AC 25-17A

Advisory circular · Transport Airplane Cabin Interiors Crashworthiness Handbook

Show pages 822–833
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818 Pre-amendment 25-72 Post-Amendment 25-72

25.855(a-1) 25.855(b) (a-1)(1) (c) (a-1)(2) (d) and Appendix F, Part I (a)(2)(iii) (a-2) (d) and Appendix F, Part I (a)(2)(iv)

(b) (e)

(c) (f)

(d) (g)

(e) (a), (h) and (i) (Note: first sentence of (e) to (a), second sentence of (e) and (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3) to (h), and last sentence of (e) to (i)

25.1307(a) 25.785(a) with minor revision and clarification

25.1359(a) 25.869(a)(1)

(e) (a)(2)

(f) (a)(3)

(g) (a)(4) and Appendix F, Part I (a)(4)

25.1413 (removed by amendment 25-72)

(a) unnecessary duplication of 25.791

(b) and (c) transferred and combined with the same requirements for seats

(d) 25.785(i)

25.1415(a) minor revision Some errors created by Amendment 25-72

25.812(g)(1)(ii) references 25.803(e), should be 25.810(c)

25.812(g)(2) references 25.809(f), should be 25.810(a)

25.812(h) references 25.809(f)(1) and (h), should be 25.810(a) and (d)

25.1411(c) references 25.809(f), should be 25.810(a)

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819 APPENDIX 11 FAA MEMORANDUM (latest revision) Certification of Strengthened Flightdeck Doors on Transport Category Airplanes U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Subject: INFORMATION: Certification of Strengthened Flightdeck Doors on Transport Category Airplanes Date: Original Release:

November 6, 2001 Revised:

December 3, 2002

From: Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100 Reply to Attn. of: Jeff Gardlin 01-115-11 To: Refer to Distribution This memorandum has been revised to include additional information on § 25.772(b) and information contained in the airplane flight manual.

The events of September 11, 2001, have highlighted the importance of expediting the installation of strengthened flightdeck doors to prevent, or at least delay, entry of unauthorized persons into the flightdeck. To accomplish this goal in a very short time, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) promulgated Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 92, effective October 9, 2001, and subsequent amendments, SFAR 92-1 through SFAR 92-4, the latest being effective March 19, 2002. While earlier versions of the SFAR only encouraged entities operating under part 121 of 14 CFR to install internal locking devices on their flightdeck compartment doors to resist intrusion by unwanted persons, the latest version requires the installation of these devices. To facilitate rapid improvements to security, all versions of the SFAR allow installations that do not meet all of the airworthiness requirements of Title 14 CFR part 25. At this time, most U.S. operators have installed bars and/or bolts on their flightdeck doors.

These installations have usually resulted in a non-compliance with one or more of the part 25 requirements, typically, the decompression requirements of § 25.365, the egress from the flightdeck requirements of § 25.772, and the entry into the flightdeck requirements of §§ 25.807 and 25.809.

On November 19, 2001, the United States Congress enacted Public Law 107-71, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, henceforth referred to as the Act. Section 104 of the Act required the FAA to issue requirements to improve flightdeck integrity, specifically the strengthening of the flightdeck door. On January 15, 2002, the FAA

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820 issued Amendment 25-106 which adds new intrusion resistance and ballistic penetration requirements to part 25. Concurrently, the FAA also issued Amendment 121-288 that requires part 121 passenger operators that are required to have flightdeck doors, and part 121 cargo operators with flightdeck doors installed on that date, to strengthen these doors. Flightdeck doors on these airplanes must meet these new requirements of part 25 by April 9, 2003.

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) applications involving flightdeck door modification must address all affected regulatory requirements, including, but not limited to: §§ 25.301, 25.303, 25.305, 25.307, 25.365, 25.571, 25.601, 25.605,

25.607, 25.609, 25.611, 25.613, 25.619, 25.625, 25.771, 25.772, 25.777, 25.789,

25.803, 25.807, 25.809, 25.831, 23.853, 25.855, 25.857, 25.1301, 25.1309, and

25.1581. Final determination of the affected regulatory sections is dependent on the complexity and scope of the modification, and the agreed certification basis of the design change. As stated earlier, all the applicable regulatory sections must be addressed and complied with in order for an applicant to be issued an STC.

The regulations that have been most commonly excepted under SFAR 92-4 (§§ 25.365, 25.772, 25.807, 25. 795, and 25.809) will typically pose the greatest challenge for STC applicants. Additionally, other significant requirements that must be addressed by an STC applicant include the ventilation and smoke requirements of § 25.831, § 25.855, § 25.857, and the flammability requirements of § 25.853.

Information about these requirements and possible acceptable design approaches are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Pressurized Compartment Loads:

Background: Changes in decompression venting integral to the flightdeck door, and in the surrounding flightdeck barrier, must be reviewed to ensure compliance with § 25.365. Airplane decompression requirements include both minimum effective vent areas and maximum opening times for blowout panels or similar decompression venting devices. In cases where the entire flightdeck door functions as a large decompression blowout panel, applicants should consider the impact of additional door locking features on the release time, the reliability of the latching system to release under decompression loads, as well as any increases in opening time due to an increase in door mass, special or additional door hinges, etc. Some of these same concerns apply to smaller decompression blowout panels. Applicants must also address reduced decompression venting area due to the addition of grilles, louvers, or similar features, as well as the direction of the required venting (e.g., from the main cabin to the flightdeck or from the flightdeck to the main cabin).

Failure of a decompression mechanism to function could result in a catastrophic failure of the flightdeck structure. Therefore, if the decompression venting relies on an electrically or mechanically actuated release or opening mechanism, the applicant should

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821 conduct qualitative and/or quantitative assessments in accordance with Figure 2, "Depth of Analysis Flowchart," in AC (AC) 25.1309-1A, "System Design and Analysis."

FAQ:

Q: Should the effects of loose articles (e.g., newspapers, magazines, blankets, etc.)

blocking the available flightdeck door flow area through grilles, louvers, grates, or similar features be considered?

A: The intent of CFR 25.365(e) is to establish a minimum design level of strength for floors, bulkheads, partitions and other structure to be able to withstand prescribed decompression scenarios. In particular, CFR 25.365(e)(2) currently establishes a hole size based on fuselage cross-sectional area and is intended to cover different decompression scenarios through one simple and conservative criterion.

Since loose articles are not part of the type design, and their effect cannot be quantified with any certainty, loose articles such as newspapers, magazines, or blankets need not be considered in a decompression analysis. However, if there is something inherent to the airplane design that would become detached or would otherwise be free to block a vent

(e.g., a curtain or a lavatory door), then this should be considered in the analysis.

While the intent of the decompression criteria is to establish a simple and conservative level of strength, certain rational assumptions, such as the use of a discharge coefficient, have historically been accepted and will continue to be accepted. Other assumptions may also be accepted. For example, the flow area restriction formed by the flightdeck glareshield and overhead panel, as would occur in the event of a windshield blowout, may be considered, provided that it is shown that these components will remain intact.

Reliability:

The primary purpose of the door systems is to deter and delay unauthorized entry into the flightdeck without compromising aircraft safety. The flightdeck door systems that are developed to comply with the new § 25.795 requirements must have a reliability level commensurate with the security function intended to support the operational strategies for intruder mitigation. Although the conditional probability of an intruder is not considered extremely high (i.e., this probability is less than one), there should be reasonable confidence that the door will deter and delay any intrusion attempt. Systems used to meet flightdeck intrusion, decompression or other safety related criteria, must meet the applicable requirements of § 25.1309. Guidance on compliance to § 25.1309 is provided in AC 25.1309-1A. Reliability guidance is based on section § 25.1309(b) which states:

The airplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that:

(1) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable, and

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(2) The occurrence of any other failure condition which would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions is improbable.

Flightdeck door systems must be shown to comply with §§ 25.1309(b)(1) and (b)(2). In showing compliance with § 25.1309(b)(1) the applicant must consider that the failure of the flightdeck door locking system to unlock during a decompression event may be catastrophic.

If the probability of the decompression event is used then the probability of occurrence must be based on statistically valid data or supporting service experience. Further, the applicant must show the independence between the decompression event and the failure of the system to unlock.

