The concern sheetOCR
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Airworthiness FAA Concern Sheet Date:
Michael Downs Make, Model, Series, Serial No.: Bellanca/Alexandria Aircraft Aerospace Engineer LLC, models 17-30 all s/n, 17-31 all s/n, 17-30A s/n 30263- Chicago Aircraft Certification Office 301030, 17-31A all s/n, 17-31-ATC all s/n ACE-118C 2300 East Devon Ave. Reason for Airworthiness Concern: Recent accident on Des Plaines, IL 60018 2/17/2007. Exhaust system failure caused a magneto "P" lead and Telephone: 847-294-7870 engine failure. Seven other similar accidents occurred since 1986 when AD 76-23-03 was amended to solve this problem.
FAA Description of Airworthiness Concern Airworthiness Directive (AD) 76-23-02 currently requires repetitive inspections of the exhaust system on the abovereferenced airplanes every 100 hours TIS. On February 17, 2007, a Bellanca Model 17-30A airplane was involved in an accident in Fountain, Florida, where National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations indicate that defective internal muffler welds on the exhaust system have caused hot exhaust gases to escape into the engine compartment. This resulted in the insulation on wires that lead to the right and left magnetos to melt, which resulted in engine failure and cabin air contamination. Several other reports of exhaust system problems have been reported on airplanes where AD 76-23-03 was complied with. AD 76-23-03 currently does not require disassembly of the exhaust system. The exhaust system has internal welds that are not able not be inspected without disassembly.
Bellanca is developing a service bulletin to include procedures for inspecting the exhaust system and rerouting magneto "p" leads.
Request for Information: The FAA is requesting any information regarding this subject to help in determining the course of action to address this condition.
This Airworthiness Concern Sheet (ACS) is intended as a means for FAA Aviation Safety Engineers to coordinate airworthiness concerns with aircraft owner/operators through associations and type clubs. At this time, the FAA has not made a determination on what type of corrective action (if any) should be taken. The resolution of this airworthiness concern could involve an AD action or an SAIB, or the FAA could determine that no action is needed at this time. The FAA's final determination will depend in part on the information received in response to this ACS.
The FAA endorses dissemination of this technical information to all manufacturers and requests association and type clubs comments.
Attachments: *SDR(s)L | *A/IDS_ | *SL(s) _ *SAIBL _ *FAASR/*NTSBSR_ | *AD_ | *AMOC_ *RA Notification: FAA *AOPA X EAA, Type Club TC Holder Other:
Response Requested 6/30/07: Emergency (10 days), Alert (30 days) X Information (90 days) (Space Bar Adds "X" to Check Boxes) *Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs); Accident/Incident Data System (A/IDS); Service Letter (SL); Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB);
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)/National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation (FAASR/NTSBSR); Airworthiness Directive (AD); Alternate Method of Compliance (AMOC); Risk Assessment (RA); Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association (AOPA);
Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA); Type Certificate (TC) Revised 1/24/02