20050111001659A

Accident · Substantial damage

FAA accident report · Cessna 172M · Orlando, FL · January 11, 2005

Date
January 11, 2005 · 16:47 local
Place
Orlando, FL
Phase of flight
Fcd/Prec Ldg From Cruise
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Damage
Substantial damage
Aircraft
N9336H
NTSB investigation
NTSBMIA05LA046
Reported as
Cessna 172M
Reported engine
Lycoming O320E2D
People aboard
1
Fatal injuries
1
Pilot’s flight hours
1,620 total

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

(-23) On January 11, 2005 at approximately 1647 local time, Cessna 172, N9336H, collided with wires and a concrete power pole approximately 4 NM northwest of Orlando executive airport, Orlando, Florida, following a reported loss of engine power and subsequent emergency landing. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and no flight plan was required or filed for the 14 CFR part 91 instructional flight that originated from Orlando executive airport at approximately 15:26 local time. N9336H was substantially damaged, and privacy data omitted the flight instructor aboard the aircraft, was fatally injured. privacy data omitted A commercially rated pilot, who was receiving instruction aboard the aircraft, was seriously injured. According to the pilot privacy data omitted during an interview on 01-20-2005 with FAA inspectors privacy data omitted the instructional flight for the purpose of preparing the pilot privacy data omitted for his commercial pilot airplane single engine land additional rating had proceeded normally until, at a location approximately 8 NM northwest of Orlando executive airport, both he and privacy data omitted smelled hot oil. The pilot ^PR^ privacy data omitted ^ stated that he quickly looked at the engine oil pressure gauge and that such gauge indicated zero oil pressure. However, he indicated that he did not see any evidence of oil on the windshield or sides of the aircraft. The pilot privacy data omitted stated that he looked back to the northwest of their position to locate Orlando county airport, but did not see the airport. privacy data omitted Then called Orlando executive tower to advise the controller that they were 8 NM northwest of the airport with no oil pressure, and requested to make a straight-in approach to runway 13, which was approved by the controller. According to Orlando executive airport air traffic control tapes, such call was made at 1639:27. The pilot privacy data omitted indicated that he remained at the flight controls and initiated a climb to 2,000 feet MSL while maintaining a course directly to runway 13 at Orlando executive airport. As he approached the airport, he stated that he began a descent and at a position of approximately 4 NM northwest of the airport and at an altitude of 1,500 feet MSL, the aircraft engine of N9336H began to vibrate and then failed with the propeller stopping in a horizontal position. According to the pilot privacy data omitted immediately took command of the flight controls and then called Orlando executive tower to advise the controller of the engine failure. Orlando executive air traffic control tapes indicate that at 1644:39, a transmission from privacy data omitted stated that "niner three three six hotel just had an engine failure, looks like we are coming in on runway one three". The controller cleared N9336H to land on runway 13, and advised that the wind was from zero nine zero at five knots. At 1645:01, a transmission from privacy data omitted stated "doesn't look like we are going to make the runway so we are going to turn around for the golf course." According to the pilot privacy data omitted maneuvered N9336H towards the dubstread golf course, which was to the left of the aircraft when the engine failed. The pilot privacy data omitted stated that they saw three fairways that might be suitable for landing and that privacy data omitted asked him which one he thought they should use. The pilot privacy data omitted indicated that he told privacy data omitted that he thought they should land on the "big one", and that privacy data omitted continued to maneuver N9336H in a left turn toward the golf co urse, making several "s-turns" to lose altitude. Radar data from Orlando approach control indicates that at 1644:31, N9336H was on a heading of 111 degrees and an altitude of 1,500 feet. At 1645:04, N9336H was on a heading of 120 degrees and an altitude of 1,300 feet. From that point, radar data indicates that N9336H made a left turn from a heading of 120 degrees until radar data was lost at an altitude of 600 feet, a heading of 300 degrees, and a ground speed of 77 knots. The pilot privacy data omitted stated that as N9336H approached the golf course fairways from an easterly to westerly direction, it appeared that the aircraft was going to overfly the point of intended landing. When asked by inspector ^priva^ if privacy data omitted attempted to "slip" the airplane in order to dissipate altitude, the pilot privacy data omitted stated "no". The pilot privacy data omitted further stated that as N9336H crossed the trees at the easterly end of the golf course fairways, the aircraft was too high and privacy data omitted continued to maneuver the aircraft in an attempt to find a suitable location to land. While still airborne, and near the westerly end of the golf course property, the left wing of N9336H struck wires, which caused the aircraft to rotate approximately 90 degrees to the right as seen from the cockpit. The right wing tip struck the ground and N9336H then struck a concrete power pole, coming to rest at an angle of approximately 70 degrees from horizontal and on a heading of approximately 270 degrees. The aircraft remained partially suspended in the air due to the left wing's entanglement with a street light fixture attached to the concrete pole, and the right wing's embedment into the ground. According to the pilot privacy data omitted he did not see the wires that the left wing of N9336H struck until after contact with such wires, and he does not remember the aircraft hitting the power pole. Additional information regarding the sequence of events as described above was captured on videotape by a television station news helicopter. At 1645:34, the Orlando executive tower controller asked news helicopter "sky six" if they had contact with a Cessna (N9336H), which was about one and a half miles northwest of their position. Sky six reported the Cessna (N9336H) in sight. The controller asked sky six to track the aircraft. Sky six maneuvered to follow N9336H, and the cameraman aboard sky six was able to capture the accident sequence on videotape. Viewing of such videotape confirms the details of the wire strike and impact with the power pole by N9336H as described therein. Following an on scene investigation by FAA inspector privacy data omitted during the evening of 01-11-2005, inspector ^priva^ accompanied N9336H as such aircraft was recovered to a hangar at Orlando executive airport. Such hangar was secured and N9336H remained in the continual custody of the ntsb/faa. On 01-13-2005, the engine and engine components of N9336H was disassembled and inspected for the purpose of determining the cause of the engine failure. Such inspection occurred at Orlando executive airport and was conducted by FAA inspectors privacy data omitted NTSB investigator privacy data omitted Lycoming engine representative privacy data omitted and Cessna aircraft representative privacy data omitted the engine of N9336H was found to have ten ounces of engine oil remaining in the sump. One of the number two piston connecting rod retaining cap bolts was found to have failed due to high heat and stress consistent with lack of lubrication, which allowed the connecting rod to separate from the crankshaft, causing e ngine failure. Such engine was fully disassembled and inspected and the only cause of lack of lubrication was determined to be insufficient oil (ten ounces) remaining in the engine sump. All flexible oil lines and the oil cooler of N9336H were removed for testing. Fittings were adapted individually to each oil line and the oil cooler so that each component could be tested by carefully introducing regulated air pressure. All components tested satisfactorily except the engine to oil cooler flexible hose assembly, subsequently identified as Cessna part number S1167-6-C260, which immediately began to leak as soon as the slightest amount of air pressure (0-5 PSI) was applied within the hose. Accordingly, it was determined by the investigators conducting the inspection that the leak in the flexible hose assembly described herein caused the engine oil of N9336H to be pumped from the engine during flight, leading to insufficient oil quantity within the engine, and subsequent engine failure as described above. A careful inspection of such flexible oil hose revealed that the date of manufacturer was indicated as third quarter, 1981. This oil hose assembly was sent to the national transportation safety board laboratory in Washington, DC for further evaluation. A review of the maintenance logbooks of N9336H revealed that all flexible oil hoses were replaced on 08-27-1982, which is consistent with the third quarter, 1981 date found on the failed oil hose described above. The Cessna 172 maintenance manual contains a component time limits section, which specifies that all oil cooler flexible hose assemblies be replaced every five years or at engine overhaul. There are no other logbook entries of N9336H indicating replacement of such hoses past 08-27-1982. According to logbook entries, the engine of N9336H was last overhauled on 03-09-2001, and installed in the airframe of N9336H on 03-10-2001. The logbook entry for installation of such engine does not indicate that any oil cooler hoses were replaced. privacy data omitted Signed the engine installation logbook entry described above. privacy data omitted Has peformed, or supervised, the maintenance performed on N9336H since January 27, 2000, to include all annual inspections through the current annual inspection. Maintenance records and physical evidence indicate that replacement of the oil cooler hoses on N9336H was not accomplished by maintenance personnel as required by federal aviation regulations.

As the FAA filed it

(-23) ON JANUARY 11, 2005 AT APPROXIMATELY 1647 LOCAL TIME, CESSNA 172, N9336H, COLLIDED WITH WIRES AND A CONCRETE POWER POLE APPROXIMATELY 4 NM NORTHWEST OF ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT, ORLANDO, FLORIDA, FOLLOWING A REPORTED LOSS OF ENGINE POWER AND SUBSEQUENT EMERGENCY LANDING. VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILED AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND NO FLIGHT PLAN WAS REQUIRED OR FILED FOR THE 14 CFR PART 91 INSTRUCTIONAL FLIGHT THAT ORIGINATED FROM ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT AT APPROXIMATELY 15:26 LOCAL TIME. N9336H WAS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED, AND ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT, WAS FATALLY INJURED. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ A COMMERCIALLY RATED PILOT, WHO WAS RECEIVING INSTRUCTION ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT, WAS SERIOUSLY INJURED. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ DURING AN INTERVIEW ON 01-20-2005 WITH FAA INSPECTORS ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ THE INSTRUCTIONAL FLIGHT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREPARING THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ FOR HIS COMMERCIAL PILOT AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND ADDITIONAL RATING HAD PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL, AT A LOCATION APPROXIMATELY 8 NM NORTHWEST OF ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT, BOTH HE AND ^PRIVACY DA^ SMELLED HOT OIL. THE PILOT ^PR^ ^PRIVACY ^ STATED THAT HE QUICKLY LOOKED AT THE ENGINE OIL PRESSURE GAUGE AND THAT SUCH GAUGE INDICATED ZERO OIL PRESSURE. HOWEVER, HE INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT SEE ANY EVIDENCE OF OIL ON THE WINDSHIELD OR SIDES OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ STATED THAT HE LOOKED BACK TO THE NORTHWEST OF THEIR POSITION TO LOCATE ORLANDO COUNTY AIRPORT, BUT DID NOT SEE THE AIRPORT. ^PRIVACY DA^ THEN CALLED ORLANDO EXECUTIVE TOWER TO ADVISE THE CONTROLLER THAT THEY WERE 8 NM NORTHWEST OF THE AIRPORT WITH NO OIL PRESSURE, AND REQUESTED TO MAKE A STRAIGHT-IN APPROACH TO RUNWAY 13, WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE CONTROLLER. ACCORDING TO ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TAPES, SUCH CALL WAS MADE AT 1639:27. THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ INDICATED THAT HE REMAINED AT THE FLIGHT CONTROLS AND INITIATED A CLIMB TO 2,000 FEET MSL WHILE MAINTAINING A COURSE DIRECTLY TO RUNWAY 13 AT ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT. AS HE APPROACHED THE AIRPORT, HE STATED THAT HE BEGAN A DESCENT AND AT A POSITION OF APPROXIMATELY 4 NM NORTHWEST OF THE AIRPORT AND AT AN ALTITUDE OF 1,500 FEET MSL, THE AIRCRAFT ENGINE OF N9336H BEGAN TO VIBRATE AND THEN FAILED WITH THE PROPELLER STOPPING IN A HORIZONTAL POSITION. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ IMMEDIATELY TOOK COMMAND OF THE FLIGHT CONTROLS AND THEN CALLED ORLANDO EXECUTIVE TOWER TO ADVISE THE CONTROLLER OF THE ENGINE FAILURE. ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TAPES INDICATE THAT AT 1644:39, A TRANSMISSION FROM ^PRIVACY DA^ STATED THAT "NINER THREE THREE SIX HOTEL JUST HAD AN ENGINE FAILURE, LOOKS LIKE WE ARE COMING IN ON RUNWAY ONE THREE". THE CONTROLLER CLEARED N9336H TO LAND ON RUNWAY 13, AND ADVISED THAT THE WIND WAS FROM ZERO NINE ZERO AT FIVE KNOTS. AT 1645:01, A TRANSMISSION FROM ^PRIVACY DA^ STATED "DOESN'T LOOK LIKE WE ARE GOING TO MAKE THE RUNWAY SO WE ARE GOING TO TURN AROUND FOR THE GOLF COURSE." ACCORDING TO THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ MANEUVERED N9336H TOWARDS THE DUBSTREAD GOLF COURSE, WHICH WAS TO THE LEFT OF THE AIRCRAFT WHEN THE ENGINE FAILED. THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ STATED THAT THEY SAW THREE FAIRWAYS THAT MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR LANDING AND THAT ^PRIVACY DA^ ASKED HIM WHICH ONE HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD USE. THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ INDICATED THAT HE TOLD ^PRIVACY DA^ THAT HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD LAND ON THE "BIG ONE", AND THAT ^PRIVACY DA^ CONTINUED TO MANEUVER N9336H IN A LEFT TURN TOWARD THE GOLF CO URSE, MAKING SEVERAL "S-TURNS" TO LOSE ALTITUDE. RADAR DATA FROM ORLANDO APPROACH CONTROL INDICATES THAT AT 1644:31, N9336H WAS ON A HEADING OF 111 DEGREES AND AN ALTITUDE OF 1,500 FEET. AT 1645:04, N9336H WAS ON A HEADING OF 120 DEGREES AND AN ALTITUDE OF 1,300 FEET. FROM THAT POINT, RADAR DATA INDICATES THAT N9336H MADE A LEFT TURN FROM A HEADING OF 120 DEGREES UNTIL RADAR DATA WAS LOST AT AN ALTITUDE OF 600 FEET, A HEADING OF 300 DEGREES, AND A GROUND SPEED OF 77 KNOTS. THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ STATED THAT AS N9336H APPROACHED THE GOLF COURSE FAIRWAYS FROM AN EASTERLY TO WESTERLY DIRECTION, IT APPEARED THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS GOING TO OVERFLY THE POINT OF INTENDED LANDING. WHEN ASKED BY INSPECTOR ^PRIVA^ IF ^PRIVACY DA^ ATTEMPTED TO "SLIP" THE AIRPLANE IN ORDER TO DISSIPATE ALTITUDE, THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ STATED "NO". THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ FURTHER STATED THAT AS N9336H CROSSED THE TREES AT THE EASTERLY END OF THE GOLF COURSE FAIRWAYS, THE AIRCRAFT WAS TOO HIGH AND ^PRIVACY DA^ CONTINUED TO MANEUVER THE AIRCRAFT IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A SUITABLE LOCATION TO LAND. WHILE STILL AIRBORNE, AND NEAR THE WESTERLY END OF THE GOLF COURSE PROPERTY, THE LEFT WING OF N9336H STRUCK WIRES, WHICH CAUSED THE AIRCRAFT TO ROTATE APPROXIMATELY 90 DEGREES TO THE RIGHT AS SEEN FROM THE COCKPIT. THE RIGHT WING TIP STRUCK THE GROUND AND N9336H THEN STRUCK A CONCRETE POWER POLE, COMING TO REST AT AN ANGLE OF APPROXIMATELY 70 DEGREES FROM HORIZONTAL AND ON A HEADING OF APPROXIMATELY 270 DEGREES. THE AIRCRAFT REMAINED PARTIALLY SUSPENDED IN THE AIR DUE TO THE LEFT WING'S ENTANGLEMENT WITH A STREET LIGHT FIXTURE ATTACHED TO THE CONCRETE POLE, AND THE RIGHT WING'S EMBEDMENT INTO THE GROUND. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA^ HE DID NOT SEE THE WIRES THAT THE LEFT WING OF N9336H STRUCK UNTIL AFTER CONTACT WITH SUCH WIRES, AND HE DOES NOT REMEMBER THE AIRCRAFT HITTING THE POWER POLE. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE WAS CAPTURED ON VIDEOTAPE BY A TELEVISION STATION NEWS HELICOPTER. AT 1645:34, THE ORLANDO EXECUTIVE TOWER CONTROLLER ASKED NEWS HELICOPTER "SKY SIX" IF THEY HAD CONTACT WITH A CESSNA (N9336H), WHICH WAS ABOUT ONE AND A HALF MILES NORTHWEST OF THEIR POSITION. SKY SIX REPORTED THE CESSNA (N9336H) IN SIGHT. THE CONTROLLER ASKED SKY SIX TO TRACK THE AIRCRAFT. SKY SIX MANEUVERED TO FOLLOW N9336H, AND THE CAMERAMAN ABOARD SKY SIX WAS ABLE TO CAPTURE THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE ON VIDEOTAPE. VIEWING OF SUCH VIDEOTAPE CONFIRMS THE DETAILS OF THE WIRE STRIKE AND IMPACT WITH THE POWER POLE BY N9336H AS DESCRIBED THEREIN. FOLLOWING AN ON SCENE INVESTIGATION BY FAA INSPECTOR ^PRIVACY DAT^ DURING THE EVENING OF 01-11-2005, INSPECTOR ^PRIVA^ ACCOMPANIED N9336H AS SUCH AIRCRAFT WAS RECOVERED TO A HANGAR AT ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT. SUCH HANGAR WAS SECURED