What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(-23) On may 29, 2002, at 1400 hours EDT, a Piper PA-23-250, N6597Y, registered to airline training academy, inc, experienced an aborted take-off and hard landing at the st. Petersburg-Clearwater international airport (pie), Clearwater, Florida, while on a training flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an IFR flight plan was filed. The aircraft sustained minor damage and the commercial-rated pilot and commercial-rated safety pilot/passenger were not injured. The flight originated at Clearwater, Florida at 1400 hours. The aircraft departed the orlando executive airport (orl) earlier in the day with two commercial pilots on board to practice cross-country IFR procedures. After landing at pie, the pilots changed seat positions, accomplished the before-takeoff checklist and run-up and took off on runway 35 right. After takeoff, at approximately 50 feet AGL over the runway, the cabin door popped open. The right seat pilot called for an aborted takeoff as per their preflight briefing. The pilot in command closed the throttles and landed hard on the runway in a nose-down, right-wing-down attitude. The right prop contacted the runway surface and shed a three-inch by one-inch section of the prop blade tip. The blade tip section traveled through the right side of the fuselage without damaging any systems or causing injury to the right seat pilot. The prop tip section was found on the cockpit floor forward of the right seat. Prior to departing orl, the right seat pilot closed and latched the cabin door and checked it for security by appling pressure to the inside. Prior to departing pie, the door was checked visually, but neither pilot could recall if the security of the door was checked beyond a visual check of the handle position. The aircraft maintenance records indicated repeated problems with the door latching mechanism, including instances of the door coming open in flight. The aircraft is used in a training environment and, by design, does not tolerae rough handling or out-of-sequence closing/latching procedures. The built-in safety mechanism can be easily overriden by manually moving the inside door handle to the open position without first pulling up on the latch knob. This effectively changes the door latch rigging. The top door pin required adjustment and the latching mechanism required lubrication subsequent to the incident.
As the FAA filed it
(-23) ON MAY 29, 2002, AT 1400 HOURS EDT, A PIPER PA-23-250, N6597Y, REGISTERED TO AIRLINE TRAINING ACADEMY, INC, EXPERIENCED AN ABORTED TAKE-OFF AND HARD LANDING AT THE ST. PETERSBURG-CLEARWATER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (PIE), CLEARWATER, FLORIDA, WHILE ON A TRAINING FLIGHT. VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILED AT THE TIME AND AN IFR FLIGHT PLAN WAS FILED. THE AIRCRAFT SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE AND THE COMMERCIAL-RATED PILOT AND COMMERCIAL-RATED SAFETY PILOT/PASSENGER WERE NOT INJURED. THE FLIGHT ORIGINATED AT CLEARWATER, FLORIDA AT 1400 HOURS. THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTED THE ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT (ORL) EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH TWO COMMERCIAL PILOTS ON BOARD TO PRACTICE CROSS-COUNTRY IFR PROCEDURES. AFTER LANDING AT PIE, THE PILOTS CHANGED SEAT POSITIONS, ACCOMPLISHED THE BEFORE-TAKEOFF CHECKLIST AND RUN-UP AND TOOK OFF ON RUNWAY 35 RIGHT. AFTER TAKEOFF, AT APPROXIMATELY 50 FEET AGL OVER THE RUNWAY, THE CABIN DOOR POPPED OPEN. THE RIGHT SEAT PILOT CALLED FOR AN ABORTED TAKEOFF AS PER THEIR PREFLIGHT BRIEFING. THE PILOT IN COMMAND CLOSED THE THROTTLES AND LANDED HARD ON THE RUNWAY IN A NOSE-DOWN, RIGHT-WING-DOWN ATTITUDE. THE RIGHT PROP CONTACTED THE RUNWAY SURFACE AND SHED A THREE-INCH BY ONE-INCH SECTION OF THE PROP BLADE TIP. THE BLADE TIP SECTION TRAVELED THROUGH THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE FUSELAGE WITHOUT DAMAGING ANY SYSTEMS OR CAUSING INJURY TO THE RIGHT SEAT PILOT. THE PROP TIP SECTION WAS FOUND ON THE COCKPIT FLOOR FORWARD OF THE RIGHT SEAT. PRIOR TO DEPARTING ORL, THE RIGHT SEAT PILOT CLOSED AND LATCHED THE CABIN DOOR AND CHECKED IT FOR SECURITY BY APPLING PRESSURE TO THE INSIDE. PRIOR TO DEPARTING PIE, THE DOOR WAS CHECKED VISUALLY, BUT NEITHER PILOT COULD RECALL IF THE SECURITY OF THE DOOR WAS CHECKED BEYOND A VISUAL CHECK OF THE HANDLE POSITION. THE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE RECORDS INDICATED REPEATED PROBLEMS WITH THE DOOR LATCHING MECHANISM, INCLUDING INSTANCES OF THE DOOR COMING OPEN IN FLIGHT. THE AIRCRAFT IS USED IN A TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AND, BY DESIGN, DOES NOT TOLERAE ROUGH HANDLING OR OUT-OF-SEQUENCE CLOSING/LATCHING PROCEDURES. THE BUILT-IN SAFETY MECHANISM CAN BE EASILY OVERRIDEN BY MANUALLY MOVING THE INSIDE DOOR HANDLE TO THE OPEN POSITION WITHOUT FIRST PULLING UP ON THE LATCH KNOB. THIS EFFECTIVELY CHANGES THE DOOR LATCH RIGGING. THE TOP DOOR PIN REQUIRED ADJUSTMENT AND THE LATCHING MECHANISM REQUIRED LUBRICATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT.