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20111020025619I

Incident · No damage
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FAA incident report · Embraer-Empresa Brasileira De ERJ 170-200 LR · Hillsborough, NJ · October 20, 2011

FAA Aviation Safety Information Portal

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Date
October 20, 2011 · 10:22 local
Place
Hillsborough, NJ
Phase of flight
Takeoff: Climb Out
Operating rules
Air carrier (Part 121)
Operator
UHLA
Damage
No damage
Aircraft
N213JQ
Reported as
Embraer-Empresa Brasileira De ERJ 170-200 LR
Reported engine
GE CF34-8E5
People aboard
69
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
0
N213JQRegistered now · Embraer-Empresa Brasileira De ERJ 170-200 LRS/N 17000265 · Built 2008Airframe modelEmbraer-Empresa Brasileira De ERJ 170-200 LREngine modelGE CF34-8E5Turbo-fan

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

The root cause of this incident resulting in an aircraft route deviation (with no loss of separation) was the flightcrew's inability to identify and to fly the revised high altitude jet airway routing that became effective on the date of this incident. The flightcrew referred to a current, but incorrect navigation chart produced by jeppessen and provided by the company as primary for navigation. This charting error combined with the aircraft's flight management system (FMS) deferral did not provide the flightcrew an opportunity to accurately identify the redefined jet airway and subsequently navigate along the cleared route. If the FMS had been usable on the date of the incident, the valid electronic database would have provided the flightcrew with the correct airway routing and subsequently allowed the crew to navigate along the redefined jet airway. Furthermore, eventhough the flightcrew followed stated procedures pertaining to MEL provisions for this deferral, MEL provisions as currently written are inadequate to prevent recurrence of a similar incident. Therefore, the company is currently evaluating both dispatch system / MEL provisions for risk identification and mitigation.

As the FAA filed it

THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT RESULTING IN AN AIRCRAFT ROUTE DEVIATION (WITH NO LOSS OF SEPARATION) WAS THE FLIGHTCREW'S INABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND TO FLY THE REVISED HIGH ALTITUDE JET AIRWAY ROUTING THAT BECAME EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF THIS INCIDENT. THE FLIGHTCREW REFERRED TO A CURRENT, BUT INCORRECT NAVIGATION CHART PRODUCED BY JEPPESSEN AND PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY AS PRIMARY FOR NAVIGATION.THIS CHARTING ERROR COMBINED WITH THE AIRCRAFT'S FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (FMS) DEFERRAL DID NOT PROVIDE THE FLIGHTCREW AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACCURATELY IDENTIFY THE REDEFINED JET AIRWAY AND SUBSEQUENTLY NAVIGATE ALONG THE CLEARED ROUTE. IF THE FMS HAD BEEN USABLE ON THE DATE OF THE INCIDENT, THE VALID ELECTRONIC DATABASE WOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE FLIGHTCREW WITH THE CORRECT AIRWAY ROUTING AND SUBSEQUENTLY ALLOWED THE CREW TO NAVIGATE ALONG THE REDEFINED JET AIRWAY. FURTHERMORE, EVENTHOUGH THE FLIGHTCREW FOLLOWED STATED PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO MEL PROVISIONS FOR THIS DEFERRAL, MEL PROVISIONS AS CURRENTLY WRITTEN ARE INADEQUATE TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF A SIMILAR INCIDENT. THEREFORE, THE COMPANY IS CURRENTLY EVALUATING BOTH DISPATCH SYSTEM / MEL PROVISIONS FOR RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION.