What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(-23) On December 12, 2005, a Continental airlines (cala) B737-824 aircraft, N27213, flight 1425, reported smoke in the cockpit after landing at george bush Intercontinental airport (iah). An emergency evacuation of the aircraft was performed on the taxiway. Three minor injuries were reported. The L1 door slide did not deploy properly and was unusable. An investigation into the smoke (mist/fumes) in the cockpit determined that the hydrauliz reservoir was over serviced allowing hydraulic fluid to get past the check valve in the restrictor cross assembly p/n 9R3886 and enter the air conditioning system. The check valve at the time was held open by contamination allowing hydraulic fluid to backflow up the air lines and enter the air conditioning bleed air ducts. On December 13, 2005, cala engineering coordinated an emergency evacuation slide deployment test from acft. N27213, L1 door position with inspectors from the Continental airlines certificate management office (coa/cmo). The deployment test was found to be satisfactory. Cala engineering determined that the improper deployment of the slide might have resulted from the incorrect installation of the slide-to-container wind lanyards during the slide overhaul process at the b.f. goodrich overhaul facility, located at phoeniz, Arizona. On January 5, 2006, additional testing was conducted at the goodrich overhaul facility with cala engineering and inspectors from this office. It was confirmed that incorrect installation procedures of the wind lanyards caused the improper deployment of the slide. Cala engineering issued a fleet campaign directive (fcd) 2561-01161 to determine how many slides may have been affected on their fleet and to ensure the proper routing and connection of the wind lanyards on all evacuation slides. privacy data omitted
As the FAA filed it
(-23) ON DECEMBER 12, 2005, A CONTINENTAL AIRLINES (CALA) B737-824 AIRCRAFT, N27213, FLIGHT 1425, REPORTED SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AFTER LANDING AT GEORGE BUSH INTERCONTINENTAL AIRPORT (IAH). AN EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS PERFORMED ON THE TAXIWAY. THREE MINOR INJURIES WERE REPORTED. THE L1 DOOR SLIDE DID NOT DEPLOY PROPERLY AND WAS UNUSABLE. AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE SMOKE (MIST/FUMES) IN THE COCKPIT DETERMINED THAT THE HYDRAULIZ RESERVOIR WAS OVER SERVICED ALLOWING HYDRAULIC FLUID TO GET PAST THE CHECK VALVE IN THE RESTRICTOR CROSS ASSEMBLY P/N 9R3886 AND ENTER THE AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM. THE CHECK VALVE AT THE TIME WAS HELD OPEN BY CONTAMINATION ALLOWING HYDRAULIC FLUID TO BACKFLOW UP THE AIR LINES AND ENTER THE AIR CONDITIONING BLEED AIR DUCTS. ON DECEMBER 13, 2005, CALA ENGINEERING COORDINATED AN EMERGENCY EVACUATION SLIDE DEPLOYMENT TEST FROM ACFT. N27213, L1 DOOR POSITION WITH INSPECTORS FROM THE CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT OFFICE (COA/CMO). THE DEPLOYMENT TEST WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. CALA ENGINEERING DETERMINED THAT THE IMPROPER DEPLOYMENT OF THE SLIDE MIGHT HAVE RESULTED FROM THE INCORRECT INSTALLATION OF THE SLIDE-TO-CONTAINER WIND LANYARDS DURING THE SLIDE OVERHAUL PROCESS AT THE B.F. GOODRICH OVERHAUL FACILITY, LOCATED AT PHOENIZ, ARIZONA. ON JANUARY 5, 2006, ADDITIONAL TESTING WAS CONDUCTED AT THE GOODRICH OVERHAUL FACILITY WITH CALA ENGINEERING AND INSPECTORS FROM THIS OFFICE. IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT INCORRECT INSTALLATION PROCEDURES OF THE WIND LANYARDS CAUSED THE IMPROPER DEPLOYMENT OF THE SLIDE. CALA ENGINEERING ISSUED A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE (FCD) 2561-01161 TO DETERMINE HOW MANY SLIDES MAY HAVE BEEN AFFECTED ON THEIR FLEET AND TO ENSURE THE PROPER ROUTING AND CONNECTION OF THE WIND LANYARDS ON ALL EVACUATION SLIDES. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^
Other reports on N27213 · 2
Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.