AND N9336H REMAINED IN THE CONTINUAL CUSTODY OF THE NTSB/FAA. ON 01-13-2005, THE ENGINE AND ENGINE COMPONENTS OF N9336H WAS DISASSEMBLED AND INSPECTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE CAUSE OF THE ENGINE FAILURE. SUCH INSPECTION OCCURRED AT ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT AND WAS CONDUCTED BY FAA INSPECTORS ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ NTSB INVESTIGATOR ^PRIVACY DATA^ LYCOMING ENGINE REPRESENTATIVE ^PRIVACY DATA ^ AND CESSNA AIRCRAFT REPRESENTATIVE ^PRIVACY DATA ^ THE ENGINE OF N9336H WAS FOUND TO HAVE TEN OUNCES OF ENGINE OIL REMAINING IN THE SUMP. ONE OF THE NUMBER TWO PISTON CONNECTING ROD RETAINING CAP BOLTS WAS FOUND TO HAVE FAILED DUE TO HIGH HEAT AND STRESS CONSISTENT WITH LACK OF LUBRICATION, WHICH ALLOWED THE CONNECTING ROD TO SEPARATE FROM THE CRANKSHAFT, CAUSING E NGINE FAILURE. SUCH ENGINE WAS FULLY DISASSEMBLED AND INSPECTED AND THE ONLY CAUSE OF LACK OF LUBRICATION WAS DETERMINED TO BE INSUFFICIENT OIL (TEN OUNCES) REMAINING IN THE ENGINE SUMP. ALL FLEXIBLE OIL LINES AND THE OIL COOLER OF N9336H WERE REMOVED FOR TESTING. FITTINGS WERE ADAPTED INDIVIDUALLY TO EACH OIL LINE AND THE OIL COOLER SO THAT EACH COMPONENT COULD BE TESTED BY CAREFULLY INTRODUCING REGULATED AIR PRESSURE. ALL COMPONENTS TESTED SATISFACTORILY EXCEPT THE ENGINE TO OIL COOLER FLEXIBLE HOSE ASSEMBLY, SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS CESSNA PART NUMBER S1167-6-C260, WHICH IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO LEAK AS SOON AS THE SLIGHTEST AMOUNT OF AIR PRESSURE (0-5 PSI) WAS APPLIED WITHIN THE HOSE. ACCORDINGLY, IT WAS DETERMINED BY THE INVESTIGATORS CONDUCTING THE INSPECTION THAT THE LEAK IN THE FLEXIBLE HOSE ASSEMBLY DESCRIBED HEREIN CAUSED THE ENGINE OIL OF N9336H TO BE PUMPED FROM THE ENGINE DURING FLIGHT, LEADING TO INSUFFICIENT OIL QUANTITY WITHIN THE ENGINE, AND SUBSEQUENT ENGINE FAILURE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. A CAREFUL INSPECTION OF SUCH FLEXIBLE OIL HOSE REVEALED THAT THE DATE OF MANUFACTURER WAS INDICATED AS THIRD QUARTER, 1981. THIS OIL HOSE ASSEMBLY WAS SENT TO THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD LABORATORY IN WASHINGTON, DC FOR FURTHER EVALUATION. A REVIEW OF THE MAINTENANCE LOGBOOKS OF N9336H REVEALED THAT ALL FLEXIBLE OIL HOSES WERE REPLACED ON 08-27-1982, WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE THIRD QUARTER, 1981 DATE FOUND ON THE FAILED OIL HOSE DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE CESSNA 172 MAINTENANCE MANUAL CONTAINS A COMPONENT TIME LIMITS SECTION, WHICH SPECIFIES THAT ALL OIL COOLER FLEXIBLE HOSE ASSEMBLIES BE REPLACED EVERY FIVE YEARS OR AT ENGINE OVERHAUL. THERE ARE NO OTHER LOGBOOK ENTRIES OF N9336H INDICATING REPLACEMENT OF SUCH HOSES PAST 08-27-1982. ACCORDING TO LOGBOOK ENTRIES, THE ENGINE OF N9336H WAS LAST OVERHAULED ON 03-09-2001, AND INSTALLED IN THE AIRFRAME OF N9336H ON 03-10-2001. THE LOGBOOK ENTRY FOR INSTALLATION OF SUCH ENGINE DOES NOT INDICATE THAT ANY OIL COOLER HOSES WERE REPLACED. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ SIGNED THE ENGINE INSTALLATION LOGBOOK ENTRY DESCRIBED ABOVE. ^PRIVACY DAT^ HAS PEFORMED, OR SUPERVISED, THE MAINTENANCE PERFORMED ON N9336H SINCE JANUARY 27, 2000, TO INCLUDE ALL ANNUAL INSPECTIONS THROUGH THE CURRENT ANNUAL INSPECTION. MAINTENANCE RECORDS AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE INDICATE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE OIL COOLER HOSES ON N9336H WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED BY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AS REQUIRED BY FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.