20030903029909I

(-23) On 3 September 2003 inspector was notified by o'Hare regional center and his supervisor Mr. Martinez that an accident had occurred at o'Hare international airport at atlantic coast airlines (aca). Inspector was informed by Mr. Martinez to contact Mr. Tim sorenson of the NTSB and Mr. Joe hexter aca's director of safety. Mr. Sorenson was contacted immediately by phone and informed inspector to contact him upon arrival at ord airport. Next Mr. Hexter was contacted, he provided inspector with a point of contact at thier ord facility his name was Mr. John coffield. Mr. Huxter stated that any information I needed concerning this occurrence feel free to contact himself or Mr. Coffield. At 18:30 inspector arrived at atlantic coast airlines (aca) line maintenance office PIC charles galton, f/o michael roth, Mr. Freddy peratta, MS. Kristain falasca, and Mr. Wayon davis were not available for interview. Inspector was met by Mr. John coffield aca's director of operation. Mr. Coffield briefed inspector that, Mr. Perrata the push back tractor operator for aircraft N665BR elected to proceed with the push back with only one wing walker, MS. Falasca. Simultaneous to the start of the push, driver of baggage tractor DH-54 Mr. Davis arrived planeside to drop-off 3 bags for that flight. While he was verifying the tail number on his run sheet, aircraft N665BR was pushed into his bag tractor. Mr. Coffield stated that the aircraft sustained minimal damage but the baggage tractor was severely damaged and the only injury sustained was on the right hand of the tractor driver which required several stitches on one finger. No other injuries were reported. Mr. Coffield also informed inspector that there was one wing walker on the right side of the aircraft and all personnel involved in this occurrence were sent for drug testing. Mr. Coffield provided inspector with copies of photos of the occurrence, written statements from each ramp crew member involved in the occurrence, aca's written statements from each ramp crew member involved in the occurrence, aca's aircraft ground equipment incident report, flight crew certificate information, and aircraft information. Mr. Coffield informed inspector that aircraft N665BR and the damaged tug had been moved to the aca maintenance hangar and quarantined pending faa/ntsb release. He also stated that the company was awaiting release to start working on aircraft N665BR as soon as it was released from quarantine. Next inspector went to the aca's maintenance hangar where he inspected and took phots of aircraft N665BR. He inspected and photographed the damage to the left wing winglet, lt outboard trailing edge, and a lower wind fairing assembly. After completing the inspection of aircraft N665BR inspector released the aircraft back to aca to start repairs after making a preliminary assessment of the accident scene, aircraft, and the baggage tractor inspector contacted Mr. Sorenson and provided him preliminary details on who, what, where and when this incident occurred. After the inspection of aircraft N665BR was complete, inspector inspected and took photos of the damage to bag tractor DH-54. Inspector observed that the front windshield was shattered, the drivers side of the cab area was crushed in and back towards the driver side seat on the left hand side, the steering wheel was bent down and back toward the drivers seat and shards of glass were scattered throughout the cab. After inspector hill completed inspecting baggage tractor D-54, he released it back to the aca. On 4 September inspector returned to aca's o'Hare iap gate F2B to view incident scene in the daylight, to photo skid marks left by baggage tractor DH-54 and to view the push back procedure at gate FB2. From inspector's observation of aca's push back procedure at gate F2B, inspector identified the blind spot for the tug driver. Next inspector went to aca's line station and reviewed the companies push back procedure. Aca's push back procedure only required one wing walker and the second wing walker was optional. After completing the review, inspector determined that aca's push back procedure was inadequate for operations at o'Hare iap, because of the extremely high traffic volume at ord one wing walker is not able to ensure wing clearance or verify the absence ground activity on the other side of the aircraft. Inspector contacted Mr. Huxter and Mr. Coffield to discuss his safety concern and the inadequacy of the aca's push back procedure for ord operations. Both Mr. Huxter and Mr. Coffield agreed to have the aca's push back procedure for ord operations changed to two wing walkers required at ord. Mr. Coffield put out a company memo to all supervisors that effective immediately all push backs will be accomplished at ord with two wing walkers. He has also requested a change be made in the aca's ord station procedure. During a recent follow up on aca, inspector noted that aca is using two wing walker's on push backs. Inspector also contacted the aca's certificate management team (cmt) and aca's safety office to determine the status of the agreed upon manual change. Aca's cmt and safety office acknowledged that the change to the ord pushback procedure had been submitted, accepted and implemented. No further investigation required by this ASI.