What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
This runway excursion was preceded by a loss of directional control after an unsatisfactory attempt at a rejected takeoff. The pilot holds a commercial certificate with a multi-engine rating earned in July, 2009. Since obtaining this rating, the pilot has accumulated an additional twenty-five (25) hours of dual instruction in category and class. Furthermore, over a one-year period preceding the accident, the pilot conducted only four flights totaling four (4) hours as pilot in command. The accident sequence began when the pilot chose to abort his takeoff at the 2000 ft. point in the takeoff roll. The aircraft began to veer into the wind (or west of centerline) with approximately 1,300 feet of runway remaining. Evidence of unequal braking began at approximately 2,400 feet into the takeoff run (2-3 seconds after reject decision) or approximately 900 feet remaining. Analysis of pilot operating handbook (POH) performance data reveals the aircraft may be stopped in approximately 600 feet given average pilot technique and utilizing the correct reject takeoff procedures. During the subsequent investigation, the pilot stated the aircraft achieved normal, symmetrical takeoff power prior to brake release. The aircraft consistently tracked the centerline during the first 1000 ft. of takeoff roll. The pilot stated he did not experience a "dragging brake" or any unusual rudder forces required to maintain the runway centerline with a maximum, computed cross-wind component of 11 KTS. Post accident field investigation revealed the left main gear tire rotated freely about the axle. Until the pilot elected to abort the takeoff run, only minor lateral deviations in aircraft track were observed. The loss of aircraft control became evident soon after his decision to reject the takeoff or approximately 2000 ft. into the takeoff run. (Or 1300 ft. effective distance remaining)the pilot stated he attempted to lift-off the nose of the aircraft after achieving red line or 100 mph. Post crash flight control continuity test was conducted along with stab trim operation. The elevator trim tab functioned normally with no binding during full travel checks stop-to-stop. Additionally, the trim setting was found in the takeoff band at the accident scene. The external control lock was found in the nacelle locker. Furthermore, the airman stated the control lock had been removed prior to flight. Additionally, the CG loading for the conditions stated was acceptable.
As the FAA filed it
THIS RUNWAY EXCURSION WAS PRECEDED BY A LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL AFTER AN UNSATISFACTORY ATTEMPT AT A REJECTED TAKEOFF. THE PILOT HOLDS A COMMERCIAL CERTIFICATE WITH A MULTI-ENGINE RATING EARNED IN JULY, 2009. SINCE OBTAINING THIS RATING, THE PILOT HAS ACCUMULATED AN ADDITIONAL TWENTY-FIVE (25) HOURS OF DUAL INSTRUCTION IN CATEGORY AND CLASS. FURTHERMORE, OVER A ONE-YEAR PERIOD PRECEDING THE ACCIDENT, THE PILOT CONDUCTED ONLY FOUR FLIGHTS TOTALING FOUR (4) HOURS AS PILOT IN COMMAND.THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE BEGAN WHEN THE PILOT CHOSE TO ABORT HIS TAKEOFF AT THE 2000 FT. POINT IN THE TAKEOFF ROLL. THE AIRCRAFT BEGAN TO VEER INTO THE WIND (OR WEST OF CENTERLINE) WITH APPROXIMATELY 1,300 FEET OF RUNWAY REMAINING. EVIDENCE OF UNEQUAL BRAKING BEGAN AT APPROXIMATELY 2,400 FEET INTO THE TAKEOFF RUN (2-3 SECONDS AFTER REJECT DECISION) OR APPROXIMATELY 900 FEET REMAINING. ANALYSIS OF PILOT OPERATING HANDBOOK (POH) PERFORMANCE DATA REVEALS THE AIRCRAFT MAY BE STOPPED IN APPROXIMATELY 600 FEET GIVEN AVERAGE PILOT TECHNIQUE AND UTILIZING THE CORRECT REJECT TAKEOFF PROCEDURES. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, THE PILOT STATED THE AIRCRAFT ACHIEVED NORMAL, SYMMETRICAL TAKEOFF POWER PRIOR TO BRAKE RELEASE. THE AIRCRAFT CONSISTENTLY TRACKED THE CENTERLINE DURING THE FIRST 1000 FT. OF TAKEOFF ROLL. THE PILOT STATED HE DID NOT EXPERIENCE A "DRAGGING BRAKE" OR ANY UNUSUAL RUDDER FORCES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE RUNWAY CENTERLINE WITH A MAXIMUM, COMPUTED CROSS-WIND COMPONENT OF 11 KTS. POST ACCIDENT FIELD INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE LEFT MAIN GEAR TIRE ROTATED FREELY ABOUT THE AXLE. UNTIL THE PILOT ELECTED TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF RUN, ONLY MINOR LATERAL DEVIATIONS IN AIRCRAFT TRACK WERE OBSERVED. THE LOSS OF AIRCRAFT CONTROL BECAME EVIDENT SOON AFTER HIS DECISION TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF OR APPROXIMATELY 2000 FT. INTO THE TAKEOFF RUN. (OR 1300 FT. EFFECTIVE DISTANCE REMAINING)THE PILOT STATED HE ATTEMPTED TO LIFT-OFF THE NOSE OF THE AIRCRAFT AFTER ACHIEVING RED LINE OR 100 MPH. POST CRASH FLIGHT CONTROL CONTINUITY TEST WAS CONDUCTED ALONG WITH STAB TRIM OPERATION. THE ELEVATOR TRIM TAB FUNCTIONED NORMALLY WITH NO BINDING DURING FULL TRAVEL CHECKS STOP-TO-STOP. ADDITIONALLY, THE TRIM SETTING WAS FOUND IN THE TAKEOFF BAND AT THE ACCIDENT SCENE. THE EXTERNAL CONTROL LOCK WAS FOUND IN THE NACELLE LOCKER. FURTHERMORE, THE AIRMAN STATED THE CONTROL LOCK HAD BEEN REMOVED PRIOR TO FLIGHT. ADDITIONALLY, THE CG LOADING FOR THE CONDITIONS STATED WAS ACCEPTABLE.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.