19970921027769A

Accident · Substantial damage

FAA accident report · Amtr Rotorwayexec · Westminister, MD · September 21, 1997

Date
September 21, 1997 · 14:45 local
Place
Westminister, MD
Airport
Carrol County Airport
Phase of flight
Forced Landing
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Damage
Substantial damage
Aircraft
N94CJ
NTSB investigation
NTSBIAD97LA121
Reported as
Amtr Rotorwayexec
Reported engine
AMTRRW ROTWY162
Fatal injuries
0
Pilot’s flight hours
762 total201 in this make and model33 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

Experimental rotorway lost engine power and crashed. Other circumstances are unknown. (.4) on September 21, 1997, about 1445 eastern daylight time, a homebuilt rotorway exec 90, N94CJ; was substantially damaged as it impacted the ground during a forced landing at carroll county regional/jack b. poage field (W54), westminster, Maryland. The certificated private pilot/co-owner received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the personal local flight conducted under 14 CFR part 91. The pilot flew the helicopter in the traffic pattern for 40 minutes, performing takeoffs and landings. He reported that "at 200 feet on final approach with 19 inches of manifold pressure set, the engine stopped running." The pilot recalled glancing at the carburetor air temperature gauge and it was not in the yellow caution range. During the descent, the pilot maneuvered to avoid an embankment and impacted the ground damaging the tail boom and rotor blades. A federal aviation administration (FAA) inspector examined the helicopter. His examination revealed no mechanical malfunctions with the engine. The inspector reported that the engine started and ran without any difficulty. A pilot, who had flown a another helicopter, told the inspector that he was required to use carburetor heat that morning. The temperature/dew point recorded by the automated weather observing system (AWOS) at W54 was: 57 degrees fahrenheit and 38 degrees fahrenheit, respectively. Utilizing the "icing probability curves" charts, these temperatures combined with a glide power setting, placed the carburetor within the serious icing range. Examination of the helicopter revealed that the carburetor heat was preset prior to flight, and not accessible from inside the cockpit. After the accident, the FAA recommended to the manufacturer that a switch be placed in the cockpit. The manufacturer completed a modification allowing control of the carburetor heat from inside the cabin.

As the FAA filed it

EXPERIMENTAL ROTORWAY LOST ENGINE POWER AND CRASHED. OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES ARE UNKNOWN. (.4) ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1997, ABOUT 1445 EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME, A HOMEBUILT ROTORWAY EXEC 90, N94CJ; WAS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED AS IT IMPACTED THE GROUND DURING A FORCED LANDING AT CARROLL COUNTY REGIONAL/JACK B. POAGE FIELD (W54), WESTMINSTER, MARYLAND. THE CERTIFICATED PRIVATE PILOT/CO-OWNER RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES. VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILED AND NO FLIGHT PLAN WAS FILED FOR THE PERSONAL LOCAL FLIGHT CONDUCTED UNDER 14 CFR PART 91. THE PILOT FLEW THE HELICOPTER IN THE TRAFFIC PATTERN FOR 40 MINUTES, PERFORMING TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS. HE REPORTED THAT "AT 200 FEET ON FINAL APPROACH WITH 19 INCHES OF MANIFOLD PRESSURE SET, THE ENGINE STOPPED RUNNING." THE PILOT RECALLED GLANCING AT THE CARBURETOR AIR TEMPERATURE GAUGE AND IT WAS NOT IN THE YELLOW CAUTION RANGE. DURING THE DESCENT, THE PILOT MANEUVERED TO AVOID AN EMBANKMENT AND IMPACTED THE GROUND DAMAGING THE TAIL BOOM AND ROTOR BLADES. A FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) INSPECTOR EXAMINED THE HELICOPTER. HIS EXAMINATION REVEALED NO MECHANICAL MALFUNCTIONS WITH THE ENGINE. THE INSPECTOR REPORTED THAT THE ENGINE STARTED AND RAN WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTY. A PILOT, WHO HAD FLOWN A ANOTHER HELICOPTER, TOLD THE INSPECTOR THAT HE WAS REQUIRED TO USE CARBURETOR HEAT THAT MORNING. THE TEMPERATURE/DEW POINT RECORDED BY THE AUTOMATED WEATHER OBSERVING SYSTEM (AWOS) AT W54 WAS: 57 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AND 38 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT, RESPECTIVELY. UTILIZING THE "ICING PROBABILITY CURVES" CHARTS, THESE TEMPERATURES COMBINED WITH A GLIDE POWER SETTING, PLACED THE CARBURETOR WITHIN THE SERIOUS ICING RANGE. EXAMINATION OF THE HELICOPTER REVEALED THAT THE CARBURETOR HEAT WAS PRESET PRIOR TO FLIGHT, AND NOT ACCESSIBLE FROM INSIDE THE COCKPIT. AFTER THE ACCIDENT, THE FAA RECOMMENDED TO THE MANUFACTURER THAT A SWITCH BE PLACED IN THE COCKPIT. THE MANUFACTURER COMPLETED A MODIFICATION ALLOWING CONTROL OF THE CARBURETOR HEAT FROM INSIDE THE CABIN.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.