What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(.19) On July 12, 2001, about 0745 eastern daylight time, a Taylorcraft F21B, N4418U, was substantially damaged while landing at the Simsbury Airport, Simsbury, Connecticut. The certificated flight instructor (CFI) and student pilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local instructional flight conducted under 14 CFR part 91. According to a federal aviation administration inspector, the airplane was executing touch and go's on runway 03, a 2,205 foot long, 50 foot wide, asphalt runway. After touchdown, the airplane ground looped, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. The winds reported at a nearby airport, about the time of the accident, were from 320 degrees at 10 knots. (-23) found Maule anti-shimmy connector springs (high and low frequency springs) rigging loose. Both springs p/n 06-15150 were found slack. Rudder horn to rudder attach bolts also found elongated - 2" left to right play at rudder trailing edge before response to tailwheel. (.4) according to the CFI, the private pilot was executing touch and go's on runway 03. During the third landing, after touchdown, the airplane's tail wheel began to "chatter." The airplane started to veer to the right and did not respond to left rudder or brake inputs by the CFI, who had taken over the controls. The airplane then departed the right side of the runway and nosed over. Examination of the airplane revealed that the high and low frequency anti-shimmy compression springs on the tailwheel assembly "had slack." The "slack" allowed for about 2 inches of rudder movement before the compression springs became effective. Review of the airplane's maintenance records revealed that it had seven annual inspections performed after the installation of the tailwheel assembly. The most recent annual inspection was conducted about four months prior to the accident, and the airplane had accumulated about 15 hours of operation since. According to FAA regulations, appendix d of part 43, scope and detail of items to be included in annual and 100-hour inspections, each person performing an annual or 100-hour inspection shall inspect all units of the landing gear group for poor condition and insecurity of attachment. The winds reported at a nearby airport, about the time of the accident, were from 320 degrees at 10 knots.
As the FAA filed it
(.19) ON JULY 12, 2001, ABOUT 0745 EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME, A TAYLORCRAFT F21B, N4418U, WAS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED WHILE LANDING AT THE SIMSBURY AIRPORT, SIMSBURY, CONNECTICUT. THE CERTIFICATED FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR (CFI) AND STUDENT PILOT WERE NOT INJURED. VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILED AND NO FLIGHT PLAN WAS FILED FOR THE LOCAL INSTRUCTIONAL FLIGHT CONDUCTED UNDER 14 CFR PART 91. ACCORDING TO A FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION INSPECTOR, THE AIRPLANE WAS EXECUTING TOUCH AND GO'S ON RUNWAY 03, A 2,205 FOOT LONG, 50 FOOT WIDE, ASPHALT RUNWAY. AFTER TOUCHDOWN, THE AIRPLANE GROUND LOOPED, NOSED OVER, AND CAME TO REST INVERTED. THE WINDS REPORTED AT A NEARBY AIRPORT, ABOUT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, WERE FROM 320 DEGREES AT 10 KNOTS. (-23) FOUND MAULE ANTI-SHIMMY CONNECTOR SPRINGS (HIGH AND LOW FREQUENCY SPRINGS) RIGGING LOOSE. BOTH SPRINGS P/N 06-15150 WERE FOUND SLACK. RUDDER HORN TO RUDDER ATTACH BOLTS ALSO FOUND ELONGATED - 2" LEFT TO RIGHT PLAY AT RUDDER TRAILING EDGE BEFORE RESPONSE TO TAILWHEEL. (.4) ACCORDING TO THE CFI, THE PRIVATE PILOT WAS EXECUTING TOUCH AND GO'S ON RUNWAY 03. DURING THE THIRD LANDING, AFTER TOUCHDOWN, THE AIRPLANE'S TAIL WHEEL BEGAN TO "CHATTER." THE AIRPLANE STARTED TO VEER TO THE RIGHT AND DID NOT RESPOND TO LEFT RUDDER OR BRAKE INPUTS BY THE CFI, WHO HAD TAKEN OVER THE CONTROLS. THE AIRPLANE THEN DEPARTED THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE RUNWAY AND NOSED OVER. EXAMINATION OF THE AIRPLANE REVEALED THAT THE HIGH AND LOW FREQUENCY ANTI-SHIMMY COMPRESSION SPRINGS ON THE TAILWHEEL ASSEMBLY "HAD SLACK." THE "SLACK" ALLOWED FOR ABOUT 2 INCHES OF RUDDER MOVEMENT BEFORE THE COMPRESSION SPRINGS BECAME EFFECTIVE. REVIEW OF THE AIRPLANE'S MAINTENANCE RECORDS REVEALED THAT IT HAD SEVEN ANNUAL INSPECTIONS PERFORMED AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF THE TAILWHEEL ASSEMBLY. THE MOST RECENT ANNUAL INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED ABOUT FOUR MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT, AND THE AIRPLANE HAD ACCUMULATED ABOUT 15 HOURS OF OPERATION SINCE. ACCORDING TO FAA REGULATIONS, APPENDIX D OF PART 43, SCOPE AND DETAIL OF ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN ANNUAL AND 100-HOUR INSPECTIONS, EACH PERSON PERFORMING AN ANNUAL OR 100-HOUR INSPECTION SHALL INSPECT ALL UNITS OF THE LANDING GEAR GROUP FOR POOR CONDITION AND INSECURITY OF ATTACHMENT. THE WINDS REPORTED AT A NEARBY AIRPORT, ABOUT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, WERE FROM 320 DEGREES AT 10 KNOTS.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.