What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(.19) On March 25, 1999, about 1139 eastern daylight time, a Grumman G-21A, N5548A, registered to tropic bird holdings inc., operating as a 14 CFR part 135 competency flight, experienced a reported loss of left engine power, and crashed into a canal about 2 miles south of fort Lauderdale executive airport, fort Lauderdale, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The airline transport pilot FAA observer sustained serious injuries. The flight originated from watson island international, miami, Florida, about 10 minutes before the accident. Review of radio transcriptions between fort Lauderdale executive air traffic control tower and N5548A revealed that N5548A initially contacted the tower at 1136:33 with the ATIS information. At 1138:06, N5548A informed the tower that he was 3 miles south for landing. The controller asked N5548A to state type of airplane. N5548A replied, "standby sir standby." At 1138:36, N5548A replied, "five five four eight alpha we'd like to declare an emergency sir ah we're two miles south." The controller informed N5548A to enter right base runway eight, cleared him to land and asked the nature of the emergency. N5548A replied at 1138:44, "ok we have a bad engine on the left side sir." The controller cleared N5548A to land again and provided the winds. There was no other recorded communication with N5548A. The FAA observer stated in an initial interview that shortly before the accident that she heard a bad engine sound and looked at the manifold pressure and RPM. She informed the pilot that there was a pasture. He stated he was going for the water. They went down like a rock turning towards the canal and crashed. Witnesses stated they saw the airplane flying towards the north at a very low altitude descending. The engines were making a loud popping sound. The airplane started a shallow turn estimated less than 45 degrees. The airplane collided with a tree and crashed into the canal. (-23) see attached sheet for a preliminary report on the accident. An amended form will follow at the conclusion of the investigation. (.4) the pilot was receiving a competency flight in the seaplane from an FAA inspector. The pilot was returning to there initial departure airport, descended to 1,000 feet, contacted the control tower for landing instructions, and was instructed to enter on a right base. Before he could acknowledge the landing instructions the engines started to make loud, rough, and unusual noises. The pilot informed the control tower that he was 2 miles south , declared an emergency, and stated he had a bad engine on the left side. The FAA inspector stated the pilot started the emergency procedure, the manifold pressure and RPM was fluctuating. The inspector could not determine the dead engine by the dead foot, dead engine method, because her rudder pedals were stowed. She pointed out a pasture and the pilot stated they were going to the water. She did not recall the pilot shutting down the engine or feathering the propeller. She could not recall the final seconds of the flight. The airplane collided with a tree, canal bank, and came to rest inverted in the canal. Examination of the airframe and flight control systems revealed no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. Examination of the left propeller revealed it was not feathered. The no. 6 front forward spark plug ignition lead was disconnected from the spark plug. The ignition lead shroud threaded coupling on the no. 4 fro nt forward spark plug was unscrewed and the carbon wire was exposed. The left and right engine were removed from the airplane and transported to an authorized FAA approved repair station. The left engine was placed in an engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. The spark plug lead was removed from the no.6 forward cylinder. The left magneto had a 125 RPM drop during the magneto check. The right magneto had a 75 RPM drop. The magneto drop exceeded the allowable drop indicated by the engine overhaul manual. The right engine was placed in a engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. Review of the FAA inspectors FAA form 4040.6 revealed she was not ebc current for the 4th quarter of the flight standards event based currency program, and she did not meet the ebc quarterly events required by the end of the 14-DAY grace period. FAA order 4040.9 states for an FAA inspector to be eligible / assigned to perform flight certification job function they must be ebc current. Managers and supervisor shall not assign and inspectors will not accept assignments without being in compliance with the FAA order. The FAA inspectors supervisor was aware that the inspector was not ebc current. He contacted the FAA safety regulation branch, FAA southern region headquarters, and stated that FAA southern region indicated that the inspector could administer the checkride. FAA southern region stated at no time did they approve or agree to an operation outside the parameters of the far's, inspector handbook or FAA order.
As the FAA filed it
(.19) ON MARCH 25, 1999, ABOUT 1139 EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME, A GRUMMAN G-21A, N5548A, REGISTERED TO TROPIC BIRD HOLDINGS INC., OPERATING AS A 14 CFR PART 135 COMPETENCY FLIGHT, EXPERIENCED A REPORTED LOSS OF LEFT ENGINE POWER, AND CRASHED INTO A CANAL ABOUT 2 MILES SOUTH OF FORT LAUDERDALE EXECUTIVE AIRPORT, FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA. VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILED AND NO FLIGHT PLAN WAS FILED. THE AIRPLANE WAS DESTROYED. THE AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT WAS FATALLY INJURED. THE AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT FAA OBSERVER SUSTAINED SERIOUS INJURIES. THE FLIGHT ORIGINATED FROM WATSON ISLAND INTERNATIONAL, MIAMI, FLORIDA, ABOUT 10 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT. REVIEW OF RADIO TRANSCRIPTIONS BETWEEN FORT LAUDERDALE EXECUTIVE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER AND N5548A REVEALED THAT N5548A INITIALLY CONTACTED THE TOWER AT 1136:33 WITH THE ATIS INFORMATION. AT 1138:06, N5548A INFORMED THE TOWER THAT HE WAS 3 MILES SOUTH FOR LANDING. THE CONTROLLER ASKED N5548A TO STATE TYPE OF AIRPLANE. N5548A REPLIED, "STANDBY SIR STANDBY." AT 1138:36, N5548A REPLIED, "FIVE FIVE FOUR EIGHT ALPHA WE'D LIKE TO DECLARE AN EMERGENCY SIR AH WE'RE TWO MILES SOUTH." THE CONTROLLER INFORMED N5548A TO ENTER RIGHT BASE RUNWAY EIGHT, CLEARED HIM TO LAND AND ASKED THE NATURE OF THE EMERGENCY. N5548A REPLIED AT 1138:44, "OK WE HAVE A BAD ENGINE ON THE LEFT SIDE SIR." THE CONTROLLER CLEARED N5548A TO LAND AGAIN AND PROVIDED THE WINDS. THERE WAS NO OTHER RECORDED COMMUNICATION WITH N5548A. THE FAA OBSERVER STATED IN AN INITIAL INTERVIEW THAT SHORTLY BEFORE THE ACCIDENT THAT SHE HEARD A BAD ENGINE SOUND AND LOOKED AT THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE AND RPM. SHE INFORMED THE PILOT THAT THERE WAS A PASTURE. HE STATED HE WAS GOING FOR THE WATER. THEY WENT DOWN LIKE A ROCK TURNING TOWARDS THE CANAL AND CRASHED. WITNESSES STATED THEY SAW THE AIRPLANE FLYING TOWARDS THE NORTH AT A VERY LOW ALTITUDE DESCENDING. THE ENGINES WERE MAKING A LOUD POPPING SOUND. THE AIRPLANE STARTED A SHALLOW TURN ESTIMATED LESS THAN 45 DEGREES. THE AIRPLANE COLLIDED WITH A TREE AND CRASHED INTO THE CANAL. (-23) SEE ATTACHED SHEET FOR A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT. AN AMENDED FORM WILL FOLLOW AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INVESTIGATION. (.4) THE PILOT WAS RECEIVING A COMPETENCY FLIGHT IN THE SEAPLANE FROM AN FAA INSPECTOR. THE PILOT WAS RETURNING TO THERE INITIAL DEPARTURE AIRPORT, DESCENDED TO 1,000 FEET, CONTACTED THE CONTROL TOWER FOR LANDING INSTRUCTIONS, AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO ENTER ON A RIGHT BASE. BEFORE HE COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE LANDING INSTRUCTIONS THE ENGINES STARTED TO MAKE