19971007041689I

Incident

FAA incident report · Boeing 757-224 · Cleveland, OH · October 7, 1997

Date
October 7, 1997 · 02:28 local
Place
Cleveland, OH
Airport
Cleveland-Hopkins International
Phase of flight
To Aborted (Fixed Wing)
Operating rules
Air carrier (Part 121)
Operator
CALA
Aircraft
N17104
Reported as
Boeing 757224
People aboard
2
Fatal injuries
0
Pilot’s flight hours
12,000 total337 in this make and model237 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

NARRATIVE: INCIDENT NO. IGL25980011: ON OCTOBER 7, 1997, AT APPROXIMATELY 0228 EDT, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLIGHT NO. 2041 INITIATED TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 28 AFTER HAVING RECEIVED CLEARANCE FOR TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 23L. THE TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED, AND FLIGHT 2041 THEN TAXIED BACK AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL TAKE OFF ON RUNWAY 23L AS CLEARED. PIC AND SIC WERE FORMALLY COUNSELED AND REQUIRED TO ATTEND CALA ERROR MANAGEMENT SCHOOL. PIC, IN ADDITION, RECEIVED LINE CHECKS AND A SIMULATOR CHECK. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS RELEVANT TO THIS INCIDENT: 1. THIS INCIDENT IS NOT CONSIDERED AGGRAVATED SINCE IT WAS INADVERTENT AND THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION. 2. ALTHOUGH FLIGHT 2041 INFORMED CLEVELAND ATCT CONCERNING THEIR UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE AIRPORT, CLEVELAND ATCT DID NOT PROVIDE A SPECIFIC TAXI ROUTE FOR FLIGHT 2041. THE FLIGHT APPARENTLY TAXIED VIA TAXIWAY J AND BECAME CONFUSED AT THE CONFLUENCE OF TAXIWAY J, RUNWAY 28 AND RUNWAY 23L. THIS CONFUSION WAS A FACTOR IN FLIGHT 2041'S INITIATING TAKE-OFF ON THE INCORRECT RUNWAY. 3. NO PRIOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE PILOTS WERE FOUND IN THE ISIS (EIS) REPORT. 4. BOTH THE CAPTAIN (PIC) AND FIRST OFFICER (SIC) WERE GIVEN LETTERS OF WARNING. 5. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES TOOK THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: a) THE CAPTAIN WAS COUNSELED ON OCTOBER 8, 1997. b) THE CAPTAIN RECEIVED A LINE CHECK ON OCTOBER 10, 1997. c) THE CAPTAIN RECEIVED A SIMULATOR CHECK ON OCTOBER 22, 1997. d) THE CAPTAIN ATTENDED ERROR MANAGEMENT SCHOOL ON OCTOBER 30, 1997. e) THE CAPTAIN RECEIVED A TWO LEG LINE CHECK ON NOVEMBER 3, 1997, AND WAS RETURNED TO LINE DUTY. f) THE FIRST OFFICER WAS COUNSELED ON OCTOBER 10, 1997. g) THE FIRST OFFICER ATTENDED ERROR MANAGEMENT SCHOOL ON OCTOBER 14, 1997, AND WAS RETURNED TO LINE DUTY. h) THE CAPTAIN AND FIRST OFFICER, EACH RECEIVED A LETTER OF COUNSELING. 6. INSPECTOR STAMM, CLEVELAND FSDO TELEPHONICALLY DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE PIC, CAPTAIN EPPLEMAN. HIS ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE AND HE DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCIDENT.

As the FAA filed it

NARRATIVE: INCIDENT NO. IGL25980011: ON OCTOBER 7, 1997, AT APPROXIMATELY 0228 EDT, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLIGHT NO. 2041 INITIATED TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 28 AFTER HAVING RECEIVED CLEARANCE FOR TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 23L. THE TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED, AND FLIGHT 2041 THEN TAXIED BACK AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL TAKE OFF ON RUNWAY 23L AS CLEARED. PIC AND SIC WERE FORMALLY COUNSELED AND REQUIRED TO ATTEND CALA ERROR MANAGEMENT SCHOOL. PIC, IN ADDITION, RECEIVED LINE CHECKS AND A SIMULATOR CHECK. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS RELEVANT TO THIS INCIDENT: 1. THIS INCIDENT IS NOT CONSIDERED AGGRAVATED SINCE IT WAS INADVERTENT AND THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION. 2. ALTHOUGH FLIGHT 2041 INFORMED CLEVELAND ATCT CONCERNING THEIR UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE AIRPORT, CLEVELAND ATCT DID NOT PROVIDE A SPECIFIC TAXI ROUTE FOR FLIGHT 2041. THE FLIGHT APPARENTLY TAXIED VIA TAXIWAY J AND BECAME CONFUSED AT THE CONFLUENCE OF TAXIWAY J, RUNWAY 28 AND RUNWAY 23L. THIS CONFUSION WAS A FACTOR IN FLIGHT 2041'S INITIATING TAKE-OFF ON THE INCORRECT RUNWAY. 3. NO PRIOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE PILOTS WERE FOUND IN THE ISIS (EIS) REPORT. 4. BOTH THE CAPTAIN (PIC) AND FIRST OFFICER (SIC) WERE GIVEN LETTERS OF WARNING. 5. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES TOOK THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: a) THE CAPTAIN WAS COUNSELED ON OCTOBER 8, 1997. b) THE CAPTAIN RECEIVED A LINE CHECK ON OCTOBER 10, 1997. c) THE CAPTAIN RECEIVED A SIMULATOR CHECK ON OCTOBER 22, 1997. d) THE CAPTAIN ATTENDED ERROR MANAGEMENT SCHOOL ON OCTOBER 30, 1997. e) THE CAPTAIN RECEIVED A TWO LEG LINE CHECK ON NOVEMBER 3, 1997, AND WAS RETURNED TO LINE DUTY. f) THE FIRST OFFICER WAS COUNSELED ON OCTOBER 10, 1997. g) THE FIRST OFFICER ATTENDED ERROR MANAGEMENT SCHOOL ON OCTOBER 14, 1997, AND WAS RETURNED TO LINE DUTY. h) THE CAPTAIN AND FIRST OFFICER, EACH RECEIVED A LETTER OF COUNSELING. 6. INSPECTOR STAMM, CLEVELAND FSDO TELEPHONICALLY DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE PIC, CAPTAIN EPPLEMAN. HIS ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE AND HE DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCIDENT.