What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(-23) Mooney lost elevator control after completing a touch and go sequence. As the acft rotated and the pilot applied full throttle, the elevator control rod end pulled loose from the elevator attachment point. The aircraft severely pitched up to an uncontrollable attitude before it started back down approx. 400 feet AGL. The aircraft nose rotated to a critical nose down attitude to approx. 100 feet AGL before starting back up. The pilot gained partial control of the aircraft by applying applicable power to the engine to maintain a near stable altitude of appro. 200 feet AGL. The aircraft had an uncontrollable slight turn to the left approx. 3 to 5 degrees per minute. The pilot initiated a descent approx. 100 feet per minute in a left turn to landing. (.4) according to the pilot, following power application after his first touch and go landing, the aircraft assumed an extremely nose high attitude, and he realized he had no pitch control, limited rudder control, and full aileron control. He was able to control pitch attitude with throttle setting, and conducted an emergency landing in a field adjacent to the airport, sus taining substantial damage. Postcrash examination revealed a disconnect in the pitch controls at the aft pitch control rod-end-to-bellcrank connection in the tailcone. Examination of the components revealed that the pitch control rod-end eye was missed when the connecting bolt was pushed through the bellcrank side plate holes. When the nut was fitted to the bolt and tightened, the result was a connection that was only a "squeezed", friction fit. About 12 flight hours before the accident, on October 24, 2000, the aircraft underwent a 100-hour inspection, at which time the following was entered in the logbook, "checked all control push rods and rod end bearings. Lubricated flight controls". On April 24, 1980, Mooney aircraft corporation recognized a potential for a misconnection between the rod end and the bellcrank and promulgated service instruction M20-44, which had not been accomplished on this aircraft.
As the FAA filed it
(-23) MOONEY LOST ELEVATOR CONTROL AFTER COMPLETING A TOUCH AND GO SEQUENCE. AS THE ACFT ROTATED AND THE PILOT APPLIED FULL THROTTLE, THE ELEVATOR CONTROL ROD END PULLED LOOSE FROM THE ELEVATOR ATTACHMENT POINT. THE AIRCRAFT SEVERELY PITCHED UP TO AN UNCONTROLLABLE ATTITUDE BEFORE IT STARTED BACK DOWN APPROX. 400 FEET AGL. THE AIRCRAFT NOSE ROTATED TO A CRITICAL NOSE DOWN ATTITUDE TO APPROX. 100 FEET AGL BEFORE STARTING BACK UP. THE PILOT GAINED PARTIAL CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT BY APPLYING APPLICABLE POWER TO THE ENGINE TO MAINTAIN A NEAR STABLE ALTITUDE OF APPRO. 200 FEET AGL. THE AIRCRAFT HAD AN UNCONTROLLABLE SLIGHT TURN TO THE LEFT APPROX. 3 TO 5 DEGREES PER MINUTE. THE PILOT INITIATED A DESCENT APPROX. 100 FEET PER MINUTE IN A LEFT TURN TO LANDING. (.4) ACCORDING TO THE PILOT, FOLLOWING POWER APPLICATION AFTER HIS FIRST TOUCH AND GO LANDING, THE AIRCRAFT ASSUMED AN EXTREMELY NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE, AND HE REALIZED HE HAD NO PITCH CONTROL, LIMITED RUDDER CONTROL, AND FULL AILERON CONTROL. HE WAS ABLE TO CONTROL PITCH ATTITUDE WITH THROTTLE SETTING, AND CONDUCTED AN EMERGENCY LANDING IN A FIELD ADJACENT TO THE AIRPORT, SUS TAINING SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE. POSTCRASH EXAMINATION REVEALED A DISCONNECT IN THE PITCH CONTROLS AT THE AFT PITCH CONTROL ROD-END-TO-BELLCRANK CONNECTION IN THE TAILCONE. EXAMINATION OF THE COMPONENTS REVEALED THAT THE PITCH CONTROL ROD-END EYE WAS MISSED WHEN THE CONNECTING BOLT WAS PUSHED THROUGH THE BELLCRANK SIDE PLATE HOLES. WHEN THE NUT WAS FITTED TO THE BOLT AND TIGHTENED, THE RESULT WAS A CONNECTION THAT WAS ONLY A "SQUEEZED", FRICTION FIT. ABOUT 12 FLIGHT HOURS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, ON OCTOBER 24, 2000, THE AIRCRAFT UNDERWENT A 100-HOUR INSPECTION, AT WHICH TIME THE FOLLOWING WAS ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK, "CHECKED ALL CONTROL PUSH RODS AND ROD END BEARINGS. LUBRICATED FLIGHT CONTROLS". ON APRIL 24, 1980, MOONEY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION RECOGNIZED A POTENTIAL FOR A MISCONNECTION BETWEEN THE ROD END AND THE BELLCRANK AND PROMULGATED SERVICE INSTRUCTION M20-44, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ON THIS AIRCRAFT.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.