In addition to the decompression scenario, less severe failure conditions such as the crew “lock out” scenarios discussed elsewhere in this Memorandum may become a more stringent requirement and should be assessed when showing compliance to § 25.1309(b)(2).

It is assumed that a failure of the system to lock the door will be detected within one flight. Therefore, the period of latency in this case is reasonable for the failure of the door to unlock. The applicant should provide substantiation that the failure mode is not intermittent. In this case the latency period could be much greater and should factor into the method for showing compliance to § 25.1309(c). Failures of the system to lock the door should be indicated and only be evident to the cockpit crew.

Based on the above rationale, the FAA considers a suitable reliability level to be on the order of 10-5 failure per flight-hour for both lock and unlock operations. Applicants should provide specific rationale if a lower reliability target is requested. This should be accomplished via the issue paper process.

FAQ:

Q: Some designs use decompression panels for venting instead of the opening of the door. Does the above guidance apply to these designs?

A: The reliability target of 10-5 for the door lock and unlock functions is also applicable to the decompression detection and venting functions.

Q: How do you show that a decompression event, a catastrophic event, to be extremely improbably using the 10-5 reliability target?

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823 A: There is no agreed probability of occurrence for a decompression event. However, the FAA considers the probability of a decompression event to occur during flight to be much less than 10-4. Using a decompression venting system that is on the order of 10-5 failure per flight-hour, the probability of a catastrophic event becomes extremely improbable (10-9).

Intrusion Protection:

Background: Section 25.795 (a)(1) requires that the flightdeck door installation be designed to resist intrusion by any person who attempts to enter the flightdeck by physically forcing his or her way through the door. The door installation includes the door, its means of attachment to the surrounding structure, and the attachment structure to the bulkhead itself. Of concern are the integrity of the locking/latching/hinge mechanism, any decompression venting panels included as part of the door panel, the door panel itself, and the attachment of the door to the surrounding structure.

It is important to understand that the intent of this regulation is not to make the flightdeck door impenetrable, rather to deter attempts at entry and delay any attempts until other actions can be taken to prevent entry.

Advisory Circular 25.795-1 includes test methods and procedures that result in acceptable methods for demonstrating compliance. Other methods, or deviations from methods described in the AC, may be acceptable to demonstrate compliance.

Alternative compliance methods should be coordinated with the Transport Directorate Staff and documented in an issue paper.

FAQ:

Q: How much of the structure surrounding the door must be representative for the test set-up, and how representative must it be? For example, doors may be installed in airplanes with interior configurations that result in the door being installed on various types of bulkheads from multiple suppliers, with different strength and stiffness characteristics. In some cases, the original mounting structure is no longer available.

A: Section 25.795(a)(1) identifies intrusion requirements for the door installation. The preamble to this amendment states, “the door installation includes the door, its means of attachment to the surrounding structure, and the attachment structure on the bulkhead itself.” Therefore, the test article should be representative of that installation. If the structure to which the door frame attaches is not available, it may be possible to test with the extreme conditions of stiffness (i.e., soft and firm). Conversely, an installation that does not rely on the existing monuments for structural capabilities (strength and stiffness) would avoid this issue.

Q: Do interface loads (static and dynamic) between the door/surround structure need to be collected during the testing? If required, how are these loads applied?

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824 A: As discussed above, the relevant structure should be included in the test. If the door, the door frame, and the surround structure to which the door frame is attached is represented in the test, collection of interface loads during testing should not be necessary. Testing that is proposed to be conducted with non-representative structure should be coordinated in advance with the appropriate Aircraft Certification Office. In this case, interface loads may be required to substantiate the installation of the door system.

Ballistic Penetration:

Background: Section 25.795 (a)(2) requires design precautions be taken to minimize the penetration of shrapnel from a fragmentation device and small arms fire which might be fired through the flightdeck doors from occupied compartments. The intent of the ballistic requirements is twofold: (1) to ensure that the integrity of the flightdeck door is not compromised from a ballistic threat that could enable an intruder to gain access to the flightdeck, and (2) to protect the pilot and critical flight instruments from projectiles penetrating into the flightdeck. Again, the intent is not to make the flightdeck “impenetrable,” but to provide a high level of protection.

