20140127002939A

The aircraft departed ksac at approximately 0530 local time under instrument flight rules (IFR) in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and climbed to an initial altitude of 5,000 feet MSL. At approximately 0550 the PIC obtained the weather information for KO22 and identified the airport beacon. After visual contact with the airport beacon the crew visually identified the airport by turning on the airport lighting system and then cancelled instrument flight rules (IFR). After cancelling IFR the PIC made a descent to 4,500 MSL. The airport, according to an official print out of the automated weather observation system (AWOS), was reporting more than 10 miles visibility, clear skies, and no wind. The temperature at the time was approximately 4OC with a dew point of -4OC.

The PIC made a left 45 entry to the base leg for a left traffic pattern to runway 35. The PIC and SIC state that they began configuring the aircraft for landing about 5 miles from the airport. The PIC indicated that he called for gear down and full flaps on the base leg, but then stated he requested full flaps on final. The SIC indicated that at approximately 5 miles to the airport the PIC called for the 1st notch of flaps to slow the aircraft down and then requested gear down on the final approach segment of the traffic pattern. Both pilots agree that the landing gear was called to be extended, was extended, and three green lights were illuminated indicating the gear was in fact down and locked. Post-accident pictures also indicate the gear was in the down and locked position. The SIC indicates that his eyes were in the cockpit calling out airspeeds, checking that the aircraft was in landing configuration, and watching the GPS unit for terrain warnings. The PIC indicated during an interview that he was using the vertical approach slope indicator (VASI) initially for guidance but drifted below the glide path and did not correct back up to the glide path. Both pilots agree that the aircraft was operating normally with no discrepancies. Both pilots stated ?the approach and landing felt normal until it wasn?t?. The SIC stated that the landing was firm but ?not a ball buster?, but he would have taken a look around the plane after shutdown.

Hearsay from pilots that live in the area stated that they heard what sounded like a go around prior to the accident. Damage to both propellers, and ground scaring on the runway indicate both engines were producing power. Portions of the propeller tips were found imbedded in the right side of the nose of the aircraft.

Photographs obtained by an outside source, and by iic request, indicate that the aircraft may have impacted the terrain prior to the asphalt of runway 35. Initial touchdown marks on the asphalt were made by the left main landing gear and occurred 100 feet 8 inches short of the runway 35 threshold. The tire mark of the left main was accompanied by a ground scar which appears to be from the left main gear's brake caliper. The left main gear's brake caliper was found fractured and detached from the remainder of the left main gear approximately 173 feet from the ground scar. It appears the left wing tip also left a ground scar in the same vicinity of the initial impact area. The nose wheel and right main gear also left wheel marks in the initial touch down area, however the nose wheel and right main left touchdown marks not usually associated with a normal landing. The right main wheel appears that the wheel twisted at impact with the runway. The nose wheel mark is followed by multiple ground scars, possibly from the fracture of the nose wheel. A post impact fire consumed the fuselage and left wing of the aircraft. The fire started under the left wing and spread via the leaking fuel. The crew noted in interview that when the aircraft came to a stop the fire was isolated under the left wing only. Fire crews did not arrive at the accident until 10 to 15 minutes after the accident occurred