What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
This is a report concerning the united air lines B-737-300 that went off the runway at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on 12/26/98. Ual flight 1956 lax/jac was under the command of captainprivacy data omitted and was assisted by f/oprivacy data omitted .both pilots were experienced on the B-737-300, but it was their first entry into Jackson Hole. Captainprivacy data omittedhas 9500 total flight hours, with 1737 in the B-737 type aircraft. F/o^privac^has 5500 total flight hours, with 2090 in the B-737 type aircraft. United air lines' sop's indicate that landings at Jackson Hole should be made with max flap setting for the weight and runway conditions and that auto brakes should be at level 3. The approach was initiated with flaps 40 and a vref of approximately 132 KTS with a target speed of 152 KTS. The wind was 210/16 gusting to 26. During the approach the wind gusts and approach speed caused the flaps to blow up to the 30 position. The crew elected to leave the flaps at 30 and continue the approach because of the existing conditions. The auto brakes were selected to level 3 and the auto speed brake was armed as per sop's. captainprivacy data omittedreport indicates that the braking action was fair and is verified by the Jackson Hole Airport runway condition friction measurement report ( average mu#=38.6). There was a statement made in the air carrier incident report that the pilot was informed the braking action was fair to poor and that was verfied by the ATC tape. But the Jackson Hole Airport supplementary incident report indicated the captain reported touchin down within 1000 to 2000 ft of the landing zone. The aircraft was in good working condition with no inoperative components that would impair the the aircraft's performance. Jackson Hole Airport has no operating control tower that could give the flight crews up-to-date information concerning the braking action or any other useful information. The runway length is a factor in this incident because its length it only 6305 ft with an elevation of 6445 above sea level. privacy data omitted . There were apparently no soft ware problem areas. The flight crew did not have at their disposal all the tools that could have made for a better decision, I.e.a current braking action report, a check airman experienced in th e area and in particular that airport or high altitude airport operations, training in high altitude or special airport (FAR 121.445) operations, and dispatch unable to contact the flight crew via acars in a timely manner. The denver FSDO submitted a safety recommendation concerning the Jackson Hole Airport on August 4, 1998 outlining many of these elements as potential problem areas. privacy data omitted
As the FAA filed it
THIS IS A REPORT CONCERNING THE UNITED AIR LINES B-737-300 THAT WENT OFF THE RUNWAY AT JACKSON HOLE, WYOMING ON 12/26/98. UAL FLIGHT 1956 LAX/JAC WAS UNDER THE COMMAND OF CAPTAIN^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ AND WAS ASSISTED BY F/O^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ .BOTH PILOTS WERE EXPERIENCED ON THE B-737-300, BUT IT WAS THEIR FIRST ENTRY INTO JACKSON HOLE. CAPTAIN^PRIVACY DA^HAS 9500 TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS, WITH 1737 IN THE B-737 TYPE AIRCRAFT. F/O^PRIVAC^HAS 5500 TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS, WITH 2090 IN THE B-737 TYPE AIRCRAFT. UNITED AIR LINES' SOP'S INDICATE THAT LANDINGS AT JACKSON HOLE SHOULD BE MADE WITH MAX FLAP SETTING FOR THE WEIGHT AND RUNWAY CONDITIONS AND THAT AUTO BRAKES SHOULD BE AT LEVEL 3. THE APPROACH WAS INITIATED WITH FLAPS 40 AND A VREF OF APPROXIMATELY 132 KTS WITH A TARGET SPEED OF 152 KTS. THE WIND WAS 210/16 GUSTING TO 26. DURING THE APPROACH THE WIND GUSTS AND APPROACH SPEED CAUSED THE FLAPS TO BLOW UP TO THE 30 POSITION. THE CREW ELECTED TO LEAVE THE FLAPS AT 30 AND CONTINUE THE APPROACH BECAUSE OF THE EXISTING CONDITIONS. THE AUTO BRAKES WERE SELECTED TO LEVEL 3 AND THE AUTO SPEED BRAKE WAS ARMED AS PER SOP'S. CAPTAIN^PRIVACY DATA^REPORT INDICATES THAT THE BRAKING ACTION WAS FAIR AND IS VERIFIED BY THE JACKSON HOLE AIRPORT RUNWAY CONDITION FRICTION MEASUREMENT REPORT ( AVERAGE MU#=38.6). THERE WAS A STATEMENT MADE IN THE AIR CARRIER INCIDENT REPORT THAT THE PILOT WAS INFORMED THE BRAKING ACTION WAS FAIR TO POOR AND THAT WAS VERFIED BY THE ATC TAPE. BUT THE JACKSON HOLE AIRPORT SUPPLEMENTARY INCIDENT REPORT INDICATED THE CAPTAIN REPORTED TOUCHIN DOWN WITHIN 1000 TO 2000 FT OF THE LANDING ZONE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN GOOD WORKING CONDITION WITH NO INOPERATIVE COMPONENTS THAT WOULD IMPAIR THE THE AIRCRAFT'S PERFORMANCE. JACKSON HOLE AIRPORT HAS NO OPERATING CONTROL TOWER THAT COULD GIVE THE FLIGHT CREWS UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BRAKING ACTION OR ANY OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION. THE RUNWAY LENGTH IS A FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE ITS LENGTH IT ONLY 6305 FT WITH AN ELEVATION OF 6445 ABOVE SEA LEVEL. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ . THERE WERE APPARENTLY NO SOFT WARE PROBLEM AREAS. THE FLIGHT CREW DID NOT HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL ALL THE TOOLS THAT COULD HAVE MADE FOR A BETTER DECISION, I.E.A CURRENT BRAKING ACTION REPORT, A CHECK AIRMAN EXPERIENCED IN TH E AREA AND IN PARTICULAR THAT AIRPORT OR HIGH ALTITUDE AIRPORT OPERATIONS, TRAINING IN HIGH ALTITUDE OR SPECIAL AIRPORT (FAR 121.445) OPERATIONS, AND DISPATCH UNABLE TO CONTACT THE FLIGHT CREW VIA ACARS IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE DENVER FSDO SUBMITTED A SAFETY RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE JACKSON HOLE AIRPORT ON AUGUST 4, 1998 OUTLINING MANY OF THESE ELEMENTS AS POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^
Other reports on N352UA · 1
Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.