Advisory Circular 25.795-2 includes test methods and procedures that result in acceptable methods for demonstrating compliance. Other methods, or deviations from methods described in the AC, may be acceptable to demonstrate compliance.

Alternative compliance methods should be coordinated with the Transport Directorate Staff and documented in an issue paper.

FAQ:

Q: How will certification of ballistics labs be handled?

A: There are two ballistics test facilities, U.S. Test Laboratories and H.P. White, that have been accepted by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) as being capable of conducting tests in accordance with NIJ 0101.04. The FAA has discussed these laboratories qualifications with the NIJ. Based on their qualifications, the FAA will accept either of these laboratories for testing. Conformity inspections would still be required using the normal processes. Other test facilities may be acceptable; however, additional FAA review and oversight will be required. Note, test witnessing may be delegated to the above two laboratories, however, the pass/fail determination will be made by the FAA or an authorized designated engineering representative (DER).

Q: If the door contains decompression panels as part of the design, does the door need to pass the ballistic penetration tests with the panels deployed?

A: The door is not required to provide ballistic penetration protection after a decompression event.

Q: Some designs may contain louvers or openings in panels that are installed at angles greater or less than the 0-30 degree angle required in AC 25.795-2. Since the bullet would be deflected by these louvers/openings and not allow penetration into the

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825 flightdeck at the test angles required by the test, would additional testing be required at other angles that may allow the bullet to enter the flightdeck?

A: The 0-30 degree test described in AC 25.795-2 is basically a material test. The two test conditions are used to evaluate the penetration resistance of the material and to verify that there is no significant difference in performance based on angle of incidence.

With regard to the door design, a shotline that originates in the passenger cabin, and enters the flightdeck, should be evaluated to determine if it constitutes a hazardous trajectory. If it’s determined that no hazardous trajectory can result, additional protection may not be required.

Q: Advisory Circular 25.795-2 addresses projectiles targeted at the edge of the door.

Our understanding is that the intent was to arrest an errant projectile not an intentionally aimed projectile. Based on the above, would we be expected to aim a shot at the door knob/lock mechanism, the hinges, the gaps or other such door features for ballistic testing?

A: The preamble to Amendment 25-106 states, “any compromise to the integrity of the flightdeck door from a ballistic threat could enable an intruder to gain access to the flightdeck. It would be impracticable to protect the door without including a ballistic protection component.” Thus, the features mentioned above would require substantiation if their failure compromises the penetration resistance of the door, or would allow the door to open. For example, if a penetration failure results in a hazardous trajectory or enables an intruder to gain access to the flightdeck, these results would be unacceptable. For a feature with one of these potential types of failures, the feature should be tested, or shown to meet the requirement through some other means.

Q: What is the FAA's position on the ballistic testing of gaps?

A: Based upon AC 25.795-2, if the gap is protected with an equivalent amount of material that passed the material ballistic tests, testing of the gap is generally not necessary. Surfaces of protective material that are butted flush against each other may also be acceptable without testing, if it is clear that penetration is not an issue. If it’s determined that a gap needs to be tested, however, the same pass/fail criteria for the material ballistic test would apply.

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826 Q: Is it necessary to test at angles other than 0 and 30 degrees for features where other angles might be critical?

A: The intent of the requirement is to provide a ballistic penetration barrier across the door, that will prevent compromise to the flightdeck, either by the ballistic threat itself, or by an intruder. To the extent that this barrier contains features and details that are not homogeneous, they may behave differently with shots at different angles of incidence.

Based on experience gathered to date, assuming that there are no discontinuities in the barrier, (Refer to figure), it is sufficient to address these features with shots at 0 and 30 degrees only. It is not necessary to try and define some other angle. Where there are discontinuities, this effectively results in no protective barrier for the part of the door where the discontinuity exists, which is contrary to the intent of the requirement.

Q: Since the revised NIJ standard calls for semi-jacketed bullets, can these types of bullets be used in lieu of jacketed hollow point bullets specified in AC 25.795-2?

