AD 2022-18-51

Historical

Emergency airworthiness directive · Air · Airbus A330-841 and A330-941

Issued
August 18, 2022
Superseded by
AD2022-19-05
Models
A330-841, A330-941
Data sheet
TCDSA46NM
Registered aircraft
40 matched by model
Product
Aircraft · Large airplane
ATA chapter
75 · Engine air
Issued as
Emergency AD

Unofficial copy of the text in the FAA’s Dynamic Regulatory System. The FAA’s own copy is the authoritative one. DRS record last changed November 22, 2025.

On this page

The airworthiness directive

1

FAA Aviation Safety EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/ DATE: August 18, 2022 AD #: 2022-18-51 Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2022-18-51 is sent to owners and operators of Airbus SAS Model A330-841 and -941 airplanes. Background The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E, dated August 17, 2022 (EASA Emergency AD 2022 -0170-E) (referred to after this as the mandatory continuing airworthiness information, or the MCAI), to correct an unsafe condition on Airbus SAS Model A330-841 and -941 airplanes. The MCAI states that occurrences were reported of leaking bleed system high pressure valves (HPVs), likely due to HPV clip failure and sealing ring damage. A leaking HPV may expose the pressure regulating valve (PRV), which is installed downstream from the HPV, to high pressure, possibly damaging the PRV itself and preventing its closure. The MCAI specifies revising the applicable Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to incorporate additional limitations prohibiting takeoff for certain airplane configurations; specifies airplane dispatch restrictions using certain provisions of the A330 master minimum equipment list (MMEL) or amending the operator’s minimum equipment list (MEL) ; and specifies, after any AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT, to contact Airbus for applicable instructions and accomplishi ng those instructions accordingly. This emergency AD was prompted by reports of a leaking bleed system HPV, which may expose the PRV, which is installed downstream from the HPV, to high pressure, possibly damaging the PRV itself and preventing its closure . This condition, if not addressed, could result in high pressure and temperatures in the duct downstream from the PRV, duct burst, damage to several systems, and consequent loss of control of the airplane . Related Service Information The FAA reviewed EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E, which specifies the following actions: • Revising the applicable AFM to incorporate additional limitations prohibiting takeoff in the following configurations: PACKS OFF, APU bleed ON, and ENG bleed OFF ; • Restricting dispatch of the airplane under the provisions of any of the following A330 MMEL items: Packs, Engine Bleed Air Supply System, Engine Bleed IP Check Valve, and Engine Bleed HP Valve; and • Contacting Airbus to obtain applicable instructions and accomplishing those inst ructions accordingly after any AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT.

2 FAA’s Determination These products have been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA’s bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, it has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. The FAA is issuing this emergency AD after determining that the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. Emergency AD Requirements This emergency AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E described previously, except for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of this emergency AD, and except as discussed under “Differences Between this Emergency AD and the MCAI.” Differences Between this Emergency AD and the MCAI EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E requires operators to inform all flightcrews of revisions to the existing AFM and MEL, and thereafter to operate the airplane accordingly. However, this emergency AD does not specifically require those actions , as those actions are already required by FAA regulations. FAA regulations require operators to furnish to pilots any changes to the AFM (for example, 14 CFR 121.137), and to ensure the pilots are familiar with the AFM (for example, 14 CFR 91.505). As with any other flightcrew training requirement, training on the updated AFM content is tracked by the operators and recorded in each pilot’s training record, which is available for the FAA to review. FAA regulations also require pilots to follow the procedures in the AFM including all updates. 14 CFR 91.9 requires that any person operating a civil aircraft must comply with the operating limitations specified in the AFM. Furthermore, FAA regulations (14 CFR 121.628 (a)(2)) require operators to provide pilots with access to all of the information contained in the operator’s MEL. Furthermore, 14 CFR 121.628 (a)(5) requires airplanes to be operated under all applicable conditions and limitations contained in the operator’s MEL. Therefore, including a requirement in this emergency AD to operate the airplane according to the revised AFM and MEL would be redundant and unnecessa ry. Paragraph (2) of EASA Emergency AD 2022 -0170-E prohibits the dispatch of an airplane under specified provisions of the A330 MMEL items. This emergency AD alternatively allows revising the operator’s existing FAA -approved MEL by removing the items specified in paragraph (2) of EASA Emergency AD 2022 -0170-E. Interim Action The FAA considers that this emergency AD is an interim action. The FAA anticipates that further AD action will follow. Justification for Immediate Adoption and Determination of the Effective Date Section 553(b)(3)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency, for “good cause,” finds that those procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public

3 interest.” Under this section, an agency, upon finding good cause, may issue a final rule without providing notice and seeking comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, upon a finding of good cause. An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. The FAA has found that t he risk to the flying public justifies forgoing notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because a leaking HPV may expose the PRV to high pressure, possibly damaging the PRV itself and preventing its closure, which could lead to high pressure and temperatures in the duct downstream from the PRV, with possible duct burst, damage to several systems, and consequent loss of control of the airplane . The FAA considers a leaking HPV to be an urgent safety issue. The required actions of this emergency AD must be performed before further flight as of August 19, 2022. Accordingly, notice and opportunity for prior public comment are impracticable and contrary to the public interest pur suant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B). In addition, the FAA finds that good cause e xists pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days, for the same reasons the FAA found good cause to forgo notice and comment. Authority for this Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s auth ority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detai l the scope of the Agency’s authority. The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regul ations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identi fied in this rulemaking action. Presentation of the Actual Emergency Airworthiness Directive The FAA is issuing this emergency airworthiness directive under 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, and 44701 according to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator. 2022-18-51: Project Identifier MCAI-2022-01125-T. (a) Effective Date This emergency airworthiness directive (AD) is effective upon receipt. (b) Affected ADs None. (c) Applicability This emergency AD applies to all Airbus SAS Model A330-841 and -941 airplanes, certificated in any category.

4 (d) Subject Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 75, Air. (e) Unsafe Condition This emergency AD was prompted by reports of leaking bleed system high pressure valves (HPVs), likely due to HPV clip failure and sealing ring damage. The FAA is issuing this emergency AD to address a leaking HPV, which may expose the pressure regulating valve (PRV), which is installed downstream from the HPV, to high pressure, possibly damaging the PRV itself and preventing its closure. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in high pressure and temperatures in the duct downstream from the PRV, with possible duct burst, damage to several systems, and consequent loss of control of the airplane . (f) Compliance Comply with this emergency AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Required Actions Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this emergency AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with , European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Emergency AD 2022-0170-E, dated August 17, 2022 (EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E). (h) Exceptions to EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E (1) Where paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E refer to “the effective date of this [EASA] AD,” this emergency AD requires using “August 19, 2022.” (2) Where paragraphs (1) and (2) of EASA Emergency AD 2022 -0170-E specify to inform all flightcrews of dispatch limitations, and thereafter to operate the airplane accordingly, this emergency AD does not require those actions, as those actions are already required by existing FAA regulations. (3) Where paragraph (2) of EASA Emergency AD 2022 -0170-E prohibits the dispatch of an airplane under specified provisions of the A330 master minimum equipment list (MMEL) items, t his emergency AD alternatively allows revising the operator’s existing FAA -approved MEL by removing the items specified in paragraph (2) of E ASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E, if accomplished before further flight as of August 19, 2022. (4) This AD does not require compliance with the “Remarks” section of EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E. (i) Special Flight Permit Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the actions required by this emergency AD may be accomplished, provided the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of EASA Emergenc y AD 2022-0170-E are first accomplished. (j) Additional Emergency AD Provisions The following provisions also apply to this emergency AD:

5 (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this emergency AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the Manager, International Validation Branch , send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k)(1) of this emergency AD. Information may be emailed to: 9 -AVS-AIR- 730-AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your approp riate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the ma nager of the responsible Flight Standards Office. (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this emergency AD to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, International Validation Branch , FAA; or EASA; or Airbus SAS’s EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA - authorized signature. (k) Additional Information (1) For more information about this emergency AD, contact Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, FAA, International Validation Branch , 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone 206-231-3229; email Vladimir.Uly anov@faa.gov. (2) For EASA Emergency AD 2022-0170-E, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email ADs@easa.europa.eu; website easa.europa.eu. You may find this EASA AD on the EASA website at ad.easa.europa .eu. You may view this service information at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.

Issued on August 18, 2022.

Ross Landes, Deputy Director for Regulatory Operations, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

Affected TCDS · 1

The type certificate data sheets for the models this AD names, matched by model and maker.

Registered aircraft · 40

Registered aircraft whose airframe or engine model this AD names. Matched by model only, so check each against the AD’s applicability.

By aircraft maker
  • Airbus40 aircraft
By year built
20192025
Registered aircraft by year built: 39 aircraft
20194
20204
20213
20229
20237
20245
20257

1 with no year recorded

By model

Aircraft

See all 40 aircraft