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20081031852209I

Incident · No damage
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FAA incident report · Airbus A319-112 · New York, NY · October 31, 2008

FAA Aviation Safety Information Portal

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Date
October 31, 2008 · 23:05 local
Place
New York, NY
Airport
La Guardia
Phase of flight
Landing
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Operator
F3LA
Damage
No damage
Aircraft
N941FR
Reported as
Airbus A319112
Reported engine
GE CFM56*
People aboard
71
Fatal injuries
0
Pilot’s flight hours
4,457 total3,070 in this make and model127 in the last 90 days
N941FRRegistered now · Airbus A319-112S/N 2483 · Built 2005Airframe modelAirbus A319-112Engine modelCFM International CFM56 seriesTurbo-fan

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

(-23) The captain had limited experience at lga, as did the first officer. The crew had planned for a landing on rw 22 and had briefed for that. When they were switched to New York approach, they were assigned rw 31. Since they were number 1 for the airport, they were told to keep their speed up. This limited the amount of time available for briefing the approach and landing. After flying the expressway visual approach, the landing was within the touchdown zone, but at the FAR end of the zone. Auto-brakes were selected to low. Full reverse thrust was applied, but it could not be verified how long it was employed. Due to lack of familiarity with the airport, the captain did not realize that a turn-off is normally made prior to rw 4-22. They were told by the tower controller that rw 22 was available and if unable then use taxiway aa. The captian did not believe that the airacraft could make either turn off. The tower informed frontier 516 that traffic was on 1/2 mile final and asked them to make good time clearing the runway. The captain became confused about the turn-off and mistakenly turned left into a hard surfaced safety area. This event has been submitted to an asap program.

As the FAA filed it

(-23) THE CAPTAIN HAD LIMITED EXPERIENCE AT LGA, AS DID THE FIRST OFFICER. THE CREW HAD PLANNED FOR A LANDING ON RW 22 AND HAD BRIEFED FOR THAT. WHEN THEY WERE SWITCHED TO NEW YORK APPROACH, THEY WERE ASSIGNED RW 31. SINCE THEY WERE NUMBER 1 FOR THE AIRPORT, THEY WERE TOLD TO KEEP THEIR SPEED UP. THIS LIMITED THE AMOUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE FOR BRIEFING THE APPROACH AND LANDING. AFTER FLYING THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL APPROACH, THE LANDING WAS WITHIN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE, BUT AT THE FAR END OF THE ZONE. AUTO-BRAKES WERE SELECTED TO LOW. FULL REVERSE THRUST WAS APPLIED, BUT IT COULD NOT BE VERIFIED HOW LONG IT WAS EMPLOYED. DUE TO LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE AIRPORT, THE CAPTAIN DID NOT REALIZE THAT A TURN-OFF IS NORMALLY MADE PRIOR TO RW 4-22. THEY WERE TOLD BY THE TOWER CONTROLLER THAT RW 22 WAS AVAILABLE AND IF UNABLE THEN USE TAXIWAY AA. THE CAPTIAN DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AIRACRAFT COULD MAKE EITHER TURN OFF. THE TOWER INFORMED FRONTIER 516 THAT TRAFFIC WAS ON 1/2 MILE FINAL AND ASKED THEM TO MAKE GOOD TIME CLEARING THE RUNWAY. THE CAPTAIN BECAME CONFUSED ABOUT THE TURN-OFF AND MISTAKENLY TURNED LEFT INTO A HARD SURFACED SAFETY AREA. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO AN ASAP PROGRAM.