830 amount of uncontaminated air to enter the flight crew environment in order to provide a comfortable working environment and exclude harmful or hazardous concentrations of gases or vapors.
The ability of the ventilation system to evacuate hazardous quantities of smoke in the flight deck must also be maintained.
Venting changes must also not affect the ability to exclude hazardous quantities of smoke or extinguishing agent from the cargo compartments in compliance with §§ 25.855 and 25.857. Previous certification tests have demonstrated that smoke can migrate from a cargo compartment to the flightdeck unless the proper ventilation balance and compartment sealing are provided. Hazardous quantities of smoke or extinguishing agent could also enter other occupied areas (e.g., the main cabin) from the cargo compartment due to changes in the ventilation balance.
FAQ:
None at this time.
Compartment Interiors:
Background: All materials in the cabin, including the flightdeck door, are subject to the flammability requirements of § 25.853. Strengthening of the flightdeck doors may introduce materials that have not been traditionally used in Transport Category aircraft construction. In particular, material used to provide ballistic and shrapnel protection to the flightdeck should be evaluated for compliance to the flammability requirements of § 25.853.
FAQ:
Access into Flightdeck During Flight for §121.313(j):
Background: The effect of strengthening the flightdeck doors to enhance intrusion resistance, and removing access to the flightdeck for the cabin crew could result in a new unsafe design feature with respect to § 21.21(b)(2). In addition, § 121.313(j)(2), at Amendment 121-288, requires that each operator establish methods to enable a flight attendant to enter the pilot compartment in the event that a member of the flight crew becomes incapacitated. Consideration should be given to the following two situations that result in the crew not being able to access the flightdeck: (1) A pilot leaves the flightdeck, and the remaining pilot becomes incapacitated. The able-bodied pilot in this case may be effectively “locked out” of the flightdeck; or, (2) One pilot becomes incapacitated and the remaining pilot requires assistance to continue flying the airplane.
Previously, crew members were able to access the flightdeck via a common key to the flightdeck door, and provide any necessary assistance. Without a key, and behind a
831 strengthened door, assistance may not be available from crew members. One acceptable approach to address both situations would be to (a) add an Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) limitation requiring another crew member to be present in the flightdeck when one of the required flight crew leaves the flightdeck, and (b) providing a method to unlock the door from each pilot seat. Other proposed methods should be agreed upon using the issue paper process.
Access into Flightdeck During Flight for §25.772(c):
Background: As stated above, §121.313(j) requires that operators establish methods for a flight attendant to enter the flightdeck in the event that a member of the flight crew becomes incapacitated. This requirement differs from that of the new §25.772(c), in that the latter rule requires consideration of incapacitation of the entire flight crew.
Nonetheless, many manufacturers and modifiers have elected to design systems that comply with §25.772(c), even though this is not required for retrofit applications and is more stringent. The following guidance addresses systems designed to meet §25.772(c).
This guidance assumes that (1) the immediate response of a flight crewmember to an entry system alert will be to deny entry, and (2) the cabin crew will be instructed to use this system’s entry method only in the case of suspected incapacitation of the flight crew.
For the purposes of illustration only, a typical design and associated scenario would consist of the following:
1. Cabin crew attempts to contact flight crew using inter-phone system, knocking on flightdeck door, and any other available means.
2. If contact with the flight crew cannot be established and the cabin crew suspects that the flight crew may be incapacitated, the flight attendant requests emergency access to the flightdeck by entering a code using a numeric keypad or by some other method.
3. An alert is generated in the flightdeck to notify the flight crew that the emergency door unlocking sequence has been initiated from the cabin.
4. If the flight crew is capable of doing so (i.e., they are not incapacitated), one flight crew member will immediately respond to the alert by inhibiting the system, so that the door will not unlock. Then the flight crew will assess the situation to determine whether or not someone is attempting unauthorized access to the flightdeck.
5. If the flight crew is incapacitated, and as a result the system is not inhibited, after some period of time (time delay) the door will be automatically unlocked.
Time delay: The time delay for the emergency unlock feature is used to give the flight crew a reasonable amount of time to inhibit the alert while at the same time allowing flight attendants access to the flightdeck in the case of an incapacitated flight crew. The flight attendant would only activate this emergency door unlocking sequence if s/he
832 believes the flight crew is incapacitated, and thus needs access to the flightdeck. If the airplane is near the ground (especially while descending), and/or seriously out of control, the ability of the cabin crew to successfully intervene is very unlikely.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to require the time delay to be short enough to allow cabin crew intervention in such situations. If the airplane is in stable flight, it may be possible for the cabin crew to successfully intervene. However, in such cases, access should be timely, but a reasonable delay is acceptable. The flight crew needs a reasonable amount of time to inhibit the alert (to ensure intruders do not gain access before the flight crew responds to the alert), since they may be attending to other high priority tasks. This time delay should be consistent with the selected level of alert. Based on the above rationale, the FAA considers the appropriate time delay for the emergency unlock function to be between 30 and 60 seconds.
If applicants (the manufacturer and/or operator) desire time delays shorter than 30 seconds, they should provide specific rationale for a shorter time period. This rationale should be weighed against the need to prevent access to the flightdeck by unauthorized persons (if pilots fail to inhibit the unlock sequence within the time delay period). In addition, the applicant should provide information on the design features and/or procedures that will ensure that the pilots will respond to the alert by denying access within the time delay period (i.e., prior to automatic unlocking of the door). These features and/or procedures should account for other potential high priority tasks or high workload phases of flight. Notwithstanding the above, the FAA does not envision approving time delays shorter than 15 seconds.
If applicants desire time delays longer than the 60 seconds, they should provide specific rationale for a longer time period. This rationale should be weighed against the need to allow timely access to the flightdeck in case of incapacitation of the flight crew.
Notwithstanding the above, the FAA does not envision approving time delays longer than 120 seconds.
If manufacturers develop systems that allow operators to reprogram the time delay after delivery, the approval of the selected time delay for each operator will be managed by the FAA Flight Standards Service, using the guidance provided above. However, the range of programmable time delays allowed by the design should not exceed the maximum range specified above (15- 120 seconds). The approved time delay should be identified on the type design.
When the flight crew inhibits the system (i.e., denies entry) after responding to an emergency access alert, the duration time of the system in a disabled mode (i.e., unable to make an access request) should not be more than 30 minutes. Any longer duration needs to be substantiated by the applicant and documented in an issue paper. Once the door is unlocked using the emergency access system due to flight crew incapacitation, the door should remain unlocked for a minimum of 5 seconds after the specified time delay.
Level of alert: If the flight crew is in fact incapacitated, the level of alert is irrelevant.
If the flight crew is not incapacitated, they must assume one of the two conditions: (1)
833 the cabin crew has already tried to contact the flight crew by other means which were unsuccessful. In this case, the cabin crew believes there may be an emergency, or (2) an intruder is attempting to gain access to the flightdeck. This represents an immediate threat to safety of flight.
A crew procedure should be associated with this alert, including an action to immediately inhibit the emergency unlock system. If the pilots do not respond to the unlock alert within the specified time period, the system will unlock the door and could allow an intruder access to the flightdeck. This is considered to be a potentially catastrophic event. This alert most closely fits the warning category (reference § 25.1322 and AC 25-11, Section 10). It may be possible for an applicant to substantiate using the caution category, based on the design philosophy for the existing caution and warning system and the time period within which the pilot must respond. The delay time is important because the shorter the time delay, the more urgent the alert, and the more quickly pilots must take action to deny entry.
Visual and aural alerts should be consistent with the existing flightdeck design of the airplane’s caution and warning system. If the airplane has master alerts for warnings and/or cautions, it is desirable that the appropriate master alert be triggered in response to the emergency request for flightdeck access. It would also be desirable to integrate the alert into the crew alerting system display, if one is installed. However, the FAA recognizes that it may not be practicable (due to cost and schedule constraints) to fully incorporate the alerts into a centralized alerting system, especially in retrofit designs.
