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20101220055379I

Incident · Minor damage
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FAA incident report · Embraer-Emp EMB-500 · La Verne, CA · December 20, 2010

FAA Aviation Safety Information Portal

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Date
December 20, 2010 · 15:48 local
Place
La Verne, CA
Airport
Brackett
Phase of flight
Landing: Rollout
Operating rules
Air taxi and commuter (Part 135)
Operator
9SUA
Damage
Minor damage
Aircraft
N574JS
Reported as
Embraer-Emp EMB-500
Reported engine
Pratt & Whitney Canada PW617F-E
People aboard
5
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
0
Pilot’s certificate
Airline transport
Pilot’s flight hours
4,400 total520 in this make and model80 in the last 90 days
N574JSRegistered now · Embraer-Empresa Brasileira De EMB-500S/N 50000046 · Built 2009Airframe modelEmbraer-Empresa Brasileira De EMB-500Engine modelPratt & Whitney Canada PW617F-ETurbo-fan

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

This investigation has determined at the time of the incident no mechanical irregularities, or aircraft components contributed to the incident. The flight crew landed the aircraft with not enough available runway considering the runway was wet and not grooved. Sections of the operators gom and AFM indicated the flight crew must use landing distances corrected for contaminated surfaces. The standing water corrected landing distance is based on the un-factored landing distance for a dry runway. The crew must then calculate the additional distance for the regulatory requirement. The available runway distance at kpoc for the day of the incident would not be enough according to the performance data for the aircraft. Pilot states approach, touchdown were normal. When brakes were applied, no action was noted. Pilot switched to emergency brakes and again, no braking action was available. Aircraft departed the end of the runway, hit two runway lights, and proceeded approximately 200 yards through mud until aircraft came to a stop.

As the FAA filed it

THIS INVESTIGATION HAS DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT NO MECHANICAL IRREGULARITIES, OR AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT. THE FLIGHT CREW LANDED THE AIRCRAFT WITH NOT ENOUGH AVAILABLE RUNWAY CONSIDERING THE RUNWAY WAS WET AND NOT GROOVED. SECTIONS OF THE OPERATORS GOM AND AFM INDICATED THE FLIGHT CREW MUST USE LANDING DISTANCES CORRECTED FOR CONTAMINATED SURFACES. THE STANDING WATER CORRECTED LANDING DISTANCE IS BASED ON THE UN-FACTORED LANDING DISTANCE FOR A DRY RUNWAY. THE CREW MUST THEN CALCULATE THE ADDITIONAL DISTANCE FOR THE REGULATORY REQUIREMENT.THE AVAILABLE RUNWAY DISTANCE AT KPOC FOR THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH ACCORDING TO THE PERFORMANCE DATA FOR THE AIRCRAFT.PILOT STATES APPROACH, TOUCHDOWN WERE NORMAL. WHEN BRAKES WERE APPLIED, NO ACTION WAS NOTED. PILOT SWITCHED TO EMERGENCY BRAKES AND AGAIN, NO BRAKING ACTION WAS AVAILABLE. AIRCRAFT DEPARTED THE END OF THE RUNWAY, HIT TWO RUNWAY LIGHTS, AND PROCEEDED APPROXIMATELY 200 YARDS THROUGH MUD UNTIL AIRCRAFT CAME TO A STOP.