20051121027829I

(-23) On or about 11/21/2005 at approximately 0600 PST Gulfstream ga-v-v; s/n: 672; r/n: N225GV, belonging to nike, inc. (nike) of beaverton, Oregon departed Hillsboro, Oregon (hio) for an anticipated flight to toronto, ontario, Canada (yyz). There were a total of 7 persons on board the aircraft. The occupant list consisted of three crew members and four employees of nike, inc. the pilot in command was privacy data omitted . The second in command was privacy data omitted (msat-a report included). There was a flight attendant, privacy data omitted on board. The certifications/qualifications of the flight attendant are unknown at this time. The aircraft departed hio with 30,000 pounds of fuel on board. Scheduled flight time was 4 hours 7 minutes. The flight planning service was provided by air routing. The aircraft received a pre-departure inspection by a member of the nike flight operations maintenance department. The aircraft was then reinspected by the flight crew. No discrepancies were noted. Immediately after departure from hio, a normal landing gear retraction was attempted. The cockpit gear position indicating system indicated that the right h and main landing gear did not retract completely. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to extend and retract the landing gear. The crew notified the nike flight operations maintenance department (by telephone) that there was a landing gear configuration problem. During the ensuing flight the manufacturer of the aircraft, Gulfstream, was notified. Gulfstream made several recommendations to the crew including two "touch & go" landings, designed to free the stuck landing gear. These efforts proved ineffective. The aircraft was then flown to an altitude above 20,000 feet where several positive and negative "g" forces were placed on the aircraft. Eventually the landing gear was released. After an uneventful landing, the aircraft was marshaled to the nike hangar facility at hio. The aircraft was secured within the facility, all maintenance records were secured at the facility and operator principal inspectors privacy data omitted (maintenance), privacy data omitted (former pmi), and privacy data omitted (avionics) were dispatched to the facility for post event investigation. Upon arrival, the inspectors were met by privacy data omitted director of maintenance (dom) and privacy data omitted, chief inspector (ci). Both persons were very helpful and presented a compliant attitude during the investigation. The inspectors were informed that a service crew had been dispatched from the Gulfstream service center in long beach, CA (lgb) and that they would arrive that day at approximately 1630 PST. The inspectors were given a tour of the aircraft and provided with preliminary findings that the nike maintenance crew had found. These included tire scuff marks on the interior side of the right hand inboard main gear door. It was later determined that these marks matched the right hand outboard main gear tire. The right hand outboard main gear tire had seven visible circular puncture marks on the outer edge of the tire. It was later determined that these marks aligned with a set of the bolts used to attach the door seal to the inboard main gear door. A wire, that would normally be attached to ground terminal E3043G, in the wheel well, was found broken. It was believed that this wire broke as a result of the air loads present in the wheel well area after extended high speed flight with the right hand gear door open. No other deficiencies were noted during the preliminary inspection. The maintenance records for the aircraft were requested and provided to the inspectors. A review of the records for the past year revealed no anomalies. The aircraft had previously been registered in bermuda and essentially all of it's maintenance, for the previous year, had been performed by the Gulfstream service center in savannah, GA. This facility is an FAA certified repair station (GR4R216M) and a bermuda aviation maintenance organization (AMO-039). The aircraft received it's U.S. Registration and U.S. Standard airworthiness certificate on 10/29/2005. This was just prior to delivery to nike. It is recorded that a complete conformity inspection was performed at that time and no serious deficiencies were found. Any minor deficiencies were repaired at that time and all appropriate maintenance entries were made. A set of maintenance service documents were provided to the inspectors for familiarization of the landing gear system of this aircraft. A review of the system revealed no unique design features or maintenance requirements that would cause this system to be vulnerable to unanticipated failures. In fact, the aircraft series holds a very impressive safety record and no serious failures in thelanding gear system. At approximately 1630 PST, the service crew from Gulfstream arrived. The inspectors were introduced to privacy data omitted director - service center operations and privacy data omitted field service representative for the Oregon region. The service team jacked the aircraft, attached the aircraft to a ground power and hydraulic system and actuated the landing gear system. The team was able to duplicate the event that occurred in flight. After the confirmation of the failure, an inspection of the landing gear/gear door sequencing system determined that the compression spring bungee, located between main landing gear and the gear sequencing valve had failed. It appeared (initially) that there was some form of corrosion on the metal sleeve of the bungee. This had failed (apparently during the initial attempted retraction of the gear) and caused the landing gear and the landing gear door to get out of sequence, causing the landing gear to become bound on the landing gear door. A replacement part was ordered, but due to the late hour of the finding, it was decided by the inspectors to adjourn for the day and return the following morning for follow-up. The inspectors were told that the system would be prepared for installation of the replacement part as soon as it arrived. During the night the complete hydraulic system fluid would be replaced and bled to facilitate an operational inspection in the morning. These are the findings as of the time of this report. A follow-up report will be generated, as necessary, as more information becomes available.