The concern sheet
Text extracted from the PDF.
Airworthiness Concern Sheet
Anthony Flores Aerospace Engineer Date: November 3, 2009 Revised 1/24/02
Chicago Aircraft Certification Office Systems & Flight Test Branch, ACE-117C 2300 E. Devon Ave.
Des Plaines, IL 60018 847-294-7140 anthony.flores@faa.gov Make, Model, Series, Serial No.:
Cirrus Design Corporation (CDC) Model SR22, with Flight Into Known Icing Approval Serial Numbers: 3003, 3310, 3326, 3405 and subsequent Reason for Airworthiness Concern:
Possible failure/malfunction of the ice protection system.
FAA Description of Airworthiness Concern (Who, What, Where, When, How? Attachments: RA and appropriate data) The FAA has been made aware that the ice protection system fluid supply lines may not all be properly crimped to the compression fittings allowing the line to disconnect from the system. Per the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement, dispatch into known icing conditions is prohibited if the porous panels do not fully “wet-out” or with persistent annunciation of any Anti-Ice System CAS message. If a line were disconnected on the ground, it may be noticed during the pre-flight inspection.
While in flight, a disconnected fluid line may result in a ANTI ICE PSI or ANTI ICE FLO annunciation. CDC has issued a Service Alert, SA 09-16, dated November 3, 2009, which requests operators to install a placard to the instrument panel limiting Flight Into Known Icing.
Request for Information (Proposed Alternate Inspection/Repair Procedures, Cost Impact, Etc. Note: Any comments or replies to the FAA need to be as specific as possible. Please provide specific examples to illustrate your comments/concerns.):
Please provide us with additional information that the FAA should consider before taking any airworthiness action. This includes any additional findings, accidents/incidents, or service difficulties pertaining to this airworthiness concern.
This Airworthiness Concern Sheet (ACS) is intended as a means for FAA Aviation Safety Engineers to coordinate airworthiness concerns with aircraft owner/operators through associations and type clubs. At this time, the FAA has not made a determination on what type of corrective action (if any) should be taken. The resolution of this airworthiness concern could involve an AD action or an SAIB, or the FAA could determine that no action is needed at this time. The FAA’s final determination will depend in part on the information received in response to this ACS.
The FAA endorses dissemination of this technical information to all manufacturers and requests association and type clubs comments.
Attachments: *SDR(s) *A/IDS *SA(s) *SAIB *FAASR/*NTSBSR *AD *AMOC *RA
Notification: FAA *AOPA *EAA Type Club *TC Holder O t h e r :
Response Requested 11/17/09: Emergency (10 days) Alert (30 days) Information (90 days) (Space Bar Adds “X” to Check Boxes) *Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs); Accident/Incident Data System (A/IDS); Service Letter (SL); Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB);
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)/National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation (FAASR/NTSBSR); Airworthiness Directive (AD); Alternate Method of Compliance (AMOC); Risk Assessment (RA); Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association (AOPA);
Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA); Type Certificate (TC)