LOUD, ROUGH, AND UNUSUAL NOISES. THE PILOT INFORMED THE CONTROL TOWER THAT HE WAS 2 MILES SOUTH , DECLARED AN EMERGENCY, AND STATED HE HAD A BAD ENGINE ON THE LEFT SIDE. THE FAA INSPECTOR STATED THE PILOT STARTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE, THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE AND RPM WAS FLUCTUATING. THE INSPECTOR COULD NOT DETERMINE THE DEAD ENGINE BY THE DEAD FOOT, DEAD ENGINE METHOD, BECAUSE HER RUDDER PEDALS WERE STOWED. SHE POINTED OUT A PASTURE AND THE PILOT STATED THEY WERE GOING TO THE WATER. SHE DID NOT RECALL THE PILOT SHUTTING DOWN THE ENGINE OR FEATHERING THE PROPELLER. SHE COULD NOT RECALL THE FINAL SECONDS OF THE FLIGHT. THE AIRPLANE COLLIDED WITH A TREE, CANAL BANK, AND CAME TO REST INVERTED IN THE CANAL. EXAMINATION OF THE AIRFRAME AND FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF A PRECRASH MECHANICAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION. EXAMINATION OF THE LEFT PROPELLER REVEALED IT WAS NOT FEATHERED. THE NO. 6 FRONT FORWARD SPARK PLUG IGNITION LEAD WAS DISCONNECTED FROM THE SPARK PLUG. THE IGNITION LEAD SHROUD THREADED COUPLING ON THE NO. 4 FRO NT FORWARD SPARK PLUG WAS UNSCREWED AND THE CARBON WIRE WAS EXPOSED. THE LEFT AND RIGHT ENGINE WERE REMOVED FROM THE AIRPLANE AND TRANSPORTED TO AN AUTHORIZED FAA APPROVED REPAIR STATION. THE LEFT ENGINE WAS PLACED IN AN ENGINE TEST CELL. THE ENGINE WAS STARTED, DEVELOPED RATED POWER, AND ACHIEVED TAKEOFF POWER. THE SPARK PLUG LEAD WAS REMOVED FROM THE NO.6 FORWARD CYLINDER. THE LEFT MAGNETO HAD A 125 RPM DROP DURING THE MAGNETO CHECK. THE RIGHT MAGNETO HAD A 75 RPM DROP. THE MAGNETO DROP EXCEEDED THE ALLOWABLE DROP INDICATED BY THE ENGINE OVERHAUL MANUAL. THE RIGHT ENGINE WAS PLACED IN A ENGINE TEST CELL. THE ENGINE WAS STARTED, DEVELOPED RATED POWER, AND ACHIEVED TAKEOFF POWER. REVIEW OF THE FAA INSPECTORS FAA FORM 4040.6 REVEALED SHE WAS NOT EBC CURRENT FOR THE 4TH QUARTER OF THE FLIGHT STANDARDS EVENT BASED CURRENCY PROGRAM, AND SHE DID NOT MEET THE EBC QUARTERLY EVENTS REQUIRED BY THE END OF THE 14-DAY GRACE PERIOD. FAA ORDER 4040.9 STATES FOR AN FAA INSPECTOR TO BE ELIGIBLE / ASSIGNED TO PERFORM FLIGHT CERTIFICATION JOB FUNCTION THEY MUST BE EBC CURRENT. MANAGERS AND SUPERVISOR SHALL NOT ASSIGN AND INSPECTORS WILL NOT ACCEPT ASSIGNMENTS WITHOUT BEING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAA ORDER. THE FAA INSPECTORS SUPERVISOR WAS AWARE THAT THE INSPECTOR WAS NOT EBC CURRENT. HE CONTACTED THE FAA SAFETY REGULATION BRANCH, FAA SOUTHERN REGION HEADQUARTERS, AND STATED THAT FAA SOUTHERN REGION INDICATED THAT THE INSPECTOR COULD ADMINISTER THE CHECKRIDE. FAA SOUTHERN REGION STATED AT NO TIME DID THEY APPROVE OR AGREE TO AN OPERATION OUTSIDE THE PARAMETERS OF THE FAR'S, INSPECTOR HANDBOOK OR FAA ORDER.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.
Other reports on N5548A · 1
Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.