20010309004669A

(-23) At 1801 hours March 9, 2001, an N48DD, Hawker siddeley DH125-3A, serial number 25115 touchdown on runway 6 bravo at Igor I. Sikorsky memorial airport (bdr) with 3200 feet of runway remaining per the observation made by the bdr ATC tower on the "aircraft accident/incident preliminary notice" FAA form 8020-9 after departing bdl. The actual length of runway 6 (bdr) is 4677' per the us government flight information publication "airport/facility directory" northeast us (effective 0901Z.25 January 2001. The accident occurred during landing roll-out exiting runway 6 through an airport blast fence onto an adjacent road that is positioned perpendicular to runway 6. The final position of the aircraft (post accident) had approx. half the length of the a/c fuselage on the adjacent road unsupported due to a collapsed nose landing gear strut and one deflated nose tire. The landing gear nose assembly was positioned 90 degrees perpendicular to the nose structure bulkhead. The sing structure of the a/c (both left and right) had penetrated the blastt fence approx. 2' to 3' in the aft direction. (.19) on March 9, 2001, about 1401 eastern standard time, a Hawker siddeley HS-125-3A, N48DD, was substantially damaged when it overran the runway while landing at the Igor I. Sikorsky memorial airport (bdr), Bridgeport, Connecticut. The two certificated airline transport pilots were not injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that originated from bradley international airport, windsor locks, Connecticut. The positioning flight was conducted under 14 CFR part 91. According to the pilot-in-command (PIC), the copilot was flying the airplane at the time of the accident. An ILS to runway 6 was executed and the airplane descended out of the overcast clouds about 400 feet above the ground. The runway appeared dry, with blowing snow across it, and the approach was continued. As the airplane touched down on the runway, the copilot stated that she did not have any braking effectiveness, and the PIC selected the "dump flaps" to slow the airplane. The airplane continued down the runway and did not seem to be slowing to a safe speed. The flightcrew observed the 1,000 foot remaining marker approaching, and the copilot selected the emergency brakes. After she felt a lack of deceleration, the copilot selected the parking brake. The airplane continued off the departure end of the runway, impacted a non-frangible fence, and came to rest with about 4 feet of the airplane protruding onto a public access road. A witness was driving on a road located about 1/4 mile prior to runway 6, about the time of the accident. The witness stated that he observed a jet airplane on approach to the airport. The witness estimated that the airplane crossed over the threshold of the runway at an altitude of about 100 feet, and about 125 feet to the right of the runway centerline. As the witness continued to observe the airplane, it banked to the left about 10-15 degrees and became aligned with the centerline of the runway. The witness thought he would see the airplane execute a missed approach, but it continued to fly down the runway, about a "gear length" above the runway. The witness did not observe the airplane touchdown on the runway, due to the snow obscuring the visibility, which he estimated as 3/4 mile. The witness estimated the speed of the airplane, as he observed it landing, was "hot", but he could not estimate a numerical value. A pilot, who was flying a Piper PA-31 the day of the accident, stated that he had flown the ILS to runway 6 just prior to the accident airplane and was asked by air traffic control (ATC) to "keep his speed up" for a trailing airplane. The pilot recalled that the weather conditions were, visibility of about 1/2 - 3/4 mile, with a "ragged" ceiling of 250-300 feet. After landing, the pilot was queried by the ATC tower for a braking action report, which the pilot replied, "good." The pilot additionally stated that the conditions on runway were "slushy" with snow accumulations towards the middle of the runway. After the pilot parked his airplane, he observed that it was snowing very heavy at times, with wet heavy snowflakes. An airport operations officer stated that he was instructed to conduct a braking action test on runway 6 after the accident. The test was conducted using a vehicle, at a speed of 40 mph. He reported the braking action as "good" for the first, second, and third portions of the runway. The officer also observed 1/8 - 1/4 inch of slush patches on the runway surface. After the accident, a federal aviation administration (FAA) inspector interviewed the air traffic controller who had issued the landing clearance for the airplane. The controller stated that he observed the airplane touch down on runway 6 abeam taxiway "bravo," with 3,200 feet remaining. On landing rollout, slush was observed "spraying" from the airplane, which extended 5 feet from the airplane. The controller did not observe the airplane impact the non-frangible fence due to the obscured visibility from snow. The controller added that the airplane "landed at a high rate of speed." The airplane was examined on March 12, 2001 by a safety board investigator and the FAA inspector. The emergency brake lever located in the cockpit was in the release position. The accumulator pressure was full scale high. When the emergency brake was selected, a "squishing sound" was heard and the brake pads of the left and right main landing gear were observed to move. The emergency brake was then released. The brake pedals on the left and right side of the cockpit were applied individually. Each time pressure was applied to a brake pedal, a "squishing sound" was heard and the brake pads of the respective main landing gear were observed to move. The weather recorded at bdr, at 1354 was, winds from 080 degrees at 5 knots, 3/4 mile visibility, light snow and mist, overcast skies at 300 feet, and a temperature of 34 degrees fahrenheit. The bdr operations office issued a NOTAM at 1143 for "thin wet snow all surfaces." No further NOTAMS were issued that related to runway surface conditions. (.4) arriving in the Bridgeport airport area, the pilot-in-command (PIC) received the ATIS, which stated that the visibility was 1/2-mile with snow and fog. The ILS runway 06 approach was in use. Braking action advisories were in effect, and all surfaces were covered with thin wet snow. During the approach to the airport, with the second-in-command (SIC) at the controls, the PIC visually observed that the hydraulic pressure gauge, "smiley face," was normal, and he performed a "brake test." The tower controller advised the flightcrew that a navajo had just landed and reported a 250-foot ceiling, 3/4 miles of visibility, and that the runway braking action was "good." On final approach, the airplane broke out of the overcast clouds about 400 feet above the ground. The runway appeared dry, with only blowing snow acros s it. As the airplane touched down about 1,463 feet beyond the approach end of the 4,677-foot long runway on the runway, the SIC stated that she did not have any braking effectiveness, and selected the "dump flaps" to slow the airplane. The airplane continued down the runway and did not seem to be slowing to a safe speed. The flightcrew observed the 1,000-foot marker approaching and the SIC selected the emergency brakes. After she felt a lack of deceleration, the SIC selected the parking brake. The airplane continued off the end of the runway, impacted a non-frangible fence, and came to rest with about 4 feet of the airplane protruding onto a public access road. Examination of the airplane revealed a reference speed set on the pilot's airspeed indicator of 117 knots. According to the Hawker siddeley HS-125 airplane flight manual (AFM) performance section, the uncorrected landing distance, on a dry runway, at the estimated landing weight of the airplane was approximately 2,610 feet. The AFM performance section also had a chart for the "effect of slippery runway on landing distance." The chart determined that the "equivalent scheduled landing distance available," was approximately 2,150 feet. According to airport records, a NOTAM was issued the day of the accident, which referenced the condition of the runway surfaces as having "thin wet snow all surfaces." An air traffic controller observed slush "spraying" from the airplane, which extended 5 feet from the airplane, as the airplane rolled out. The airplane's braking system was tested after the accident and no abnormalities were noted.