What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(-23) At 16:30 on may 7, 2006, two tandem parachute jumps were commenced at about 10,500 feet AGL above the skydive sedona drop zone at the Cottonwood, AZ airport. The parachutist-in-command (PIC) of the first tandem team to jump (#1 tandem team) observed after opening his chute, that the second tandem teamp to jump (#2 tandem team) was above him at an estimated altitude of 5500 AGL with a chute already deployed. The chute was a white rectangular reserve that looked like it was partially opened. He then observed the #2 tandem team descending past him moving quite fast indicating a higher than normal rate of descent. The PIC of the #1 tandem team then observed that the white partially deployed parachute of the #2 tandem team was ripped about 1/3 of the width of the parachute; that it cycled through inflating, deflating and spinning and partially inflating again; and he estimated a speed upon impact #2 tandam team of approximately 30-35MPH. The passenger parachutist of #1 tandem team said that he had unlatched the upper harness clips at the scene to allow the injured PIC to breathe, so the harnessing of the #2 tandem team together, is not suspect. The police cut the cords of the reserve parachute to remove the injured people. The equipment was obtained from the Cottonwood police department and inspected. The main parachute had not been deployed and still had the drogue and ripcord in place. The reserve parachute, which had been deployed, had rips along both sides of the center cell compromising the center 3 cells. The material was hardened and crinkled along the torn surfaces showing evidence of excessive stress. The cords had some black marking from the brass eyelets and some areas of hardened surface consistent with friction from the eyelets moving along the cords at a high rate of speed and under high load. No defects were found in the reserve parachute other than those described that would be caused by deployment at excessive speed. The packing card for the reserve parachute recorded that it had been packed by a certificated parachute rigger on April 12, 2006. The pilot of the aircraft from which the two tandem teams jumped said that the PIC of the #2 tandem team had difficulty getting the passenger parachutist to put her foot out of the aircraft in preparation to jump and that the pilot observed that the #2 tandem team did tumble after departing the aircraft. The passenger parachutists of both the #1 and #2 tandem teams said they had received a briefing before the jump but no record of the briefing exists to verify content of the briefings. The injured PIC of the #2 tandem team did most of the briefing for both jumpers. The passenger parachutist of #2 tandem team, who was injured, said that they had done flips, then stopped doing "stuff", then started to tumble and roll. She felt that the "instructor" (PIC) was flailing or kicking her and that he told her they had a problem and would be having a rough landing. The owners of skydive sedona told inspectors that the standard procedure is to not deploy the drogue chute for the main parachute in an unstable flight condition; that speed builds up in unstable conditions; that speeds of 150 to 180 mph can be reached in tumbling falls; and that the drogue chute is not to be deployed if the reserve chute is deployed because they can tangle together leaving no chute functioning. The reserve parachute had a placard giving operating limits stating the max deployment speed of 80 knots eas. The tandem vector owner's manual, revision 0 (09351-5/30/2003), indicates on page 73 that when exiting the aircraft above 7,500 AGL that the drogue should be deployed within 5 seconds after exit; that tandem terminal velocity is 170 mph; and that the minimum recommended altitude for main parachute is 4,000 AGL. On page 75, the tandem vector owner's manual states that it is very important to retain stability throughout the exit sequence of every tandem jump; requires that stability be ensured prior to deployment; that the drogue is not to be used to gain stability; and that using the drogue to get stable should be used only as a last resort since it is better than pulling the reserve while unstable. On page 85, the tandem vector owner's manual addresses the freefall control problem of instability following exit and indicates that student's (passenger's) arms, legs, and body position contribute to the ability to become stable, but that the good body position from the instructor (PIC) will almost always overcome shortcomings of the student's (passenger's) body position. In interviewing other experienced master tandem instructors not associated with skydive sedona it was learned that tandem instructor training includes the information that if the tandem team is in a drogue down side spin the standard procedure would be to deploy the reserve chute; that spins accelerate rapidly and are very disorienting; and that parachutes deployed when unstable do not have a "clean" deployment and this affects the abruptness of the deployment and the loads associated with opening.
As the FAA filed it
(-23) AT 16:30 ON MAY 7, 2006, TWO TANDEM PARACHUTE JUMPS WERE COMMENCED AT ABOUT 10,500 FEET AGL ABOVE THE SKYDIVE SEDONA DROP ZONE AT THE COTTONWOOD, AZ AIRPORT. THE PARACHUTIST-IN-COMMAND (PIC) OF THE FIRST TANDEM TEAM TO JUMP (#1 TANDEM TEAM) OBSERVED AFTER OPENING HIS CHUTE, THAT THE SECOND TANDEM TEAMP TO JUMP (#2 TANDEM TEAM) WAS ABOVE HIM AT AN ESTIMATED ALTITUDE OF 5500 AGL WITH A CHUTE ALREADY DEPLOYED. THE CHUTE WAS A WHITE RECTANGULAR RESERVE THAT LOOKED LIKE IT WAS PARTIALLY OPENED. HE THEN OBSERVED THE #2 TANDEM TEAM DESCENDING PAST HIM MOVING QUITE FAST INDICATING A HIGHER THAN NORMAL RATE OF DESCENT. THE PIC OF THE #1 TANDEM TEAM THEN OBSERVED THAT THE WHITE PARTIALLY DEPLOYED PARACHUTE OF THE #2 TANDEM TEAM WAS RIPPED ABOUT 1/3 OF THE WIDTH OF THE PARACHUTE; THAT IT CYCLED THROUGH INFLATING, DEFLATING AND SPINNING AND PARTIALLY INFLATING AGAIN; AND HE ESTIMATED A SPEED UPON IMPACT #2 TANDAM TEAM OF APPROXIMATELY 30-35MPH. THE PASSENGER PARACHUTIST OF #1 TANDEM TEAM SAID THAT HE HAD UNLATCHED THE UPPER HARNESS CLIPS AT THE SCENE TO ALLOW THE INJURED PIC TO BREATHE, SO THE HARNESSING OF THE #2 TANDEM TEAM TOGETHER, IS NOT SUSPECT. THE POLICE CUT THE CORDS OF THE RESERVE PARACHUTE TO REMOVE THE INJURED PEOPLE. THE EQUIPMENT WAS OBTAINED FROM THE COTTONWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT AND INSPECTED. THE MAIN PARACHUTE HAD NOT BEEN DEPLOYED AND STILL HAD THE DROGUE AND RIPCORD IN PLACE. THE RESERVE PARACHUTE, WHICH HAD BEEN DEPLOYED, HAD RIPS ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE CENTER CELL COMPROMISING THE CENTER 3 CELLS. THE MATERIAL WAS HARDENED AND CRINKLED ALONG THE TORN SURFACES SHOWING EVIDENCE OF EXCESSIVE STRESS. THE CORDS HAD SOME BLACK MARKING FROM THE BRASS EYELETS AND SOME AREAS OF HARDENED SURFACE CONSISTENT WITH FRICTION FROM THE EYELETS MOVING ALONG THE CORDS AT A HIGH RATE OF SPEED AND UNDER HIGH LOAD. NO DEFECTS WERE FOUND IN THE RESERVE PARACHUTE OTHER THAN THOSE DESCRIBED THAT WOULD BE CAUSED BY DEPLOYMENT AT EXCESSIVE SPEED. THE PACKING CARD FOR THE RESERVE PARACHUTE RECORDED THAT IT HAD BEEN PACKED BY A CERTIFICATED PARACHUTE RIGGER ON APRIL 12, 2006. THE PILOT OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM WHICH THE TWO TANDEM TEAMS JUMPED SAID THAT THE PIC OF THE #2 TANDEM TEAM HAD DIFFICULTY GETTING THE PASSENGER PARACHUTIST TO PUT HER FOOT OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT IN PREPARATION TO JUMP AND THAT THE PILOT OBSERVED THAT THE #2 TANDEM TEAM DID TUMBLE AFTER DEPARTING THE AIRCRAFT. THE PASSENGER PARACHUTISTS OF BOTH THE #1 AND #2 TANDEM TEAMS SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED A BRIEFING BEFORE THE JUMP BUT NO RECORD OF THE