19961019045609A

Accident · Substantial damage

FAA accident report · Doug MD-88 · New York, NY · October 19, 1996

Date
October 19, 1996 · 16:38 local
Place
New York, NY
Airport
La Guardia
Phase of flight
Final Approach
Operating rules
Air carrier (Part 121)
Operator
DALA
Damage
Substantial damage
Aircraft
N914DL
NTSB investigation
NTSBNYC97MA005
Reported as
Doug MD88
Reported engine
Pratt & Whitney JT8D219
People aboard
60
Fatal injuries
0
Pilot’s flight hours
10,024 total3,578 in this make and model223 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

Struck approach lights too low on final. Skidded down runway on nose gear. PIC wearing non approved mono contacts. (.4)the airplane had struck the approach light structure and the end of the runway deck during the approach. Because of the captain's use of monovision contact lenses, he was unable to overcome the visual illusions resulting from the approach over water in limited light conditions (absence of visible ground features), the irregular spacing of the runway edge lights at shorter-than-usual intervals, the rain, and the fog, and that these illusions led the captain to perceive that the airplane was higher than it was during the visual portion of the approach, and thus, to his unnecessarily steepening the approach during the final 10 seconds before impact. Aviation medical examiners (ames) need to know if pilot examinees are using contact lenses, and currently no process is in place to ensure that ames are provided with that information. The lag time in the display of vertical speed information in the vertical speed indicator installed in the accident airplane limited the first officer's ability to provide the captain with precise vertical speed information during the critical final seconds of the approach, and therefore contributed to the accident.

As the FAA filed it

STRUCK APPROACH LIGHTS TOO LOW ON FINAL. SKIDDED DOWN RUNWAY ON NOSE GEAR. PIC WEARING NON APPROVED MONO CONTACTS. (.4)THE AIRPLANE HAD STRUCK THE APPROACH LIGHT STRUCTURE AND THE END OF THE RUNWAY DECK DURING THE APPROACH. BECAUSE OF THE CAPTAIN'S USE OF MONOVISION CONTACT LENSES, HE WAS UNABLE TO OVERCOME THE VISUAL ILLUSIONS RESULTING FROM THE APPROACH OVER WATER IN LIMITED LIGHT CONDITIONS (ABSENCE OF VISIBLE GROUND FEATURES), THE IRREGULAR SPACING OF THE RUNWAY EDGE LIGHTS AT SHORTER-THAN-USUAL INTERVALS, THE RAIN, AND THE FOG, AND THAT THESE ILLUSIONS LED THE CAPTAIN TO PERCEIVE THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS HIGHER THAN IT WAS DURING THE VISUAL PORTION OF THE APPROACH, AND THUS, TO HIS UNNECESSARILY STEEPENING THE APPROACH DURING THE FINAL 10 SECONDS BEFORE IMPACT. AVIATION MEDICAL EXAMINERS (AMES) NEED TO KNOW IF PILOT EXAMINEES ARE USING CONTACT LENSES, AND CURRENTLY NO PROCESS IS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT AMES ARE PROVIDED WITH THAT INFORMATION. THE LAG TIME IN THE DISPLAY OF VERTICAL SPEED INFORMATION IN THE VERTICAL SPEED INDICATOR INSTALLED IN THE ACCIDENT AIRPLANE LIMITED THE FIRST OFFICER'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE THE CAPTAIN WITH PRECISE VERTICAL SPEED INFORMATION DURING THE CRITICAL FINAL SECONDS OF THE APPROACH, AND THEREFORE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.