However, even if not fully integrated, the emergency access request alert should provide a level of awareness and urgency that is appropriate for the identified alert level (caution or warning). In general, the alert for emergency flightdeck access requests should include an aural alert, unless other suitable attention-getting features are incorporated.
Verification of Alerting System Functionality: While specific designs for flightdeck door access systems may allow for alternate approaches to ensure proper system functioning, the following generic policy is applicable: (1) proper functioning of visual and aural alerts must be verified at least daily, and (2) if power can be removed from the flightdeck door system via means other than by pulling a circuit breaker, a preflight verification must be accomplished to ensure that the system is powered. The system should either have visual indication of the system state or flightcrew procedures should incorporate a preflight verification of the system state. It is recommended that the requirements to check the system be implemented to provide maximum flexibility in how they are carried out. With respect to verification of the alerting system, for those systems that include a “doorbell” function (as discussed below under “multi-function designs”), where the same device is used to generate the routine and emergency access signals, use of the doorbell would be sufficient to verify functioning of the aural alert.
Multi-function designs: Some proposed designs are intended to provide functionality for the cabin crew to request routine access to the flightdeck (i.e., “doorbell” function) as well as provide emergency access to the flightdeck. In order to be compliant with the
834 requirement of § 25.772(c) the system must be designed so that the means by which routine access is requested cannot activate the automatic lock release mechanism.
In addition, the routine and emergency entry functions should be distinctive in the method of activation. The intent is to ensure that the undesired mode will not be activated. While not all possible designs can be described here, the following examples are intended to provide additional insight: (1) using one dedicated key (e.g., the number “1”) for routine access and a three-digit code for emergency access would be considered distinctive methods of activation, (2) using a guarded button for one function and a keypad entry for the other would be considered distinctive methods of activation, (3) if a keypad were used, having different three- digit codes for routine and emergency access would not be considered distinctive in the method of activation, and (4) if dedicated pushbuttons were used, having two unguarded buttons for the two modes would not be considered distinctive in the method of activation.
The flightdeck alerts (aural and visual) for routine and emergency access functions should be distinctly different from each other. While the emergency access request should result in a caution or warning level alert (due to consequences of failing to respond to the alert), this level of alert is not appropriate for the routine access request, which will not automatically unlock the door. Distinctly different alerts will help ensure that there is never any momentary confusion between the two alerts.
The crew response to an emergency access request should be distinct from the response to a routine access request. This is because routine access requests will be orders of magnitude more frequent than emergency access requests, so the most habitual response of the pilot will be to unlock the door. In the rare event of an emergency access request, that habitual response (unlocking the door) is a foreseeable error that would defeat the purpose of the new security measures for the flightdeck doors.
If a proposed design has similarities between the routine and emergency access alerts (similar sounds or sound sources) or if the pilot response to the emergency access request is similar to the response to a routine access request (e.g., activating the same switch in a different direction), an alternative method of compliance would be to inhibit the unlock function during the emergency unlock time delay period, to prevent inadvertent activation. In such cases, the time delay should not be less than 30 seconds.
Flight crew and cabin crew procedures should clearly distinguish between the two functions, when they are to be used, and the response to the alerts.
Irrespective of the system design, there are issues with obtaining positive verification of the personnel requesting entry. FAA Flight Standards is currently in the process of developing guidance on positive verification.
Multi-function designs (revised May 24, 2002): The above guidance identifies the potential for a specific pilot error if there are similarities between the alerts and the controls for routine and emergency access requests (i.e., they are not “distinctly different”). This potential error would involve the inadvertent selection of the "unlock"
835 function, rather than the "inhibit unlock" function, and could thus allow an unauthorized person access to the flightdeck. In order to prevent this foreseeable error and its consequences, the FAA suggested two methods of compliance: 1) make the alerts for routine access and emergency distinctly different and also make the control actions distinctly different, or 2) inhibit the unlock function during an emergency access request.
