What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
Pilot stated that while conducting a pass heading north on runway 35 at approximately 50' AGL, he initiated a climbing right hand turn at a bank angle of between 45 and 60 degrees in which he intended to land following completion of the turn. Pilot stated that while during the turn, he experienced a control lockup of the cyclic and collective controls. Pilot stated he was not sure if the tail rotor pedals were functioning at the time. Pilot stated that he tried to select emergency hydraulics, but hit the ground before he could accomplish this. Following this, inspectors from the scottsdale FSDO visited the accident site. Inspectors confirmed that although the flight was part of a television show, no video footage of the accident by the film crews was available. A video of the accident was provided by a person that witnessed the accident. The pilot stated that several "go-pro" video cameras were placed in and on the helicopter, but no cameras were present when inspectors arrived. These cameras could not be located. The accident aircraft was not being used as a camera platform. Investigation of the aircraft showed that the tail rotor was free to rotate and change pitch. Tail rotor drive shaft and push pull tube were sheared apparently from impact when tailboom separated from the aircraft. Could not verify if main rotor was free to rotate or change pitch due to damage to the mast. The aircraft was further examined by inspectors following it being recovered by a local company and taken to the company's storage facility. Inspectors verified that both hydraulic systems appeared to be properly serviced and neither system's bypass indicators showed a bypass condition. Both hydraulic pumps were removed and were verified to turn freely; pump fluid while being turned and each pumps shaft were verified intact. Although the main transmission was damaged, inspectors were able to turn the output shaft that did in fact turn both hydraulic pump drive quills. Inspectors then verified flight control continuity for the tail rotor controls except for the break in the push pull tube that appears to have occurred during the accident impact. The collective and cyclic control continuity was confirmed up to the hydraulic servo inputs except for a broken Bell crank on the collective controls. This break appears to be from an overload condition experienced during the accident impact.a review of aircraft records indicated an un-commanded yaw from the scas occurred on 2-20-12. Record entry stated more data was required and it was transferred to another record but no record correcting or deferring the item was located.
As the FAA filed it
PILOT STATED THAT WHILE CONDUCTING A PASS HEADING NORTH ON RUNWAY 35 AT APPROXIMATELY 50' AGL, HE INITIATED A CLIMBING RIGHT HAND TURN AT A BANK ANGLE OF BETWEEN 45 AND 60 DEGREES IN WHICH HE INTENDED TO LAND FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE TURN. PILOT STATED THAT WHILE DURING THE TURN, HE EXPERIENCED A CONTROL LOCKUP OF THE CYCLIC AND COLLECTIVE CONTROLS. PILOT STATED HE WAS NOT SURE IF THE TAIL ROTOR PEDALS WERE FUNCTIONING AT THE TIME. PILOT STATED THAT HE TRIED TO SELECT EMERGENCY HYDRAULICS, BUT HIT THE GROUND BEFORE HE COULD ACCOMPLISH THIS.FOLLOWING THIS, INSPECTORS FROM THE SCOTTSDALE FSDO VISITED THE ACCIDENT SITE. INSPECTORS CONFIRMED THAT ALTHOUGH THE FLIGHT WAS PART OF A TELEVISION SHOW, NO VIDEO FOOTAGE OF THE ACCIDENT BY THE FILM CREWS WAS AVAILABLE. A VIDEO OF THE ACCIDENT WAS PROVIDED BY A PERSON THAT WITNESSED THE ACCIDENT. THE PILOT STATED THAT SEVERAL "GO-PRO" VIDEO CAMERAS WERE PLACED IN AND ON THE HELICOPTER, BUT NO CAMERAS WERE PRESENT WHEN INSPECTORS ARRIVED. THESE CAMERAS COULD NOT BE LOCATED. THE ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT WAS NOT BEING USED AS A CAMERA PLATFORM. INVESTIGATION OF THE AIRCRAFT SHOWED THAT THE TAIL ROTOR WAS FREE TO ROTATE AND CHANGE PITCH. TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT AND PUSH PULL TUBE WERE SHEARED APPARENTLY FROM IMPACT WHEN TAILBOOM SEPARATED FROM THE AIRCRAFT. COULD NOT VERIFY IF MAIN ROTOR WAS FREE TO ROTATE OR CHANGE PITCH DUE TO DAMAGE TO THE MAST. THE AIRCRAFT WAS FURTHER EXAMINED BY INSPECTORS FOLLOWING IT BEING RECOVERED BY A LOCAL COMPANY AND TAKEN TO THE COMPANY'S STORAGE FACILITY. INSPECTORS VERIFIED THAT BOTH HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS APPEARED TO BE PROPERLY SERVICED AND NEITHER SYSTEM'S BYPASS INDICATORS SHOWED A BYPASS CONDITION. BOTH HYDRAULIC PUMPS WERE REMOVED AND WERE VERIFIED TO TURN FREELY; PUMP FLUID WHILE BEING TURNED AND EACH PUMPS SHAFT WERE VERIFIED INTACT. ALTHOUGH THE MAIN TRANSMISSION WAS DAMAGED, INSPECTORS WERE ABLE TO TURN THE OUTPUT SHAFT THAT DID IN FACT TURN BOTH HYDRAULIC PUMP DRIVE QUILLS. INSPECTORS THEN VERIFIED FLIGHT CONTROL CONTINUITY FOR THE TAIL ROTOR CONTROLS EXCEPT FOR THE BREAK IN THE PUSH PULL TUBE THAT APPEARS TO HAVE OCCURRED DURING THE ACCIDENT IMPACT. THE COLLECTIVE AND CYCLIC CONTROL CONTINUITY WAS CONFIRMED UP TO THE HYDRAULIC SERVO INPUTS EXCEPT FOR A BROKEN BELL CRANK ON THE COLLECTIVE CONTROLS. THIS BREAK APPEARS TO BE FROM AN OVERLOAD CONDITION EXPERIENCED DURING THE ACCIDENT IMPACT.A REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT RECORDS INDICATED AN UN-COMMANDED YAW FROM THE SCAS OCCURRED ON 2-20-12. RECORD ENTRY STATED MORE DATA WAS REQUIRED AND IT WAS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER RECORD BUT NO RECORD CORRECTING OR DEFERRING THE ITEM WAS LOCATED.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.