Commercial air tour operators should establish and document procedures that most effectively leverage EFFC resources in response to abnormal or emergency operations before they occur. The following are some of the situations that may be encountered followed by possible solutions:
2.7.1 Partial or Full Loss of EFFC Function. Clearly defined procedures should address the effective management of partial or full shutdown of an EFFC. This encompasses handling scenarios such as power failure, loss of primary ISP connectivity, or instances requiring a complete evacuation due to emergencies such as fire, snow, earthquake, hurricane, tsunami, tornado, flood, etc. Computers, tablets, phones, and other essential equipment should be immediately available for the OCS to quickly execute a “grab and go” should an emergency evacuation be necessary.
2.7.2 Unavailable Facilities. Contingency plans should be in place for situations where local facilities are unavailable for relocating the EFFC. During such circumstances, operators should consider holding a temporary moratorium on launching new flights in anticipation of events that may trigger a EFFC temporary shutdown or a complete recall. This may involve temporarily transferring EFFC duties to alternative EFFC facilities or mobile resources until a suitable alternate EFFC facility is established.
3-1 CHAPTER 3. OPERATIONS CONTROL SPECIALIST (OCS) DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
3.1 OCS Duties and Responsibilities. Each commercial air tour operator should describe in their General Operations Manual (GOM) or other FAA-accepted document the duties and responsibilities of an OCS. This includes preflight risk mitigation strategies, risk control measures, and the use of a shift change checklist. The level of operational control authority delegated to the OCS should be clearly defined in the commercial air tour operator’s GOM (for 14 CFR part 119 certificate holders (CH)) or described in Operations Specifications (OpSpec) A008, Operational Control, if applicable. Operators must also ensure that each person authorized to exercise operational control are listed in the GOM in accordance with 14 CFR § 135.23(a). The minimum duties of an OCS should include:
3.1.1 Operational Control. The commercial air tour operator should authorize each OCS to exercise operational control, directing the pilot to decline, divert, abort, or reroute the flight. The OCS should not provide opinions to the pilot suggesting that a flight can be initiated or completed when weather is a factor. Likewise, in the opinion of the pilot, whenever a flight should not be initiated or continued due to weather or other safety factors, the OCS should not suggest or direct otherwise.
Note: One principle employed by several operators is the OCS should follow the “advise, suggest, direct” concept, advising the pilot of any potential hazards along proposed routes, suggesting possible mitigation strategies, and, if needed directing the commercial air tour pilot to decline, divert, or terminate the flight.
3.1.2 Communications. Ideally, the OCS should communicate directly with the commercial air tour pilot via radio or other means to provide weather advisories and notifications of other factors affecting the overall safety of the flight. If direct communication is not possible between the OCS and pilots, a secondary means through a communications center staffed by trained communications specialist (CS), should be available. These procedures should be incorporated into the CH’s GOM or other written standard operating procedure (SOP). If communications between the air tour pilot and OCS are expected and there is a loss of communication, the operator should be prepared to activate the Accident/Incident Plan (AIP).
3.1.3 Weather Reporting. The OCS may provide pilots with weather briefings, to include current and forecasted weather along the planned route of flight. While the OCS may obtain weather from non-National Weather Service (NWS)/FAA weather sources to aid in situational awareness, only information derived from the NWS or other FAA-approved sources will be used in making “go” decisions. However, any weather source that is relevant to the safety of flight should be used for advisories as a flight progresses. This information may be relayed to the pilot by an appropriately trained OCS.
3.1.4 Monitor the Progress of the Flight. The OCS should monitor the progress of each commercial air tour flight. This may be accomplished through a variety of means, including satellite tracking, position reports, etc. Weather conditions in the area(s) of
3-2 operation should be monitored, and methods communicating adverse or forecast deteriorating weather conditions to the pilot should be established. In the event the OCS cannot directly monitor a flight’s progress via satellite or other graphic means, commercial air tour operators should have established procedures for monitoring the flight via position reports or other means.
3.1.5 Preflight Risk Analysis. EFFC personnel/pilots should be trained in basic risk analysis, with the ability to stop or terminate a flight as risk dictates. The analysis is ongoing as flights progress and conditions change. If the risk level increases as the day/flight progresses, the appropriate higher risk approval authority should be immediately notified to approve, mitigate, or terminate continued operations.
3.1.6 Risk Analysis. Risk analysis is a continuous and iterative process encompassing risk assessment, mitigation, and reassessment. The risk assessment phase is a key element within the broader risk analysis process. This involves identifying hazards, calculating the probability of their occurrence, and determining the likely severity of outcomes should a hazard occur.
3.1.7 Risk Mitigation. Risk mitigation and its effectiveness in reducing risk is an essential component of the risk analysis program. In cases where the risk assessment rates a particular risk element as high, preplanned, and preapproved mitigations may be advisable. Risk mitigations should not be improvised at the time of need to prevent unintended consequences. Following application of effective mitigation measures, both individual and total residual risk factors should be reassessed. This risk mitigation/reassessment cycle should be repeated until all higher risks are effectively mitigated.
3.1.8 Risk Threshold. Each individual risk element is evaluated against the operator’s predetermined risk threshold and aggregated into a total risk score after applying approved mitigation strategies. This total risk is then compared to the operator’s predetermined aggregate threshold. If the final aggregate residual risk or individual risk elements or both exceed the operator’s predetermined thresholds, a higher level of operator management approval (above the OCS) should be sought. If this approval cannot be obtained, the flight should be declined.
3.1.9 Participation of Personnel. The OCS should participate in preflight risk analysis, providing essential preflight information and should limit their approval to low-risk scenarios, typically routine commercial air tour flights with minimal risk. Unmitigated risks above the low level should be forwarded to upper-level management (e.g., Director of Operations (DO), Chief Pilot, etc.) for consideration in accordance with company procedures.
3.1.9.1 The OCS should ensure the pilot completes all items on the operator’s preflight risk analysis worksheet. Procedures for determining the minimum items for the risk analysis should be clearly outlined in the operator’s risk analysis program.
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3.1.9.2 The OCS should verify the pilot’s completion of all items on the preflight risk analysis worksheet. Additionally, they should assist the pilot in mitigating any identified risks prior to takeoff. If communication systems are available and maintained, the OCS can provide real-time information during flights in case of unexpected changes in conditions.
3.1.9.3 Risk mitigation strategies offered by the OCS should be presented as validated options previously endorsed by the operator. Ad hoc risks mitigation may lead to unintended consequences. It’s important to note that the PIC ultimately decides the acceptability of the recommended risk mitigation strategies.
Conversely, the OCS should assess mitigation strategies proposed by the PIC and have the authority to direct the PIC to decline or abort a flight if, in their opinion, the proposed risk mitigation is inadequate, inappropriate, or if the residual risk remains excessive.
3.1.9.4 Operators are encouraged to document the use of mitigation strategies and their impact on the safe conduct of a flight.
3.1.9.5 The air tour operator should establish a procedure for OCS acknowledgment in writing, specifying the accurate completion date and time of the preflight risk analysis worksheet. According to the OCS’s professional judgment, this documentation should confirm that the flight can be conducted safely.
3.1.9.6 The method of acknowledgement may vary as specified by the commercial air tour operator in their risk analysis program. This acknowledgement can be on the same risk analysis worksheet completed by the PIC or on a separate record. The record needs to include the acknowledgement date and time, sufficient information to identify the PIC, the flight date, the flight route details, confirmation of accurate completion of the preflight analysis worksheet, and the OCS’s professional judgment that the flight may be conducted safely, along with any other information deemed appropriate by the CH. The method of acknowledgement may be in writing, electronic, etc., as specified in the risk analysis program.
3.1.9.7 When, in their professional opinion, the OCS cannot concur that a flight can be conducted safely, the OCS should direct the PIC not to accept the flight. If the OCS observes changes in the risk analysis factors during a commercial air tour operation, the OCS should advise the PIC, recommend possible mitigation strategies, and, if the risk becomes unacceptable, direct the PIC to divert or abort the flight. This OCS authority should be documented in the CH’s or operator’s risk analysis program and GOM or other FAA-accepted document, as applicable.
Note: Chapter 7, Risk Analysis Tool, provides additional information related to the purpose, suggested use, of a risk analysis tool, and an example of a risk assessment matrix.
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3.1.10 Emergency Assistance Capabilities. The OCS plays an important role in providing emergency assistance to PICs during emergency situations, such as an encounter with inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC), if equipped with advanced communication technology. Two-way communication systems have the potential to enhance situational awareness, preventing unknown IIMC encounters for the pilot. In many circumstances, the OCS may observe the aircraft’s position and maintain communication with the PIC when the aircraft is below air traffic control (ATC) radar and communications coverage. Under these circumstances:
3.1.10.1 The OCS may need to relay crucial information to ATC regarding an aircraft declaring an emergency and the pilot’s intentions.
3.1.10.2 Additional communication resources enable active OCS personnel to deliver accurate weather information or route recommendations to airborne aircraft.
This capability is important and crucial for a commercial air tour to avoid or navigate away from severe or deteriorating weather conditions. In certain situations, the OCS may be the only means by which the PIC can receive accurate weather information or route recommendations to escape severe or deteriorating weather conditions.
Note: The utilization of advanced communication technology by the OCS can significantly contribute to the overall safety of the flight, providing timely and critical information to the PIC, especially in emergency scenarios. The OCS’s ability to relay information to ATC and offer real-time guidance enhances the operational response and decision-making capabilities during unforeseen events, ultimately ensuring the well-being of the flight and its passengers.
3.2 OCS Shift Change and Relief Procedures. Commercial air tour operators should develop a shift change and relief checklists for use by OCS personnel during shift changes. Procedures for briefing the incoming OCS on ongoing and upcoming commercial air tour operations should be developed, documented, and regularly trained.
The shift change checklist should, at a minimum, encompass the following:
• Active ongoing commercial air tour operations.
• Weather affecting possible flight areas.
• Temporary flight restrictions (TFR).
• Technology anomalies to include “COMMUNICATION” and “INTERNET” status.
• New flight operations policies, manual changes, etc., that have taken effect since the last shift for an oncoming OCS.
Note: Refer to AC 120-96, Operations Control Center (OCC) for Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) Operations, for additional OCS shift change procedures.