Other methods of compliance could also be acceptable. The FAA has revisited the above guidance and, while it is still considered valid and prudent, the FAA has concluded that strict adherence to this guidance may not be required.
If unauthorized persons were to use the system in an attempt to gain access, they could choose either the routine access function or the emergency access function. The FAA has considered which function would be the most likely to be used. Routine access is activated using a single button press, which could be determined by watching flight attendants or by looking at fairly accessible manuals; the button to use does not change over time; use of this function by cabin crew is routine and would raise no special alarms in the flightdeck. Emergency access is activated using a coded entry which must be retrieved from somewhat obscure sources or forcibly extracted from a flight attendant (if they are required to commit it to memory); the code is programmable and is subject to change; use of this function will produce an alarm in the flightdeck that is likely to raise pilot alertness and signifies a non-normal situation; access would only be granted if, in addition to not following procedures, the pilot makes the error at issue.
The FAA has concluded that while error potential still exists, it is much more likely that an unauthorized person would use the routine access function, if they were trying to use the system to gain access to the flightdeck. In such situations, the pilot does nothing
(i.e., does not touch the door switch) and the door stays locked. The error potential only exists if the emergency access function is used, which we judge to be much less likely because the intruder would correctly determine that it is much less likely to succeed.
Therefore, the potential for the pilot error represents a lesser risk than originally assumed.
In the interest of furthering timely design and installation of the new flightdeck doors, the FAA has concluded that the pilot error discussed above, while still possible, represents a small enough risk to justify a more relaxed interpretation of the earlier policy with respect to "distinctly different" alerts and controls. However, it is still important that the pilots be able to reliably discriminate between the alerts for routine and emergency access. That is because, if the pilot determines that an unauthorized person is attempting to gain access, the action that must be taken differs based on the type of alert: (1) For routine access alerts, the pilot does not move the switch and the door remains locked, and (2) For emergency access alerts, the pilot MUST move the switch to the “inhibit unlock” position or the door will automatically unlock.
Therefore, even if the alerts are not “distinctly different,” they must be sufficiently different to allow the pilot to readily discriminate between these two conditions. The FAA recommends that the alert sound continuously for all emergency access requests.
836 The procedures which detail the pilot procedures in response to both routine and emergency access requests should be included in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM).
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM): For flightdeck doors with remote access systems, the functional check of the remote access system should be identified in the AFM as a limitation (reference section on “Verification of Alerting System Functionality”). It is recommended, but not required to have a cross-reference to the operating procedure for conducting the functional check. There may be other items that should also be contained in the AFM limitations depending on the peculiarities of individual door designs.
Emergency procedures should note that the automated remote access system will not perform its intended function in the event of a loss of electrical power and explain the use of any other alternative methods for locking the door (e.g., deadbolts). Emergency procedures should also include instructions for emergency egress (e.g., removal of decompression blowout panels).
The normal operating procedures should provide the instructions for performing the daily functional check and an explanation of the various functions of the remote access system.
Detailed operating procedures may be provided for operators to use “as is” or reformat to standardize with their company manuals.
Indication of Unlocked Flightdeck Door (CFR 25.1309(c)) Since September 11, 2001, an unlocked flightdeck door has been considered a potential hazard.
This is a different characterization than existed prior to September 11, but one that is both appropriate and applicable, given the potential consequences of unrestricted access to the flightdeck.
Section 14 CFR 25.1309(c) requires that, “Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors which could create additional hazards.” The door locking mechanism is a system (whether mechanical or electro-mechanical) under the terms of § 25.1309(c) and, as noted above, a door that is unlocked is considered a potential hazard.
