20130317004719A

Accident · Substantial damage

FAA accident report · Robinson Helicopter R22 Beta · Chino Valley, AZ · March 17, 2013

Date
March 17, 2013 · 17:00 local
Place
Chino Valley, AZ
Phase of flight
Other, Specify
Operating rules
Pilot school (Part 141)
Operator
G30S
Damage
Substantial damage
Aircraft
N223G
NTSB investigation
NTSBWPR13CA155
Reported as
Robinson Helicopter R22 Beta
Reported engine
Lycoming O&VO-360 series
People aboard
1
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
0
Pilot’s certificates
Commercial pilot, flight instructor
Pilot’s flight hours
1,029 total687 in this make and model136 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

From the limitations section model R22 rotorcraft flight manual: flight when surface winds exceed 25 knots, including gusts, is prohibited unless the pilot manipulating the controls has logged 200 or more flight hours in helicopters, at least 50 of which must be in the rhc model R22 helicopter.

From interviews with the pilots involved: instructional flight for a private pilot who was preparing for commercial pilot check ride, departed prc at 1634 local time. The student pilot had 170 hours of rotorcraft flight time, 140 hours of which was in the R-22. The weather information that the pilots said they had from ATIS and prc tower, included winds at 280 degrees @ 17 gusting to 24. (METAR indicated wind gusts to 27) the student began a pinnacle approach by completing one orbit. At about 300 feet out in the horizontal plane and about 100 feet above the intended termination point (landing zone ?lz?), a downdraft was felt by the pilots and the student increased collective control. The flight instructor believed that the student?s application of the collective control had been too aggressive and advised him as such. About 5 to 10 seconds later, at about 100 feet out in the horizontal plane and about 50 feet above the intended termination point, another downdraft was felt by the pilots and again the student increased collective control. The flight instructor believed that the student?s application of the collective control input was excessively aggressive. The rotor RPM dropped and the low rotor speed warning annunciated. The flight instructor took the controls and initiated low rotor RPM procedures. The aircraft contacted the ground short of the intended termination point on a sloped rocky surface and then immediately rose up while yawing approximately 90-110 degrees to the right. Aircraft control was regained with the helicopter?s left skid contacting the slope, perpendicularly to it. The flight instructor held the aircraft against the slope, ensured that the rotor RPM was in the normal operating range (101-104%), and then flew the helicopter to a suitable landing spot adjacent to the pinnacle. The flight instructor inspected the helicopter and found a crease on the lower right side of the tail boom just aft of its mounting point.

From inspection of the helicopter at the site of the accident: there was a buckling of the tail boom aligned with the lower right attachment bracket and starting at the edge of the doubled for that bracket. The buckling is 6.15 inches long (from the 3:30 position to the 5:30 position), 3.8 inches wide (at the widest point), and 0.885 inches deep (at the deepest point). The right skid was bent vertically in the middle. It was cracked and indented on the underside at the apex of the bend. The arch of the bend was 1 inch at the center and spread over about 4 feet of skid length. The forward inside portion of the left skid had fresh scrape marks.

From inspection of the accident site: there were scraped and overturned rocks where the front of the skids were when the helicopter first contact with the ground. There was a rock with scrape marks on its pointed upper surface where the center of the right skid was when the helicopter first hit the ground. There was disturbed ground where the left, uphill, skid was, when the helicopter contacted the ground the second time.

As the FAA filed it

FROM THE LIMITATIONS SECTION MODEL R22 ROTORCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL: FLIGHT WHEN SURFACE WINDS EXCEED 25 KNOTS, INCLUDING GUSTS, IS PROHIBITED UNLESS THE PILOT MANIPULATING THE CONTROLS HAS LOGGED 200 OR MORE FLIGHT HOURS IN HELICOPTERS, AT LEAST 50 OF WHICH MUST BE IN THE RHC MODEL R22 HELICOPTER.

