AD 2017-25-03

This AD becomes effective December 21, 2017.

We must receive comments on this AD by January 22, 2018.

You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• Fax: 202-493-2251.

• Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone: 425-227-1137; fax: 425-227-1149.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD 2013-0003, dated January 7, 2013 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for all Fokker Services B.V. Model F28 Mark 0070 and 0100. The MCAI states:

Following a report of sparks and an electrical smell on the flight deck of an F28 Mark 0070 aeroplane, the investigation results revealed heat damage on several contacts of connector J 4222A/P 4222B, most likely caused by a degraded contact. An imbalance of the resistance of two contacts, used in parallel in the left-hand (LH) windshield heating system, resulted in a too high current. This overheated the contacts and caused carbonising, thereby creating a conductive path between the contacts of the LH windshield heating system and the LH sliding window heating system. The conductive path resulted in a too high voltage on the LH sliding window, causing overheating of the LH sliding window heating element.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to further cases of electrical overload, possibly resulting in failure of sliding window heating element(s) and consequent arcing, smoke and fire in the cockpit area.

Prompted by these findings, Fokker Services issued Service Bulletin (SB) SBF100-30-027 which introduces a modification of wiring distribution on the affected receptacles and plugs.

To correct this potential unsafe condition, [Civil Aviation Authority—The Netherlands] CAA-NL issued [Dutch] AD NL-2005-009 (EASA approval 2005-6043) [which corresponds to FAA AD 2006-15-17, Amendment 39-14698 (71 FR 43033, July 31, 2006)] to require modification of the wiring distribution of the AC Bus Transfer Power System and the Windshield Anti-Icing Systems, as specified in Fokker Services SBF100-30-027.

Since that [Dutch] AD was issued, Fokker Services found that, as the Accomplishment Instructions of SBF100-30-027 were divided in 5 blocks, an individual aeroplane (serial number) could be specified in one or more blocks. This led to confusion for operators and may have resulted in incomplete accomplishment of the modification as required by [Dutch] AD NL-2005-009.

Fokker Services SBF100-30-027 has now been revised to include a one-to one relation between each aeroplane and the applicable blocks in the Accomplishment Instructions.

For the reasons described above, this [EASA] AD requires a one-time check of the work accomplished through Fokker Services SBF100-30-027, a visual inspection of the contacts of connectors and, depending on findings, rework of the wiring.

You may examine the MCAI on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2017-1097.

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

There are currently no domestic operators of this product. Therefore, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2017-1097; Product Identifier 2013-NM-015-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

Currently, there are no affected U.S.-registered airplanes. This AD requires contacting the FAA to obtain instructions for addressing the unsafe condition, and doing the actions specified in those instructions. Based on the actions specified in the MCAI AD, we are providing the following cost estimates for an affected airplane that is placed on the U.S. Register in the future:

We estimate the following costs to do any necessary on-condition modification that would be required based on the results of the required actions:

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes to the Director of the System Oversight Division.

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and

4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):