What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
The pilot aborted the first takeoff due to a rough running eninge. He performed a run-up, determined that the engine seemed normal, and returned for another takeoff. After liftoff, the engine began to lose RPM and the pilot had difficulty gaining altitude. About 100 feet AGL, he turned toward a grassy area parallel to the runway. The aircraft collided with the trees and came to rest upright on the ground. The safety board conducted a run-up of the engine. No abnormal sounds were noted at 2,000 RPM, but at full throttle, the engine began to run rough and the fuel pressure gauge was at or near the low scale indication. The aircraft has a separate fuel shutoff valve independent of the fuel selector. The shutoff valve is operated by a control knob near the pilot's right knee. It was noted that the fuel shutoff valve follower handle was partially closed at the valve while the control knob was in the on position. The firewall-mounted clamp that secures the cable housing was loose and the cable housing was able to slide back and forth in the clamp. The valve could be hand actuated from the on to off position without any significant movement of the control knob. With the fuel shutoff valve properly configured and in the full on position, another engine run-up was conducted to full power with and without the auxiliary fuel pump. AD70-24-04 concerning the fuel shutoff valve was complied with in 1984 by installation of Cessna kit no. SK117-10. The fuel shutoff control knob is required to be safetied in the 'on' position. No safety wire was in place and no hole was drilled in the subject knob to accommodate the wire. (-23) on Wednesday July 29 1998, 1130 PDT, an aircraft Cessna 177-177, N177JH, departed Corona airport on runway 25. After take-off, the aircraft lost power and made a left turn back to the airport and tried to land on the grassy area south of the airport. The aircraft crashed short and received substantial damage, and there was no fire. The pilot received minor injuries and the passenger received serious injuries. During the post crash investigation, it was discovered that FAA airworthiness directive 70-24-04, to install a new heavier fuel shutoff value cable part number S2113-1, had been installed. When the replacement of the heavier fuel shutoff valve control cable, part number S2113-1 and associated parts described in either paragraphs a(4) or b of this AD (70-24-04) have been accomplished. The inspection required by this AD (70-24-04) is no longer required. Following this recommendation elimintes the possibility of inadvertently moving the valve to a closed intermediate position.
As the FAA filed it
THE PILOT ABORTED THE FIRST TAKEOFF DUE TO A ROUGH RUNNING ENINGE. HE PERFORMED A RUN-UP, DETERMINED THAT THE ENGINE SEEMED NORMAL, AND RETURNED FOR ANOTHER TAKEOFF. AFTER LIFTOFF, THE ENGINE BEGAN TO LOSE RPM AND THE PILOT HAD DIFFICULTY GAINING ALTITUDE. ABOUT 100 FEET AGL, HE TURNED TOWARD A GRASSY AREA PARALLEL TO THE RUNWAY. THE AIRCRAFT COLLIDED WITH THE TREES AND CAME TO REST UPRIGHT ON THE GROUND. THE SAFETY BOARD CONDUCTED A RUN-UP OF THE ENGINE. NO ABNORMAL SOUNDS WERE NOTED AT 2,000 RPM, BUT AT FULL THROTTLE, THE ENGINE BEGAN TO RUN ROUGH AND THE FUEL PRESSURE GAUGE WAS AT OR NEAR THE LOW SCALE INDICATION. THE AIRCRAFT HAS A SEPARATE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE INDEPENDENT OF THE FUEL SELECTOR. THE SHUTOFF VALVE IS OPERATED BY A CONTROL KNOB NEAR THE PILOT'S RIGHT KNEE. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE FOLLOWER HANDLE WAS PARTIALLY CLOSED AT THE VALVE WHILE THE CONTROL KNOB WAS IN THE ON POSITION. THE FIREWALL-MOUNTED CLAMP THAT SECURES THE CABLE HOUSING WAS LOOSE AND THE CABLE HOUSING WAS ABLE TO SLIDE BACK AND FORTH IN THE CLAMP. THE VALVE COULD BE HAND ACTUATED FROM THE ON TO OFF POSITION WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT OF THE CONTROL KNOB. WITH THE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE PROPERLY CONFIGURED AND IN THE FULL ON POSITION, ANOTHER ENGINE RUN-UP WAS CONDUCTED TO FULL POWER WITH AND WITHOUT THE AUXILIARY FUEL PUMP. AD70-24-04 CONCERNING THE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE WAS COMPLIED WITH IN 1984 BY INSTALLATION OF CESSNA KIT NO. SK117-10. THE FUEL SHUTOFF CONTROL KNOB IS REQUIRED TO BE SAFETIED IN THE 'ON' POSITION. NO SAFETY WIRE WAS IN PLACE AND NO HOLE WAS DRILLED IN THE SUBJECT KNOB TO ACCOMMODATE THE WIRE. (-23) ON WEDNESDAY JULY 29 1998, 1130 PDT, AN AIRCRAFT CESSNA 177-177, N177JH, DEPARTED CORONA AIRPORT ON RUNWAY 25. AFTER TAKE-OFF, THE AIRCRAFT LOST POWER AND MADE A LEFT TURN BACK TO THE AIRPORT AND TRIED TO LAND ON THE GRASSY AREA SOUTH OF THE AIRPORT. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED SHORT AND RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE, AND THERE WAS NO FIRE. THE PILOT RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES AND THE PASSENGER RECEIVED SERIOUS INJURIES. DURING THE POST CRASH INVESTIGATION, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT FAA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE 70-24-04, TO INSTALL A NEW HEAVIER FUEL SHUTOFF VALUE CABLE PART NUMBER S2113-1, HAD BEEN INSTALLED. WHEN THE REPLACEMENT OF THE HEAVIER FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE CONTROL CABLE, PART NUMBER S2113-1 AND ASSOCIATED PARTS DESCRIBED IN EITHER PARAGRAPHS A(4) OR B OF THIS AD (70-24-04) HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE INSPECTION REQUIRED BY THIS AD (70-24-04) IS NO LONGER REQUIRED. FOLLOWING THIS RECOMMENDATION ELIMINTES THE POSSIBILITY OF INADVERTENTLY MOVING THE VALVE TO A CLOSED INTERMEDIATE POSITION.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.