BRIEFING EXISTS TO VERIFY CONTENT OF THE BRIEFINGS. THE INJURED PIC OF THE #2 TANDEM TEAM DID MOST OF THE BRIEFING FOR BOTH JUMPERS. THE PASSENGER PARACHUTIST OF #2 TANDEM TEAM, WHO WAS INJURED, SAID THAT THEY HAD DONE FLIPS, THEN STOPPED DOING "STUFF", THEN STARTED TO TUMBLE AND ROLL. SHE FELT THAT THE "INSTRUCTOR" (PIC) WAS FLAILING OR KICKING HER AND THAT HE TOLD HER THEY HAD A PROBLEM AND WOULD BE HAVING A ROUGH LANDING. THE OWNERS OF SKYDIVE SEDONA TOLD INSPECTORS THAT THE STANDARD PROCEDURE IS TO NOT DEPLOY THE DROGUE CHUTE FOR THE MAIN PARACHUTE IN AN UNSTABLE FLIGHT CONDITION; THAT SPEED BUILDS UP IN UNSTABLE CONDITIONS; THAT SPEEDS OF 150 TO 180 MPH CAN BE REACHED IN TUMBLING FALLS; AND THAT THE DROGUE CHUTE IS NOT TO BE DEPLOYED IF THE RESERVE CHUTE IS DEPLOYED BECAUSE THEY CAN TANGLE TOGETHER LEAVING NO CHUTE FUNCTIONING. THE RESERVE PARACHUTE HAD A PLACARD GIVING OPERATING LIMITS STATING THE MAX DEPLOYMENT SPEED OF 80 KNOTS EAS. THE TANDEM VECTOR OWNER'S MANUAL, REVISION 0 (09351-5/30/2003), INDICATES ON PAGE 73 THAT WHEN EXITING THE AIRCRAFT ABOVE 7,500 AGL THAT THE DROGUE SHOULD BE DEPLOYED WITHIN 5 SECONDS AFTER EXIT; THAT TANDEM TERMINAL VELOCITY IS 170 MPH; AND THAT THE MINIMUM RECOMMENDED ALTITUDE FOR MAIN PARACHUTE IS 4,000 AGL. ON PAGE 75, THE TANDEM VECTOR OWNER'S MANUAL STATES THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO RETAIN STABILITY THROUGHOUT THE EXIT SEQUENCE OF EVERY TANDEM JUMP; REQUIRES THAT STABILITY BE ENSURED PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT; THAT THE DROGUE IS NOT TO BE USED TO GAIN STABILITY; AND THAT USING THE DROGUE TO GET STABLE SHOULD BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT SINCE IT IS BETTER THAN PULLING THE RESERVE WHILE UNSTABLE. ON PAGE 85, THE TANDEM VECTOR OWNER'S MANUAL ADDRESSES THE FREEFALL CONTROL PROBLEM OF INSTABILITY FOLLOWING EXIT AND INDICATES THAT STUDENT'S (PASSENGER'S) ARMS, LEGS, AND BODY POSITION CONTRIBUTE TO THE ABILITY TO BECOME STABLE, BUT THAT THE GOOD BODY POSITION FROM THE INSTRUCTOR (PIC) WILL ALMOST ALWAYS OVERCOME SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STUDENT'S (PASSENGER'S) BODY POSITION. IN INTERVIEWING OTHER EXPERIENCED MASTER TANDEM INSTRUCTORS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH SKYDIVE SEDONA IT WAS LEARNED THAT TANDEM INSTRUCTOR TRAINING INCLUDES THE INFORMATION THAT IF THE TANDEM TEAM IS IN A DROGUE DOWN SIDE SPIN THE STANDARD PROCEDURE WOULD BE TO DEPLOY THE RESERVE CHUTE; THAT SPINS ACCELERATE RAPIDLY AND ARE VERY DISORIENTING; AND THAT PARACHUTES DEPLOYED WHEN UNSTABLE DO NOT HAVE A "CLEAN" DEPLOYMENT AND THIS AFFECTS THE ABRUPTNESS OF THE DEPLOYMENT AND THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH OPENING.