19980203000919A

Accident · Destroyed

FAA accident report · Bell UH-1H · Savannh, TN · February 3, 1998

Date
February 3, 1998 · 08:50 local
Place
Savannh, TN
Airport
Savannah-Hardin County Airport
Phase of flight
Hovering
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Damage
Destroyed
Aircraft
N30TV
NTSB investigation
NTSBMIA98GA069
Reported as
Bell UH1H
Reported engine
Lycoming T53L13B
People aboard
3
Fatal injuries
4
Pilot’s flight hours
12,710 total380 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

Rope stringing operation. Failed to maintain control, struck pole and workman, rolled and impacted ground. (.4)helicopter (hel) was being used to string rope/wires with chief pilot (PIC) in left front seat, copilot in right front seat, & 2 observers behind pilots on either side. Witnesses observed hel approach 150' tall pole with a workman at the top. Workman was to connect a rope to a 17' line from the hel which had 600 lbs of weights attached. Foreman in charge of ground operations was observing on ground between his vehicle & the pole. He was not in radio contact with pilots, although vehicle was radio equipped. Witnesses saw hel approach workman & pole from above with hel's nose facing northwest. Wind was from 110 deg at 9 gusting 19 KTS. Observers were watching from sides of hel; right observer was providing suggested flight directions for the copilot, who was on the controls. Hel came to a high hover over the pole; workman attempted to attach the rope. Witnesses said hel descended as it drifted left & forward of pole & workman, then it began to back up & climb. Rotor blades struck pole & workman. Hel then rolled right, descended, & I mpacted ground on its right side. The hook system that was normally used for this type of operation was on another hel & was not available for this mission. Instead, a 'u' shaped swivel hook with a bolt & nut arrangement was used. The normal hook system would have allowed the workman to quickly hook the rope to the hel within seconds. Video tape showed hel hovering above workman & pole for 1-1/4 min until tape stopped (just before accident). Operation manual required 2-WAY radio communication between pilot & ground crew (unless otherwise authorized by manager of aviation services). There was no communication between pilot & ground crew from time hel was overhead until accident occurred. (-23)narrative MIA98GA069.

As the FAA filed it

ROPE STRINGING OPERATION. FAILED TO MAINTAIN CONTROL, STRUCK POLE AND WORKMAN, ROLLED AND IMPACTED GROUND. (.4)HELICOPTER (HEL) WAS BEING USED TO STRING ROPE/WIRES WITH CHIEF PILOT (PIC) IN LEFT FRONT SEAT, COPILOT IN RIGHT FRONT SEAT, & 2 OBSERVERS BEHIND PILOTS ON EITHER SIDE. WITNESSES OBSERVED HEL APPROACH 150' TALL POLE WITH A WORKMAN AT THE TOP. WORKMAN WAS TO CONNECT A ROPE TO A 17' LINE FROM THE HEL WHICH HAD 600 LBS OF WEIGHTS ATTACHED. FOREMAN IN CHARGE OF GROUND OPERATIONS WAS OBSERVING ON GROUND BETWEEN HIS VEHICLE & THE POLE. HE WAS NOT IN RADIO CONTACT WITH PILOTS, ALTHOUGH VEHICLE WAS RADIO EQUIPPED. WITNESSES SAW HEL APPROACH WORKMAN & POLE FROM ABOVE WITH HEL'S NOSE FACING NORTHWEST. WIND WAS FROM 110 DEG AT 9 GUSTING 19 KTS. OBSERVERS WERE WATCHING FROM SIDES OF HEL; RIGHT OBSERVER WAS PROVIDING SUGGESTED FLIGHT DIRECTIONS FOR THE COPILOT, WHO WAS ON THE CONTROLS. HEL CAME TO A HIGH HOVER OVER THE POLE; WORKMAN ATTEMPTED TO ATTACH THE ROPE. WITNESSES SAID HEL DESCENDED AS IT DRIFTED LEFT & FORWARD OF POLE & WORKMAN, THEN IT BEGAN TO BACK UP & CLIMB. ROTOR BLADES STRUCK POLE & WORKMAN. HEL THEN ROLLED RIGHT, DESCENDED, & I MPACTED GROUND ON ITS RIGHT SIDE. THE HOOK SYSTEM THAT WAS NORMALLY USED FOR THIS TYPE OF OPERATION WAS ON ANOTHER HEL & WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR THIS MISSION. INSTEAD, A 'U' SHAPED SWIVEL HOOK WITH A BOLT & NUT ARRANGEMENT WAS USED. THE NORMAL HOOK SYSTEM WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE WORKMAN TO QUICKLY HOOK THE ROPE TO THE HEL WITHIN SECONDS. VIDEO TAPE SHOWED HEL HOVERING ABOVE WORKMAN & POLE FOR 1-1/4 MIN UNTIL TAPE STOPPED (JUST BEFORE ACCIDENT). OPERATION MANUAL REQUIRED 2-WAY RADIO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PILOT & GROUND CREW (UNLESS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY MANAGER OF AVIATION SERVICES). THERE WAS NO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PILOT & GROUND CREW FROM TIME HEL WAS OVERHEAD UNTIL ACCIDENT OCCURRED. (-23)NARRATIVE MIA98GA069.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.