What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(.4)The first officer (f/o) was making a descent from FL350 to FL240 in smooth air in VMC conditions with the autopilot (a/p) engaged. As the flight (flt) neared FL250, the captain became concerned that the airplane would not level off at FL240. He instructed the f/o to slow the rate of descent. The f/o attempted this by using the pitch thumbwheel on the a/p control panel. The captain then took control, attempted to overpower the a/p, and pulled back on the control yoke. With back pressure on the control yoke, he disengaged the a/p. with the reduced control column resistance after the a/p was disengaged, there was further excursion of the elevators to the up position. According to the flt data recorder, the airplane was subjected to a +2.28 g-load. A passenger in the aft lavatory suffered a fractured ankle. A 2nd passenger and 2 flt attendants received minor injuries. The MD-11 flight crew operating manual (fcom) advised against attempting to overpower the a/p; however, this was contained under the title, 'severe turbulence and/or heavy rain ingestion.' Each use of pitch thumbwheel interrupted the automatic level off, and the system would wait for 2 seconds after release of the thumbwheel before interrupted the automatic level off sequence again. Continued use of thumbwheel precluded the a/p from performing the level off at FL240. The manufacturer has issued fcom changes to warn pilots about the hazards of applying force to the control whell or column while the a/p is engaged and adjusting the pitch thumbwheel during a level off.
As the FAA filed it
(.4)THE FIRST OFFICER (F/O) WAS MAKING A DESCENT FROM FL350 TO FL240 IN SMOOTH AIR IN VMC CONDITIONS WITH THE AUTOPILOT (A/P) ENGAGED. AS THE FLIGHT (FLT) NEARED FL250, THE CAPTAIN BECAME CONCERNED THAT THE AIRPLANE WOULD NOT LEVEL OFF AT FL240. HE INSTRUCTED THE F/O TO SLOW THE RATE OF DESCENT. THE F/O ATTEMPTED THIS BY USING THE PITCH THUMBWHEEL ON THE A/P CONTROL PANEL. THE CAPTAIN THEN TOOK CONTROL, ATTEMPTED TO OVERPOWER THE A/P, AND PULLED BACK ON THE CONTROL YOKE. WITH BACK PRESSURE ON THE CONTROL YOKE, HE DISENGAGED THE A/P. WITH THE REDUCED CONTROL COLUMN RESISTANCE AFTER THE A/P WAS DISENGAGED, THERE WAS FURTHER EXCURSION OF THE ELEVATORS TO THE UP POSITION. ACCORDING TO THE FLT DATA RECORDER, THE AIRPLANE WAS SUBJECTED TO A +2.28 G-LOAD. A PASSENGER IN THE AFT LAVATORY SUFFERED A FRACTURED ANKLE. A 2ND PASSENGER AND 2 FLT ATTENDANTS RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES. THE MD-11 FLIGHT CREW OPERATING MANUAL (FCOM) ADVISED AGAINST ATTEMPTING TO OVERPOWER THE A/P; HOWEVER, THIS WAS CONTAINED UNDER THE TITLE, 'SEVERE TURBULENCE AND/OR HEAVY RAIN INGESTION.' EACH USE OF PITCH THUMBWHEEL INTERRUPTED THE AUTOMATIC LEVEL OFF, AND THE SYSTEM WOULD WAIT FOR 2 SECONDS AFTER RELEASE OF THE THUMBWHEEL BEFORE INTERRUPTED THE AUTOMATIC LEVEL OFF SEQUENCE AGAIN. CONTINUED USE OF THUMBWHEEL PRECLUDED THE A/P FROM PERFORMING THE LEVEL OFF AT FL240. THE MANUFACTURER HAS ISSUED FCOM CHANGES TO WARN PILOTS ABOUT THE HAZARDS OF APPLYING FORCE TO THE CONTROL WHELL OR COLUMN WHILE THE A/P IS ENGAGED AND ADJUSTING THE PITCH THUMBWHEEL DURING A LEVEL OFF.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.