During flight, it is expected that the door may be opened for various reasons (e.g., pilot use of restroom or meal/refreshment service for the flightcrew). For the designs that incorporate a manual locking/unlocking mechanism, it is considered likely that the door will be closed in many cases by persons other than the pilots (e.g., cabin crew or observers’ seat occupant). In such situations, that person may be unable to lock the door or may fail to lock the door. Pilots, who may be occupied with other tasks, may fail to ensure that the door is locked. Therefore, flightdeck door designs should include features that will reduce the likelihood of this foreseeable crew error, which would result in unrestricted access to the flightdeck.
There are a number of possible and feasible design modifications and/or operational procedures that would satisfy this requirement, including, but not limited to:
• Provide indications to the flight crew that will remind them that the door is not locked. If a visual indication is used, it should be in the pilot’s normal field of view.
• Designing the latch/lock mechanism so that it automatically locks when the door is closed. This would minimize the potential for crew error to result in an unlocked door.
• Incorporate a partial hardware solution (e.g., spring load the bolt to prop the door open or spring load the door open) along with appropriate operational procedures to ensure the door is not inadvertently left unlocked. For this situation, the following limitation should be added to the AFM:
The flightdeck door must be kept closed and locked at all times during flight except to permit access and egress in accordance with the FAA approved procedures for opening, closing, and locking the door.
• Address the issue entirely through required operational procedures. In addition to the above AFM limitation, incorporate operational procedures to include the following challenge and response procedure as an AFM limitation:
The flightdeck door must be kept closed and locked at all times during flight except to permit access and egress in accordance with the FAA approved procedures for opening, closing, and locking the door.
Any time the flightdeck door is opened in flight, a challenge and response closing and locking verification procedure must be used to verify that the door is closed and locked.
This approach necessitates an equivalent level of safety finding and is expected to be utilized on smaller transport category airplanes with shorter average flight segments.
Electromagnetic Compatibility and Lightning The strengthened flightdeck doors may include electrical and electronic equipment and associated wiring. This equipment may cause unwanted electromagnetic interference (EMI) to other airplane systems, particularly airplane radio receivers.
In addition, the flightdeck door electrical and electronic equipment may be susceptible to radio frequency fields from airplane systems, external high intensity radiated fields (HIRF), and lightning-induced transients.
The flightdeck door electrical and electronic equipment must comply with FAA regulations regarding equipment installation compatibility, specifically §§ 25.1353(a) and 25.1431(c). The flightdeck door electrical and electronic equipment should be tested and meet the requirements of RTCA/DO-160D Section 21.
Category M is recommended. If the flightdeck door electrical and electronic
838 equipment meet the requirements of RTCA/DO-160D Section 21 Category M, then airplane ground testing to ensure no adverse interference with existing systems on the airplane is adequate, and no flight tests to demonstrate electromagnetic compatibility are required. Flight tests to demonstrate compatibility with other systems on the airplane would only be necessary if, a) the ground test demonstrates unresolved electromagnetic interference from the flightdeck door electrical and electronic equipment that may be due to the ground specific test configuration and not representative of in-flight conditions, or b) the RTCA/DO-160D Section 21 test results show significant RF emissions that exceed Category L within airplane communication, navigation or surveillance radio frequency bands. In these cases, the flight tests should assess any possible interference with radio systems required for continued safe flight and landing, such as auto-land, and Instrument Landing Systems during flightdeck door operations which potentially cause the most interference.
In general, flightdeck door systems have not been categorized as having catastrophic, hazardous or major failure conditions with respect to HIRF and lightning-induced transients. This must be confirmed by the specific flightdeck door installation applicant. If confirmed by the applicant, then § 25.1316 for system lightning protection and the HIRF special condition do not apply to the flightdeck door system.
Although the HIRF special condition generally will not be applied to the flightdeck door system, RF susceptibility tests for the flightdeck door electrical and electronic equipment are recommended as part of the compliance with §§ 25.1353(a) and
25.1431(c). Tests performed according to RTCA/DO-160D Section 20 Category T are acceptable.
