19981111032919A

Acft was taxiing to parking at gate N4 when its left wing struck the vertical stabilizer of a parked aeroflot IL62 acft. (.19) on November 11, 1998, at 0133 Alaska standard time, a Boeing 747-400 airplane, HL7414, operated as flight 221 by asiana airlines of seoul, korea, sustained substantial damage when it collided with an ilyushin IL-62 airplane. Both flights were being conducted under 14 CFR part 129 as foreign flag carriers operating in the united states. The asiana flight was taxiing to parking after landing at the Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The 18 crewmembers and 220 passengers on board the Boeing were not injured. The ilyushin was parked at gate N-2, and was being operated by aeroflot russian airlines as flight 853. It was scheduled to depart for san francisco, California, at 0230. The crew of 11, and one contract cleaner, were on board preparing for departure; the passengers for this flight had not yet boarded. The crew of the ilyushin were not injured; the cleaner on board reported a sprained wrist. The asiana flight had departed john f. kennedy international airport, new york, new york, at 1828 Alaska standard time, and the destination was anch orage. Continuous snow removal operations for the runways were in effect at the airport, and light snow was falling. At the time of the collision, witnesses stated that between one and two inches of dry snow had accumulated on the ground. When the NTSB investigator-in-charge (iic) arrived about 0230, he observed a uniform layer of about 2 inches of loose snow on the north ramp, with dry pavement underneath. The ground marshaller for the asiana airplane told the NTSB iic that as the airplane reached N-6, he observed the nosewheels turn left, but the airplane continued straight ahead, with the nosewheels sliding sideways. The marshaller stated: "I gave the emergency stop sign (crossed wands). The aircraft slowed and then I heard an increase in engine power, then a reduction in power, and then a bigger increase in power. The aircraft disappeared in a cloud of snow..." He saw the airplane continue past gate N-4, and begin a right turn, away from the gate area. He then heard the collision. The left, outboard, engine (number 1) of the Boeing struck the left wingtip of the ilyushin, and then the left wingtip struck the vertical stabilizer of the ilyushin. Several other witnesses who wer e positioned either on the N-6 jetway, or on the ground, described the Boeing 747 taxiing in faster than normal, observing the nosewheels turn and slide sideways, hearing an increase in engine noise, and seeing a snow cloud behind the Boeing 747 (statements attached). The lead mechanic for another airline, who was sitting in a ground vehicle at gate N-8, provided a written statement which said, in part: "I was waiting for the asiana 747-400 to clear the gate area, which I also had full view of.... As the asiana flight approached, I observed it execute a right turn at N8. It was passing me when I saw, and heard, surprisingly, the unmistakable sound of thrust being applied to its engines. Within 2-3 seconds, I, and my vehicle was engulfed in a massive snow "whiteout". The 747-400 completely disappeared into the cloud of snow.... I arrived on the scene exactly at the same time as the emergency people did.... I do not remember if the asiana airplane had any of its engines running when I arrived but I don't believe it did. I don't remember being in any sort of jet blast and there certainly would have been that given where I was standing. One thing I do know, is that the asiana 747 appliied power as it taxied by me." The asiana captain and first officer told the NTSB iic during two separate interviews in the asiana airport offices on November 11 (at 0300, and again at 1130), that when the captain turned the steering tiller to turn left into gate N-6, the airplane did not respond to tiller inputs, and that after passing gate N-4, they saw the ilyushin in front of them at gate N-2. The captain stated that he applied right tiller, and right side brakes to turn to the right, away from the ilyushin and the terminal, but was unable to miss striking the ilyushin. The crew indicated they then shut down all four engines, and disembarked the passengers using a stair truck. During both interviews, and all subsequent interviews, an interpreter was provided by asiana airline. The captain told the NTSB iic during the first interview on November 11, immediately after the accident that he did not use any reverse thrust, that he did not apply power, and that he kept the throttles at the idle position. He said he did not use differential power to turn. Both the captain and the first officer told the iic that the captain was manipulating the controls, not the first officer. During the second interview on November 11, both the captain and first officer indicated that the taxi speed they read from the cockpit ground speed display was 6 or 7 knots. They said that for slippery/icy taxi operations, they are limited to 10 knots or less. The captain wrote in his NTSB pilot / operator report that "ground speed was 5-6 knots. I add little power to gain momentum for the turn to N-6. However the a/c slipped to N-2 thru N-4. I tried to stop the a/c by applying brakes to no avail then the a/c continued skidding toward the parked IL-62M on N-2." The asiana crew said they did not believe there were any preimpact mechanical problems with the airplane. The lead purser on the Boeing 747 stated to the NTSB iic that when the airplane came to a stop, they did not know why. No one in the cabin felt the impact, no masks fell down, and they did not know there was an accident until the cabin occupants had deplaned. The persons in the cabin thought it was a regular stop, and expected to exit the Boeing by the normal jetway. The purser believed that it took about 20 minutes after they stopped to begin to deplane passengers via a stair truck. The crew of the ilyushin told the NTSB iic,through an interpreter provided by aeroflot, that they were in the main cabin at the time of the collision. They said that immediately after the collision, they turned off all power, and deplaned using air stairs on the right side of the airplane. (-23) see narrative #ANC99FA012A (.4)the Boeing 747-400 was taxiing to gate N-6, after landing on runway 6R. The flight crew reported to the tower that braking action on the runway was poor. While taxiing to the parking ramp, the captain commented to the first officer that the airplane was skidding. As the airplane approached gate N-6, ground personnel observed the airplane's nosewheels turn 90 degrees toward the gate, but the airplane continued straight ahead, skidding the nosewheels sideways. Ground personnel heard, and the flight data recorder confirmed, an increase in engine power as the airplane continued past the gate. The airplane was then observed turning right, away from the terminal, and colliding with a parked IL-62M airplane. A cleaning person aboard the IL-62M received minor injuries when she was knocked down by the collision. The crew told the NTSB investigator-in-charge that they did not use brakes until attempting to turn away from the parked airplane. Ground witnesses described the taxi speed as 'faster than normal.' The maximum ground speed recorded by the on-board recorders was 16 knots. The company flight manual states, in part: '(1) turning... 10 knots or below (5 knots if wet or slip pery).' Snow contamination was recorded by the airport authority commencing 11 hours prior to the accident. The airport 'snow removal plan' denotes the lead-in lines to the terminal as a priority 1-A area. Continuous snow romal operations were being conducted at the time of the accident, with all priority 1 areas, and numerous priority ii areas being plowed and treated. The lead-in taxi lines to the terminal had been sanded five hours prior tothe accident. The ramp area, and the lead-in taxi lines had not been plowed. One hour after the accident, about 2 inches of unbroken snow was on theramp.