FROM INTERVIEWS WITH THE PILOTS INVOLVED: INSTRUCTIONAL FLIGHT FOR A PRIVATE PILOT WHO WAS PREPARING FOR COMMERCIAL PILOT CHECK RIDE, DEPARTED PRC AT 1634 LOCAL TIME. THE STUDENT PILOT HAD 170 HOURS OF ROTORCRAFT FLIGHT TIME, 140 HOURS OF WHICH WAS IN THE R-22. THE WEATHER INFORMATION THAT THE PILOTS SAID THEY HAD FROM ATIS AND PRC TOWER, INCLUDED WINDS AT 280 DEGREES @ 17 GUSTING TO 24. (METAR INDICATED WIND GUSTS TO 27) THE STUDENT BEGAN A PINNACLE APPROACH BY COMPLETING ONE ORBIT. AT ABOUT 300 FEET OUT IN THE HORIZONTAL PLANE AND ABOUT 100 FEET ABOVE THE INTENDED TERMINATION POINT (LANDING ZONE ?LZ?), A DOWNDRAFT WAS FELT BY THE PILOTS AND THE STUDENT INCREASED COLLECTIVE CONTROL. THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR BELIEVED THAT THE STUDENT?S APPLICATION OF THE COLLECTIVE CONTROL HAD BEEN TOO AGGRESSIVE AND ADVISED HIM AS SUCH. ABOUT 5 TO 10 SECONDS LATER, AT ABOUT 100 FEET OUT IN THE HORIZONTAL PLANE AND ABOUT 50 FEET ABOVE THE INTENDED TERMINATION POINT, ANOTHER DOWNDRAFT WAS FELT BY THE PILOTS AND AGAIN THE STUDENT INCREASED COLLECTIVE CONTROL. THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR BELIEVED THAT THE STUDENT?S APPLICATION OF THE COLLECTIVE CONTROL INPUT WAS EXCESSIVELY AGGRESSIVE. THE ROTOR RPM DROPPED AND THE LOW ROTOR SPEED WARNING ANNUNCIATED. THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR TOOK THE CONTROLS AND INITIATED LOW ROTOR RPM PROCEDURES. THE AIRCRAFT CONTACTED THE GROUND SHORT OF THE INTENDED TERMINATION POINT ON A SLOPED ROCKY SURFACE AND THEN IMMEDIATELY ROSE UP WHILE YAWING APPROXIMATELY 90-110 DEGREES TO THE RIGHT. AIRCRAFT CONTROL WAS REGAINED WITH THE HELICOPTER?S LEFT SKID CONTACTING THE SLOPE, PERPENDICULARLY TO IT. THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR HELD THE AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE SLOPE, ENSURED THAT THE ROTOR RPM WAS IN THE NORMAL OPERATING RANGE (101-104%), AND THEN FLEW THE HELICOPTER TO A SUITABLE LANDING SPOT ADJACENT TO THE PINNACLE. THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR INSPECTED THE HELICOPTER AND FOUND A CREASE ON THE LOWER RIGHT SIDE OF THE TAIL BOOM JUST AFT OF ITS MOUNTING POINT.

FROM INSPECTION OF THE HELICOPTER AT THE SITE OF THE ACCIDENT: THERE WAS A BUCKLING OF THE TAIL BOOM ALIGNED WITH THE LOWER RIGHT ATTACHMENT BRACKET AND STARTING AT THE EDGE OF THE DOUBLED FOR THAT BRACKET. THE BUCKLING IS 6.15 INCHES LONG (FROM THE 3:30 POSITION TO THE 5:30 POSITION), 3.8 INCHES WIDE (AT THE WIDEST POINT), AND 0.885 INCHES DEEP (AT THE DEEPEST POINT). THE RIGHT SKID WAS BENT VERTICALLY IN THE MIDDLE. IT WAS CRACKED AND INDENTED ON THE UNDERSIDE AT THE APEX OF THE BEND. THE ARCH OF THE BEND WAS 1 INCH AT THE CENTER AND SPREAD OVER ABOUT 4 FEET OF SKID LENGTH. THE FORWARD INSIDE PORTION OF THE LEFT SKID HAD FRESH SCRAPE MARKS.

FROM INSPECTION OF THE ACCIDENT SITE: THERE WERE SCRAPED AND OVERTURNED ROCKS WHERE THE FRONT OF THE SKIDS WERE WHEN THE HELICOPTER FIRST CONTACT WITH THE GROUND. THERE WAS A ROCK WITH SCRAPE MARKS ON ITS POINTED UPPER SURFACE WHERE THE CENTER OF THE RIGHT SKID WAS WHEN THE HELICOPTER FIRST HIT THE GROUND. THERE WAS DISTURBED GROUND WHERE THE LEFT, UPHILL, SKID WAS, WHEN THE HELICOPTER CONTACTED THE GROUND THE SECOND TIME.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.