All airplane wiring associated with the installation of the strengthened flightdeck door should comply with FAA policy statement, ANM-01-04, System Wiring Policy for Certification of Part 25 Airplanes, published in the Federal Register, February 5, 2002. The policy statement addresses wiring installation drawings, safety analysis and instructions for continued airworthiness. The safety analysis should specifically address interference on adjacent wiring and wire bundles in the airplane, especially any wire associated with systems required for safe flight and landing. For example, any potential interference with auto-land systems needs to be specifically addressed.
Although not specifically addressed in this memorandum, the following information is provided for reference and consideration on flightdeck door certification projects.
Video Camera Monitoring Systems: As part of the flightdeck door modification, applicants may choose to incorporate a video camera monitoring system in the door design. Policy and guidance relating to video systems used to view the cabin from the flightdeck is not addressed by this Memorandum, but is available in FAA Memorandum 01-111-196, dated October 5, 2001, “Interim Summary of Policy and Advisory Material Available for Use In the Certification of Cabin Mounted Video Cameras Systems with Flightdeck Displays on Title 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft.”
839 For questions regarding the guidance in this memo, please contact Jeff Gardlin at (425) 227-2136, or via email at jeff.gardlin@faa.gov.
/s/ Vi Lipski Vi Lipski
DISTRIBUTION All Managers, Aircraft Certification Offices Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-100 Manager, Transport Standards Staff, ANM-113 Manager, International Branch, ANM-116 Manager, SEA-AEG Manager, LGB-AEG
841 APPENDIX 12
ESTABLISHING THE MAXIMUM PASSENGER SEATING CAPACITY FOR AN
AIRPLANE MODEL For airplanes intended to be used in passenger carrying operations, the establishment of the maximum passenger seating capacity is one of the most important activities to be accomplished by the airplane manufacturer. The maximum passenger seating capacity is important because the commercial viability of an airplane is often dependent on its passenger seating capacity. The maximum passenger seating capacity must be established considering evacuation on land (emergency evacuation and exits requirements of §§ 25.803 and 25.807), and in the water (the ditching exit requirements of § 25.807). Additionally, if the airplane is proposed to be certified for extended overwater operations, compliance with the ditching requirements of § 25.801 must be demonstrated. If the airplane is to be utilized in extended overwater operations, compliance with all of the ditching requirements is necessary.
a. For an airplane not certified for extended overwater operations:
There are two or three requirements (depending on the maximum passenger seating capacity sought) that determine the maximum passenger seating capacity. For this appendix, the current amendment level of each regulation is noted. The requirements are as follows:
1. Type and number of emergency exits, § 25.807(g), Amendment 25-94. Paragraph (g) of § 25.807 establishes a maximum passenger seating capacity for land evacuation. Paragraph (g) stipulates the type (e.g., A, B, III) and number of exit pairs (except for ventral and tail cone exits) that need to be installed by adding up the “ratings” of each exit pair. There are some limitations regarding how exit types may be combined in getting the maximum passenger seating capacity, particularly for capacities up to 110.
2. Ditching emergency exits for passengers, § 25.807(i), Amendment 25-94. Paragraph (i) of § 25.807 establishes a maximum passenger seating capacity for water evacuation. Ditching exits are required whether or not the airplane is intended for extended overwater operations. It must be shown that, under reasonably probable water conditions, the flotation time and trim of the airplane will allow the occupants to leave the airplane. For airplanes not certified for extended overwater operations the flotation time and trim of the airplane must provide adequate time for the occupants to leave the airplane either into the water or on to the wing. For airplanes certified for extended overwater operations the flotation time and trim of the airplane must provide adequate time for the occupants to leave the airplane and enter the liferafts required by § 25.1415. Note that ditching exit capacity is based on individual exits, rather than exit pairs.
Type A exits are allowed 70 passengers per exit, whereas all other exits are allowed 35 passengers per exit.
3. Emergency evacuation demonstration, § 25.803(c), Amendment 25-72. This demonstration is conducted to ensure that the airplane, with its combination of exits, exit locations, seating and furnishing arrangements, etc., can be evacuated in a timely manner under