What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
Narrative: right engine failed in flight 9000 msc, VMC, 2300 fuel. Instantaneous shuddering, vibration and yaw failure. Verified w. engine instruments - then right firewall fuel fire lite illum. Secured engine - checklist, norm single engine landing in Miami. No in flight fire detected or declared. Maintenance verified that fire had occurred in #2 engine compartment. Damage from the fire was limited to the fireseal and several plastic drain tubes contained in the lower portion of the engine compartment. The fuel oil heater, engine ice vane actuator, igniter box and igniter leads were changed as a precautionary measure because, they were located in proximity of the fire. The fire was caused by fuel which sprayed out of the purge can and ignited after the engine experienced a compressor stall. The purge can was split when the engine bleed valve stuck causing a compressor stall. The stall caused excessive air pressure to enter the can which split the can. Fuel from the split can sprayed into the engine compartment where it ignited. A check valve was found failed in the open position, allowing fuel into the purge can from the fuel nozzle manifold. This can is normally pressurized with P3 air, but should not have fuel in it. Three components, a purge can p/n 129-920036-1, a bleed valve p/n 3117010-01, and a flow divider check valve p/n 3036640 were replaced. privacy data omitted The aircraft was returned to service. No further problems have been encountered. A flow divider check valve p/n 3036640 were replaced.
As the FAA filed it
NARRATIVE: RIGHT ENGINE FAILED IN FLIGHT 9000 MSC, VMC, 2300 FUEL. INSTANTANEOUS SHUDDERING, VIBRATION AND YAW FAILURE. VERIFIED W. ENGINE INSTRUMENTS - THEN RIGHT FIREWALL FUEL FIRE LITE ILLUM. SECURED ENGINE - CHECKLIST, NORM SINGLE ENGINE LANDING IN MIAMI. NO IN FLIGHT FIRE DETECTED OR DECLARED. MAINTENANCE VERIFIED THAT FIRE HAD OCCURRED IN #2 ENGINE COMPARTMENT. DAMAGE FROM THE FIRE WAS LIMITED TO THE FIRESEAL AND SEVERAL PLASTIC DRAIN TUBES CONTAINED IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT. THE FUEL OIL HEATER, ENGINE ICE VANE ACTUATOR, IGNITER BOX AND IGNITER LEADS WERE CHANGED AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE BECAUSE, THEY WERE LOCATED IN PROXIMITY OF THE FIRE. THE FIRE WAS CAUSED BY FUEL WHICH SPRAYED OUT OF THE PURGE CAN AND IGNITED AFTER THE ENGINE EXPERIENCED A COMPRESSOR STALL. THE PURGE CAN WAS SPLIT WHEN THE ENGINE BLEED VALVE STUCK CAUSING A COMPRESSOR STALL. THE STALL CAUSED EXCESSIVE AIR PRESSURE TO ENTER THE CAN WHICH SPLIT THE CAN. FUEL FROM THE SPLIT CAN SPRAYED INTO THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT WHERE IT IGNITED. A CHECK VALVE WAS FOUND FAILED IN THE OPEN POSITION, ALLOWING FUEL INTO THE PURGE CAN FROM THE FUEL NOZZLE MANIFOLD. THIS CAN IS NORMALLY PRESSURIZED WITH P3 AIR, BUT SHOULD NOT HAVE FUEL IN IT. THREE COMPONENTS, A PURGE CAN P/N 129-920036-1, A BLEED VALVE P/N 3117010-01, AND A FLOW DIVIDER CHECK VALVE P/N 3036640 WERE REPLACED. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE. NO FURTHER PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED. A FLOW DIVIDER CHECK VALVE P/N 3036640 WERE REPLACED.