A: AC 25.795-2 was based on the National Institute of Justice Ballistic Resistance of Personal Body Armor, NIJ Standard 0101.04, dated September 2000. This standard called out a jacketed hollow point bullet. The standard was later revised in June 2001 to call out a semi-jacketed bullet. To promote standardization, the NIJ requires a specific bullet, the Remington R44MG3 semi-jacketed bullet, to be used when testing to the standard. The FAA considers this same bullet as acceptable for testing in accordance with AC 25.795-2. Otherwise, a jacketed bullet should be used as per the AC.

Pilot Compartment Doors:

Background: In part, § 25.772 requires that a means be provided for the flight crew members to directly enter the passenger compartment from the pilot compartment if the cockpit door becomes jammed. Compliance with this requirement is usually accomplished by way of frangible access panels in the door, removable panels in the door, or quick release hinges. Strengthening of the door may involve removing or covering frangible panels to prevent forced entry, and reducing clearances for ballistic resistance. A possible acceptable design approach would be removable panels in the door, or surrounding structure, that are openable from the flightdeck, but do not allow access from the passenger compartment.

FAQ:

Dicontinuity where angle exceeds 30 deg Door Ballistic Material Ballistic Material Discontinuity where angle exceeds 30 deg

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827 Q: Are the performance tests for ballistic and intrusion protection independent of the requirements of § 25.772?

A: Any performance tests for ballistic and intrusion protection would be independent of the requirements of § 25.772. That is, evaluation of the door design for egress from the flightdeck is accomplished without taking into consideration damage resulting from the intrusion or ballistic testing.

Q: What is the applicability of § 25.772(b) to strengthened flightdeck door certification programs?

A: The requirement that the flightcrew be able to enter the passenger cabin in the event that the flightdeck door becomes jammed was adopted by amendment 25-47 to § 25.772.

This rule is not in the certification basis of many airplanes currently in the fleet. While it might seem that this requirement would be adopted for strengthened flightdeck door certification programs under the provisions of § 21.101, this was not clearly delineated in this original guidance memo, and there are some projects that have not added this requirement to the certification basis. The FAA has determined that, for airplanes that have exits on the flightdeck, it is not necessary to add Amendment 25-47 to the certification basis for strengthened flightdeck door projects to retain the level of safety intended. For airplanes that do not have exits on the flightdeck, Amendment 25-47 should be included in the certification basis for strengthened flightdeck door projects.

Q: The original type certificate evaluation for demonstrating compliance to § 25.772 allowed overcoming the jam (i.e., pushing on the door to remove the jam). Based on the above guidance, can I use this same approach?

A: The following explanation for addressing egress out of a jammed flightdeck door is provided in the preamble of the notice of proposed rulemaking for § 25.772, at amendment 25-47: “The National Transportation Safety Board Recommendation A-74- 102 cites cases where, in an emergency situation, flight crewmembers had to exit through cockpit sliding windows because the pilot compartment to passenger compartment door was jammed. As a result, the flight crew was not in a position to assist in the evacuation of the passengers from the airplane.”

Further, the preamble to the final rule at Amendment 25-47 responded to several commenters objections that (1) the possibility of door jamming is remote due to aircraft design, (2) cockpit crash axes offer an equivalent method, and (3) cockpit security would be adversely affected. The preamble states: “Some airplanes are designed to preclude floor deformation and subsequent door jamming; however, this proposal provides for any door jamming condition which could occur regardless of aircraft design. The use of a crash axe does not provide the same degree of access to the passenger compartment from the cockpit. Under certain conditions, the crash axe may not provide access until a considerable period of time has elapsed. Cockpit security

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828 would not be compromised since the requirement applies to new designs and allows sufficient design flexibility.”

As noted above, it is clear that § 25.772 intends to address a situation where a door is jammed, irrespective of design features that are intended to preclude such jamming. It is not clear that past compliance findings have approached the requirement in this way, although it is clear that features have been incorporated to enable the crew to mitigate a jammed door. However, in some cases, the features appear to have been intended to overcome the jammed condition, i.e., the door is forcibly unjammed, rather than providing means of entry into the cabin, even though the door remains jammed. For the purposes of addressing reinforced flightdeck door approvals, previous test methods to show compliance are considered acceptable for a given airplane type. However, we intend to revisit this subject with respect to the methods of compliance intended by the regulation and, if necessary, publish a policy statement for future approvals. Methods of compliance that depend on features intended to overcome a jammed door should be documented in an issue paper.

Emergency Exits and Emergency Exit Arrangement:

Background: Current regulations require that exits be openable from both the inside and outside (Ref. § 25.809). Additionally, the flightdeck requires access to two emergency exits (one on each side of the airplane) or a single top hatch (Ref. § 25.807).

For airplanes with flightdeck windows, or a top hatch, where each are openable from the inside and outside, there is no requirement for the flightdeck door to have provisions for egress from the flightdeck or entry by rescue personnel. On some aircraft, one or both of the window exits are not openable from the outside; access for rescue personnel to the flight crew area in this case is provided from nearby passenger exit(s) through the flightdeck door. The regulations allow flightdeck window exits to not be openable from the outside if other approved exits are convenient and readily accessible to the flight crew area.

For airplanes that use other approved exits, which are convenient and readily accessible to the flight crew area (i.e., forward passenger exits), the flightdeck door design must have provisions for entry by rescue personnel to meet the “readily accessible” requirement. Previously, the frangible nature of the flightdeck door provided ready access to the flightdeck for rescue personnel. Flightdeck doors designed to resist intrusion will not provide access as readily as previous doors. Two design approaches that may be employed to demonstrate that airplanes with strengthened door designs continue to meet § 25.809(b) are: (1) providing two exits or one hatch in the flightdeck, each openable from the outside, or (2) showing that the door in the closed and locked position can be entered by rescue personnel using normally available non-powered hand carried rescue tools (e.g., crowbar, ax, etc) in a reasonable time. The FAA expects that most, if not all, rescue personnel would have axes or crowbars at their disposal to gain access to the flightdeck, but not necessarily more sophisticated devices such as the “jaws of life.” Provided rescue personnel can be shown to be able to enter the flightdeck as described above, there is no need to consider structural deformation (jamming) for

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829 § 25.809. It should be noted that what may be considered “readily accessible” regarding entry into the flightdeck through strengthened doors by rescue personnel, is likely to be beyond the limits of what is acceptable for “readily accessible” or similar terms used in other sections of part 25.

FAQ:

Q: Are the performance tests for ballistic and intrusion protection independent of the requirements of § 25.809?

A: Any performance tests for ballistic and intrusion protection would be independent of the requirements of § 25.809. That is, evaluation of the door design for ingress and egress from the flightdeck is accomplished without taking into consideration damage resulting from the intrusion or ballistic testing.

Q: In the event that the crew is trapped in the cockpit, what is the maximum amount of time allotted for rescue personnel to gain access to the cockpit through the improved flightdeck doors?

A: It is expected that with the improvements that are being incorporated into the flightdeck doors that the time needed by rescue personnel to gain access to the cockpit will be increased over that of the existing doors. The existing doors are considered frangible, therefore access by rescue personnel was not previously deemed a critical issue, but with the introduction of the intrusion and ballistic resistance requirements, the door can no longer be considered frangible and therefore the access time must be reevaluated. Based on information gathered from various sources, the FAA has determined that a maximum of 10 minutes is a reasonable and achievable goal for rescue personnel to gain access to the flightdeck through the strengthened flightdeck door. The FAA will evaluate any demonstrated time over the limit of 10 minutes on a case-by-case basis in order to determine its acceptability.

Q: How does an applicant show compliance with flightdeck accessibility by rescue personnel and is a compliance test required?

A: Since the doors were previously considered frangible, no known test data exist at this time that could be used as a basis for an analytical analysis Therefore, it is expected that a compliance test will be required. Subsequent certification programs may be candidates for an analytical approach provided they can be shown to be suitably similar to the previously certified doors. Other considerations that need to be addressed are the test parameters. It is expected that the test be conducted using trained rescue personnel, who are naive about the door design, using axes and/or crowbars, or other normally available non-powered hand carried tools. The timing for rescue personnel to gain access into the flightdeck should start with the first contact on the door.

Ventilation and Smoke:

Background: The previously mentioned decompression venting changes could negatively impact compliance with § 25.831. Venting changes should allow a sufficient